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‘Makings of the self and of the sun’: Modernist Poetics of Climate 
Change 
 
Matthew Griffiths 
 
Abstract 
This thesis aims to formulate a critical methodology and a poetics that engage with climate change. 
It critiques the Romantic and social justice premises of literary ecocriticism, arguing that a 
modernist poetics more capably articulates the complexities exacerbated in anthropogenic climate 
change. Analysing the form of a range of modernist work, I assess its expression of the  
human–climate relations at the root of the planet’s present state, and trace this work’s influence on 
contemporary climate change poetry. 
Ecocriticism’s topical approaches to nature and the environment have been constitutively 
unable to grapple with climate change until the discipline’s recent synthesis of literary theory, and 
the emergence of a ‘material ecocriticism’ informed by developments in environmental sociology, 
ethics and philosophy. Modernist aesthetics has an array of concerns in common with this critical 
thinking on climate change, and the reciprocity of the two prompts my rereading here of key 
modernist texts. T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land is seen to reveal civilisation’s inability to suppress or 
surpass its environment; Wallace Stevens’s opus exposes the necessarily fictive quality of our 
relations with nature; Basil Bunting extends Stevens’s reconsideration of Romanticism with the 
diminishment of selfhood and breakdown of order in his poetry; while David Jones’s The 
Anathemata employs the scope of modernist poetics to understand the prehistoric climate change 
that enabled the emergence of civilisation. 
By being conscious of modernist traditions, new work – as exemplified here by Jorie Graham’s 
Sea Change – acknowledges the role of human culture in creating the world imaginatively and 
phenomenally. As contemporary climate change poetry moves away from using culturally familiar 
elegiac modes, it benefits from a fuller range of resources to articulate the entanglement and 
hybridity of nature and culture in the twenty-first century. 
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Introduction 
Climate changes everything 
 
In 2009, as his term as UK poet laureate ended, Andrew Motion was asked to write a piece that 
would feature in The Guardian Review, among commissions from other writers, ‘To support the 
launch of the 10:10 campaign to reduce carbon emissions’ (Guardian 26 Sept. 2009). The poem 
would also be set to music by Peter Maxwell Davies for the University of Cambridge. Motion 
composed a five-sonnet sequence entitled ‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’, addressing the theme of climate 
change.  
The first sonnet begins with the narrator explicitly locating himself in time and place: ‘Midnight 
and midsummer in London. / I … stand in my quarter-acre of garden’ (Motion 1.1–3). In contrast 
to the global scale and upheaval with which we might associate climate change, the opening line is 
still and verbless, fixing a moment in time. As the poem progresses, the narrator acknowledges that 
he cannot remain in his pastoral vantage point, a small (‘quarter-acre’) green space in the 
encroaching metropolis. Although he seeks the solace also sought in Andrew Marvell’s ‘The 
Garden’, the phrase ‘at my back the spacious mulberry tree’ (1.9) more clearly alludes to Marvell’s 
‘To His Coy Mistress’, whose narrator declares: ‘At my back, I always hear / Time’s wingèd chariot 
hurrying near’ (Complete Poems 51; lines 21–2). Motion’s allusion sets up a tension between stillness 
and change. Whether we interpret his phrase ‘what passes for its [the earth’s] sleep’ (1.5) as 
referring to the busyness of nocturnal London or to the continuation of natural processes while 
many of the city’s inhabitants are in bed, or as a metapoetic recognition that likening night to 
human sleep is a fictive, anthropomorphic device, it emphasises the provisional quality of that 
original calm. Yet the narrator strives to remain in the green eye of an urban storm, and effects a 
separation between himself and nature at the end of the first sonnet: ‘the dark earth wakes and I 
look on’ (1.14), he remarks, putting himself in the position of a privileged spectator.  
Despite the tension between rest and restlessness in the first sonnet, the poem is grounded in 
the narratorial backyard. The strategic advantage of creating a lyric persona and an everyday 
environment is to engage the reader in familiar, shared experience. However, introducing climate 
change then presents a challenge. Where and how do we experience it in this domestic milieu? 
Motion progresses outwards from his seclusion by attending to ‘the sour music of traffic cruising 
close’ (2.3), a banal juxtaposition of solitude with engine noise, and of the relatively natural garden 
with the automobile as a totem of pollution. The cars are at least kept at a distance, ‘close’ but 
outside the garden. To cover any further ground, the narrator has to be ‘swept on a breeze / which 
was […] pure and simple once’, and which ‘carries and scatters [him] / over the polar cap’ (2.4–5; 
7–8). Again, he attempts to put distance between the lyric clarity of this vision and the pollution he 
witnesses, although the distinction is not now geographical but temporal, and thus nostalgic – the 
breeze was ‘pure and simple once’ (my italics). A vision of Nature, in its common usage to mean the 
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wild or green world, is associated with the narrator’s sense of self in space in his garden (in the first 
sonnet), and then at some unspecified point in time when the wind was unpolluted (in the second). 
Now apparently scattered, his self still commands an integrated voice, and he remains the distanced 
observer who ‘looks on’ as he did in the first sonnet. A tone of pastoral retreat and pleasure 
informs the sequence’s view of “green” nature in the garden, and the polar ice: ‘every luminous, 
upside-down meadow stitched / with gorgeous frost-flowers and icicle grass’ (2.9–10). By 
assimilating this imagery to the English literary tradition, Motion makes it doubly familiar, because 
we already recognise the ‘snapped-off sea-ice’ (2.8) and the ‘rising tides overflowing their slack 
estuaries and river basins’ later in the sequence (4.9) as tropes of climate change, thanks to a 
quarter-century of news reports and natural history documentaries. Motion’s reference to ‘the 
already famously lonely polar bear’ (4.12) is half-hearted, then, both as a recognition and an 
enactment of the compassion fatigue engendered by news media climate imagery.  
Motion’s vision of an untouched polar region is elaborated in the second sonnet: ‘three 
thousand years have worked through / and sculpted [it] in silence’ (2.11–12). The ice here 
represents a work of art three millennia in the making, and the present state of affairs is putting it in 
jeopardy. The conceit supposes a preceding continuity in the order of nature to distinguish 
contemporary climate change. The invocation of a three-thousand-year period, which accounts for 
a substantial part of the history of human civilisation, gives this vision some weight. However, it 
has to be scaled to civilisation to do so. In A Cultural History of Climate (2010), Wolfgang Behringer 
notes that ‘there has been no permanent ice during 95 per cent of the earth’s history. Statistically, 
warm periods are the characteristic climate of our planet’ (20). Motion’s ‘three thousand years’ is a 
much shorter period of time, corresponding roughly with Behringer’s observation that ‘The long 
warm and dry period of the Bronze Age gave way around 800 BC – roughly 2,800 years ago – to 
the cooler climate of the (“post-warming”) Subatlantic Age’ (58; author’s italics). Nevertheless, 
Motion tacitly valorises the formation of ice by likening it to a work of art (‘sculpted’) and hinting at 
its seclusion and remoteness (‘silence’). The apparent longevity of arctic ice is given human value; 
but without that it has no claim on permanence. Motion attempts to shift this human focus, or 
anthropocentricity, towards the end of the fifth sonnet, where he recognises that it is impossible to 
enclose domestic space apart from the rest of the world: he moves ‘quickly over the threshold’ back 
into the house, but ‘one look is enough to show the bare horizon behind’ (5.12–13). The door 
between the human province and the world is open and cannot be completely shut. But this still 
maintains a distance between himself and the ‘bare horizon’, which replicates the earlier distance 
between London and the pole, suggesting that climate change is more accessible at the latter 
location than the former. 
Motion’s poem raises some of the key issues surrounding poetic engagements, or attempts at 
engagement, with climate change. For instance, his laureateship indicates an institutional orthodoxy 
about the need to approach climate change as a public issue, the commission emphasising the role 
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of the sequence as an act of bearing witness. In an interview with Richard Eden in the Telegraph (2 
May 2009), Motion alludes to this function, declaring: ‘To me, climate change is so bleeding 
obvious. Anyone who thinks it’s not happening should get outside more’. But in ‘The Sorcerer’s 
Mirror’ the narrator only advances as far as his back garden; it takes an imaginative projection to 
the pole to “see” climate change happening. To ‘get outside’ would only work if we could go to the 
calving face of the ice itself. This contrast attests to the difficulty of bearing witness to something 
that is not within the purview of sense experience. The strain of trying to reconcile local and polar 
is further complicated by Motion’s choice of mode. I have already suggested that the sequence 
begins in a pastoral vein, and draws straightforward contrasts between a mythical natural purity and 
current trends. His Telegraph interview makes the choice of mode explicit: ‘I’ve written a lament 
about it [climate change] which has the air of a call to arms’. The movement from ‘lament’ to ‘arms’ 
figures a process whereby poetic elegy is designed to inspire a presumed reader or audience 
politically, and this imposes further interpretative frames on the sequence.  
I read ‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’ here as typical of certain strains of environmentalist discourse, and 
in particular of climate change poetry. I will be discussing other examples of both kinds as this 
thesis progresses, with an analysis of selected contemporary poems in the final chapter. As a 
representative example, though, Motion’s sequence allows me to pose some key questions. What, 
for example, are we lamenting as the climate changes? Can a poem, whether or not it is explicitly 
about climate change, spur us into political action? Would that assumption suggest that the climate 
changes only as a result of our conscious, intentional actions, and that by changing our intentions 
we can prevent further climate change? Does such action depend on personal epiphanies such as 
Motion’s being ‘reflected back at [him]self, crouched like a guilty thing’ in his French windows (5. 
11)? These invite further, broader questions. How is climate change constituted as a political issue, 
a media topic, or an atmospheric and oceanic phenomenon? Does it consist in the opposition of 
certain tropes of environmentalist invective like ‘the sour music of traffic’ and ‘the miserable sky-
litter / of planes circling in their stack’ (2.3; 3.5–6) with others like polar bears and icecaps? Does 
poetry about climate change belong in the tradition of the pastoral or the elegy? Does it demand a 
moralistic tone? What do these formal considerations of the poetry suggest about climate change, 
and our engagement with it? And what alternative models or approaches might there be? 
In this thesis, I will critically examine these questions and their implications, with the aim of 
formulating a poetics of climate change. In so doing, I will work in the field of environmental 
literary criticism, more commonly referred to as ecocriticism. This discipline has, like ‘The 
Sorcerer’s Mirror’, also sought to situate itself within a tradition. Just as Motion’s sequence is 
informed by pastoral and elegiac modes, critical and cultural traditions of nature have commonly 
been the starting point for “green” critics as they establish the relevance of environmental concerns 
to literary studies. Similarly, where Motion’s response to climate change is a putative ‘call to arms’, 
ecocriticism does not regard the subject of nature dispassionately but with a proselytising bent; it 
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has therefore aligned itself with, and borrowed from, the projects of feminist, postcolonial and 
Marxist criticism, seeking to reclaim marginalised canons of nature and environmental writing, as 
well as reviving interest in Romantic and Transcendentalist literature.  
Yet recourse to the archive, whether literary or critical, will not in itself suffice to galvanise the 
thinking that is crucial to engaging with contemporary climate change. I contend that climate 
change represents a novel category of problem, in which realms conventionally inscribed as 
“human” and “natural” are mutually compromised. A fully developed climate change criticism 
should attend to the particularities and praxis of literary style – its poetics – to consider how these 
operate in the effort to represent, and thus prevent or mitigate, dangerous global warming. This 
criticism can also examine traditions of writing to see what cultural resources or modes might be 
deployed in the literature of climate change. One quality of this critical method will be the 
recognition that, given human implication in the emergence of contemporary climate change, we 
cannot limit the focus of interest to texts that address nature alone – certainly not the nostalgic, 
pastoral species of “Nature” that is favoured by Motion and early ecocriticism.1 Indeed, if a  
climate-inflected approach to literature is to have critical validity, it should also be applicable to 
works that, paradoxically, are not even concerned with climate change, because it is through far 
more than our direct engagements with the world that we have an effect on the climate.  
When ecocriticism took shape in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was motivated by emerging 
environmental concerns, but nonetheless chiefly occupied with nature as a topic in literature. 
Artificial – that is, anthropogenic – climate change did not figure largely in its considerations of 
Wordsworth or Thoreau, yet the issue was making its presence felt on the political and cultural 
agendas at the time. The subsequent twenty-five years have only increased our understanding of the 
character and magnitude of the threat that climate change poses, yet ecocriticism has struggled to 
get to grips with it. This comparative neglect is evident, for instance, from a search for articles 
mentioning ‘global warming’ or ‘climate change’ in the MLA Bibliography;2 this returns, 
respectively, forty-one and eighty-eight results. Citations for the former begin in the mid-1990s, 
though all but two are from the twenty-first century, and fifteen date from 2010 or later – that is, 
the time in which this thesis was researched and written. Citations for the latter term begin a little 
earlier, though fully eighty-three of the entries are from the twenty-first century and fifty-seven of 
these from 2010 or after. In contrast, a search for the term ‘wilderness’, a key term totemic in early 
ecocriticism, offers 1,213 pieces.3 A similar basic keyword search of articles in the twenty-year 
archives of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and the Environment (ISLE) yields eighty-five citations 
for ‘global warming’ and ninety-four for ‘climate change’. A search on ‘wilderness’ gives 656 
                                                          
1
 I will define in greater detail my understanding of nature in my first chapter; however, when I invoke an uninterrogated 
nostalgic, green vision of the term, I will use the capital-N form, “Nature”, as here. 
2
 Carried out via http://web.ebscohost.com on 16 July 2013; these have increased from nineteen and twenty-six 
respectively at the time of a similar initial search, 10 March 2010, making a doubling in references to the first and a 
more than threefold increase in references to the latter. 
3
 Up from 1,014 in March 2010. 
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citations.4 That is not necessarily to say that climate change is a low priority in the journal – after all, 
‘ozone layer’ only offers eleven results and ‘biodiversity loss’ five – and citations are certainly more 
frequent in twenty-first-century editions. Likewise, results will be skewed by the fact that the 
phrases ‘global warming’ and ‘climate change’ have only been in popular usage for two decades or 
so, whereas ‘wilderness’ has a much longer pedigree.5  
These citations include book reviews, creative work and considerations of other media such as 
film, so literary criticism represents a more limited selection among them. Still fewer address my 
particular focus on poetry and climate change. One piece among the ISLE citations of ‘global 
warming’ is useful in this regard, even if by invoking climate change it specifically rules out 
considering it. In ‘Renaissance Literature and Our Contemporary Attitude toward Global Warming’ 
(2009), Ken Hiltner asks:  
 
How do we live without burning the fossil fuels that we know are wreaking havoc, not only with 
the environment (in particular the atmosphere), but with our very life and health, when the 
energy that they supply is paradoxically essential for that life and health? This is certainly a 
question that I am in no position to answer (433).  
 
Hiltner recognises that, unlike Motion, we cannot put physical distance between ourselves and 
climate change, because our daily practices are entangled with it. Like Hiltner, I would acknowledge 
the difficulty of this paradox, but it is one of the challenges to thought that climate change presents. 
This thesis will attempt to articulate a fuller range of problems than Hiltner does, and propose 
some potential responses. 
In the first chapter, I will survey the emergence and directions of first- and second-wave 
ecocriticism, demonstrating where these limit our ability to think about climate change, but also 
pursuing the potential that they exhibit. This survey will more fully illustrate the tendency for 
ecocriticism to neglect climate change, as well as the more recent increase in interest. That interest 
is marked by the emergence of a putative “material ecocriticism”, which seeks to position 
intentional human agency within the much larger network of forces responsible for shaping our 
world, as well as by a greater ecocritical willingness to engage with literary theory. I will also be 
informed in my analysis by environmental philosophy, science studies, risk sociology and other 
relevant fields of study. The chapter will close with a comparison of two prose pieces on climate 
change, exemplifying different strands of thought.  
In my second chapter, I will consider modernist poetry as an alternative subject of ecocritical 
attention, it having been largely neglected in the field in favour of texts that make nature or 
environmental concerns their topic. My thesis is that modernist poetics engages with the kinds of 
                                                          
4
 Via http://oxfordjournals.org accessed 16 July 2013; this is up from sixty-five, fifty-four and 564 respectively at the time 
of the last search on 12 August 2010. 
5
 The OED’s first citation for ‘global warming’ is 1952, and for ‘climate change’, as a prospect in the present rather than 
prehistorically, is 1957. Citations for ‘wilderness’ go back to the thirteenth century (www.oed.com, last accessed 25 
February 2013). 
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complexity and difficulty that persist and are exacerbated in contemporary climate change. As such, 
I will concentrate on modernist work as a model of formal innovation, reading it as an interrogation 
of ecocritical premises, rather than in terms of its already extensively discussed cultural history. 
Modernist poetry offers scope to implement many of the theoretical assertions of material 
ecocriticism, for instance, which in turn illuminate as yet unconsidered aspects of the work. 
Through my examination of modernist literary aesthetics, I will set out an alternative ecopoetics for 
our changing climate, and use this to reread a key canonical text of modernism, T. S. Eliot’s The 
Waste Land. In three subsequent chapters, I will develop this through reconsideration of work by 
other poets of the modernist era, Wallace Stevens, Basil Bunting and David Jones, to extend my 
critique and to offer new critical reflections on their writing. A sixth and final chapter will return to 
the contemporary poetry of climate change, considering a selection of examples in both lyrical and 
neo-modernist modes. My conclusion will then propose a poetics of climate change based on this 
analysis. My research aims to situate the practice of poetry materially, intellectually and aesthetically 
within the context of the global climate, while making a critical contribution to both ecocriticism 
and modernist studies. I shall articulate the value of poetry as a method for encountering and 
experiencing the world, a way of knowing that can offer fresh insights into the phenomena and 
discourses of climate change. 
 
A note on terminology 
I have already mentioned a distinction between “nature” and “Nature”, and I will expand on my 
definitions (p.14, n.1, above) during the course of the thesis.6 Throughout, I largely employ the 
term “climate change” to signify the network of phenomena that are of concern. Those phenomena 
are both human – cultural, economic, industrial, agricultural – and biophysical – atmospheric, 
oceanic, solar, botanical and so on. I therefore refer repeatedly to the “phenomena” rather than 
“phenomenon” of climate change. I also endeavour for consistency in using the term “climate 
change”, and in contrast only refer to “global warming” where meaning demands the distinction 
between increasing average terrestrial temperatures and other effects of the changing climate – 
polar ice loss, species migration or extinction, seasonal shift and so on. This is in accordance with a 
distinction that Lorraine Whitmarsh explains in her 2009 survey of public understanding of the two 
terms: 
 
Since the 1980s, the term ‘global warming’ has been commonly used to describe the impact on 
climate of increased levels of greenhouse gases linked to human activities. While the ‘warming’ 
metaphor may have been effective in capturing the public’s imagination about this global risk, it 
obscures the complex and potentially devastating range of effects resulting from what is more 
commonly referred to amongst scientists as the ‘enhanced greenhouse effect’ or ‘climate change’ 
(403).7  
                                                          
6
 Terms such as these under general discussion are signalled by double quotation marks, to differentiate them from 
direct quotations in single quotation marks. 
7
 Whitmarsh cites John Houghton’s Global Warming: The Complete Briefing for the ‘enhanced greenhouse effect’. 
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Nevertheless, given the necessity of  regular references to “climate change”, I may use “global 
warming” as a synonym in places to ease the burden of  repetition on the reader. 
Whitmarsh’s mention of  ‘increased levels of  greenhouse gases linked to human activities’ also 
prompts me to declare my understanding that contemporary climate change is, to a greater or lesser 
extent, a result of  human-generated emissions. Such an understanding is not uncontroversial, but is 
overwhelmingly dominant among the scientific community. In the study ‘Quantifying the 
Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the Scientific Literature’ (2013), Cook et al. 
examine 11,944 abstracts of articles on global climate change or global warming over a period of 
two decades, and report that ‘Among abstracts expressing a position on AGW [anthropogenic 
global warming], 97.1% endorsed the consensus position that humans are causing global warming’. 
The analysis was refined by inviting authors of neutral papers to rate their positions, and the 
authors conclude ‘that the number of papers rejecting the consensus on AGW is a vanishingly small 
proportion of the published research’ (Cook et al. 1). 
In this thesis, I share Dipesh Chakrabarty’s position in ‘The Climate of History’ (2009) that, not 
being scientists, we can still ‘make a fundamental assumption about the science of  climate change’, 
that it is ‘right in its broad outlines’ (200). I proceed on the basis that contemporary climate change 
has been and will continue to be anthropogenic. However, with the understanding that climate has 
changed on numerous occasions throughout the earth’s existence, I intend my discussion to have 
some wider relevance, in addition to its contemporary urgency. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Houghton writes that the ‘increased amount of carbon dioxide is leading to global warming of the Earth’s surface 
because of its enhanced greenhouse effect’ (29). 
 
Chapter 1 
Green sees things in waves: Cyclic ecocriticism and climate disruption 
 
If we consider the changing climate as something happening solely in an entity called “the 
environment”, which exists around rather than entangled with human culture, then we overlook the 
continual complexities of our relationship with climate. Whether or not we subscribe to the view 
that contemporary climate change is human-induced, our existence qua culture is contingent on the 
climate, and always has been. This means that an attempt to pigeonhole climate change as an 
“environmental” issue is impossible: the fact that the discourse of climate change is still current a 
quarter of a century after it entered the public consciousness reflects that the phenomena cannot be 
successfully categorised and legislated. The geographer Mike Hulme recognises this in Why We 
Disagree About Climate Change (2009) when he says that climate change ‘has moved from being 
predominantly a physical phenomenon to being simultaneously a social phenomenon’ (xxv). To 
assess the complexity of these socio-physical phenomena for culture, my first chapter will review 
key critical approaches to what is variously called “the environment”, “ecology” or “nature”, and 
see how a topical definition of the “environment” might predispose these approaches to consider 
climate change in a particular, and often reductive, fashion.  
As the field of environmental literary criticism, or ecocriticism, develops over the past few 
decades, it more or less consciously models itself on other politically informed critiques such as 
feminism or postcolonialism. However, the traditional characterisation of “nature” in the first wave 
of ecocriticism, and the more explicit alignment of environmentalism with the social justice agenda 
in the second,1 foster a vision of human relations with the world that hampers the potential for 
literary engagement with climate change. After reflecting on these, I will consider indications of 
emergent theory that reads from rather than towards climate change. I will conclude the chapter with 
an analysis of some typical accounts of climate change from the literature. In this way, I intend to 
articulate the key problems that climate change presents for conventional understandings of 
“nature” and even “the environment”, and in particular for literary critical approaches. This will 
prepare us for subsequent chapters’ exploration of modernist poetics as an alternative way of 
engaging with this complexity, in a nuanced and more sophisticated fashion. 
 
Back to nature: First-wave ecocriticism 
Although the term ‘ecocriticism’ is coined in 1978 by William Rueckert in the title of his essay 
‘Literature and Ecology: An Experiment in Ecocriticism’, his focus is on ‘applying ecological 
concepts to the reading, teaching, and writing about literature’ (107) and the discipline does not 
assume its more familiar status as a critical field until the last decade of the twentieth century, with 
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 Lawrence Buell defines this first/second wave distinction in 2005’s The Future of Environmental Criticism (17; 21ff). 
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books such as Jonathan Bate’s Romantic Ecology and The Song of the Earth (1991 and 2000) in the UK 
and Lawrence Buell’s The Environmental Imagination (1995) in the USA. This is some time after the 
emergence of politically informed readings of literature such as Marxist or feminist criticism, and 
some time, too, after the beginnings of the modern environmental movement itself in the 1960s 
and 1970s, as Cheryll Glotfelty indicates in 1996:  
 
While related humanities disciplines, like history, philosophy, law, sociology, and religion have 
been ‘greening’ since the 1970s, literary studies have apparently remained untinted by 
environmental concerns. And while social movements, like the civil rights and women’s 
liberation movements of the sixties and seventies, have transformed literary studies, it would 
appear that the environmental movement of the same era has had little impact (‘Literary Studies 
in an Age of Environmental Crisis’ xvi).  
 
As a result, once environmental issues are back on the agenda in the late 1980s and early 1990s,2 
green-thinking scholars of literature feel they have some catching up to do. Glotfelty argues that the 
recovery of Rueckert’s term ‘ecocriticism’ for the movement is essential in this effort. 
In The Environmental Imagination, Lawrence Buell imagines the work of environmental criticism 
not just as a parallel to but a radical development of the examination of cultural difference through 
literature, as postcolonial or feminist critics have undertaken. In comparison to these, he claims, ‘by 
far the single most significant aspect of cultural difference with which we shall have to reckon 
pertains neither to ethnicity nor to gender but to anthropocentrism’ (20). By ‘anthropocentrism’, 
Buell refers to the practice of making humans the focal point of writing and thought, and thus 
placing the nonhuman in a secondary role.3 The other movements to which Buell alludes have 
made an impact by both reconsidering the canon from their distinctive viewpoints and recovering 
the work of marginalised writers for literary study, an endeavour that thus seems to inspire Buell ‘to 
take stock of the resources within our traditions of thought that might help address’ the 
anthropocentrism he perceives, to ‘arrive at a more ecocentric state of thinking than western culture 
now sustains’ (21). In this, however, there is a double movement: into the stock of our ‘traditions of 
thought’, in the past, to ‘arrive’ at a point in a more ecocentric future. 
Buell is by no means unique in positioning environmental understanding in a longer cultural 
heritage. In Ecopoetry: A Critical Introduction (2002), J. Scott Bryson defines the titular genre as ‘a 
subset of nature poetry that, while adhering to certain conventions of romanticism, also advances 
beyond that tradition and takes on distinctly contemporary problems and issues’ (5).4 John Elder 
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 Hulme refers to the ‘convergence of events, politics, institutional innovations, and the intervention of prominent public 
and charismatic individuals’ on climate change in 1988 (64), for instance; while 1992 saw the UN’s Earth Summit in 
Rio de Janeiro. 
3
 In The Cambridge Introduction to Literature and the Environment (2011), Timothy Clark further distinguishes between 
this tendency, implicitly ‘strong’ anthropocentrism, and a ‘stance […] attempting to identify with all life or a whole 
ecosystem, without giving such privilege to just one species’, which is nevertheless ‘a stance taken by human beings 
and is hence “anthropocentric” in a weak sense’ (3). 
4
 Bryson does not enumerate what these conventions are specifically, but he remarks ‘Although in many ways 
ecopoems fall in line with such canonical nature lyrics as “Contemplations,” “Intimations of Immortality,” and “Ode to a 
Nightingale,” they just as clearly take visible steps beyond that tradition’ (3). In his reading, ecopoetry is a reforming 
rather than a radical genre, emerging from, rather than in reaction to, previous conceptions of nature. 
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also annexes current work to a tradition of thinking about nature in Imagining the Earth (second 
edition, 1996), maintaining that ‘The earth […] awakens culture to its context and counterbalance. 
Today’s poetry of nature is the vehicle by which the cultural tradition at once surrenders and 
resolves itself’ (209) – that is to say, surrenders its anthropocentrism at the same time as entering 
the longer history of writing about nature. Note that for Bryson contemporary work is only a 
‘subset’ of a tradition that it ‘advances’, while Elder’s definition of tradition is acknowledgedly 
partial, in both senses of that word: ‘I have not attempted to explore this process through any 
comprehensive survey of current American poetry. Instead, I have chosen to focus on several 
writers who have been important to my own vision of nature and culture’ (1). Both represent 
conservative revision of literary canons rather than critical engagement with the socio-physical 
phenomena of environment and climate.  
Buell attempts a more systematic, critical approach, however, proposing four criteria for what he 
dubs ‘environmental literature’: 
 
1. The nonhuman environment is present not merely as a framing device but as a presence that begins to suggest 
that human history is implicated in natural history [...]  
2. The human interest is not understood to be the only legitimate interest [...]  
3. Human accountability to the environment is part of the text’s ethical orientation [...]  
4. Some sense of the environment as a process rather than a constant or a given is at least implicit in the text [...] 
      (Environmental 7–8; author’s italics) 
 
This certainly identifies critical focal points outside conventional notions of the aesthetic, and 
outlines a set of cultural concerns distinct from those of other politically engaged accounts of 
literature. However, Buell immediately recognises that ‘By these criteria, few works fail to qualify at 
least marginally, but few qualify unequivocally and consistently’ (8), and decides that Henry David 
Thoreau’s Walden (1854) and other environmental nonfiction best fulfils his requirements. 
Buell’s problem with defining ‘environmental literature’, Elder’s avowedly personal attempt to 
do so (or rather, avoid doing so), and Bryson’s subsuming ‘ecopoetry’ to the nature poetry tradition 
reflect a key question: that is, what pertains to “the environment”? A bigger question that shadows 
this, thanks to its implication in our understanding of the environment, is that of “nature” and how 
to define it. The concept of nature is vital to both Elder’s and Bryson’s positions, for instance. It is 
not without reason that Raymond Williams calls nature ‘perhaps the most complex word in the 
language’ in Keywords, ‘since nature is a word which carries, over a very long period, many of the 
major variations of human thought – often, in any particular use, only implicitly yet with powerful 
effect on the character of the argument’ (219, 224; author’s emphasis).  
 
What we talk about when we talk about “nature” 
One key work that attempts to describe these ‘major variations of human thought’ is Kate Soper’s 
What is Nature? (1995), and her distinction between usages of the word can help clarify what 
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different writers have in mind when they invoke the term. Soper differentiates ‘the “metaphysical”, 
the “realist” and the “lay” (or “surface”) ideas of nature’, elaborating them as follows: 
 
1. Employed as a metaphysical concept […] ‘nature’ is the concept through which humanity 
thinks its difference and its specificity. […] 
2. Employed as a realist concept, ‘nature’ refers to the structures, processes and causal powers 
that are constantly operative within the physical world […] 
3. Employed as a ‘lay’ or ‘surface’ concept, […] ‘nature’ is used in reference to ordinarily 
observable features of the world: […] This is the nature of immediate experience and 
aesthetic appreciation; the nature we have destroyed and polluted and are asked to conserve 
and preserve (155–6). 
 
Although Soper’s first and third definitions will come into play, the second, ‘realist concept’ of 
process is the governing interpretation for this thesis, because climate change shows nature to be 
neither separable from us, as in her first definition, nor consisting entirely in what is ‘observable’, as 
in her third. In Soper’s words, this ‘realist concept’ represents a nature ‘indifferent to our choices, 
[that] will persist in the midst of environmental destruction, and will outlast the death of all 
planetary life’ (159–60). 
In contrast to this indifference stands Elder’s ‘vision of human culture in harmony with the rest 
of the natural order’ (1), which thanks to its distinction between the ‘human’ and ‘the rest’ suggests 
Soper’s first, metaphysical, definition of nature. While the phrase ‘the rest of the natural order’ 
attempts to take account of anthropocentrism by implying that human culture is only one part of 
that order, it betrays a deeper level of anthropocentrism by imagining that the conditions on which 
human culture is contingent are ‘the natural order’ (my italics), when in fact, they merely represent 
the conditions that have obtained for our current interglacial episode, from about 10,000 or 13,000 
years ago (13 kya).5 But in spite of this contingency, both Elder and Buell still frame nature in 
terms indebted to traditional notions of uncultivated sublime and pastoral retreat. For Elder, ‘There 
is a redemption offered to human cycles within the order of natural cycles, an equilibrium as precise 
and comprehensive as an ecosystem’ (82); more specifically and less fancifully, ‘seasonality is also [a] 
bedrock’ for Buell, and ‘in some sense an obstinate objective given’ (242).  
It thus suffices for Buell’s fourth criterion, of ‘process’, to be thought of in the conventional 
sense of cyclical for both critics, although Buell is himself aware that this can have a normative 
value: ‘Because seasonal succession […] has not (yet) been so affected more than marginally [by 
climate change], to take it as a central point of reference is to risk perpetuating an old-fashioned 
picture of nature as a homeostasis that humanity can ignore but not change’ (281). Thinking this 
way attempts to direct us back to a ‘natural order’, reading change as part of regular ongoing 
                                                     
5
 A timespan roughly consistent with Jared Diamond, who in Guns, Germs, and Steel notes that ‘around 11,000 B.C 
[…] corresponds approximately to the beginnings of village life in a few parts of the world, the first undisputed peopling 
of the Americas, the end of the Pleistocene Era and last Ice Age, and the start of what geologists term the Recent Era’ 
(35). As a result of these conditions, Tim Flannery in The Weather Makers explains that ‘agriculture commenced […] 
around 10,500 years ago in the Fertile Crescent’ in what is the present-day Middle East (63). Behringer observes 
‘Only during the Holocene’, beginning around 10 kya, ‘did the environment we now think of as “natural” make its first 
appearance’, and ‘The global warming’ that then occurred ‘is associated with a fundamental shift to culture with more 
diverse and sophisticated features than before’ (42–3). 
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process rather than acknowledging it as a potential rupture. The literary corollary of this is to see 
work ‘adhering to conventions of romanticism’ as Bryson does, when that work might need to 
challenge rather than adhere to or even ‘advance’ such principles. In the light of this conception of 
nature, Buell’s attempt to prescribe what constitutes ‘environmental literature’ is – however broad – 
exclusionary. He has already criticised the ‘acts of compartmentalization’ by which resource-hungry 
western civilisation is ‘sustained’ (4), yet his focus on nonfiction nature writing itself represents an 
act of literary enclosure because it orients ecocriticism solely towards texts that are topically or 
thematically environmental, relating to this particular vision of Nature. 
This self-confirmatory gesture, of defining the environment through environmental literature, 
means that the nature considered by Buell and Elder, while active and dynamic according to a 
pattern, does not have the scope or depth of Soper’s second definition of nature. The practices of 
both critics are in fact closer to Soper’s third, ‘lay’ or ‘surface’ concept of nature we experience 
personally. In Imagining the Earth, Elder includes chapters on his own ‘excursions’ as starting points 
for his literary reflections, because ‘A natural culture is […] a localized culture, in which art and 
tradition develop from a deep familiarity with the beings and cycles of a given place’ (37–8). Buell 
also attests that ‘environmental conscience’ is ‘quickened by a combination of lococentrism and 
local knowledge’ (209), and this idea of emplacement is key to both his critical metric and 
compositional practice. Asking us to imagine him looking up from the writing of the book at ‘the 
grove of second-growth white pines that sway at this moment of writing [...] forty feet from my 
computer screen’ he seeks to affirm the existence of a world beyond the text, in contrast to ‘The 
forest of American scholarship’, which ‘is a forest where treeness matters but the identities and 
material properties of the trees are inconsequential’ (10). His gesture beyond the page becomes 
totemic in ecocriticism for the idea of nature as a simple object of reference, though his trees’ 
materiality fixes that nature in particular entities rather than the ‘process’ of his fourth criterion. 
Some theoretical grappling has therefore been required to take Buell’s co-ordinates of writer and 
world and make them methodologically workable as ecocriticism. 
 
Place, personhood and politics 
Buell and Elder work from personal experiences of nature in particular locations. While Buell goes 
on to acknowledge that ‘art removes itself from nature’, he stresses that ‘from another point of 
view the emphasis on disjunction between text and world seems overblown. To most lay readers, 
nothing seems more obvious than the proposition that literature of a descriptive cast […] portrays 
“reality”, even if imperfectly’ (84). By invocation of the ‘lay’ reader, Buell works within Soper’s 
third definition, that of immediate experience. He does license a certain creativity beyond this, but 
he is careful to charge it with being functional: ‘One has to invent, to extrapolate, to fabricate. Not 
in order to create an alternative reality but to see what without the aid of the imagination isn’t likely 
to be seen at all’ (102). Nevertheless, the imagination is here a projection of the senses, ‘to see’. It 
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corresponds with philosopher David Abram’s assertion that ‘imagination is not a separate mental 
faculty (as we so often assume) but is rather the way the senses themselves have of throwing 
themselves beyond what is immediately given’ (The Spell of the Sensuous 58). Buell’s vision remains 
contingent on an experiencing self who communicates nature’s significance to readers, even when 
that “experience” has to be imagined. 
In an attempt to move beyond this paradigm, Buell identifies an ‘aesthetics of relinquishment’ in 
nonfiction nature writing, ‘the effect [of which] is most fundamentally to raise the question of the 
validity of the self as the primary focalizing device for both writer and reader’ (179). He already 
notes that ‘This prospect can […] be unsettling; the degree zero existence of Wallace Stevens’s 
snow man’, for instance (144). Nevertheless, despite the seeming necessity of this ‘unsettling’ 
quality to the interrogation of selfhood, Buell determines that the aesthetics of relinquishment are a 
generic feature peculiar to nature writing, rather than a criterion for ecocriticism that we might read 
in any other mode, such as modernist poetry. In his remark that the drafts of Walden show 
‘Thoreau undergoing a partly planned, partly fortuitous, always somewhat conflicted odyssey of 
reorientation such as I myself have begun to undergo in recent years, such as it seems American 
culture has been undergoing, such as I am asking the reader to undergo’ (23), Buell makes his own 
self, both as a reader and as a political subject, into a locus from writer to reader, exemplary of what 
he sees as a shift in US society.  
Buell’s motif of looking up from the text during composition at the world is also present in 
Jonathan Bate’s Romantic Ecology (1991), though a comparison with Buell’s view from his window is 
instructive. The ‘leading stories on the evening television news’ are before Bate, or at least in his 
mind’s eye, as he writes, and these cover events in the USSR and newly-unified Germany, as well as 
research ‘that there are links between freak weather conditions and global warming’ (Romantic 1). 
Bate’s anecdote combines observation with politics and the mechanisms by which we bring nature 
into culture, via broadcast media and public debate. Bate also draws the warming globe into his 
literary-critical method, because he sees that its potential disruption of seasonal procession could 
complicate future readings of the Romantics: ‘One effect of global warming will be (is already?) a 
powerful increase in the severity of winds in northern Europe [...] Keats’s ode “To Autumn” is 
predicated upon the certainty of the following spring’s return; the poem will look very different if there 
is soon an autumn when “gathering swallows twitter in the skies” for the last time’ (2).6 Bate opens up 
the possibility of considering a text in undetermined futures – indeed, in undetermined presents, 
given that his hesitancy about whether the wind is already changing signals the fact that we cannot 
gain ready perspective on an environmental shift we might already inhabit. 
The turn from personal to environmental politics is more fully explored in the anecdote with 
which Bate begins his later essay ‘Living with the Weather’.7 Bate’s account is again more markedly 
political than Buell’s, with the recollection that he heard then Labour Party leader Michael Foot 
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 Citing line 33 of Keats’s poem; Major Works 324–5. 
7
 This is later reworked as ‘Major Weather’, Chapter 4 of Bate’s book The Song of the Earth (2000). 
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reciting Byron’s poem ‘Darkness’ at a party conference.8 Foot’s appropriation of the poem as a 
warning about nuclear holocaust prompts Bate to consider politically informed criticism during the 
Cold War. As Buell seeks to move critical debate on from considerations of gender and ethnicity to 
those of the environment, Bate takes Marxist historicist readings of Romanticism as a starting point 
for reconsidering ‘the legacy of romanticism in our age of eco-crisis’ (‘Living’ 435). However, unlike 
Buell, Bate is not seeking to define a particular kind of literature as environmental; rather, he 
reconsiders the field of Romanticism in the light of contemporary concerns. This immediately 
engages his reading of ‘Darkness’ with environmental crisis. He makes the distinction that, whereas 
‘the scholar’s elucidation of sources’ (432) highlights allusion and influence in a text, and a 
politically oriented critic recovers the ‘human agency’ surrounding the poem (437), the 
environmental critic distinctively draws our attention to the atmospheric context of the volcano 
Tambora’s eruption in 1816. Airborne particulates from the volcano contributed to the dreary 
Swiss summer that inspired ‘Darkness’, in addition to the succession of bad harvests that prompted 
Keats to celebrate the return to a successful crop in 1819 with ‘To Autumn’, Bate writes. In this 
respect, he hints at a working ecocritical methodology: he is not looking for texts with the 
environment in them, he is looking at environments with texts in them.  
This reading both plays up its ecological focus, and also, in a scholarly valuable way, recovers 
the natural environment of these poems, giving them a context beyond the sociocultural. Bate thus 
restores agency to nonhuman forces that have been closed down in both literary and political 
analysis, because traditionally ‘The constancy of nature was something against which to measure the 
vicissitudes of culture’ (439), as it remains for Elder. The critical tendency to take nature as read and 
concentrate instead on cultural, human agency inevitably overlooks crucial contexts, particularly 
those which evince that ‘nature is not stable’ (439), such as Tambora’s eruption. Nevertheless, this 
approach doesn’t entirely validate Bate’s claim that ‘Global Warming Criticism is about to be born’ 
(436),9 because it addresses historical environmental conditions, rather than the present-day 
implications of ‘global warming’. Nevertheless, Bate is explicitly attempting what Buell turns away 
from when the latter writes: ‘the psychic health of an individual in a relatively self-contained 
subculture, and the health of that subculture as a whole, can be altered more easily than the rate of 
global CO2 emissions’ (Environmental 295). Buell’s remark recentres the work of his brand of 
ecocriticism in the self, disavowing the possibility of engaging with phenomena on a different scale. 
Defining our engagement with the environment through conventional literary categories such as 
the authorial or lyric self, however, presents a further political quandary on different scales.  
First-wave ecocritics, that is, those who take their reading of nature from Transcendentalist and 
Romantic texts, consciously or not inflect their environmentalism with a kind of rugged 
individualism by dint of the traditions they identify. The remoteness and specificity of Walden 
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 Byron’s poem can be found on pp.272–3 of his Major Works. 
9
 Bate omits reference to this in The Song of the Earth; I have drawn on the essay rather than the book here because of 
this assertion about ‘Global Warming Criticism’. 
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Pond is for Buell representative of the wilderness, but even though this purports to stand outside 
civilisation, Thoreau’s human presence there underscores the ideological implication of that  
self-removal. As William Cronon elaborates, ‘The Trouble with Wilderness’ is that it’s already tied 
up with national myths and is seen as ‘the quintessential location for experiencing what it meant to 
be an American’ (76). He maintains that ‘the concept of wilderness’ is already ‘loaded with some of 
the deepest core values of the culture that created and idealized it’ (73). Canonising texts that 
perpetuate the idea of wilderness just serves to perpetuate a polar opposition of culture and nature. 
Bill McKibben’s remark that ‘The greenhouse effect is the first environmental problem we can’t 
escape by moving to the woods’ (The End of Nature 188) offers a proleptic critique of Thoreau’s 
lionisation by Buell. In more analytical vein, Hulme speaks of the need for new forms of politics to 
respond to climate change because ‘If the atmosphere truly offers no boundaries to the circulation 
of greenhouse gases around the planet then a commensurate global system of climate governance 
must also break down the national and sectarian barriers of traditional forms of governance’ (290). 
Ecocriticism cannot break down these boundaries if it originates in an unchallenged vision of 
untrammelled Nature. 
Bate suggests, however, that it is a pre-condition of our culture that we make such a distinction 
between Nature and culture. He draws on the work of sociologist Bruno Latour to argue that ‘The 
modern Constitution was above all premised on a strict separation between culture and nature’ 
(‘Living’ 439). For Latour, our ‘constitution’ is ‘The common text that defines this understanding 
and this separation’, but on such a foundation We Have Never Been Modern, in the title of his 1993 
book (WHNBM 14). This is because the separation of nature and politics is what paradoxically 
necessitates the creation of ‘hybrids’ between the two categories: ‘All of culture and all of nature get 
churned up again every day’ (2), as we can see in anthropogenic climate change’s blurring of 
conventional notions of distinct natural and human agency. Much of Latour’s work, to which I will 
return throughout this thesis, is concerned with the fallacious separation of science and politics, as 
means of describing and controlling nature and society respectively. Instead, he argues that the two 
are interdependent and that their relationship creates ‘quasi-objects’ (51ff), neither essentialist nor 
constructivist entities. 
Latour maintains in a subsequent work, Politics of Nature, that ‘People have been much too quick 
to believe that it sufficed to recycle the old concepts of nature and politics unchanged, in order to 
establish the rights and manners of a political ecology’, when instead these terms want ‘a 
thoroughgoing rethinking’ (Politics 2). Where politics behaves as though Nature is fundamentally a 
source of truths, and society then uses its observation or derivation of these truths as the basis for 
its decisions, that basis is false. Latour advocates that we instead break down and redistribute 
scientific, social and political functions as a ‘collective’ so that we might conceive of the world in a 
manner fit to deal with anthropogenic environmental change. To acknowledge that change as 
anthropogenic not only undermines the supposed independent, value-neutral certainties of Science 
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as an institution but also explains why our world is now characterised by such uncertainties. As a 
result, Latour’s proposed collective is constitutionally subject to constant revision. He contends that 
‘Politics has to get back to work without the transcendence of nature’ (56; author’s italics), where 
Elder for instance wants to read poetry such as Wordsworth’s for precisely these ‘transcendent 
intimations’ (113). Inasmuch as ecocriticism seeks to be political, it needs to be critical about its 
conception of ‘eco’, and it would do better to consider what ‘we are left with’ after we disavow this 
transcendence, the ‘multiple associations of humans and nonhumans, waiting for their unity to be 
provided by work carried out by the collective’ (Politics 46). This provides the intellectual heft to 
enable us to enact Buell’s critical requirement for texts to exhibit a ‘sense of [humans] being one 
among many actors in a much vaster and complexer habitat’, and ‘to imagine nonhuman agents as 
[our] bona fide partners’ (178; 179). 
 
Repurposing the politics of nature: Second-wave ecocriticism 
In second-wave ecocriticism, the environmental and the cultural, the latter characterised by identity 
politics and social justice, come into closer relation. Writing ten years after The Environmental 
Imagination, Buell explains that ‘For first-wave ecocriticism, “environment” effectively meant 
“natural environment”’, whereas ‘Second-wave ecocriticism has tended to question organicist 
models of conceiving both environment and environmentalism’ and so the field’s ‘traditional 
commitment to the nature protection ethic must be revised to accommodate the claims of 
environmental justice’ (The Future of Environmental Criticism [2005] 21–2). Patrick D. Murphy makes a 
similar critical distinction between nature writing and environmental writing: environmental writing 
unlike nature writing ‘does not stop at describing the natural history of an area, but instead, or in 
addition, discusses the ways in which [...] forms of human intervention have altered the land and 
the environment’ (Farther Afield 5). 
In surveying the writing of environmental crisis, monographs such as Murphy’s Farther Afield 
(2000) and Buell’s own Writing for an Endangered World (2001) not only make this transition from 
nature writing to environmental writing, they are of necessity considering a much wider body of 
work than the Western canon. They thus make good on Buell’s disclaimer in The Environmental 
Imagination that ‘A more radical critic would want to caution to a greater extent than I do against 
relying for intellectual support on the likes of Thoreau and other disaffected westerners’ (22). Karla 
Armbruster and Kathleen R. Wallace’s Beyond Nature Writing (2001) has the subtitled aim of 
Expanding the Boundaries of Ecocriticism, reflecting a growing ‘concern with representing diverse 
cultural viewpoints on nature and the environment’ (3). But given that in 1996 Glotfelty identifies 
ecocriticism as ‘predominantly a white movement. It will become a multi-ethnic movement when 
stronger connections are made between the environment and issues of social justice, and when a 
diversity of voices are encouraged to contribute to the discussion’ (xxv), second-wave ecocriticism 
is simply completing an endeavour proposed in the first.  
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This shift into a more political and cultural context could simply recapitulate the movement of 
literary criticism over the course of the twentieth century, from close assessment of a text’s 
aesthetic merits to more and variously contextualised readings, in the transition from Buell’s 
mimetic standards to the requirements of the reading culture. In so doing, the second wave still 
adheres to the revision and recuperation paradigm pioneered in other politically informed modes of 
reading, where characteristically twentieth-century concerns are used to interrogate the assumptions 
of literary criticism and establish alternative canons. Indeed, Glotfelty explicitly suggests feminist 
literary criticism as a model for three stages of ecocriticism. Specifically, these are to ‘study how 
nature is represented in literature’; to ‘recuperate the hitherto neglected genre of nature writing’ and 
to identify ‘fiction and poetry writers whose work manifests an ecological awareness’; and a 
‘theoretical phase, which is far[-]reaching and complex’ (xxiii–xxiv) – the latter not much in 
evidence in the first or second waves. Timothy Clark summarises the second wave’s developments 
as follows: ‘a previously dominant realist paradigm, that is, reading a text in relation to the ethical 
and cognitive challenge of its rendering of the natural world, is being displaced by a culturalist one, 
that is, reading a text’s stances in terms of the various kinds of cultural identity projected or at issue’ 
(The Cambridge Introduction to Literature and the Environment 93; author’s italics).  
In The Future of Environmental Criticism, Buell seems to regard this expanded vision of ecocriticism 
as sufficient in itself, concluding that ‘to succeed in changing the subject or in changing the archive 
is every bit as important in the evolution of critical inquiry as a revolution in critical theory as such’ 
and ‘It will have been achievement enough if environmentality becomes seen as indispensable to 
how one reads literature’ (130–1). Murphy in contrast asks ‘why should people imagine that [...] 
current ways of organizing academic study are accurate or even adequate to the range of literary 
phenomena […]?’ (63). Syllabus-bound literary criticism limits engagement with environmental 
crisis by charging ecocriticism with reading texts that confirm its interest in environmental crisis – 
the ‘Toxic Discourse’ Buell describes in 2001’s Writing for an Endangered World (30ff) – rather than 
examining the significant implications of anthropogenic environmental change for literary theory 
and practice. Considering how culture deals with climate change, and considering how climate 
change deals with culture, are distinct intellectual activities. 
 
Why nature is not an other 
The tendency for looking at the ‘toxic discourse’ of disempowered groups in some cases results in a 
problematic equivalence between the nonhuman world and marginalised human “others”. Buell 
implies as much when he points out that ‘it is self-evidently more problematic for an ecocritic to 
presume to speak for “nature” than for (say) a black critic to speak for black experience’ (Future 8), 
defining the ecocritical project through its difficulty. However far we personify it, nature is not an 
ostracised “other” within society; neither can we readily adopt the same approaches or goals as have 
lent critical legitimacy to the concerns of “othered” groups. Indeed, Clark remarks that ‘The most 
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controversial political effect of climate change may be its challenge to basic dominant assumptions 
about the nature and seeming self-evident value of “democracy” as the most enlightened way to 
conduct human affairs’, and as such, we face ‘questions about the dominant, liberal/progressive 
cultural politics of much mainstream professional literary criticism’ (‘Scale’ 98, 100). We cannot 
proceed by assimilating ecocriticism to a prevailing culturalist tradition, so we must contrast literary 
environmentalism with other kinds of radical critique.  
Prejudice relating to gender, race, sexuality or class is culturally determined, and therefore the 
recovery of writing representing such individuals or groups or their interests is itself the beginning 
of a culturally promulgated change in prevailing attitudes. In contrast, redressing the  
under-representation of the environment in literary canons in the same way will only begin a 
similarly intrasocial process. Moreover, the narrative of environmental neglect is already well known 
from other media, and the recovery of a literary archive confirming as much is simply to secure the 
stable door after the horse has bolted. As feminism and other socio-political literary-critical agendas 
recover marginalised writers and texts, they engage in effective, political work. When 
environmentalists and ecocritics do the same, they remind us that current environmental change 
comes from long-held attitudes, but they do not undo the emissions that those attitudes have 
enabled. Changing our attitudes towards oppressed social groups, however prevailing orthodoxies 
have characterised them, is entirely within the circle of the human – the anthropocentric or the 
sociocentric. Subsequent scholarship that seeks to redress historic marginalisation can never undo 
past injustice; neither is the work of such cultural critique by any means complete. However, the 
scope of this work as a political project is co-extensive with the potential range of its influence – 
that is to say, its aims and its reach are both within human culture.  
By following this model, ecocriticism imposes a cultural scope on itself, when its ambition 
actually reaches beyond the human world. Even if through a political model of literary criticism we 
seek to promote or alter the sociocultural status and reception of a marginalised population, we 
cannot do so straightforwardly, although we at least have better ways of observing and managing 
our progress towards those goals. This is far less possible with the environment – especially when 
the emergence of anthropogenic climate change reveals that our exploitation of natural resources 
has resulted in something quite alien, if not inimical, to our conscious intentions. The sociologist 
Ulrich Beck makes clear that ignorance is no defence in such a context: ‘the “side effects”, which 
were wilfully ignored or were unknowable at the moment of decision, assume the guise of 
environmental crises that transcend the limits of space and time’ (World at Risk 19). 
The idea of “tradition” might become more radical if we instead think of the accumulation of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere as a neglected tradition in itself, which would mean that 
climate change is usurping the role of the politicised literary scholar in bringing this to our 
attention.10 This is because contemporary ‘Global risks are the embodiment of the errors of the 
                                                     
10
 I have proposed as much in the article ‘Climate Change and the Individual Talent’ (2013). 
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whole industrial era’, as Beck writes (100). This involves a transfer of agency from cultural intention 
to its unintended consequences. We can in this context contrast the way that Bate requires ‘the 
language itself […] to do ecological work’ (The Song of the Earth 200), where Hulme maintains that 
‘we need to reveal the creative, psychological, ethical and spiritual work that climate change is doing for 
us’ (326; my italics). Bate focuses on the text, Hulme on the environmental phenomena and their 
presence in culture. By thinking of carbon emissions as a tradition, we can flip the tacit ecocritical 
assumption that it suffices to think of nature as culture’s other, as in Soper’s first definition of 
‘nature’, and instead entertain the idea of culture as nature’s other. Nature then takes on the 
position of enforcing an environmental hegemony rather than being the other to a cultural 
hegemony. Its principles underlie our culture and, as the emergence of climate change reminds us, 
they ‘will persist in the midst of environmental destruction, and will outlast the death of all 
planetary life’ (Soper 159–60). 
A useful illustration of this is Kent C. Ryden’s exploration of Aldo Leopold’s metaphor of 
nature as text in A Sand County Almanac. Ryden elaborates the sleight of mind that becomes 
necessary when working through analogies between the ecocritical project and recovered minority 
writing. Leopold ‘casts nature and natural systems in the role of author while placing humans in the 
position of incompetent readers’ and Ryden thus ingeniously suggests that ‘Leopold’s textual 
metaphor effectively place[s] nature in an elite position and relegate[s] humans to the ranks of 
society’s disenfranchised and dispossessed’ (‘“How Could a Weed be a Book?”’ 3, 5). Ryden 
suggests that the straightforward identification of nature with an oppressed social group is 
impossible, and that we have to invert our thinking and work in terms of an artificial metaphor – 
the book – to come to a better understanding of the nonhuman: 
 
Leopold’s textual metaphor enables him to construct an ironic version of the world in which his 
readers actually live, one in which humans will only gain full membership—a membership set on 
nature’s terms—if they improve their reading skills so they can make out what the natural world 
wants to communicate to them (6). 
 
Bear in mind that it is in the terms of reading – or a reading – that Bill McKibben describes the 
identification of climate change itself: ‘To find what climatologists call the “warming signal” 
through th[e] static of naturally cold and hot years’. Humanity has thus marginalised itself in the 
hegemony of natural processes, hence the ‘huge effort’ that it takes to obtain such a reading 
(McKibben 20). The need to “read” nature is confirmed by Latour, who maintains that it is the role 
of the sciences to provide ‘a fabulously complex and extremely fragile speech prosthesis’ for nonhuman 
entities (Politics 67; author’s italics), which lends political weight to a project for thinking from the 
environment rather than just thematising it into pre-thought cultural–political categories. 
 
Styles, space and scale 
Rather than being satisfied with diversification as an extension of ecocriticism’s canon in the 
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second wave, Murphy and Armbruster and Wallace give it some more methodological ambition. 
Murphy asserts that a ‘reader has a right to expect that a general critical orientation would be 
applicable, at least to some extent, to every literary work’ (16), hence we might make productive 
ecocritical insights, and insights about ecocriticism, when reading texts that resist a given vision of  
nature. This provides good grounds for an ecocritical examination of  modernism and its 
interrogation of  Romantic and Transcendentalist modes of  nature, for instance. Armbruster and 
Wallace also set out to ‘demonstrate the relevance of  our [ecocritical] approach’ by collecting work 
that shows it ‘can be usefully applied to texts outside of nature writing’, to ‘authors who seem less 
concerned with nature than with culture’ (3). Murphy’s choice of reading in Farther Afield 
deliberately contrasts with the white, male and chiefly nonfictional Western tradition considered by 
Buell in The Environmental Imagination, because he believes a wider scope can help ‘exemplify how 
departures from Enlightenment realism can intensify the themes found in environmental literature,’ 
and that, for instance, ‘the defamiliarizing practices of postmodern representation can cause readers 
to attend more carefully to the natural world around them’ (181).  
While Murphy limits here his horizon to ‘the natural world around’ us, the non-representational 
techniques he outlines can also be employed to defamiliarise the non-natural world, highlighting 
culture’s solipsism by connecting it with its impacts on the environment, which we usually choose 
not to perceive. Buell himself recognises literature’s capabilities in this regard in Writing for an 
Endangered World when he argues for an ‘environmental unconscious’, which is simultaneously ‘the 
limiting condition of predictable, chronic perceptual underactivation in bringing to awareness, and 
then to articulation, of all that is to be noticed and expressed’ and ‘a residual capacity […] to awake 
to fuller comprehension of physical environment and one’s interdependence with it’ (22). This 
advances his idea of ‘the environmental imagination’ somewhat, but still works from the mimetic 
paradigm of what can ‘be noticed and expressed’. Murphy on the other hand bids us to ‘Think 
about the weakness and simplicity of a conception of reality based exclusively on observable 
phenomena [...] There are all kinds of things, processes, and actions that nobody has ever really 
seen’ (63) that nevertheless have an impact on us.  
Second-wave ecocritiques begin to respond to this problem by thinking beyond the local. For 
instance, Buell proposes five different models for ‘place-connectedness’ in Chapter 2 of Writing for 
an Endangered World (64ff), which include concentric zones centred on the self; archipelagos of 
disparate place; places as historic process; our accumulation of significant places through time; and, 
through imagination. In The Future of Environmental Criticism, he goes on to maintain ‘a mature 
environmental aesthetics – or ethics, or politics – must take into account the interpenetration of 
metropolis and outback, of anthropocentric as well as biocentric concerns’ (22–3). He then reflects 
on the tension between local and global: ‘There is no single answer to the question of whether the 
more responsible position […] is to find a place to which you’re willing to commit yourself or to 
forage around through libraries, labs, and continents with your antennae alert’ (Future 69).  
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In Field Notes from a Catastrophe: A Frontline Report on Climate Change (2007) Elizabeth Kolbert 
adopts both of Buell’s proposed strategies by visiting affected areas, such as Alaska and the 
Netherlands, and laboratories where she interviews scientists about their discoveries and 
projections. She nevertheless acknowledges ‘Such is the impact of global warming that I could have 
gone to hundreds if not thousands of other places […] to document its effects. These alternate 
choices would have resulted in an account very different in its details, but not in its conclusions’  
(2–3). This contingency of representation reflects what Hulme calls ‘the diversity of linguistic 
repertoires of climate change that can co-exist in a society at the same time’, something he 
considers valuable because each of these ‘reveals something different about the multiple and 
perhaps overlapping constituencies that tend to use them’ (232). 
Such a recognition properly challenges our expectations about texts’ ability to cohere around a 
unifying narrative or voice, however, because Kolbert’s account is still that of an experiencing self 
as much as the nature writing tradition that Buell celebrates in The Environmental Imagination. The 
need for multiple responses is affirmed by Hulme’s mythography of climate change. This is a 
productive corollary to the work of the second-wave ecocritics in that it demonstrates the range of 
work we make climate change do for us culturally, by using it as an opportunity for ‘Lamenting 
Eden’, ‘Presaging Apocalypse’, ‘Constructing Babel’ or ‘Celebrating Jubilee’ (Hulme 340ff). Unlike 
Buell’s or Murphy’s surveys, however, Hulme’s mythography does not focus from the text outward, 
but uses climate change to analyse the existing narratives with which we frame it. It is not so much 
to say that we can approach climate change through Romantic or pastoral modes, or even 
postcolonial, feminist or postmodern approaches; more that the character of climate change 
necessitates multiple modes of writing, often in tension with one another. The literary-critical 
implications of this are outlined by Ursula Heise in Sense of Place and Sense of Planet (2008): ‘climate 
change poses a challenge for narrative and lyrical forms that have conventionally focused above all 
on individuals, families, or nations, since it requires the articulation of connections between events 
at vastly different scales’ (205).  
The second wave is where we begin to see an attempt to reconcile these discrepant scales. 
Murphy gives a thumbnail philosophical sketch that upscales from the human to the environmental 
and offers a starting point for transacting between the two: the ‘extension of agency from the 
human to the nonhuman,’ he writes, ‘reflects the historical progression of the widening circle of 
living beings that come under the purview of moral considerability within Western thought’ (87). 
But this might simply be an ethical recasting of Buell’s concentric model of place (Writing 64–5), at 
the centre of which is the experiencing self. And can we as easily extend ‘moral considerability’ to 
atmospheric, oceanic and terrestrial phenomena, as Murphy does to ‘living beings’? Bear in mind 
Buell’s caution that ‘It is hard enough to extend oneself across one moral frontier,’ and reflect on 
marginalised human beings, ‘let alone [the] two’ required to consider nonhuman entities  
(Writing 234). 
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Once artificially generated greenhouse gases are present in the atmosphere in such quantities 
that they influence the climate, then our responsibility for the climate comes into play as a moral 
consideration, however. Simply the possibility that we may be responsible for weather patterns or 
polar melt implicates us morally in these things, and while these phenomena are not moral agents 
themselves, there is no clean nature/culture distinction that can be drawn, according to Latour, and 
our moral agency is attached to them. Bill McKibben insists that ‘By changing the weather, we 
make every spot on earth man-made and artificial […] Nature’s independence is its meaning; 
without it there is nothing but us’ (54; author’s italics). His end of nature is the end of humanity’s 
metaphysical other, further confirmation that it cannot be mapped on to existing notions of 
marginalised human beings. The difficulty remains that the level of nature at which this change 
occurs, according with Soper’s second definition, is not immediately apparent. We have to consider 
nature across its scales to appreciate it, somehow holding the thought of the abstract climate 
together with sense experience of the immediate environment. 
In attributing agency to the climate, I am following Latour’s understanding of actor-network 
theory that ‘any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor’ 
(Reassembling the Social 71; author’s italics). Nancy Tuana considers this interplay of agency in her 
reading of Hurricane Katrina, though she cautions that  
 
This does not mean that we cannot attempt to determine the extent to which human factors 
increased the intensity of a hurricane or some other weather-related phenomena. Indeed, issues 
of distributive justice may require that such a distinction be made in order to determine how to 
apportion responsibility across nations for harm from human-induced climate change (‘Viscous 
Porosity’ 193). 
 
Nevertheless, this endorses our inability to ascribe responsibility for climate change in a 
conventional sense solely to civilisation or nonhuman forces. Once we begin such categorical 
breakdowns, it reaffirms Heise’s injunction to think again about traditional subjects of literary 
investigation. 
 
Material metiers: A third wave on the horizon? 
An emergent field identifying itself as material ecocriticism is attempting to reimagine the categories 
of literary critique in accordance with this understanding of multiple agencies, and is thus valuable 
to my argument. By acknowledging that ‘The concrete sense of these views is also expressed in 
Latour’s actor-network theory’, Serpil Oppermann explicitly understands the congruencies between 
the sociologist’s approach and this nascent critical field (‘Theorizing Material Ecocriticism: A 
Diptych’ 466). The so-called “material turn” in critical theory aims to establish humans’ position in 
a field of various influences that cannot be controlled and can only half-successfully be managed. 
Inasmuch as this turn marks, in Stacey Alaimo’s words, ‘a recognition not just that everything is 
interconnected but that humans are the very stuff of the material, emergent world’ (Bodily Natures 
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20), it might seem first-wave, simply reminding us of a nature we have neglected or forgotten. But 
the thrust of Bodily Natures (2010) is that it is not by consciousness-raising encounters with natural 
history or the wilderness that we recognise our implication in the material world, but rather by our 
susceptibility to environmentally propagated toxins, a recognition that ‘blurs the commonsensical 
outlines of the human body’ (118). Alaimo and other material ecocritics thus take first-wave 
ecocritics’ attempt to restore us to nature and give it some critical sophistication, with reference to 
Latour’s mapping of actor networks and Beck’s sociology of risk.  
Despite her announced focus on bodies as sites of human and environmental interaction, 
Alaimo disavows the anthropocentricity of her project, claiming that it instead undoes our  
self-certainty by showing our susceptibility to forces beyond our intention and control. However, 
her concentration on Bodily Natures means that she sometimes reads as providing a more 
theoretically nuanced account of Buell’s ‘toxic discourse’ – her key texts are by and large topically 
concerned with diseases and conditions brought about by exposure to unsafe environments. 
Alaimo does point out that the bodily effects are not necessarily sensory, and ‘the often invisibly 
hazardous landscapes of risk society [...] require scientific mediation’ (17) for us to be made aware 
of them, as our changing climate also does. But material agency on these terms tends to result in 
physical deterioration or chronic conditions that are ultimately and painfully sensible to us in a way 
that climate change is not, without counting the second-order effects of increased extreme weather 
and disease vectors that are difficult to predict. 
Nevertheless, Alaimo concludes her critical readings with the valuable observation that ‘agency is 
usually considered within the province of rational―and thus exclusively human―deliberation’, and 
this ‘evacuation of agency from nature underwrites the transformation of the world into a passive 
repository of resources for human use. Alternative conceptions’, she suggests, would allow us to 
‘accentuate the lively, active, emergent, agential aspects of nature [to] foster ethical/epistemological 
stances that generate concern, care, wonder, respect, caution (or precaution), epistemological 
humility, kinship, difference, and deviance’ (143). The allowance of agency to material forces, in 
spite of its traditional alignment with human will, is summarised by Serenella Iovino, who attests 
that ‘Humans share [a] horizon with countless other actors, whose agency—regardless of being 
endowed with degrees of intentionality—forms the fabric of events and causal chains’ (Iovino and 
Oppermann 451), such as the causal chains through which a hybridised culture–nature changes the 
climate.  
This understanding has two consequences for Iovino: ‘the first is that an ontological vision 
based on the superiority of human agency over the nonhuman “world of things” becomes 
problematic. The second is that we have to redraw the boundaries of the “self”’ (457). To read 
anthropogenic climate change in these terms, we can observe that it represents our failure to master 
the consequences of a carbonised economy. We need also to understand that just because we 
haven’t intended to change the climate doesn’t mean that it isn’t changing. Indeed, the latter fallacy 
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prompts one of Alaimo’s most pertinent remarks on climate change. Thanks to a particular strain of 
conceptual resistance to anthropogenic climate change, namely 
 
the astonishing right-wing denial of global warming, which casts it as a matter of personal 
“belief[”, i]t seems we have been granted the right to choose whether or not we “believe in” 
global warming, as if (quasi-religious) beliefs or personal opinions could insulate us from the 
emergent processes of material/political realities (Bodily 16). 
 
The network of agencies actually entangled is typical of the subjects considered by material 
ecocriticism in Serpil Oppermann’s analysis. She writes: ‘multiple interacting systems, such as 
climate change entailing geopolitical and economic practices, [...] produc[e] unpredictable changes’ 
(Iovino and Oppermann 461). Material ecocriticism is not climate change criticism, but its 
breakdown of conventional categorisation does productive work for my project. I shall therefore be 
returning to materially ecocritical principles in my readings of modernist poetry later in the thesis. 
 
Global warming, local language: Writing the unwriteable 
Material ecocriticism demonstrates that traditional literary categories are problematically placed to 
engage with the complexities of climate change, because we cannot consider the climate as a 
phenomenon separate from us to be mimetically represented in language. This occasions Alaimo’s 
observation that 
 
we need to mark the limits of our own ability to render the material world with language. Such a 
sense of limits does not pose nature as exterior to human language, but instead acts to ensure an 
awareness that the process of making meaning is an ongoing one, a process that includes 
nonhuman nature as a participant rather than as an object of inquiry (Bodily 42). 
 
The question of what we talk about when we talk about climate change is vexed precisely because it 
defies representation by any of the conventional methods. Climate change can then be seen as a 
problem that emerges, in part, because there is no tradition of writing or thinking about it: ‘the 
horizon of climate change arrives as a cognitive blow without representation or metrics,’ Tom 
Cohen points out (Telemorphosis xi). It is not something we experience like a walk in the woods, or 
the rubbish we find there. This is one of the key problematics in the discourse of climate change, 
because as Hulme points out, ‘global climate change […] is a good example of un-situated risk. The 
source of the risk is distant and intangible – no-one can see climate changing or feel it happening – 
and the causes of the risk are diffuse and hard to situate’ (196). Distribution of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere is not something visible to the human eye – or to the lyrical ‘I’ – and is therefore 
not factored into the lay conception of nature.  
The presence of anthropogenic greenhouse gases has therefore to be scientifically demonstrated. 
Climatologists Kendal McGuffie and Ann Henderson-Sellers indicate that climate change ‘over the 
last few decades can only be detected by careful analysis of instrument records’, with the 
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concomitant observation that ‘Any human response will depend on such a perception, whether 
consciously or subconsciously’ (A Climate Modelling Primer 13). This reinforces the necessity of 
making a leap of the imagination to connect with the concept of climate change: it recalls Murphy’s 
injunction to ‘think about the weakness and simplicity of a conception of reality based exclusively 
on observable phenomena’ (63). But does it suffice to import this scientific understanding 
wholesale into one or more appropriate literary modes? Buell thinks ‘Literature functions as 
science’s less systematic but more versatile complement’ (Environmental 94), but in the context of 
climate change the potential of such an interpretation is limited by Hulme’s observation that: 
 
it is not sufficient to argue that more or clearer information about climate change from scientists 
will lead to greater public engagement with the issue. Neither can it be argued that more 
scientific certainty about future climate change, or better representations of scientific uncertainty, 
will necessarily lead to greater public agreement about what to do in response (215; author’s 
italics). 
  
Rather than seeing science and literature as complementary, Elder regards them as born from the 
same impulse and attentiveness, so ‘scientific measurement transcends itself, leading through 
particulars to luminous unity’ (176). Buell’s privileging of scientific authority and Elder’s vision of 
unity present a science that threatens to short-circuit literary endeavour if scientific accuracy 
becomes the main criterion with which we read – just as it threatens political initiative for Latour, 
who cautions that green activists ‘have come up with nothing better than a nature already 
composed, already totalized, already instituted to neutralize politics’ (Politics 3). Hulme points out 
‘There are barriers other than lack of scientific knowledge to changing the status of climate change 
in the minds of citizens – psychological, emotional and behavioural barriers’ (215). 
This is because there is what David Abram describes as a ‘continual clash between our scientific 
convictions and our spontaneous experience’ (42). It may be impossible to “experience” climate 
change at this personal level; Hulme notes ‘Climate cannot be experienced directly through our 
senses’ but ‘is a constructed idea that takes these sensory encounters and builds them into 
something more abstract’ (3–4). It thus seems appealing to attach global climate change to 
instances of experienced weather. But such an approach is problematic. McKibben for instance 
cites scientist James Hansen’s remarks to US senators that ‘It is not possible to blame a specific 
drought on the greenhouse effect,’ which McKibben glosses by pointing out that ‘even if the 
American summer of 1988 had been cool and damp as it was in London […] Hansen would have 
said the same thing’ about global warming as he said anyway (22–3). It was nonetheless the 
coincidence of his testimony with the hot summer experienced on the Eastern seaboard of the 
USA that made the notion of climate change take root in our cultural understanding. 
This point about the unrepresentability of climate change is crucial, because to embody it 
metonymically in weather events is to suggest that these discrete events somehow stand for it. 
While the weather may seem an ideal parole in which to communicate the langue of climate, the 
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association of climate change with short-term weather patterns also opens up to sceptics the 
opportunity to point to individual cold spells or short-term variation as evidence against climate 
change.11 Climate change risks being signified by a handful of terms and ‘the persistent use of 
visual icons’ as Hulme puts it (13): drought, sea-level rise, polar bears, unseasonal weather, Kyoto, 
Copenhagen, “business as usual”. Meteorological examples carry tempting rhetorical weight, as at 
the opening of Romantic Ecology when Bate links ‘freak weather conditions and global warming’ (1).  
The use of freak weather for ‘staging’ climate change, to use Beck’s term for representing global 
risk (World at Risk 10ff), is necessary precisely because of climate change’s radical non-presence. 
However, if we are prepared to read freak weather in a text in a way that is specifically not a 
scientific account of a particular event – that is, indicatively rather than mimetically – it may reflect 
the increasing frequency, or increasing frequency of perception, of such events. We are used to 
considering the truth status of literature as not absolute but exemplary, so there is a value in literary 
modes for engaging with climate change simply because they do not polemically fasten on to the 
particular any more than an indicative value. Bate’s engagement with then-current scientific 
thinking and McKibben’s presentation of James Hansen’s more problematic understanding about 
the relationship between global warming and individual weather events highlights that ecocriticism 
of climate change must be adaptable and dynamic enough to accommodate such developments. 
Richard Kerridge contends that this is a key responsibility for ecocritics, who ‘must accept the 
possibility that changes in scientific understanding tomorrow may necessitate changes in the 
literary-critical judgements that have just been made’ (‘Ecocriticism’ 6). This corresponds with 
Latour’s idea of continual reconsideration of candidate phenomena, both human and nonhuman, in 
the ‘progressive composition’ of his collective (Politics 147). What might an ecocriticism of climate 
change look like, then? 
 
Changing the critical climate 
Rather than attesting to a unified version of nature, the rapid developments in scientific and 
popular understandings of climate change, along with its global quality and the uncertainties with 
which it confronts us, should already make us wary of tying literary texts too closely to specific 
representation. Our readings must be adaptable, as Bate’s account of Keats’s ode is, regarding 
literature as much a series of dynamic processes as the environment is. Yet they must remain 
qualitatively true, in the manner that modernist poet David Jones describes in a footnote within his 
work The Anathemata (1952): ‘The findings of the physical sciences are necessarily mutable and 
change with fresh evidence or fresh interpretation of the same evidence. […] But the poet, of 
whatever century, is concerned only with how he can use a current notion to express a permanent 
mythus’ (82). In The Anathemata, Jones uses contemporary science and anthropology to ‘express a 
                                                     
11
 For example, Philip Ball’s Observer review of Christopher Booker’s The Real Global Warming Disaster points out 
that: ‘Booker commits the cardinal sin, for which climate scientists have often castigated alarmists, of making a 
swallow into a summer (or, here, winter) by using the cold snap of 2008 as a reason to doubt the warming trend’. 
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permanent mythus’ for Catholicism (as I will discuss in my fifth chapter); in our present context, 
however, I would argue that it is on this basis that many poems about climate change have fallen 
down, by treating the ‘current notion’ of climate change, as in ‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’, rather than 
what the phenomena reveal about past political and industrial practice. I will analyse further such 
poems of topical climate change in my final chapter.  
The novelty of climate change can be evidenced in more recent critiques of first and second-
wave ecocriticism. Adam Trexler and Adeline Johns-Putra suggest in 2011 that ‘the contours of 
ecocriticism’ in these earlier iterations ‘go some way to explaining why it has been relatively slow to 
engage with climate change’ (‘Climate Change in Literature and Literary Criticism’ 192). By contrast, 
Timothy Morton in Ecology without Nature (2007) seeks to deconstruct the idealised and ideologised 
vision of nature typified by John Elder, suggesting that such a nature was ‘wheeled out to adjudicate 
between what is fleeting and what is substantial and permanent’; this kind of ‘Nature smoothes over 
uneven history, making its struggles and sufferings illegible’ (EwN 21). Morton’s work here, and 
later in The Ecological Thought (2010), puts into critical practice Bill McKibben’s diagnosis of nature’s 
end. Tom Cohen likewise argues that climate change cannot be contained by the discourse of 
cultural politics in the introduction to Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate Change (2011) when he 
contends ‘That the twentieth-century preoccupation with human on human justice is interrupted, 
and a new network of catastrophics arrives not accessible to archival memory or social history 
alone’ (xxii). Morton elaborates, ‘The time should come when we ask of any text, “What does this 
say about the environment?” In the current situation we have already decided which texts we will 
be asking’ (EwN 5). If criticism is to be informed by climate change, it must be as pervasive and 
connective as the phenomena of climate change themselves: ‘We can’t rigidly specify anything as 
irrelevant’, Morton reminds us in The Ecological Thought (30), hence his range of reading from the 
hills of the Romantics’ Lake District to those of Hollywood. 
 
Denaturing ecocriticism 
It will not suffice simply to elevate our awareness of the immediate environment and take notice of 
the changes wrought by the changing climate, as per Buell’s understanding of the ‘environmental 
unconscious’, then, because this is to treat the climate simply as something environing or 
surrounding us. Morton’s own alignment of environment and unconscious problematises 
literature’s very ability to do so on Buell’s model: ‘Nobody likes it when you mention the 
unconscious, […] because when you mention it, it becomes conscious. In the same way, when you 
mention the environment, you bring it into the foreground. In other words, it stops being the 
environment’ (EwN 1; author’s italics). Morton thereby faults the practice of studying thematically 
environmental works for putting the environment front and centre. In the context of climate 
change, we can’t rely on studying those works that topicalise it, because of its non-situated, hybrid 
socio-physical quality. Morton goes on to point out, ‘This brand of criticism […] restricts the 
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radical openness the ecological thought implies, employing a pre-packaged container labelled 
“Nature.”’ (Thought 11). 
Morton programmatically deconstructs the term ‘Nature’, maintaining that it ‘stands at the end 
of a potentially infinite series of other terms that collapse into it, otherwise known as a metonymic 
list: fish, grass, mountain air, chimpanzees, love, soda water, freedom of choice, heterosexuality, 
free markets … Nature’ (EwN 14; author’s ellipsis). This arc from organisms to values describes the 
conceptual bagginess of ‘Nature’ and the difficulty of imposing a definitive boundary between 
nature and culture, given the disingenuous ease with which ideological norms such as 
‘heterosexuality’ and ‘free markets’ hybridise ‘Nature’ to justify themselves.12 If we were to 
substitute ‘anthropogenic climate change’ for ‘Nature’ as the master term, Morton’s vector from 
biological to ideological is more readily crossed in purely material terms, because ‘heterosexuality’ 
and ‘free markets’ have a crucial impact on the environment thanks to their contribution to 
(over)population and to resource exploitation and wastage, respectively. The processes of the 
changing climate to which we are party manifest our own inability to maintain the dichotomy 
between nature and culture, necessary to but distinct from the production of ‘hybrids of nature and 
culture’ in Latour’s terminology (WHNBM 10–12). 
Latour’s claim that We Have Never Been Modern is useful here because it suggests that ‘When the 
word “modern”, “modernization”, or “modernity” appears, we are defining, by contrast, an archaic 
and stable past’ (10). Hence, we can identify “Nature’s” creation as an artefact of contemporary 
civilisation: industrial progress accelerates exponentially, necessitating a stable, often Romantic, 
nature in which we can take solace because as Soper points out ‘a certain idea of “nature” becomes 
more desirable, and the desire for it more manipulable, as the reality it conceptualizes is diminished 
and degraded’ (196). This suggests a further value in reading modernist work, because it occurs at a 
moment in history while these processes are still occurring, rather than integrated and concealed in 
cultural networks during the course of postwar capitalism’s ascendancy. A preference for fixed, 
mimetic presentations of nature is by contrast ‘freighted with the ideology of stability and order,’ as 
Hulme puts it (26), as it becomes in the tradition received by Elder and, more critically, by 
Lawrence Buell. Contrast this with the growing awareness which Buell’s brother Frederick identifies 
in From Apocalypse to Way of Life (2004), that ‘Instability, disequilibrium, climate change and risk were 
not just fundamental to human history and human nature […] They were fundamental to 
organisms and ecosystems everywhere’ (190).  
 
Time, climate and crisis 
The tendency towards nostalgia for a tradition of nature, as Elder and Buell exhibit, is famously 
imagined by Raymond Williams as an ‘escalator’ that keeps going further into the past (The Country 
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 Compare this with Cronon’s analysis of the term ‘wilderness’: ‘Although wilderness may today seem to be just one 
environmental concern among many, it in fact serves as the foundation for a long list of other such concerns that on 
their face seem quite remote from it. That is why its influence is so pervasive and, potentially, so insidious’ (73). Like 
Morton, he sees his term as normatising a range of other terms in the field. 
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and the City 9). Such a tendency progresses only in the sense that each successive generation 
envisages the date of the break with the rural past as being more and more recent, perpetually a 
generation or two before the present. But suppose we imagine that the rupture represented by 
Latour’s idea of the modern, which he sees as being instituted at the beginning of the 
Enlightenment in the seventeenth century, is also made repeatedly in one form or another back 
through history, until civilisation’s putative beginning 10–13 kya. This flips the idea of nostalgia to 
suggest that we have always been defining ourselves against nature, as in Soper’s first interpretation 
of the term. It is therefore only from a human point of view, that is, within the lifetime of 
civilisation, that nature seems to have a ‘substantial and permanent’ order (Morton EwN 21); not 
when we consider the terrestrial changes that have taken place over the four or more billion years 
for which the earth has existed. Our sense of ourselves is implicated in the myth of order, because 
we project that sense on to the world. Behringer writes that ‘The fable of climate balance was 
already disproved in the first IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] report, in 1990. 
Whether in the past million years, the past 12,000 years or the past thousand years, we find constant 
variation between cold and warm periods’ (2). He goes on to emphasise culture’s contingency on 
climate: ‘In the perspective of cultural history the Holocene [beginning 10kya] really does constitute 
a unity, for its novel forms of human culture developed into the civilization that we know today 
from our own experience’ (39). 
If there are any grounds for envisaging a cyclical and harmonious nature, then it is simply 
because it is only in the relatively stable interglacial that we have enjoyed what Tim Flannery calls a 
‘long summer’ (63) and have the leisure to reflect on the world that supports us. Robert Markley 
refers to this as ‘Anthropogenic Time’, because the contrasting, longer view is ‘A time that 
transcends and beggars human experience’ and yet which ‘can be conceived only differentially, 
paradoxically, in its relation to phenomenological perceptions of time and experience’ (8–9). To talk 
of natural cycles or natural stability is as self-confirmatory as it is to read environmental crisis in the 
texts of environmental crisis. Even to talk of crisis is to talk of a traditional conception of crisis: 
‘the idea of a normative climate’, writes Martin McQuillan, is ‘derived from the idea that a change in 
climatic conditions would constitute a crisis for the human race’ (202). Lawrence Buell criticises the 
practice of reading crisis into a tradition in his chapter on apocalypse, writing ‘The historicization of 
the eschatological trivializes it, in a sense’. Yet he subsequently observes: ‘The concept of 
annihilative apocalypse itself is as old as Lucretius’ (Environmental 298–9). This corresponds with 
McQuillan’s notion that ‘to identify an event as a crisis is always to ontologize it and submit it to 
the model of the crisis that would explain it and domesticate it’, and ‘The naming of a crisis in the 
present works to mask that history and to neutralize it, giving it form and therefore a program and 
calculability’ (201). In the transition Frederick Buell describes From Apocalypse to Way of Life, he faces 
this problem, having to describe ‘a more, not a less, sobering picture of environmental  
crisis-in-progress’, asserting ‘Environmental crisis is, in short, a process within which individual and 
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society today dwell; it has become part of the repertoire of normalities in reference to which people 
construct their daily lives’ (35, 76).  
Critically, this entails what Morton calls ‘a rigorous and remorseless theoretical radicalism that 
opens our minds to where we are, about the fact that we’re here’ (Thought 104). To be satisfied even 
with thinking of it as a ‘crisis’ strains our understanding because, on the one hand, ‘In giving the 
event of climate change a form and a certain calculability one has begun to neutralize the effects of 
its unknowable future [...] To name it as a crisis is to subject it to the temporality of “the crisis,” 
namely that it will one day come to an end and a state of normativity will be restored’ (McQuillan 
201);13 and on the other, 
 
The singularity of climate change as a crisis might be that it is not subject to the temporality of 
the crisis and that it might be a crisis without resolution and so demonstrate itself not to be a 
crisis at all but a constant state. In this sense crisis becomes a permanent condition or at least 
the resolution of this crisis is the construction of a new idea of the normative (202). 
 
Still, ‘climate change becomes part of the latest chapter in the history of the idea of crisis and 
continues to be appropriated by it and subsumed to the model it undermines’ (202); hence its  
co-option by the various discourses that Hulme outlines. 
Hulme suggests we are prone to ‘a romantic ideology of climate [that] reads it as something 
fragile and precious, something needing to be “saved”’ (151), and this in effect scales it down to 
become an entity to be managed, even if that duty of care is as onerous as protecting a threatened 
landscape or reversing the decline in an endangered species. We overreach ourselves by imagining 
that climate change can be handled and resolved in the manner of other crises. Hulme points out 
very early on ‘Neither is climate change a problem waiting for a solution, any more than the clashes 
of political ideologies or the disputes between religious beliefs are’ (xxviii), a comparison that shows 
how entangled it is in our lives as well as suggesting its quality as a Latourian hybrid. Bronislaw 
Szerszynski argues in ‘The Post-Ecologist Condition’ (2007) that it forces us to reconsider our 
entire conception of  crisis: 
 
the solution to this crisis is not to be found in a simple restoration of  political language’s 
reference to a reality outside language [...] It was the cul-de-sac of  modernity’s ‘correspondence’ 
theory of  truth – the idea that language and the world are separate, and that language can be 
judged by how it more or less corresponds to the world – that led to the crisis of  representation 
in the first place (338). 
 
Climate change evidences this crisis of representation, but that does not mean that it can be simply 
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 In this passage, McQuillan is working from Jacques Derrida’s notion in ‘Economies of the Crisis’ that ‘By determining 
[something] as a crisis, one tames it, domesticates it, neutralizes it—in short, one economizes it. One appropriates the 
Thing, the unthinkable becomes the unknown to be known, one begins to give it form, one begins to inform, master, 
calculate, program. One cancels out a future’ (Derrida 71; author’s italics). However, the novelty of climate change is 
again apparent in the way that it is not simply that the term ‘crisis’ fails to describe or allow the complexity of what is 
happening, but that the changing climate itself paradoxically materialises this failure because crisis becomes 
permanent condition. 
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re-conceptualised into non-existence. Our cultural construction of it has enabled it to have a 
material, global impact, the hidden tradition of greenhouse gas emissions now making its presence 
felt, as Beck suggests. 
The particular difficulty with scaling the phenomena of climate change into human narrative is 
that we try to imagine them susceptible to instrumental management but neglect the processes 
through which they play out. This recalls Iovino’s observation that ‘an ontological vision based on 
the superiority of human agency over the nonhuman “world of things” becomes problematic’ today 
(Iovino and Oppermann 457). The mechanistic understandings that underpin our interventions in 
nature are constitutively simplistic in that they disavow the role played by unintentional forces 
responding to human inputs to the ecosystem. For this reason, we could with Alaimo applaud texts 
that serve to ‘cast mastery itself as a rather romantic and individualistic delusion, given […] the 
nexus of legal, economic, medical, and scientific forces that make it impossible to separate out a 
coherent “I” that could gain mastery over one’s body or over nature’ (51). 
Alaimo’s nexus is still more complicated if we factor in historical–material forces as well. There 
is no straightforwardly attributable, cause-and-effect relation between intention and climate change, 
because even if we cease emitting greenhouse gases immediately, ‘we are committed to a warming 
of several degrees’ by our previous emissions (McKibben 134). McKibben writes this more than 
two decades ago, and subsequent emissions mean that ‘what is being done presently to the 
atmosphere promises to produce quite palpable effects during the lifetimes of today’s children’, in 
Frederick Buell’s words (101). A further complication is that we are not having simply to take 
account of a delayed cumulative change, either, because the earth’s atmosphere can respond at a 
much faster rate to our emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases than it has done. 
With increasing anthropogenic intervention, there is an increased likelihood of positive feedback 
cycles, whereby warmer conditions prompt greater concentrations of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, accelerating warming and so on. To offer one instance among many,14 Frederick Buell 
notes that ‘As the world warms, there is the possibility of vast releases of methane as the 
permafrost melts and methane is released from the mud of the continental shelves [...] Once 
feedback loops like the above cut in, global warming can suddenly and catastrophically increase’ 
(103). 
The possibility of passing the tipping points that might instigate such processes and occasion 
abrupt climate change ‘promises to confound the system of accountability that hinges on the linear 
or proportional relationship between cause and effect’ in Nigel Clark’s words (‘Volatile Worlds, 
Vulnerable Bodies’ 43). Writing that also depends on both rational cause and effect and on 
anthropocentric scale will be confounded by these qualities. Its critical implications are outlined by 
Timothy Clark when he suggests climate change will necessitate our having ‘to read and reread the 
                                                     
14
 Kolbert also mentions this in Field Notes from a Catastrophe (17), going on to refer to two more such vicious cycles: 
‘The more open water that’s exposed [by ice melt], the more solar energy goes into heating the ocean’ (31), and ‘the 
acceleration of the Greenland ice sheet[‘s movement] suggests yet another feedback mechanism’ (54). 
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same text through a series of  increasingly broad spatial and temporal scales’ (‘Scale’ 101). More 
importantly, there is no way of  reconciling the views at each scale, of  bringing local or national 
perspectives into harmony with the global, in the way critics such as Elder have sought to restore a 
mythic order or harmony, for instance. Climate change brings with it ‘derangements of  scale’ 
(‘Scale’ 97). 
The individual rational actor in this context, the experiencing self  so central to first-wave 
accounts of  nature, is powerless in a context where, Frederick Buell describes, ‘People are not 
simply free to choose to stop affecting their environments as they do. Even as they try to act, they 
are shaped by a wide variety of  societal, economic, cultural, and/or ideological structures larger 
than themselves’ (150). The destabilising effect of  this is attested to by Morton, who says that 
‘Pointing out the snow in your neighbourhood suddenly becomes a mystifying, fetishistic operation 
in an era of  global warming. Something seemingly real and cold and wet is less real, and pointing to 
it is less realistic, than something we can’t directly sense. […] Reality seems to have a hole in it’ 
(Thought 116–17). In this context, the environmental commitment of  Lawrence Buell and Bate is 
seen to be contained by the same politics that produces climate change. Buell’s aesthetics of  
relinquishment can help us imagine beyond the body, but cannot help us acknowledge our 
situatedness by and within the forces his brother describes. Timothy Clark maintains that it is 
people’s physical existence, their entanglement in systems of procreation, property and transport, 
that will be ‘of more real consequence, however minuscule, than their political opinions ever will’; 
our intentionality is foxed by the ‘scale effects’ which ‘have given human beings [collectively] the 
status of a geological force’ (‘Scale’, 105). It changes our climate of reading. 
 
Reading for climate change, reading from a changing climate 
The critical implications of the environment’s co-option into a political category of  that name are 
spelled out by Szerszynski: ‘despite over three decades of  policy attention and civil society action, 
global, national and international indicators show little evidence of  any fundamental shift towards 
more “sustainable” trajectories’ (338). He suggests that although environmental groups have been 
successful in using ‘the jarring juxtaposition of  contradictory elements’ – between corporate green 
rhetoric and practice, for instance – this has merely been ‘a “corrective” irony [... ] it positions the 
ironist as an outside observer of  the irony on the moral high ground looking down, rather than 
implicated in it’ (345, 347). The positions presupposed by such tactics are polar opposites, of  moral 
agents acting on behalf  of  the environment and resisting the activities of  corporate or political 
elites, much in the manner that second-wave ecocriticism aligns environmentalism with other social 
justice agendas. Szerszynski finds that ‘Such a positing of  the ethical actor seems quite inadequate’ 
in the contemporary world (347–8). 
The irony that Szerszynski identifies has already been variously discussed. Its socioeconomic 
dimension is described by Soper when she writes 
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If  we are all of  us locked into systems of  work, modes of  consumption, and forms of  transport 
which make our individual acts daily involuntary agents of  pollution, waste and ozone deficiency 
[...] this is in part because so many continue to give their mandate to a mode of  production 
geared first to the production of  profit and only very secondarily to making good its negative 
by-products for nature and human welfare (267). 
 
We are both the consumers and producers of  environmental crisis, as Hiltner identifies (433). 
Ecocriticism is not always blind to such complexity: Murphy praises work that shows ‘the degree to 
which common people attending to simple lives are almost inextricably enmeshed in the machine 
of  commodity production, consumption, and environmental destruction’ (187). Nevertheless, even 
accounts such as these resort to mobilising existing socio-political forms of  critique, namely the 
analysis of  ‘systems of  work, modes of  consumption’ or ‘the machine of  commodity production’, 
to work outwards from the human into the environmental, rather than use our environmental 
relations to re-theorise our cultural position. Szerszynski complicates things by suggesting ‘there are 
no separate groups of  perpetrators and victims’, as we might contrastingly have said about 
instances of  social and economic injustice, however (348). 
As environmentalists, our response to this situation should be one that accounts for the fact that 
at some point ‘Irony became not just rhetorical form but philosophical content’, as Szerszynski 
maintains (348; author’s italics). Understanding this kind of  irony means we have to do away with 
any stable notion of  society in which corrective irony might operate – just as climate change, 
whether anthropogenic or not, dismantles long-held certainties about the permanence of  our 
enabling environmental context. It is in this context of situational irony, brought about by  
crisis-in-progress, that we must abandon the mimetic paradigm proposed by Lawrence Buell. The 
state that Szerszynski identifies also undoes the ease with which we can accept the experience of 
the authorial self as the source of truth and political values. That question of trust is one central to 
the climate change debate, because culture depends on complex science for evidence of climate 
change, at odds with our personal experience, and Kerridge proposes that ‘part of the business of 
ecocriticism is to define how that taking-on-trust can be done scrupulously’ (5). The ironic 
disjunction between our personal experience and the phenomena investigated by science is 
operative across Timothy Clark’s deranged scales. Hulme gives one instance when he reflects that 
‘the affective experience of an exceptionally cold summer’s day may weaken people’s reflective 
belief in the reality that the world is warming and that, rather than untoward cold, it is in fact the 
risk of increased heatwaves that needs to be guarded against’ (200). 
Textual reproduction of immediate experience serves to mislead us when reality has ‘a hole in it’ 
(Morton Thought 117), and Morton has already exploited this awareness creatively when parodying 
Buell’s compositional–critical practice:  
 
As I write this, I am sitting on the seashore. The gentle sound of waves lapping against my deck 
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chair coincides with the sound of my fingers typing away at the laptop. […] No—that was pure 
fiction, just a tease. As I write this, a western scrub jay is chattering outside my window, 
harmonizing with the quiet scratch of my pen on this piece of paper. […] That was also just 
fiction. What’s really happening as I write this: a digital camera is resting silently on a copy of an 
anthology of Romantic poetry […] (EwN 29). 
 
Morton’s playfulness with place gestures at the possibilities inherent in creative response to the 
environment; while a text materially depends on the physical act of composition, it does not in this 
case matter which, if any, of Morton’s scenarios is true. It is indicative rather than mimetic. Note, 
too, the way that his co-ordinates include those we might conventionally mark as “natural”, 
“cultural” and “technological”, enacting the Latourian hybridity that surrounds us and connects us 
to that which is not immediate. The uncertainties surrounding climate change require that we 
entertain a similar range of interpretative possibilities for each text, and it is this scope, rather than 
any given account, that will be crucial to climate-inflected criticism. 
Phenomenologist David Wood extrapolates this point, complicating it rather than lampooning it 
as Morton does, to suggest everything that has to be represented by what stands before us. 
Fortuitously for the sake of comparison with Buell, Wood draws on the example of a seen tree:  
 
Suppose I look out the window––what do I see? A tree. There it is. It is there in front of me, as 
visible as I could want. [… But] the life of the tree, the living tree, the tree of which we glimpse 
only a limb here, a trunk there, or views from various angles, this temporally extended 
persisting, growing tree, is invisible (The Step Back 152). 
 
This does more than Lawrence Buell does to offer ‘some sense of the environment as a process rather than a 
constant or a given’ (Environmental 8; author’s italics), by considering the tree not as an object fixed in 
time but an organism growing through time. It is Wood’s contention that ‘What phenomenology 
does’ – and mine that what poetry can do, in a creative response to Wood’s theory – ‘is to activate 
and reactivate the complex articulations and relations of things, restoring through description, 
through dramatization, a participatory engagement (bodily, imaginative, etc.) with things’ (153). 
This is more than simply elevating the world from the environmental unconscious as Buell would 
have us do, although that is part of it. It is paying attention to relations that take us beyond the 
immediate as well. 
Latour highlights the difficulty of  examining these relations: ‘objects appear associable with one 
another and with social ties only momentarily’ (Reassembling 80; author’s italics). But like Buell and 
Wood, he reaffirms the role of  the imagination in doing so: the fifth of  his five methods of  
exposing agency in actor-network-theory is to use ‘the resource of  fiction[, which] can bring—
through the use of  counterfactual history, thought experiments, and “scientifiction”—the solid 
objects of  today into the fluid states where their connections with humans may make sense’ (82). 
This weighs in on the side of  creative, literary engagement with climate change rather than mimetic, 
instrumental readings, in particular if  we think of  poetry as a self-conscious fiction, of  the kind 
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Wallace Stevens imagines. Indeed, Latour maintains that ‘sociologists have a lot to learn from 
artists’ (82). I have already argued for the validity of  literary criticism as a way of  reading climate 
change, but it is also a way of  writing it. Having established some basic criteria for reading (from) 
climate change, it is time to consider the writing of  it. 
 
Texts without tradition 
The problems of  using conventional modes as a literary way of  approaching climate change can be 
illustrated by reading a text that adopts a nonfictional mode, exhibiting tendencies recognised in 
first- and second-wave ecocriticism. Paul Kingsnorth’s Orion Magazine piece ‘Confessions of a 
Recovering Environmentalist’ (2012) is an account of the author’s formative experiences of nature, 
then of environmentalism, and his increasing dissatisfaction with that movement. He takes a 
Thoreauvian response both to climate change and his environmentalist friends’ advocacy of 
renewable energy, in particular wind turbines. The form of the piece rehearses Buell’s and Bate’s 
anecdotes of their first environmental stirrings, and also demonstrates a powerful and persuasive 
attachment to a version of nature comprising ‘wild places and the other-than-human world’.  
Kingsnorth is aware of the cultural mediation of this vision, inasmuch as he discusses the 
colonial practice of ‘Forcing tribal people from their ancestral lands, which had been newly 
designated as national parks, for example, in order to create a fictional “untouched nature”’. This 
awareness gestures at second-wave ecocriticism and a white, Western hegemony asserting the value 
of a Eurocentric “Nature”. However, Kingsnorth only employs this critique with historically and 
geographically remote situations, and is not prepared, reflexively, to examine how his argument is 
based on such a fiction. He celebrates ‘The mountains and moors, the wild uplands’ of Britain; but 
following his criticism of colonial practice, these landscapes too must come under question: given 
the extent of prehistoric forestation in Britain, how can we claim the moor and uplands are not, 
too, the product of human clearances?15 Here, Kingsnorth indulges in something which Lawrence 
Buell is alive to in our experience of place, ‘to fantasize that a pristine-looking landscape seen for 
the first time is so in fact’ (Writing 68), a fallacy that fails to show an awareness of ‘anthropogenic 
time’. This problematises Kingsnorth’s sniffy remark that ‘Most of us wouldn’t even know where to 
find’ the wild world. He supposes that it is uncomplicatedly there although most of us cannot be 
bothered to find it. However, his slight has another reading in the context of Szerszynski’s state of 
general irony; we can’t locate the wild world not because of our ignorance or laziness, but because it 
never existed in the state Kingsnorth imagines for it, free of human mediation. 
He demonstrates similarly problematic doublethink about the agendas we bring to climate 
change. He rightly critiques the notion of sustainability as being informed by ‘the expansive, 
colonizing, progressive human narrative’ – the same ‘confident belief in the human ability to 
control Nature’ that Hulme characterises as ‘constructing Babel’ (351, 348). However, Kingsnorth 
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 More generally, Behringer observes ‘In the Holocene Homo sapiens sapiens began to make massive incursions into 
nature, turning it into a cultural landscape’ (39). 
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is unable to use such critiques reflexively and examine the irony of his absolutist position. He cites 
the arguments of his environmentalist friends – ‘Didn’t I know that climate change would do far 
more damage to upland landscapes than turbines?’ – but rather than offer a reasoned answer to 
them or to the reader, his strategy is instead to mock his opponents by adopting their jargon: ‘Their 
talk was of parts per million of carbon, peer-reviewed papers, sustainable technologies, renewable 
supergrids, green growth, and the fifteenth conference of the parties’. Certainly, the ‘blinding 
obsession with carbon’ he writes about is indicative of the attempt to instrumentalise and manage 
our atmosphere, but Kingsnorth does not consider that, for all the rhetoric of sustainability, it has 
had little effect on the actual state of the climate.16 Rather than dispute turbines’ necessity or 
effectiveness, and consider the wider context on which climate change demands we reflect, he 
emotes against their unpleasant presence in his immediate environment: ‘the wild uplands, are to be 
staked out like vampires in the sun, their chests pierced with rows of five-hundred-foot wind 
turbines and associated access roads, masts, pylons, and wires’. This nimbyism only engages with 
the environment at the level of landscape, as cherished in first-wave ecocriticism.  
Kingsnorth’s own ‘frustrated detachment’ from conventional politics is the nub of the problem: 
he claims to be angry while simultaneously being at one remove from it, and in so doing he deploys 
a notion of Nature ‘already composed, already totalized, already instituted to neutralize politics’, as 
it does in Latour’s analysis (Politics 3). This can be seen in Kingsnorth’s reference to ‘the world’s 
wildest, most beautiful, and most untouched landscapes’ – what does it mean for a landscape to be 
‘most untouched’, when human presence created that landscape in the first place? In the absence of 
a reflexively critical quality, the narrative makes more sense as the memoir of an author who is 
falling out of love with society than as a cogent argument against the politics of ‘sustainability’; the 
titular ‘Confessions’ governs the tone and mode. ‘It took a while before I started to notice what was 
happening,’ Kingsnorth writes, ‘but when I did it was all around me. The ecocentrism—in simple 
language, the love of place, the humility, the sense of belonging, the feelings—was absent from most 
of the “environmentalist” talk I heard around me’ (author’s italics). The snobbery tacit in the earlier 
remark about ‘not knowing where to find’ the wild returns in his denouncement of 
‘environmentalists with no attachment to any actual environment’, as though a commitment to the 
earth at the global level could always be trumped by topophilia. Kingsnorth is not only unreflexive 
about his notion of nature, he is prescriptive. This represents an extreme creative enactment of the 
principles of first-wave ecocriticism.  
While Kingsnorth is prepared to qualify his caricatures – ‘I generalize, of course’, he recognises, 
and he admits ‘I don’t have any answers’ – the rhetorical strategy he employs means he is forever 
turning away, leaving him with nowhere else to go than the notion of Nature to which he clings at 
the last. ‘I am leaving on a pilgrimage to find what I left behind in the jungles and by the cold 
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 Certainly not compared to, say, the effect of the post-2007 recession on carbon emissions; the UK’s independent 
Committee on Climate Change, for instance, reports that ‘greenhouse gas emissions fell 8.6% from 2008 to 2009 with 
reductions of 9.7% in CO2 and 1.9% in non-CO2 emissions. But the reduction was largely due to the recession and 
other exogenous factors’ (Meeting Carbon Budgets 3). 
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campfires and in the parts of my head and my heart that I have been skirting around because I have 
been busy fragmenting the world in order to save it; busy believing it is mine to save.’ This is not to 
problematise the concept of salvation, as Hulme does, but to convey the author’s sulky sense of 
dispossession. Kingsnorth thus persists with his faith in untouched Nature, the unanswered 
question of climate change’s effect on the landscape hanging ominously over it. The figure of the 
Romantic exceptionalist, always turning away from the crowd, is poorly matched to the problem, 
and his retreat into a landscape that isn’t what he imagines it to be is a retreat into solipsism. 
In contrast, writing that resists reduction to a particular genre, that is not straightforwardly 
critical or creative, fictional or nonfictional, gives itself the opportunity to rethink rather than 
reinforce conventional reader–writer relations. Sheila Nickerson’s ‘Earth on Fire’, from 
Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and the Environment 5.1 (1998), is classified in the journal as an 
‘essay’ (rather than a ‘scholarly article’), and comprises a broader mixture of tones and modes than 
Kingsnorth’s polemic ‘Confessions’. The essay opens with the combative assertion that ‘The debate 
on global warming is no longer a debate’ (67), but Nickerson then moves associatively through a 
range of reports of crimes against women, nuclear proliferation, deforestation, disease epidemics, 
authorial anecdotes and poetic speculation, which across her twenty pages stack up paratactically to 
implicate a common cause. Her section on Venus, for instance, traces that planet’s mythical and 
astronomical associations, before suggesting ‘We are drawn to her, Earth’s sibling, but she is only a 
cauldron, and perhaps a beacon: a family portrait of what we might become with age, an inferno 
trapped by carbon dioxide’ (73). Nickerson’s prose transgresses categories such as science, folklore 
and current affairs to show how all are invoked by the notion of an ‘Earth on Fire’. 
Sometimes, certainly, Nickerson reads as polemical – ‘We are strangling earth’ – and other times 
the poetry runs away with her and she is plain unscientific – ‘the galaxies within our universe reach 
out and the universes beyond our universe’ (85, 82). That these tones of voice pull in different 
directions does away with the problematic assertion of autobiographical authenticity and personal 
authority that comes through in Kingsnorth’s account, however. It also abandons the journalistic 
structure of Kolbert’s Field Notes from a Catastrophe, which is divided into sections on ‘Nature’ and 
‘Man’, and which attributes and personalises each of its scientific interviewees as in the following 
example: ‘Donald Perovich has studied sea ice for thirty years […] He is a tall man with black hair, 
very black eyebrows, and an earnest manner’, Kolbert writes (29). Nickerson instead offers a 
disorienting and abrupt survey of opinion:  
 
Some say the heating of the oceans will lead to greater evaporation and snowfall, precipitating a 
new ice age; the heavy snowfall on Mount Washington in the spring of 1997, they say, is clear 
proof. Some say the 11,500 year cycle is up; the poles are shifting. The enormous increase in 
tornadoes and freakish winds is a sign. Some cite the calendar of the ancient Mayans and say 
their study of sunspots and solar magnetism clearly points to global catastrophe (68). 
 
This offers a concise yet powerful example of the diversity of discourses attached to climate change 
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– meteorological, geological and mythological – that Hulme has analysed. 
‘Earth on Fire’ also demonstrates the difficulties of assuming the nature we experience offers a 
stable truth. The wilderness into which Kingsnorth rhetorically retreats is shown by climate change 
to be profoundly contingent: ‘the famous Portage Glacier is in catastrophic retreat,’ Nickerson 
writes, ‘a stage glaciologists had not expected it to reach for another twenty years. Once Alaska’s 
most visited site, it now cannot be seen from the visitor center built in 1979 for optimal viewing’ 
(67). If the forces of nature do not conform to lay experience as at Portage Glacier, they can 
nevertheless be managed to construct a simulacrum of Nature. Clearcuts – a process in which 
‘hillsides were stripped and wood fires burned’ – 
 
for the most part, are made off the route of the cruise ships that bring half a million tourists to 
Southeast Alaska each summer. Those tourists, full of dreams of the last American wilderness, 
travel the Inside Passage only a hillside away from revelation. Carefully protected, they go home 
for the most part with their dreams intact (81). 
  
Nickerson’s expression of the misleading quality of appearance occurs in a resonant 
metaphorical context in ‘Earth on Fire’, where language cannot be simply denotative. She 
interpolates poetic modes into the essay’s documentary and anecdotal discourses. A phrase such as 
‘The weird weather of punishment has intensified’, despite a rather high-handed moralism in its 
deployment of ‘punishment’, demonstrates a poetic that connects different scales. The vehicle and 
tenor of the metaphor ‘weather’, operative together, associate global and personal catastrophe by 
making anti-women violence subject not to individual agency but to prevailing fronts – not 
excusing the perpetrators but implicating wider systems in it, a meteorology of misogyny. Weather 
is not simply the freakish instantiation of global warming, however, as it is problematically for Bate; 
it is coloured by the context of ‘Earth on Fire’ to suggest something more troubling about the 
treatment of women. Nickerson’s associative flit through social and environmental problems defies 
us to separate and solve them, because they are characterised by a Latourian hybridity. 
Through such association Nickerson also moves beyond the screen of trees seen by tourists in 
the Alaskan wilderness, to assert: ‘The tree, the crucifix, the stake, the pyre, and the match are one’ 
(87); she takes the living wood of the tree and fashions it into earthly generators of fire, so that the 
various linguistic manifestations of the one substance are broken down into biological, symbolic 
and instrumental connotations, only for their identity to be re-assimilated. As an example of 
creative writing, it finds in favour of David Wood’s tension between observed tree and life-cycle, 
rather than being satisfied by a Buellean glance from the window.17 ‘If my tree is dying,’ Wood 
writes, ‘I notice. But the earth slowly dying is not obvious, not something I can see at a glance out 
of my window. […] The glance is ripe for education’ (167).  
                                                     
17
 In Chapter 5, I will go on to show that such a diachronic vision of wood fulfils a similar role in David Jones’s 
Anathemata. We can also note that Nickerson’s phrase seems to owe something to Stevens’s ‘Thirteen Ways of 
Looking at a Blackbird’: ‘A man and a woman / Are one. / A man and a woman and a blackbird / Are one’ (IV; 
Collected Poetry & Prose 75). 
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Wood also points out that ‘Time […] is often invisible’, and Nickerson is sensitive to the 
different contexts in which time works. She is alive to the possibility that environmentalism can be 
co-opted by nostalgia, as it is in Kingsnorth, and distinguishes the two: ‘It is not just a question of 
fireflies remembered with nostalgia from childhood: those wonderful nights of chasing and bottling 
stardust. Life forms are disappearing rapidly, along with their ecosystems’ (74). This means that 
when she adopts the localism of first-wave ecocriticism, she sets it in the essay’s global context, and 
the coincidence of anthropogenic time with climatic time is understood: ‘Every time I go to look at 
the Mendenhall Glacier near my home in Juneau, I am amazed to see how far it has retreated since 
I moved into its neighborhood a quarter of a century ago’ (67).  
Nickerson’s polemic is, it is true, prone to its first and second-wave fallacies: ‘earth is no longer 
capable of maintaining equilibrium. Like the woman in India who spends much of her day carrying 
firewood and water, earth is exhausted, beyond her carrying capacity. She can no longer keep her 
balance’ (70). In spite of her disclaimers, this presents a nostalgia for nature in harmony, and 
attempts to make an easy equivalence between the oppression of women and the destruction of the 
planet: ‘If we do not value our women—and we do not—we cannot value earth; and if not earth, 
then not women’ (85). Nevertheless, these remarks take their place amid the abrupt associations 
and disjunctions of the essay as a whole, which formally fail to reconcile – indeed, formally choose 
to resist reconciliation between – the essay’s differing scales. ‘Earth on Fire’ demonstrates the 
derangements that climate change entails, as Timothy Clark describes.  
 
A mode for writing climate change 
Through this introductory survey of ecocriticism and the writing of climate change, I would argue 
that modes premised on integrity, reconciliation and the harmony of nature are not suited to 
articulating and negotiating the cultural complexities of climate change. Climate change cannot be 
annexed to historical nature writing, neither to the canonical literature of nature, as the first wave 
attempted; while the second wave’s more open alignment with social justice agendas still runs the 
risk of considering only the human effects of climate change, not its novel qualities and causal 
complexities. Where Kingsnorth’s response is ultimately satisfied with the turn into imagined 
wilderness rather than a confrontation with the problem, he is indicative of proto-Romantic 
readings of climate change; but Nickerson’s essay shows the potential for more fragmentary, abrupt 
and associative writing – which, as I have intimated, is suggestive of the forms of modernism that I 
will go on to examine in my next chapter. I propose that, largely free from typical associations with 
nature, modernism does not become a tradition to which to annexe the writing of climate change, 
but an adaptable, developing model that does not perpetuate nostalgic dreams. Neither does it 
forgo the chance to see nature’s complexities and its extensive implications for the state and future 
of our planet. 
Chapter 2 
Rereading Green Studies: From modernism to climate criticism 
 
The contention that modernist modes of writing are better equipped for the literary articulation of 
climate change has some, albeit limited, precedent. Richard Kerridge suggests some of  the 
techniques that modernism makes available to contemporary climate change literature, with 
 
the proposition that contemporary neo-Modernist writing has specific equipment for reaching 
into this subject, as writing that keeps to the personal voice and the conventionally poetic has 
not [...] neo-Modernism, and the cut-up method in particular, can bring into poetic space kinds 
of  discourse not normally available to the personal lyric (‘Climate Change and Contemporary 
Modernist Poetry’ 133). 
 
This touches on one of  the key distinctions which I will be addressing in this chapter: between 
formal response to a perceived fragmentation of  modern experience, and a ‘personal lyric’ 
premised on stable conceptions of  selfhood. Poet and ecologist Mario Petrucci elaborates on the 
necessity for a different mode to articulate the contemporary global environment, arguing that if  
our ‘processes of  perception and representation [...] are marred and distorted by being trammelled 
into certain stock ways of  expressing oneself  and understanding oneself,’ then we run the risk of  
missing ‘all the things one has to understand, know, experiment with (along with those we can’t 
know, or at best merely glimpse) in order to be completely human, to be fully related to everything 
that happens to us’ (personal interview; emphasis his). He continues: ‘after modernism, we’ve got 
very considerable resources, templates and exemplars of  how to work more fluidly with language, 
to reach the deeper truths of  how it functions and expresses our relationship with ourselves, our 
relationship with creation and perception’.  
Lawrence Buell argues that, when we are seeking ‘a thoroughgoing redefinition of  the self  in 
environmental terms’, 
 
It might seem that modernism had made such a redefinition easy. For the[se] adjustments in 
persona, prosody, and image […] have certainly to a large extent been enabled by such 
interdependent modernist cultural revolutions as the breakdown of trust in an autonomous self, 
the deterioration of faith in a symbolically significant universe, and a rejection of bound poetic 
forms. Under such circumstances, one might suppose that nothing would come easier to a late 
twentieth-century consciousness than imagining human selves as unstable constellations of 
matter occupying one among innumerable niches in an interactive biota (Environmental 167). 
 
Yet Buell concludes ‘such is not the case’. Despite the theoretical scope afforded to literature after 
the modernists, he points out, not without justification, that ‘It is [still] hard not to care more about 
individuals than about people, hard not to care more about people than about the natural 
environment’ (167). For this reason he suggests that our perceptions of nature will inevitably 
involve the human, whether as an experiencing subject or a personified nature, if they are going to 
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interest us. Buell is not wrong in identifying the difficulty of modernist forms, but in turning away 
from them, and their possibilities, he aligns himself with the return to realistic or lyric conceptions 
of the self in later twentieth-century writing, whose conventions pose problems for Andrew 
Motion’s engagement with climate change in ‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’. This resistance to non-realist 
aesthetics, however, leads Buell and other ecocritics to assert particular versions of  
environmentality, as I analysed in my first chapter, that are not able to accommodate or articulate 
the complexity of  climate change.  
My objective in this chapter, therefore, is to elaborate on Kerridge’s and Petrucci’s observations 
to offer an alternative, modernist reading of  environment in general, and climate in particular. I will 
identify and analyse the tendencies and techniques of  modernist aesthetics, particularly the high 
modernism exemplified by T. S. Eliot, and the early twentieth-century concerns in response to 
which these aesthetics emerged. Through time, the concerns of  the modernists mutate into those 
that are the subject of  critical attention today in relation to climate change, and I will assess the 
correspondence between the two contexts. Using environmental philosophy and political ecology 
to read modernist verse, I will also use the poetry reflexively to read the critical discourse and 
inform the formulation of  climate change criticism. This I will deploy in the development of  a 
twenty-first-century poetics of  climate change, considering the suitability of  modernist modes for 
expressing and engaging with the complexity of  its phenomena. My readings of  particular work in 
the modernist tradition, beginning with T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land in this chapter and moving on 
to consider Wallace Stevens, Basil Bunting and David Jones in those that follow, all aim to develop a 
new understanding of  the poetry itself  and my own critical apparatus, at the same time as exploring 
a poetics for climate change. 
 
Ecocritical modernism? 
Working in a field largely deriving its topics of study from nonfiction nature writing and notions of 
the Romantic or Transcendental, ecocritics have rarely attempted to address canonical modernist 
work in the past. As John Holmes points out, ‘Where Pound and Williams have dominated 
criticism of modernist poetry and science, supported by Yeats, Eliot, Moore and Wallace Stevens, 
the ecocritical tradition has largely ignored these poets in favour of a counter-tradition headed by 
Hardy, Jeffers and Frost’ (‘Introduction’, Science in Modern Poetry 6–7). Those ecocritics who have 
addressed canonical modernism have tended to do so without troubling their critical approaches. 
By way of example, we might consider Charlotte Zoë Walker’s ‘The Book “Laid Upon the 
Landscape”: Virginia Woolf and Nature’ (2001) and Carol H. Cantrell’s ‘“The Locus of 
Compossibility”: Virginia Woolf, Modernism, and Place’ (1998, rep. 2003). Their having Woolf in 
common as a subject is fortuitous, but also suggests they seek texts already amenable to their 
ecofeminist positions, rather than less tractable work that would challenge and develop their 
critique.  
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Walker is blatant in her assertion that ‘it is not inappropriate to consider her [Woolf] an 
ecofeminist foremother’ (144). This attempts to assimilate the novelist to the critic’s cause rather 
than to investigate that presumed relation critically, as, in a similar fashion, Bryson or Elder 
capitalise on nature poetry and nature writing traditions respectively (see Chapter 1, pp.20–1 of this 
thesis). Walker is concerned with how ‘Woolf revives in a modernist context an old trope, that of 
the natural world as a text to be read’ (143). In so doing, she offers some incidentally pertinent 
observations, arguing that ‘from a postmodern perspective, we might say that she expresses the 
intertextuality of nature and literature’ (143), or remarking that, in an essay entitled ‘Thunder at 
Wembley’, ‘Woolf juxtaposes against nature the management, architecture, and economics of this 
exhibit honouring British imperialism’ (155).1 But with her uninterrogated deployment of sweeping 
terms such as ‘modernist’, ‘postmodern’ and ‘intertextuality’ in the first of these quotations, Walker 
shows she is fulfilling her planned co-option of Woolf to an uncomplicated ecocritical agenda, 
rather than building these observations into a cogent analysis. She is simply alerting us to the 
previously unrecognised ecocritical relevance of modernism as a fresh ‘archive’, to borrow 
Lawrence Buell’s terms from The Future of Environmental Criticism (130). 
In ‘The Locus of Compossibility’, Cantrell is more careful to preface her ecocritical account of 
The Voyage Out and Between the Acts with a discussion of the theoretical problems this analysis poses. 
She suggests that modernism ‘would seem to be hostile territory for a student of literature and the 
natural environment’, because its aesthetics have ‘taught us to privilege the formal and the abstract 
over the referential’, while its exponents ‘are famously expatriates, wanderers, exiles [...] rather than 
[rooted] in local and national traditions’ (33). Even in this analysis of apparent opposition, we can 
see why modernist poetics might be a useful resource, precisely because, as I have argued, climate 
change goes beyond the field of the ‘referential’, and requires the globally networked analysis we 
can glean from ‘expatriates, wanderers, exiles’, rather than those defined by close or rooted 
relations to particular places. Modernism’s very oppositional quality is valuable, as anthropogenic 
climate change is likewise resistant to received ideas of nature. 
Cantrell argues that modernists were specifically reflecting on similar changes in the 
understanding of nature in the early twentieth century. They ‘had experienced a revolutionary 
change in “the given,” including the “the given” we call nature’. She goes on, ‘it seemed not only 
possible but necessary to create or invent new ways of seeing, new ways of registering the 
perceptual shock of change, new ways of being readers and viewers, and to respond with a new 
urgency to questions about the consequences of human creativity’ (33–4). These remarks remain 
largely within the first wave of ecocriticism by taking the topic of (an unspecified) change in the 
natural world, and tentatively reading that as a subset of the wider changes with which modernist 
writers were engaged. Tellingly, in a culturally oriented account of modernism’s concerns, Tim 
Armstrong provides a long list of changes in the early twentieth century that includes, inter alia, ‘the 
                                                 
1
 These correspond with discussions in my first chapter on treating nature as a text and managerial approaches to 
landscape, respectively (pp.30 & 41). 
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enfranchisement of women; the Russian Revolution; the re-arrangement of Europe and the 
establishment of the League of Nations. […] Einstein’s demolition of the Newtonian world-view; 
the aeroplane, cinema, television; the Titanic’, as well as the First World War (Modernism 1). The 
absence of anything we might typically categorise as “environmental” or “natural” on this list, 
notwithstanding the implications of Einstein’s work, suggests that nature, particularly in its early 
ecocritical characterisation, is at most a peripheral concern for canonical modernism, and that a 
historical reading of it will be strained by this. 
On the other hand, Cantrell claims that  
 
Key elements of modernism―the attack on dualistic thinking, the foregrounding of 
backgrounds, the exploration of the relation of language to alterity, and the self-referential 
nature of symbol-making―are vital areas of inquiry for those of us who are interested in the 
relationship between literature and the natural environment (34).  
 
With these remarks, she surveys aspects of modernist aesthetics, rather than themes, with 
ecocritical potential. Nonetheless, her case depends on modernism and ecocriticism as they are 
already perceived, rather than exploring productive tensions between the two fields. If ‘modernist 
texts’ aim at ‘jarring’ readers ‘out of routine habits of perception, and specifically out of the habit of 
thinking of place as “landscape,” “out there,” “objective,” and thus without relation to the self’ 
(37), they retread the work of Buell and Bate in striving to provoke our environmental 
consciousness. They might instead pick up on the questions modernism poses with regard to the 
presence of the human within, and its relation to, nature. 
Cantrell doubly situates her argument in the modernist moment and among its contemporary 
resonances by contrasting the rhetoric of intended meaning with unintended consequence. She 
maintains that 
 
Particularly in this [i.e. the twentieth] century, we have learned to enforce meaning and unity on 
large parts of the world by turning them into abstract spaces [...] Yet even an extreme rationalist 
relationship with an environment is a relationship, though it is not seen as such, and it proceeds 
from and leads to further relationships, many of them unintended. [...] Modern[ist] writers saw 
that the disastrous world they came to inhabit was the result of choices made at very deep levels 
of creativity―including the level of perception―and their work gives us the chance to explore 
some of the unexamined ways in which we are making and unmaking the world at every 
moment (39–40). 
 
Elaborating on the juxtaposition of nature and management that Walker reads in ‘Thunder at 
Wembley’, Cantrell uses terms such as ‘unintended’ and ‘unexamined’, opposing them to 
‘enforce[d] meaning and unity’, that recall Beck’s sociology of risk. As the analysis of material 
ecocriticism such as Alaimo, Iovino and Oppermann showed in my first chapter, the nonhuman 
processes of the world resist, with agency but without intentionality, the attempt at mastery also 
identified by Cantrell. Like Latour, modernist writers also recognise the inherent contradictions of 
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modernity, and present counter-narratives to those of progress and development. 
This relates to my ongoing argument that modernity’s shadow realm of complexity is implicated 
in the emergence of anthropogenic climate change and many other phenomena dubbed 
“environmental crisis”, because by simplifying the world to a singular chain of cause and effect we 
neglect the multiple impacts our actions have on it. Modernist formal innovation often seeks to 
express or enact these contradictions and paradoxes, and thus remains valuable, if not essential, to 
the present moment. To summarise the strategies gestured at by Walker and Cantrell, modernist 
aesthetics include ironies of representation and a resistance to received ideas of “Nature”; 
transnational or global scales; hybridisation of natural change with cultural and social 
(anthropogenic) change and the breakdown of dualisms; a new problematics of environmental 
selfhood; language’s vexed attempt to engage with the world and, reflexively, with its own 
materialism; and the expression of a troublesome environmental unconscious, which has been 
unsuccessfully repressed by narratives of civilised progress. I now turn to these strategies, as 
discussed by the critics of modernism, and expand on the relevance of each to ecocritical 
articulation of climate change. 
 
The modes of modernism 
Modernist irony: Language-slip and climates of reading 
As I have discussed, the manifestation of anthropogenic climate change represents a tradition that 
shadows progress or development – Cantrell’s recognition of ‘meaning and unity’ being ‘enforced’ 
on the world – after the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution in particular. I cannot, and do 
not, argue that modernist writers topicalise climate change per se, in the way Cantrell strains to 
suggest that they do with nature as part and parcel of wider concerns. Rather, I propose that 
modernist poetics offers ways of perceiving, and conceiving of, change. As such I should 
emphasise that, while I am interested in the ecological history of modernism, this is secondary in 
the thesis to a consideration of the resources of modernist poetics in articulating an ongoing, 
dynamic relationship with the world. This relationship necessarily alters the context in which we 
now read modernist works.  
In The Early T. S. Eliot and Western Philosophy (1999), M. A. R. Habib sees a recognition of 
changing contexts in T. S. Eliot’s understanding that  
 
The poet individuates by deploying the materiality of language, treating words as sharing the 
same individual material status as other objects in the world rather than as universal meanings or 
atemporal signs of objects. As such, a poetic construct will possess duration as well as 
unpredictability (56).  
 
Eliot himself asserts in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ (1919) that, when ‘the new work 
arrives’ in the tradition, ‘the relations, proportions, values of each work of art towards the whole 
are readjusted’ (38). The crucial difference in historical terms between Eliot’s formulation and my 
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use of it is that Eliot is concerned with the projection of an ‘ideal order’ that ‘the really new’ work 
maintains, whereas my first chapter indicated that similar ideas of order in relation to nature are 
profoundly contingent on the current interglacial episode. Climate change’s presence as a novel 
product of human activity radically disrupts any sense of order we project.  
Recognising that a gap between imposed order and emergent disorder is always already there 
and widens over time, we are also in a position to critique the persistent belief  in Nature in 
Transcendental or Romantic terms. Lawrence Buell suggests that many in the West still conceive of  
a sublime, peaceful Nature because of  ‘the inertial effect of  the time lag between material 
conditions and cultural adjustment’ (Environmental 14). But in the work of  the modernists, this 
discrepancy is central. For instance, Peter Nicholls sees a range of  modernisms emerging from a 
tradition he describes as follows: 
 
In rejecting ‘nature’, Baudelaire and his avant-garde contemporaries were not simply rejecting a 
poetic taste for trees and rivers; more fundamentally, they were denying the connection between 
poetic vision and social transformation which had underpinned the political optimism of  an 
earlier Romanticism (Modernisms 10). 
 
If  ‘Nature, once more, is the prime deceiver’ (Nicholls 22) for the modernists, it not only fails to 
underwrite Romantic humanism or transcendent unity, but also cannot guarantee accounts of  itself  
as ordered or beneficent. The gap between language and phenomenon is where irony operates. 
Nicholls has already pointed out that ‘The quarrel with mimesis [...] is often taken to define a 
pivotal moment of  modernism’s inception’ (13). It is this recognition of  the slide between 
reference and referent that underscores the value of  modernist poetics to this thesis, because the 
climate in which we perceive and conceive of  nature does not necessarily correspond to those 
perceptions and conceptions. 
This kind of  irony makes language typical of  human activity. While it purports to express one 
thing, it can effect another, and the potential for disjunction is greater according to the scale over 
which it operates, as per Timothy Clark’s ‘derangement’. It is in poetry’s self-consciousness about 
the discrepancy between semantics and situation that we find a mode in which to address the 
ironies climate change presents, particularly when, as in modernism, the preoccupation with 
relational irony is centralised. Paradoxically, the realisation by a writer that the text is askew from 
the world at the point of  composition informs the act of  composition, and renders the text 
sensitive to and interrogative of  the context, the reading climate, in which it is received. The 
destabilisation of  context through irony is what the text then communicates, rather than a definitive 
“message”. 
 
Modernist globalism: Twentieth-century scale 
Modernist writing also articulates an awareness of  these differentials in the ways that it offers access 
to scales larger than the human and the local. In Modernism, Narrative and Humanism (2002), Paul 
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Sheehan points out the significance of  this issue when he maintains that ‘Scale prepares the ground 
for anthropocentrism’ (6), and he goes on to assert that narrative ‘is human-shaped […] to maintain 
the crucial human/inhuman distinction’ (9; author’s italics). This is an indictment of traditional 
narrative forms for their complicity in perpetuating the dualism between humanity and nature, 
sidelining the presence and agency of nonhuman forces with an anthropocentric world view.  
Sheehan continues ‘It is this very process, of course, that comes under increasing strain with 
modernist reworking’ (13), remarking that ‘The modernist novel liberates narrative’s latent 
performative power by introducing formal irregularities […] Brokendown narrative is insidiously 
disquieting in ways that troubling story-content cannot match’ (15–16). Recalling Cantrell’s 
observation that one of the qualities of modernist writing is ‘the attack on dualistic thinking’ (34), 
Sheehan’s identification of brokendown structure begins to open the human to the influence of 
nonhuman forces, a creative anticipation of material ecocriticism’s project of tracing entangled 
agencies. Because modernism asks us to examine our modes as much as our subjects of 
representation, those modes can make nonhuman agency more ‘disquieting’ than if it were 
presented as the ‘troubling content’ contained by mimetic prose accounts, such as the nonfiction 
nature writing advocated by Lawrence Buell. Both Sheehan and Cantrell are concerned with 
novelistic form, and while I do not think it unreasonable to extend their observations about formal 
or categorical breakdown to modernist verse in the vein of The Waste Land, we should bear in mind 
that what is being broken down in the poem is not straightforwardly ‘narrative’ on Sheehan’s terms, 
but structures that connote the self, nationhood and society. Eliot’s work, for example, juxtaposes a 
range of voices from across the world and throughout human history. 
To understand what is innovative about modernist approaches to the global, I shall briefly 
review how nineteenth-century writers articulated awareness of the increasing relevance of the 
world beyond the local. Romantic poetry presents a connection between human and natural 
histories, as Bate has demonstrated. In ‘Seen Through the Loopholes’, David Simpson follows Bate 
in this regard by suggesting that in the pre-Romantic and Romantic era ‘Britain’s local situation 
suddenly came to seem dependent on faraway events, in weather as in war. [...] Weather, like war 
and disease, was no respecter of national borders; distant war might come closer to home’ (14). 
Simpson’s likening of weather to ‘war and disease’ suggests that nature could be drawn upon to 
provide figures for historical events, yet no causal relationship is drawn between cultural practice 
and meteorological phenomena. Even with disease, where social and environmental causes might 
overlap, such causation is not explicated in Simpson’s simile. In fact, it is only by the stability of 
reference, to whatever we understand by ‘weather’, ‘war’ or ‘disease’, that Simpson can draw such 
parallels, which mutually illuminate distinct phenomena. Timothy Morton’s analysis of 
Wordsworth’s technique in The Ecological Thought deploys a similar approach, but gives it a subtle 
twist. ‘[W]ar is environmental―it seeps into everything’ he notes (Thought 49), just as war has the 
reach of weather in Simpson’s analysis. But Morton drives home his point with a subsequent 
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question: ‘Isn’t this why ecological art must learn from the art of wartime? In a global 
environmental emergency, there is no safe place. Ordinary things [...] become pregnant with larger 
significance’ (49). Morton takes Simpson’s insight and flips it, such that what becomes important to 
ecocriticism is not Wordsworth’s reflections on nature but his recognition of the way transnational 
forces affect ‘ordinary’ life. Morton then makes this recognition pertain technically to ‘global 
environmental emergency’. To paraphrase Sheehan, it is a breakdown of scale rather than troubling 
(lyric) content that remains most disquieting here. 
One response to this recognition of the global in our surroundings is to expand the poetic 
horizon to represent the scale that comes to bear on individuals in the nineteenth century. Literary 
geographer Hsuan L. Hsu characterises American Transcendentalist poetics in this way: ‘The calling 
of the democratic poet, Whitman suggests, is scale enlargement – the assimilation of older or 
smaller civilizations into an emerging community of planetary proportions’, which the poet 
attempts through formal innovation because, ‘like steam power, tunnels, bridges, railroads, and 
telegraph cables, Whitman’s paratactic style aspires to encircle and fuse together different territories’ 
(Geography and the Production of Space in Nineteenth-Century American Literature 135, 138). Hsu elaborates:  
 
Whitman’s poetry attempts to bridge the distance between individuals and the expansive spaces 
that condition their daily lives. Yet, instead of considering how we cognitively grasp our 
relationships across an emerging global network of technologies, migrations and capital 
circulation, Whitman is primarily concerned with how we affectively experience those 
relationships in the first place. How can poetry represent an abstract geographical totality – his 
vision of a democratized globe – as a compelling site of identification? How can it mediate 
between individual experiences of embodiment and suprasensory global networks of causation? 
Can a poet’s idiosyncratic idiom unify not just the nation but the entire world? (138) 
 
In these terms, Hsu seems to characterise nineteenth-century concerns as very similar to the climate 
problematics that engage me. Yet there are crucial differences. Whitman considers the way we 
‘affectively experience’ global forces, which retains a human-scaled focus, and these, ‘technologies, 
migrations and capital circulation,’ are limited to the sphere of the cultural, rather than blurring the 
boundary between human and nonhuman agency. Moreover, the question of what ‘a poet’s 
idiosyncratic idiom’ can ‘unify’ suggests that such a unity might be possible, or at least worthy the 
attempt. Hsu contends that ‘Whitman developed a poetics intended to instil emotional 
identification at the global scale […] paradoxically, by deploying feelings of despair and 
disconnection to convey a desire for global interconnectedness’ (138). He continues that these are 
‘feelings that are at once subjective and sharable’ (142), making the poet’s expression of experience 
typical of the reader’s, in the lyric tradition.  
Rather than work through doubt in the aspiration towards unity as Whitman does, modernism 
seems in contrast almost constitutively to depend on reproducing and exacerbating that doubt, 
doing what Cantrell identified when she talked of ‘jarring’ readers ‘out of routine habits of 
perception’ (37). In this, modernism follows a different strain of nineteenth-century literature, 
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which Hsu sees exemplified in the work of Henry James: ‘Instead of stressing how otherness is 
contained or repressed’, the author ‘highlight[s] how otherness appears in the first place, 
simultaneously monstrous and intimate. [… D]istortions of narrative perspective juxtapose 
individualist models of subjectivity with expansive, shared spaces’ (93). To see how this conjunction 
of the monstrous and intimate, the individualist and the expansive, come into conjunction, we can 
consider how two of the key questions of Eliot’s ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’ (1917; The 
Complete Poems and Plays 13–17) are both formulated in the same way: ‘Do I dare / Disturb the 
universe?’ and ‘Do I dare to eat a peach?’ (14, 16). The inability to keep these scales apart is 
characteristic of individual responses to climate change, where on a broader scale ‘a person registers 
[…] less in terms of familiar social coordinates […] than as a physical entity, representing so much 
consumption of resources and expenditure of waste (not the personality, but the “footprint”)’ in 
Timothy Clark’s words (‘Scale’ 105). Eliot’s poetics recognises the peculiar juxtapositions that 
modernity, in the form of globalisation, brings about, and rather than responding to these with the 
expansive soul of Whitman, he does so through Prufrock’s ontological uncertainty. The decision to 
eat a peach may very well ‘disturb the universe’ when read today, if we factor in the water, soil and 
pesticides used to grow it and the carbon emissions associated with its shipment from the USA, for 
instance. This is a relation that we might describe in Clark’s terms as ‘absurd but intelligible’ (‘Scale’ 
97).  
There is, then, an intensification and a bringing in to proximity of the remote in modernism, 
rather than an attempt, however despairing, to embrace it. Wordsworth is witness to the 
bereavement that an overseas war causes back home, reaching across the Channel like a weather 
front in Simpson’s terms. War’s impact is not just domesticated but internalised, however, in the 
figure of Septimus Smith in Mrs Dalloway, who is typical in facing this intensification of immediate 
experience because he is ‘permanently crushed beneath an avalanche of sensation’ (Sheehan 129).2 
Increasing uncertainty of scale brings the previously remote influence into immediate proximity and 
makes connections between or across different levels look increasingly plausible. It shatters not 
only national boundaries but those of the self. But while war occasions the most intense reaction, 
even the smallest of incidents risks deranging our sense of scale in modernity. In ‘The Noble Rider 
and the Sound of Words’ (1942), Wallace Stevens writes: ‘We are close together in every way. We lie 
in bed and listen to a broadcast from Cairo, and so on. There is no distance. We are intimate with 
people we have never seen and, unhappily, they are intimate with us’ (Collected Poetry & Prose 653). 
Stevens’s ‘unhappily’ colours the rest of his remark with a tone of wary terror – the sanctum of the 
bedroom is penetrated by news from Egypt and there can no longer be any secure privacy or peace. 
There is an analogy here with our present inability to process an ‘avalanche’ of evidence for 
                                                 
2
 The distance between war and domestic experience also troubled Siegfried Sassoon, who in ‘Blighters’ deploys the 
image of ‘a Tank come down the stalls, / Lurching to rag-time tunes’ (The War Poems 68, lines 5–6) to suggest that it 
would take such proximity for the British population to be fully conscious of what was taking place on the continent. 
But notice that Sassoon’s poem achieves its effect through imagery rather than interiority, through troubling content 
rather than brokendown structure, even though the ‘Lurching to rag-time tunes’ itself suggests a poor match between 
subject and style. 
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climate change. John Lanchester writes:  
 
I don’t think I can be the only person who finds in myself a strong degree of psychological 
resistance to the whole subject of climate change. I just don’t want to think about it. […] Global 
warming is even harder to ignore [than the nuclear threat was], not so much because it is 
increasingly omnipresent in the media but because the evidence for it is starting to be manifest 
in daily life (‘Warmer, Warmer’ 3).3 
 
The crucial distinction between Lanchester and Septimus Smith is that the latter has internalised his 
wartime experiences as shell shock, whereas climate change, perceived solely as a problem that 
surrounds us rather than occupying our inner life, is one to which we might offer ‘psychological 
resistance’. What strategies does modernist poetics offer to resist that resistance, to prevent the 
closure of the self?  
 
Modernist identity: The unsustainable self 
Patrick D. Murphy formulates the problem thus: ‘the binary antonyms of  self  and other are 
fundamentally insufficient to represent the range of  relational distinctions among entities existing in 
the world’ (96). Stacey Alaimo is more urgent when she stacks up the opposing forces that shape 
our contemporary sense of  self: ‘Humanism, capitalist individualism, transcendent religions, and 
utilitarian conceptions of nature have labored to deny the rather biophysical, yet also 
commonsensical[,] realization that we are permeable, emergent beings, reliant upon the others 
within and outside our porous borders’ (Bodily 156). Our paradigm must thus move on from these 
conceptions, and show that Lawrence Buell’s abortive attempt at ‘imagining human selves as 
unstable constellations of matter occupying one among innumerable niches in an interactive biota’ 
(Environmental 167) is not only worthwhile but essential to a poetics of climate change. 
Modernism was already grappling with a related identity crisis a century ago. Sanford Schwartz 
suggests that the recognition by nineteenth-century philosophy that ‘there are as many “essences” 
as there are points of view through which to order experience’ (The Matrix of Modernism 18) is an 
important influence on modernist aesthetics, with the effect that ‘Prufrock’ ‘may be so constructed 
that we apprehend the persona neither as a subject nor as an object but as a half-object’ (197). This 
contrasts with Whitman’s Romantic attempt to extend his lyric embrace around the world. The 
uncertain status of personhood in modernism corresponds to Latour’s conception of  
‘quasi-objects’, hybrids of objective and subjective entities: ‘Quasi-objects are much more social, 
much more fabricated, much more collective than the “hard” parts of nature, but they are in no 
way the arbitrary receptacles of a full-fledged society’ (WHNBM 55), he declares.  
While Latour’s analysis is occasioned by, among other things, conditions of environmental 
uncertainty – ‘The ozone hole is too social and too narrated to be truly natural’, he comments for 
instance (6) – Alaimo builds on his work with an explicitly ecocritical agenda, recasting the idea of 
                                                 
3
 I acknowledge Kerridge (‘Climate Change’ 131) for reminding me of the pertinence of Lanchester’s remark. 
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the ‘quasi-object’ as the idea of ‘trans-corporeality, in which the human is always intermeshed with 
the more-than-human world’ (2). She comments that, in relation to the effects of environmental 
hazards on the human body, ‘trans-corporeal subjects must […] relinquish mastery as they find 
themselves inextricably part of the flux and flow of the world that others would presume to master’ 
(17). While they did not treat topically of such hazards, modernist writers also sought strategies for 
negotiating between the poles of ‘flux and flow’ and ‘mastery’ that Alaimo identifies are 
characteristic of our present moment. 
Scholars of the modernist self, which is in search of its identity without the aid of traditional 
scale as Sheehan and Schwartz have noted, also suggest that it is partly constituted by the threat 
perceived in external experience. For Nicholls, the ‘modernist aesthetic’ of Eliot and Pound was 
designed to provide ‘outlines and borders’ with which the self can ‘protect [itself] against the 
“chaos” of subjectivity’ (192). Maud Ellmann uses similar terms, so ‘the subject defines the limits of 
his body through the violent expulsion of its own excess’ (The Poetics of Impersonality 94). But by 
moving the discussion from the interior self to the physical body, she invokes biological process, 
implicitly setting the individual in its environment. Alaimo then situates an observation about the 
self like Ellmann’s in a fuller environmental context, writing, ‘Forgetting that bodily waste must go 
somewhere allows us to imagine ourselves as rarefied rational beings distinct from nature’s muck 
and muddle’ (Bodily 8). But Ellmann is nevertheless alive to the erosion of distinction between self 
and environment when she suggests ‘The body and the city melt together’ in Eliot, ‘no longer 
themselves but not yet other’ (99). This represents another continuity across or transgression of 
boundaries of scale, but also enacts Alaimo’s ‘trans-corporeality’. The environment is neither 
anthropomorphised nor other, but present through and beyond the semi-permeable membrane of 
the self. The borders that Nicholls reads in the ‘modernist aesthetic’, then, do not connote an 
authoritative self but the struggle to establish one by resisting increasing social pressures. 
By revealing the tensions and contradictions in the self, the disjunctions of modernism are a 
powerful way of grappling with issues fundamental to ecocritique, resisting the ease of both lyric 
polemic – “we are victims” – and lament – “we are perpetrators”. Prufrock could typify the figure 
of the wailing environmentalist, then, disempowered by his own knowledge as Lanchester is. 
Prufrock is both seeing subject and seen object when he says ‘I have known the eyes already, 
known them all ― / The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase,’ and this double bind is the cause 
of his inaction: ‘when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin, / When I am pinned and wriggling on 
the wall, / Then how should I begin […]?’ (Eliot Complete 14),4 a question that recurs in the circular 
motion of hesitation some ten lines later. In Frank Lentricchia’s words, by this ‘refusal to act – 
where like Prufrock we counsel ourselves into paralysis […] – we sin against community directly 
because we deny that we exist together, that we work upon each other’ (Modernist Quartet 46). 
                                                 
4
 Incidentally, the formulation of the question on this occasion, ‘how should I begin / To spit out all the butt-ends of my 
days and ways?’ (14–15), makes smoking typical of the persona’s habits, itself a mutual pollution of body and local 
environment and a trans-corporeal transgression of the supposed frontiers of the self. 
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Prufrock thus ‘inhabits’ what Schwartz calls ‘the modern inferno where mere knowledge of one’s 
condition does nothing to relieve it. The persona as perceiving subject is totally estranged from his 
own external actions’ (201). It is this tension that a modernist ecocriticism should find a way of 
redeploying productively.  
The self’s implication in the world also reflects a breakdown in the world’s presumed order. As 
Armstrong puts it,  
 
Identity can only be formed from a struggle, and what emerges from that struggle is 
contradictory and unstable, since it believes it cannot be both ‘true to itself’, its immutable 
identity, and at one with the constantly changing world. The result of this unresolved 
contradiction is that the subject identifies with the contingent and changeable – with modernity 
– and projects the unchangeable onto a ‘beyond’ – which can never be achieved (Modernism 9). 
 
Sheehan’s understanding of the modernist novel elaborates how such altered conceptions of the 
nonhuman world pollute the idea of human self and agency: ‘The stability of individual experience 
was dependent upon the stability of its world’ (123), and so he finds in Virginia Woolf’s novels 
‘unrelenting demonstrations of instability, lack of fixity, and metamorphic change […] dissolution 
of many of the traditional distinctions between human and nonhuman (animal and plant) existence’ 
(127). Septimus Smith is thus representative of a modernity where it is impossible to evade our 
concerns, just as Szerszynski affords no remote, unaffected spot in which the ironist can stand 
(‘Post-Ecologist’ 347; see Chapter 1, p.43 of this thesis). Or, Morton writes, ‘We start by thinking 
we can “save” something called “the world” “over there”, but end up realizing that we ourselves are 
implicated’ (EwN 187). 
 
Modernist fragmentation: Hybridity and hesitation 
With the transgression of traditional boundaries of scale, self and perspective, modernist techniques 
create inevitable tensions within a work. Writers of the period attempt to find ways to elucidate 
these connections and tensions, and their approaches are correspondingly useful in establishing the 
relationship between human agency and climate change. Reflecting on the relationship between self 
and the world, Nicholls finds that Wallace ‘Stevens regards the continuity between them as 
guaranteed by the imagination’, suggesting the poet’s ‘objective is to find in poetry some sort of 
equilibrium between these interacting pressures’ (214). The exercising of imagination in this process 
is not an abstract matter, because as David Abram has shown it is central to connection between 
different perspectives (see Chapter 1, p.24 of this thesis). It enables us as readers to make those 
intellectual leaps between the different scales I propose to be necessary to properly comprehend the 
environment in crisis. Indeed Sheila Nickerson’s ‘Earth on Fire’, also discussed in my previous 
chapter (pp.48–50), employs such a technique. Modernist poetry is stylistically, technically 
configured to deal with just such relations, articulating them and the problematic context in which 
they occur. As Peter Howarth points out, ‘the experience of actually reading a lot of modernist 
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poetry is more like an immersion, where there is no longer a clear distance between what you are 
seeing and the position you are invited to see it from’ (The Cambridge Introduction to Modernist Poetry 5). 
Nicholls describes the emergence of  modernism in relation to the environment, but rather than 
interpreting place and situation as grounding, as Buell, Elder or Bate do, he regards the encroaching 
urban environment of  modernity as a nexus or vortex of  destabilising forces. ‘[T]he rapidly 
expanding metropolis of  the new era appeared increasingly unintelligible and contradictory’, 
Nicholls argues, and offers a choice of  responses: ‘Writers could either retreat from it into pastoral 
fantasy [...] or they could plunge into the urban chaos’ (16–17). Nicholls constructs that decision 
baldly: as I have discussed, a nineteenth-century writer such as Whitman attempts to respond to the 
metropolis with a Romantic breadth of  spirit that celebrates diversity rather than ‘plunging into 
chaos’ per se. But it is in the recognition of  the ‘contradictory’ forces that modernism distinguishes 
itself. Nicholls regards ‘an irony buried in the very frame of  things’ (22), and it is this recognition 
that must come to bear in the writing of  climate change. How can Whitman’s aside that ‘I am large, 
I contain multitudes’ in ‘Song of Myself’ (The Complete Poems 123) make sense in a context where, 
across Timothy Clark’s deranged scales, those multitudes contain forces that could hamper or 
prevent the generosity that impels the poet’s sentiment? Even Whitman’s acknowledgement ‘Very 
well then I contradict myself’ still depends on the certain tone of  an individual voice.  
Whitman’s irony is in the voice, whereas for the modernists it is ‘buried in the very frame of  
things’ on Nicholls’s analysis. This compares with Szerszynski’s observation that irony has ceased to 
be rhetorical device and has instead become philosophical mode, where ‘there are no separate 
groups of  perpetrators and victims’, and ‘unlike conventional situational irony, there is no distanced 
observer, aloof  from the folly and blindness they perceive being played out in front of  them’ 
(‘Post-Ecologist’ 348). Szerszynski writes that such irony ‘finds expression in the very form of  the 
modern novel, with its exploration of  the multiple, incommensurable points of  view that constitute 
any human situation’ (340; author’s italics). It is his goal ‘that environmentalist practice should 
acknowledge the debt it owes to aesthetic modernism, and more wholeheartedly align itself  with 
that cultural current’. Given that this would ‘value and proliferate “impure” and vernacular mixings 
of  nature and culture, new shared meanings and practices, new ways of  dwelling with non-humans’ 
(350–51), manifesting the quasi-objects to which Latour attests, we can extend Szerszynski’s 
diagnosis beyond ‘the modern novel’ to think of  it as descriptive of  modernist literature more 
generally. Eliot’s poems, for example, mix different kinds of  discourse – inter alia literary, 
mythological, meteorological – and will provide different perspectives on the relation between the 
self-consciously human sphere and the forces at Soper’s second order of  nature that come to bear 
on it. Or, to adopt Alaimo’s terms, Eliot’s poem inhabits ‘trans-corporeal space, in which the 
human body can never be disentangled from the material world, a world of biological creatures, 
ecosystems, and xenobiotic, humanly made substances’ (Bodily 115).  
Modernist poetry is characterised by formal hesitations and discontinuities. Howarth remarks: 
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‘Without syntax to restrict the fragments’ meaning to their immediate context [...] they can now 
connect to each other in multiple and unexpected ways’ (6). This offers a technique for reading the 
peculiar connectivities that awareness of global climate change brings. Individual actions occur in an 
ironic, often indeterminable relation with the environmental context ‘implicating seemingly trivial or 
small actions with enormous stakes while intellectual boundaries and lines of demarcation fold in 
upon each other’ in the words of Timothy Clark (‘Scale’ 98). Howarth’s readings emphasise that ‘the 
banalities of ordinary material are given artistic charge by being poetically framed by structures in 
which no item or sound is ever subordinated into mere detail’ (25); in the present context, I suggest 
that it is the emergence of climate change that offers this charge to our ‘seemingly trivial or small 
actions’, and modernist modes present a means of attending to such detail. Anthony Mellors’s 
account of  Late Modernist Poetics (2005) describes the attempt to make sense of  this tension between 
scales by looking to the possibility of  an organising myth that operates in modernist verse:  
 
Myth always remains at the horizon of  meaning, the point at which historical facts should cohere. 
But this will to coherence is at odds with poetry that gets its energy from the symbolic 
irresolution of  violently contrasting elements. [...] Whatever its symbolic origins, private or 
public, its objective condition is to remain fragmentary, unstable and unresolved; energy derives 
from the act of  reading (the reader’s desire to piece together fragments) as much as from the 
paratactic nature of  the text itself  – otherwise the poem would be nothing more than a message 
(33; author’s italics).  
 
Mellors’s analysis places us as readers in the position of  trying to reconcile text with myth ‘at the 
horizon of  meaning’. In terms of  climate change, we are in the habit of  isolating what Clark calls 
our ‘seemingly trivial or small actions’ – but in the relational context suggested by modernist 
poetics, we must ask whether we can invoke “Nature”, in the transcendent form I outlined in my 
first chapter, as an organising myth, or whether those actions, with ‘the cumulative impact of their 
insignificance’ (‘Scale’ 97), debunk the possibility of that myth. 
Mellors pursues this point in a discussion of  Pound’s Cantos, writing that ‘The lack of  coherence 
at the exoteric level leads to the expectation that the text must cohere in another, esoteric way’. He 
concludes that because ‘finally Pound himself  could not claim with any confidence that his major 
work coheres[, this] shows the effect of  authority to be a mirage’ (67). The text’s status as patterned 
or chaotic, coherent or fragmented is thus indeterminate. It is only settled at each reading by the 
reader’s capacity to impose, or have faith in an author’s imposition of, unity. Armstrong sees the 
relationship in economic terms as an interplay between coteries and those they ostracise, where ‘the 
tantalizing dual status of the modernist text’ is ‘explicable if one has the key; resistant and even 
empty’ if one does not (60). In addition to emphasising the context of  reading rather than the 
authority of  the poet as determinative of  meaning, these formulations can also describe the 
relationship between the nature we experience in person, as per Soper’s third definition, and our 
interpretation of  it. Is our experience testament to forces sublimely other to humanity, as in her 
initial, philosophical definition of  nature, or is it the result of  biophysical processes, to which all 
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entities and systems on the planet are subject? There is tension between transcendence on one hand 
and contingency on the other. Considering modernists’ response to this tension, Nicholls contends 
that ‘the sense of  the “fleeting” and “contingent” is perhaps the definitive mark of  the early grasp 
of  the modern’ (6). However, his choice of  terms, ‘definitive mark’ and ‘grasp’, suggests that the 
tension persists and is inherent in the attempt to stabilise such contingency in texts. The way that 
modernist poetics is able to enact this indeterminacy, and remain contingent on our climate of  
reading, will be seen in my analysis of  The Waste Land that follows, and in particular through 
consideration of  whether or not the poem evidences order, disorder, or some other quality of  
organisation. 
 
Modernist time: The presence of  the past 
Modernist works remain contingent on a changing context by internalising the possibility of  their 
relationship with the future, and in so doing also present a distinctive sense of  time. Armstrong 
writes that ‘the dynamization of temporality is one of the defining features of modernism: past, 
present and future exist in a relationship of crisis’ (Modernism 9; author’s italics). For example, 
reading Eliot’s ‘Sweeney Among the Nightingales’ (1920; Complete 56–7), Lentricchia argues that the 
poem exhibits an ‘understanding [of] the present as an expression of the past, not so much 
diminished as it is luridly continuous, gross realist texture undergirded by mythic narrative. Allusion 
is the acknowledgement of the presence of the past; allusion says cultures are haunted’ (261). The 
poem describes its titular figure as ‘Apeneck Sweeney’ before moving further away from humans’ 
primate heritage by associating him with ‘zebra’ and ‘giraffe’. A similar movement can be seen in 
the transition from ‘The silent man in mocha brown’ to ‘The silent vertebrate in brown’ in the fifth 
and sixth stanzas, rendering this figure doubly inarticulate by referring to him only in terms of his 
biological subphylum. The poem eschews the notion that human evolution is congruent with the 
progress of civilisation: ‘hothouse grapes’, cultivated and grown by human ingenuity where they 
would not grow naturally, are eaten with the ‘murderous paws’ of a woman likened to a beast.  
The different temporal modes of evolution and civilisation superimposed by Eliot are 
comparable to the discrepant scales of time invoked by climate change. While the development of 
life and shifts in the climate have not necessarily occurred at the same rate or on the same scale 
over the course of the earth’s existence, to think of either we cannot be content with reducing time 
to individual experience. Human evolution requires us to think of ourselves as the product of 
millions of years of change, while anthropogenic climate change requires us to entertain the idea 
that two hundred years of industrial tradition, intensifying the activity of perhaps a dozen previous 
millennia, could have a cumulative and sudden effect within the next generation or two. 
Evolutionary and climatic change will coincide at that point, because the effects of human activity 
across what is, geologically speaking, a very short span of time will persist for many millennia and 
be largely responsible for a sixth planetary extinction event. Frederick Buell writes: ‘what human 
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society, at present, is extinguishing at so unprecedentedly dizzying a rate can be repaired only in 
time frames at least several times longer than the evolutionary span of the human species’ (107). We 
are poorly equipped to think about such changes if we only consider immediate or intentional 
effects. While we should acknowledge that Eliot, ‘in his cultural pessimism; in his depiction of race 
and “recessive” types like Sweeney’ was drawing on his ‘expos[ure] to eugenics in his Harvard 
lectures and in his reviewing’ (Armstrong Modernism 75), we can still acknowledge that his 
hybridising of evolutionary time with the present moment produces distortions that are satirical 
because of their derangement of temporal scales, and that this is an effect consonant with a poetics 
of climate change. 
Paradoxically, this awareness of discrepant timeframes makes Eliot’s poem a better reading of 
human entanglement in natural process than contemporary writing that explicitly engages with 
climate change as a crisis of the present moment, such as ‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’. A modernist 
poetics of climate change offers the possibility of being more charged for being unaware of, or 
oblique to, this context. Serenella Iovino points out that ‘The assertion that matter is filled with 
agency is what the new materialisms oppose to a vision of agency as connected with intentionality and 
therefore to human (or divine) intelligence’ (Iovino and Oppermann 453; my italics). In other words, an 
intention to write about “the environment” is not the only criterion for environmental writing. That 
intention itself will have unintended effects or interpretations outside the topic, while writing that 
does not intend to can nonetheless play into the field of the environmental. Writing before climate 
change is recognised, modernists’ intentionality is not freighted with the ideological baggage of 
“climate change” as we today understand it, and their insight into human–environmental relations 
exposes tendencies, processes and relations in a world warming up to be ours. This approach 
capitalises on the way Cantrell identifies in modernist ‘work […] the chance to explore some of the 
unexamined ways in which we are making and unmaking the world at every moment’ (40). The 
generative openness of  modernist aesthetics can articulate the uncertainty of  a world in which 
human activity has divergent effects at the personal, cultural, socio-political, economic and global 
ecological scales. 
 
The abstraction of water: The changing climate of The Waste Land 
T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922; Complete 59–80) juxtaposes fragmented agencies and places the 
cultural in the context of the natural. As such, I suggest it can be read as an exemplar of  the kinds 
of  associations we need to reveal if  we are going to comprehend the scale of  anthropogenic 
climate change. As Latour remarks in Politics of  Nature, ‘it will […] be necessary to represent the 
associations of  humans and nonhumans through an explicit procedure’ (Politics 41; author’s italics). 
I do not mean to propose that reading poetry supplants the scientific data, modelling and research 
that Latour refers to, but that it stages and allows us to consider the phenomena in ways that 
science and politics cannot. Indeed, Alaimo writes: ‘If poetry and science are both “languages,” […] 
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they struggle to make the invisible visible, the unknown known, the material sensible’ (Bodily 53). 
Patricia Waugh frames a discussion of the increasingly complex scientific context of the modernist 
era in Beyond Mind and Matter in similar terms, by suggesting that ‘relations between formal 
abstraction and particularity emerged as central to the various experiments, verbal and visual, which 
characterised many of the arts during the early decades of the last century’ (6).  
In addressing this relation, The Waste Land pertains in the era of climate change, because it helps 
disclose the hybrid cultural and material agency entangled in the phenomena’s emergence. The 
abstract forces which civilisation brings to bear come into presence in the poem through strategies 
of fragmentation and juxtaposition. For instance, The Waste Land attends to both humanity and its 
emissions: world and waste are compounded in its very title. Ellmann argues that ‘Waste is what a 
culture casts away in order to determine what is not itself’ (93–4), and Eliot’s juxtaposition of the 
two discloses that relation. Crucially, the poem is unable to sustain the boundaries between culture 
and what is not culture, offering us the traces of relationships between humanity and its 
environment and complicating the impact that each has on the other. The re-presencing of  ‘waste’ 
with ‘land’ exemplifies Heather Sullivan’s ‘dirt theory’, which identifies how ‘Modernity’s […] 
efforts to conceal “dirt” in its many forms have encouraged urban residents to believe that dirty 
nature is something far away and disconnected from themselves and their bodies’ (‘Dirt Theory and 
Material Ecocriticism’ 526). We can thus recontextualise Eliot’s offer to ‘show you fear in a handful 
of dust’ (line 30) in light of the horror provoked by bodily contact with dirt. That dirt represents 
both the wilderness and the dead, the spatially and temporally excluded and repressed. 
Contemporary climate change manifests the history of  industrial waste – carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases – that resists its own categorisation as waste to have a determinative impact 
on the terrestrial environment. The Waste Land offers a literary analogue of  this process, showing 
how problematic is the attempt to account for everything according to (intentional) human agency, 
because what culture discards remains stubbornly present and influential in the poem. It is a 
demonstration avant la lettre of  Ulrich Beck’s conception of  ‘reflexive modernization’, characterised 
by ‘more uncontrollable […] global interrelations in a world that is increasingly merging into a 
single planetary unit’ (121). The poem helps us to negotiate this complexity because it exposes 
networks of  agency that shape the world, and the tensions between them. It serves as an example 
of  the ‘very elaborate […] artificial situations’ that Latour says ‘have to be devised to reveal [human] 
actions and performations’ in their full context (Reassembling the Social 79). But Latour contrasts the 
exposure of human agency with that of ‘objects, [which] no matter how important, efficient, central, 
or necessary they may be, tend to recede into the background very fast, interrupting the stream of 
data’ (79–80). He therefore proposes five criteria for an actor-network-theory that would account 
for objects’ activity and agency (80–2). These criteria can be productively used to read The Waste 
Land, because they show that a poem most often considered in terms of  its cultural significance 
nevertheless contains the traces of  nonhuman agency in its “interrupted data”. Latour’s 
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methodological apparatus also overlaps with the modernist concerns that I have outlined above, 
namely, irony, scale, identity, fragmentation and time. 
At different levels, The Waste Land demonstrates or reflects all five criteria for  
actor-network-theory. Specifically, the poem is (stylistically) innovative; it is remote from us in time 
(it predates the scientific hypothesis of  anthropogenic climate change and popular understanding 
of  global warming by some decades) but open to unintended consequences; it is in a state of  
breakdown (when compared with conventional narrative and verse structures); it interprets its 
moment of  creation (each allusion is simultaneously a particular reading of that allusion); and it 
exhibits a kind of  ‘scientifiction’ in its use of  mythology. For Latour, these criteria are separate 
points of  access to objects’ agency rather than cumulative, but each can be used to leverage a 
different interpretation of  the poem. Elemental earth, air, fire and water are predominant in these 
interpretations, with changes in the state of  water being particularly telling. Eliot allows us to trace 
these elemental connections and agency by foregrounding them in the poem rather than letting 
them ‘recede into the background’ (Reassembling 80). Working towards a network of  interpretations, 
I shall consider each of  Latour’s criteria in turn, drawing my subheadings from his categories but 
breaking down the order he gives them. 
 
‘Rendered ignorant by distance’: The ‘dull roots’ of  environmental collapse 
Latour’s criterion is that objects studied by archaeologists or ethnologists ‘stop being taken for 
granted when they are approached by users rendered ignorant and clumsy by distance’ (Reassembling 
80; author’s italics) to shed light on the society that produced them. In this respect, I argue that The 
Waste Land as an object is a take on a world distant in time, in the midst of  industrial and cultural 
processes that will create today’s climate. The poem cannot try to press a case for or against 
anthropogenic global warming, topical ‘climate change’, because it is ignorant of  it. Yet the process 
of  reading the poem in relation to climate change can be supported by Latour’s politics of  nature: 
he maintains that ‘quasi objects […] can no longer be detached from the unexpected consequences 
they may trigger in the very long run, very far away, in an incommensurable world’ (Politics 24).  
Processes of  industrialisation and urbanisation were well in hand by the time The Waste Land was 
written, and in the sense that our contemporary climate represents the ‘unexpected consequences’ 
of  these, we can identify in Eliot’s era some trace of  civilisation’s ecological impact. The poem is 
typical of  the modernist moment that first exposed these traces, in a way very different to writing 
that is contemporaneous with the industrial revolution (as seen for example in the transition from 
Whitman’s cosmopolitan Romanticism to the alienation of  Septimus Smith and J. Alfred Prufrock). 
Precisely because it was written before the identification of  anthropogenic climate change, The 
Waste Land can offer a chronologically remote and disinterested cultural perspective on the 
phenomena. We now read The Waste Land in a context of  climate change, but what might it mean to 
read climate change in the context of  The Waste Land? 
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Robert Pogue Harrison originally made the connection I describe between Eliot and 
environmental crisis in Forests: The Shadow of Civilization (1992): ‘The wasteland grows within and 
without and with no essential distinction between them, so much so that we might now say that a 
poem like The Waste Land is in some ways a harbinger of the greenhouse effect’ (149). Harrison’s 
phrasing seems to conflate the ‘greenhouse effect’ – now more broadly considered as the 
mechanism by which the atmosphere has retained heat throughout the earth’s existence – with 
human-induced global warming. Nevertheless, his observation offers the opportunity to turn 
discussion of the poem away from consideration of its imagery of ‘Rock and no water’ and ‘cracked 
earth’ (lines 332, 369) solely in terms of cultural or emotional sterility. Indeed, by problematising 
our conceptions of a defined Nature, climate change necessarily demands that we refrain from 
closing down our readings, especially if doing so excludes their environmental implications.  
It is therefore worth considering, even as an aside, one possible meteorological influence on The 
Waste Land, because it hints at the poem’s critically neglected environmentality. Eliot began to 
compose the poem in 1921, a year that saw a ‘summer of drought – no rain fell for six months’ as 
Peter Ackroyd attests in his 1985 biography of Eliot (113). While not volcanic in its impact on the 
poem, this parallels Jonathan Bate’s uncovering of the relation between Tambora’s eruption and 
Byron’s composition of ‘Darkness’ (see Chapter 1, p.25 of this thesis). As a biographer, it is in 
Ackroyd’s interest to make such connections between text and environment, ‘Just as the fog of 
“Prufrock” is the St Louis fog’ of Eliot’s childhood (Ackroyd 39). But I would argue that the value 
of these details lies in their suggestion of environments that came to bear on composition, without 
being reducible to those environments. In the case of The Waste Land, Eliot takes a particular, 
contemporary instance of  drought, which he identifies as ‘a fine hot rainless spring’ in The Dial’s 
‘London Letter’ of  July 1921 (The Annotated Waste Land 183), and abstracts it into the mythologising 
mechanism of  his poem.  
The poet’s personal experience thus becomes associated with the poem’s geographically remote 
deserts, as Caroline Patey signals when she considers Eliot’s reading in Australian anthropology: 
‘Ayers Rock and the salt bed of  Lake Eyre […] offer the stony and dusty mountains of  The Waste 
Land an unexpected objective correlative’. It also recalls a wilderness distant in time, Patey 
continues, if  we consider ‘the supposedly biblical nature of  the desert to which readers could be 
misled by the [poem’s] notes’ (‘Whose Tradition?’ 168). By recognising the symbolic resonance with 
which Eliot contextualises his personal experience, we share Marjorie Perloff ’s observation that 
‘Eliot’s Unreal City is, first and foremost, a very real fog-bound London’, while being ‘under no 
illusion that such explication constitutes criticism’ by itself  (The Poetics of  Indeterminacy 11, 13). 
Whether or not, ‘despite its temporal and spatial dislocations and its collage form, a perfectly 
coherent symbolic structure’ is in evidence in The Waste Land as Perloff  then argues (13) is a 
question I shall return to. Suffice it to say that the transglobal associations of  the landscape in the 
poem mean that the allusions are never just personal and lyric, but resonant across times and scales 
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in a way that a doggedly realist account is less likely to achieve.5 The poem is open to associative 
readings, not a like-for-like representation. 
At a technical level, Denis Donoghue posits that Eliot’s poems seek ‘a language for his feelings 
at the earliest stage of their emergence’, a language for ‘unofficial impulses active at a stage long 
before their official reception as thoughts, emotions, ideas’ (Words Alone 134–5). By seeking access 
to the unconscious, the poem’s language is open to an ‘official reception’ of its inchoate 
associations with each new reading. I am not claiming, then, that Eliot was in the practice of writing 
encoded prophecies about environmental collapse, but that The Waste Land attests to a disjunction 
between urban civilisation and the hinterland of the environment from which it separates itself. 
Eliot would thus provide a creative counterpart to Latour’s theorisation in Politics of Nature, because 
the disjunction the poet identifies has developed into our present ecological emergency. 
This is achieved in The Waste Land by an attention to what civilisation attempts to disregard as 
externalities; so we see that ‘The river sweats / Oil and tar’ (lines 267–8), the side effects of  its 
history of  shipping, which Lentricchia reads as ‘a startling figure of  the perversions of  nature, 
human and otherwise’ (269). Perhaps more pertinently, the poem’s being written in a time when 
pollution was more apparent in the urban environments of  the western world than it is now also 
figures the processes of  industrial emission that a century of  legislation, what Sullivan calls 
‘Modernity’s many anti-dirt campaigns’ (526), have rendered less visible, if  no less potent. To 
register waste’s presence in this way gives it ‘not just a symbolic place but also [entails] a conscious 
and concrete embrace of dirt, which cannot be avoided since we live and breathe it daily’ (Sullivan 
517), making it an objective correlative for the invisible, insensible emission of  greenhouse gases. 
My adoption of  Eliot’s term ‘objective correlative’ from his essay on Hamlet is indicative of  the way 
I am using modernist poetics here, reversing its vector. Rather than being ‘a set of  objects, a 
situation, a chain of  events which shall be the formula of  that particular emotion; such that when 
the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is 
immediately evoked’ (‘Hamlet’ 48; author’s italics), the correlative can instead point away from 
human interiority to all that cannot ‘terminate in sensory experience’ but which is still dependent on 
our imaginative engagement to understand it: that is, anthropogenic environmental change. 
Eliot’s queasy personification of  the river is further ‘recognition not just that everything is 
interconnected but that humans are the very stuff of the material, emergent world’, in Alaimo’s 
words (Bodily 20). More specifically, we might consider Iovino’s reading of the marine environment 
in this light: ‘Material ecocriticism considers the ocean as a porous body, a congealing of agencies 
and representations, of capital flows, life forms, “quasiobjects,” and […] of geopolitical forces, such 
as migration fluxes, or environmental phenomena, such as pollution and climate changes’ (Iovino 
and Oppermann 457). In Eliot’s lines, we can see the physical presence of pollution – ‘oil and tar’ – 
‘congealing’ in the river, the ‘capital flows’ and ‘geopolitical forces’ that have delivered these 
                                                 
5
 Although such resonances are characteristic of literary texts, this quality is amplified by what I have earlier identified is 
modernism’s self-reflexive textuality and fictionality (see pp.55–6 of this thesis). 
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substances there, and the ‘porous body’ as which they are represented. The poem’s attention to 
what would normally be excluded as undesirable products of human activity also manifests 
Morton’s concept of  ‘dark ecology’, in that ‘it refuses to digest the object into an ideal form’ (EwN 
195). It also exemplifies David Wood’s idea of  a contemporary ‘end of  externality’: ‘externality is no 
longer available […] Nature is becoming part of history in the sense that we are making irreversible 
impacts on the very processes that sustain its course’ (173). Poetic example antedates 
environmental philosophy. 
 
‘Accidents, breakdowns, and strikes’: Confusing the idea of order 
Asking whether or how far Eliot was sensitive to environmental rather than cultural crisis is in this 
case irrelevant because, taking Wood’s line that we cannot assert a simple division between internal 
and external, cultural sterility is necessarily implicated in environmental crisis. The latter is the 
extension of the former, as Harrison claims. With this transgression of boundaries, the objects of 
the poem are as symbolic as they are referential, breaking down the sense of order that humans 
would impose on them. For instance, Donoghue reads Eliot’s ‘A rat crept softly through the 
vegetation’ (line 187) as having ‘only as much to do with animal life as is required to incite a certain 
feeling in the presumed speaker at that moment’ (122–3). Donoghue explains that he is ‘not 
maintaining that the word “rat” […] has ceased to observe all relation to a rodent, but that the 
word is a double agent; it accepts the friction between reality and language but it does not give full 
allegiance to either party’ (129–30). This resembles Schwartz’s reading of  Prufrock as somewhere 
between subject and object, a ‘half-object’ (197), or Perloff ’s reading of  the poet’s London as both 
real and symbolic. 
An added consideration with the rat is the close association between rodent and human in the 
urban landscape. Donoghue claims ‘For Eliot […] there is no question of  a Wordsworthian liaison 
between man and nature’ (125) at this moment; but there is a relation nonetheless, because the rat 
inhabits humanity’s shadow. In his study of  the animal’s cultural significance Rat (2006), Jonathan 
Burt comments that ‘The rat cannot be separated from human achievement, yet it also stands as a 
symptom of human destructiveness. […] the rat adapts with humans to the ever more complicated 
structures and networks that are produced by modernization’ (15). The commensality of  human 
and rat is aggravated by the prospect of  more widespread species destruction, depletion of  natural 
habitats and climate change. In the essay ‘Planet of Weeds’, the ‘near-term future’ foreseen by 
author David Quammen is one  
 
in which Earth’s landscape is threadbare, leached of diversity, heavy with humans and 
“enriched” in weedy species. That’s an ugly vision, but I find it vivid. Wildlife will consist of the 
pigeons and the coyotes and the white-tails, the black rats (Rattus rattus) and the brown rats 
(Rattus norvegicus) and a few other species of worldly rodent (67). 
 
Frederick Buell comments sardonically on Quammen’s lines that, ‘To put it another way, the world 
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will be, according to Quammen, more completely us and our pets and our pests’ (108). As climate 
change exacerbates and renders explicit our implication in processes beyond our control, it will also 
multiply the visibility of animals we desire to keep separate and remote. Recurring as a figure in the 
work of the other poets I consider, the rat becomes a visible reminder of the hybridity of artificial 
and natural environments. 
The ambivalence between bodily referent and textual reference that Donoghue reads in the rat 
can be read under Latour’s criterion of ‘accidents, breakdowns and strikes’, when he observes ‘how 
quickly objects flip-flop their mode of existence’ (Reassembling 81). This holds true on a wider scale 
in The Waste Land when it comes to the status of water as an image. Howarth suggests that one of 
the poem’s ‘chains of association’ is ‘Water as [symbolising] both death and life’ (69). For instance, 
in ‘A Game of Chess’, Eliot juxtaposes ‘The hot water at ten. / And if it rains, a closed car at four’ 
(lines 135–6), making an immediate distinction between water as a domestic utility and as 
precipitation. While we utilise one kind of water for washing, we also cut ourselves off from the 
weather. Water is a multifaceted substance rather than (simply) a domestic commodity: Eliot’s 
juxtaposition highlights this irony, providing an instance of modernist refusal to limit an image to 
one signification alone. Hovering between immediate presence and a gesture at the abstract, the 
poem’s cityscape, its deserts, its rat and its water remind us that our lifeworlds form part of larger 
causal chains than obtain in our immediate experience, in the same fashion that eating a peach may 
disturb the universe and a bunch of grapes entails a hothouse. 
Elder responds to the presence of water in The Waste Land in one of his more telling remarks on 
Eliot. The critic considers the way that the poem makes elemental significance abut human 
solipsism: ‘“The wind under the door” [line 118] is a disturbing, threatening reminder of the world 
outside. Just as the man and woman in this section of the poem cannot communicate with each 
other, their response to the natural elements is one of isolation and avoidance: “And if it rains, a 
closed car at four”’ (Elder 15, citing Waste line 135). In the longer context of the poem, dryness is 
also what will characterise the wasteland revealed in ‘What the Thunder Said’ where there ‘is no 
water but only rock / Rock and no water and the sandy road’ (lines 331–2). Yet the ‘closed car’ 
reminds us that it is also civilised practice to keep ourselves dry in public, and the culminating 
wasteland is ultimately the result of that effort. By striving to keep itself dry, humanity is implicated 
in fostering the arid state that concludes the poem.  
This is a connection with which we as a civilisation have found it hard to come to terms. For 
instance, Rebecca Solnit assesses the intensive engineering endeavours that have been devised to 
keep US cities such as Phoenix and Las Vegas in running water, to the vast detriment of aquifers 
and watercourses. She also sources Eliot – in this case, the second line of ‘The Dry Salvages’ 
(Complete 184) – as a way of thinking about humanity’s relationship with its environment. She writes 
‘T. S. Eliot’s Mississippi was a “strong brown god”: the Colorado River is more like a ruddy 
writhing serpent. Or was, since the snake has now been chopped into segments by dams’ (‘Dry 
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Lands’ 31). Nevertheless, she writes: ‘The river, in its climate-change-driven decline, will […] make 
a mockery of the two great dams and the reservoirs that were once signs of triumph over it and 
over nature’. Hydrological cycles, once they are disrupted by humans, represent a nonhuman 
agency that defeats human instrumentality. Indeed, Lawrence Buell cautions ‘that the history of 
human modification of environment should not be taken as implying a comprehensive, irreversible 
transformation of “nature” into artifact’ (Writing 5). In The Waste Land, the separation of city and 
exhausted landscape is made structurally rather than infrastructurally, but the poem’s juxtaposition 
of different locations provides a context rich with potential associations and tensions. In allowing 
the image or terminology of water to run throughout, Eliot puts water-consuming civilisation in the 
closer context of a parched, mythical landscape than everyday urban experience would recognise. 
Conversely, water itself cannot be kept free of human influence, as the ‘oil and tar’ sweated by the 
river indicate. The ‘breakdowns’ caused by civilisation make obvious the water cycle that it disrupts. 
Discontinuities expose the trace of connections, Latour maintains, and in The Waste Land they 
also draw us into the construction of meaning, engaging us with bigger, more abstract ideas at a 
scale beyond the human. The onus on us to follow the flows of water through the poem recalls 
Armstrong’s and Mellors’s analyses of meaning as a function of readerly insight in modernist work. 
Discussing Pound’s Cantos, Mellors elaborates this construction of  meaning in a way just as 
applicable to The Waste Land: ‘elisions of the text demand completion at every turn, cowing readers 
into accepting the poverty of their intellectual and imaginative grasp of the poem as a “whole”’ (67). 
Allowing that nearly a century of criticism on The Waste Land enables today’s readers to approach it 
in a more democratic position of informedness, and not to be as ‘cowed’ as they might have been in 
1922, it also gives them retrospective scope to make contemporary connections in the text’s 
disjunctions. The twenty-first-century reading context is broader than critical explication of the text, 
however, and includes our awareness of climate change. So when Eliot’s fragmented text prompts 
us to consider what order might be behind it, our faith in a Nature that could unify it is reduced by 
our cognisance of the changing environment. Perloff’s assertion that London’s existence gives 
symbolic order to the poem means that we are already asked to base our interpretation of the poem 
on a specific physical environment; our contemporary context then demands that we widen our 
consideration of that environment to include less immediate, tangible phenomena. 
 
‘To bring them back to light by using archives’: Dried specimens 
Such a reading can be complemented by drawing on Latour’s next criterion for  
actor-network-theory, which is to consider objects in the light of their background ‘using archives, 
documents, memoirs, museum collections, etc.’ in order to recreate ‘the state of crisis in which 
machines, devices, and implements were born’ (Reassembling 81). Taking a cue from ‘museum 
collections’, we can consider the context of Eliot’s literary sources. The poem pointedly represents 
an anthropogenic state of ‘crisis’ because its fragmentary quality is the result of deliberate decisions 
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by Eliot in response to comments on the poem from his wife and Ezra Pound. This understanding 
of an artificial crisis is doubly relevant in a context where we have both unintentionally engendered 
climate change and intentionally characterised its phenomena as a ‘crisis’, as I discussed in my first 
chapter (pp.40–1). Note, too, the intentionality and fussy particularity of the crisis that prompts 
another Prufrockian hesitation: ‘Should I, after tea and cakes and ices, / Have the strength to force 
the moment to its crisis?’ (Complete 15). 
To illustrate this creation of crisis from archival context, we can consider Eliot’s citation, in his 
‘Notes’ to the opening passage of ‘A Game of Chess’, of Enobarbus’s description of Cleopatra in 
her barge ‘upon the river of Cydnus’ from Antony and Cleopatra (Eliot Complete 77; note to line 77).6 
However, in The Waste Land’s version of the scene there is a confluence between Shakespeare’s 
queen and Petronius’s Sybil, so that, crucially, the setting is an interior, removed from the water – 
Eliot’s compositional process, too, strives to keep the text dry. One of the few instances of a word 
with liquid associations in the passage is when ‘synthetic perfumes […] drowned the sense in odours’ 
(lines 87–89; my italics), in contrast to Shakespeare’s ‘Purple the sails, and so perfumed that / The 
winds were love-sick with them’ (Ant. 2.2.203–4). The artificial atmosphere in Eliot’s verse 
overpowers sense in notably watery terms, associating ‘synthetic’ substance with that water as ‘oil’ 
and ‘tar’ do in the subsequent section. In contrast, the perfumed air breezes through Shakespeare’s 
lines. Eliot creates a sterile modernity from an allusion to a fertile ancient queen (‘He ploughed her, 
and she cropped’; 2.2.238) in a way that bears out Robert Crawford’s claim that this ‘reworking of 
the Enobarbus speech casts doubt on the validity of Shakespeare’s interpretation of Cleopatra’ (The 
Savage and the City 144). 
Various other images are, like Cleopatra’s barge, abstracted from an aquatic context in The Waste 
Land: the ‘sea-wood [...] Burned green and orange’ and in its ‘sad light, a carvèd dolphin swam’ 
(lines 94–6). This aesthetically rendered creature swims through light, rather than being an organic 
cetacean moving through water, and hence is at a further remove from embodied, mammalian 
presence than the rat at line 33. Eliot symbolically dehydrates his sources to connote their 
exhaustion, and the poem returns to this theme of anthropogenic sterility throughout, such as the 
abortion alluded to later in ‘A Game of Chess’: ‘It’s them pills I took, to bring it off, she said’ (line 
159). Therefore, while the poem has been read by Louis Menand as ‘not about spiritual dryness so 
much as it is about the ways in which spiritual dryness has been perceived’ (Discovering Modernism 89; 
author’s italics), I argue that it is Eliot’s own channelling of his sources that makes them definitively 
into perceptions of dryness when they weren’t suggestive of it in their original context. If the poet 
also reproduces civilisation’s act of abstracting water for its own ends, there is again a suggestion 
that we, hypocrite lecteurs, are culpable in the creation of the arid landscape seen in the final section of 
the poem. 
 
                                                 
6
 Eliot’s reference can be found at 2.2.202 in Antony and Cleopatra (Arden Shakespeare: Third Series) 139. 
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‘The use of counterfactual history’: Mythic time, clock time and climatic time 
‘The resource of fiction’, writes Latour, ‘can bring––through the use of counterfactual history, 
thought experiments, and “scientifiction”––the solid objects of today into the fluid states where 
their connections with humans may make sense’ (Reassembling 82). This approach is potentially the 
most valuable of actor-network-theory’s criteria to this thesis, because it is inherently aligned with 
literary practice. Eliot’s poetics reshapes mythology into a distinctive fiction, one he plays off 
against modernity; the poem ‘always uses the cultural echo to reveal a vacancy within the modern 
event to which it is ironically applied’, says Nicholls (279). While modernity aspires to arrest the 
change of Latour’s ‘solid objects’ into ‘fluid states’, myth plays off against this by showing the 
deeper narratives in which they – and we – are implicated. As we have seen in Solnit’s remarks on 
the Colorado River, the more assertive we are in our impositions on the environment, the greater 
are the changes we are not able to foresee. 
In ‘The Fire Sermon’, the close appearance of the ‘Sweet Thames’ and the ‘dull canal’ (lines 176, 
183–84, 189), for instance, juxtaposes a mythic version of a river – a natural watercourse – with the 
grubby reality of an artificial one. But this goes beyond the contrast of ‘hot water’ and ‘closed car’ in 
‘A Game of Chess’, as the image of the canal-fisher acquires a ritual association: ‘Musing upon the 
king my brother’s wreck’ (line 191) is a reworking of pagan vegetation ceremonies, something Eliot 
indicates by his reference to Sir J. G. Frazer’s The Golden Bough, ‘especially the two volumes Adonis, 
Attis, Osiris’, in the ‘Notes’ to the poem (Complete 76). The cyclical, seasonal motif belongs to mythic 
rather than urban time. Eliot’s contrast between modernity and mythology can be read in the light 
of Latour’s repudiation of clock time – political ecology, he declares, ‘has to modify the mechanism 
that generates the difference between the past and the future; it has to suspend the tick-tock that 
gave the temporality of the moderns its rhythm’ (Politics 189). This is because the attempt to jettison 
the past and separate ourselves from nature marks the proliferation of hybrid phenomena, quasi-
objects such as climate change, as Latour proposes in We Have Never Been Modern. Reading The Waste 
Land, Robert Crawford is particularly attentive to the difference between time schemes, pointing 
out that ‘In cities, where the seasons’ impact is dulled, the rituals of fertility seem to lose their 
meaning, but they continue, processing like scenes in a play’ (144), in a sham of their richness. The 
city actively downplays the cycles in modernity’s attempt to achieve historical progression, just as in 
‘The Burial of the Dead’ a layer of ‘forgetful snow’ and ‘sudden frost’ prevents the growth of the 
past into the present (lines 6, 73).  
With its effort to establish identity, the “self” of civilisation tries to construct barriers around it 
that signal its autonomy. In so doing, it imagines itself cut off from the very living environment on 
which it depends, failing to share Alaimo’s ‘recognition that the very substance of the self is 
interconnected with vast biological, economic, and industrial systems that can never be entirely 
mapped or understood’ (Bodily 95). But the past cannot be comprehensively buried in The Waste 
Land: ‘It is impossible to keep them [dead bones] underground’, Ellmann comments (94), 
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prompting the narrator’s question to Stetson at lines 71–2: ‘That corpse you planted last year in 
your garden / Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom this year?’ Eliot’s likening of  the dead to plants 
anticipates one of  the tenets of  Morton’s dark ecology: ‘Nature is what keeps on coming back, an 
inert horrifying presence and a mechanical repetition. Environmentalism cannot mourn the loss of  
the environment, for that would be to accept its loss, even to kill it, if  only symbolically. The task is 
not to bury the dead but to join them’ (EwN 201). Morton goes on, in ‘The Dark Ecology of  
Elegy’, to advocate that ‘Environmental elegy must,’ rather than get over the loss of  nature, ‘hang 
out in melancholia and refuse to work through mourning to the illusory other side’ (256). In the 
figure of  Tiresias, who has ‘walked among the lowest of  the dead’ (line 246), The Waste Land fulfils 
this function and keeps us among the dead, to remind us of  the shaping role of  what civilisation 
tries to exclude. 
The modernist mode exposes such a project of demarcation as being fraught with ecological 
contradictions. It exhibits the pervasive irony of Szerszynski’s cultural modernism and expresses an 
understanding of the dynamic, risky world described by Latour and Beck. The Waste Land values 
and proliferates mixings of nature and culture along Szerszynski’s lines (‘Post-Ecologist’ 351), using 
the literary technique to challenge civilised practice and preconceptions. The attempt at isolation 
leads the contemporary, commodifying mindset to dam up the river, just as it separates ‘hot water’ 
from rain, domestic utility from environmental impact. The ‘wreck’ of the king (line 191), inasmuch 
as it is a physical presence, is then adrift in the Thames, cut off from its source. By contrast, the 
drowned sailor Phlebas ‘passed the stages of his age and youth / Entering the whirlpool’ (lines  
318–19). His human life ends in the sea, time has dissolved for him and has no linear progression in 
the way that civilisation strives to have. In the turning of the whirlpool, time is necessarily cyclical. 
The sea cuts Phlebas off from the grounded narratives that civilisation makes for itself on the 
landmasses, and it gives us access to mythic time. It seeps into the history of the poem despite 
civilisation’s attempts to suppress or ignore it and civilisation cannot escape from the deeper order 
of nature. What Phlebas ‘[f]orgot’ after his death, ‘the cry of gulls, and the deep sea swell / And the 
profit and loss’ (lines 313–14) represent in Iovino’s terms another ‘congealing’ of animal, oceanic 
and economic processes, a vortex that we willingly forget alive. 
On terra firma there is a contrasting attempt to separate and distinguish the past. In his own 
book The Waste Land, Grover Smith uses the suggestive analogy of strata for the poem’s 
organisation of history, arguing that its landscape is ‘made of interpenetrating layers of diverse 
cultural ages’ (23), although the ‘forgetful snow’ (Waste line 6) figures humanity’s attempt to stop 
their interpenetration with the present. Smith only refers to cultural ages – that is, the stages of 
history. Once history is stratified, time ought to take on its human significance as a series of 
progressing moments, landlocked and kept apart from mythic time. But no such separation is 
possible, given that water itself is mutable, appearing in the poem as snow, frost, rivers, seas, canals 
and clouds. At a moment when progress and civilised capitalism are signified by commuters making 
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their way to jobs in the City, there is still a strong diluvian hint in Eliot’s description ‘A crowd 
flowed over London Bridge’ (line 62). A bridge designed to cross a river is not up to much if it lets 
anything ‘flow over’ it. The strength of the verb can be seen too in the typesetting error that it 
prompted. Jim McCue notes that the Hogarth Press edition, ‘hand-set by Virginia Woolf, [...] 
contained the assertion that “A crowd flowed under London Bridge” – a ludicrous aquatic vision’ 
(‘Editing Eliot’ 5). When the narrator then encounters Stetson on the bridge and enquires about the 
corpse, his final question is ‘has the sudden frost disturbed its bed?’ (line 73). The cold snap has the 
potential to freeze the past, preventing its renewal into the present, while locking dangerous water 
into the form of  ice and keeping the dead buried.  
Winter is a season that crops up unseasonably often in The Waste Land. Marianne Thormählen 
flags up that ‘A brief inspection of seasonal changes throughout the poem emphasises its 
discontinuity’ (The Waste Land: A Fragmentary Wholeness 94), while for Habib, ‘Eliot’s presentation of 
the seasons as unnaturally disordered is marked with the history of human attempts to understand 
and control the seasonal cycle: the seasons themselves have comprised a universal point of identical 
reference, as indices of humanity’s definitions of reality’ (235). The disorder represented by 
contemporary climate change is not just testament to the agency of wild nature, but to the 
entanglement of our attempts to manage it with its contrary reactions. The persistent winter of The 
Waste Land itself signifies the effort to hold water, along with the processes that it signifies and in 
which it participates, in stasis. This attests to the fear of a ‘collapse of boundaries that centrally 
disturbs the text’ in Ellmann’s reading of it (94).  
Given this stasis, even water in its different states can constitute a form of separation or flood 
defence. Once we are conscious of this, it refreshes our reading of the opening lines of the poem: 
 
April is the cruellest month, breeding 
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing 
Memory and desire, stirring 
Dull roots with spring rain (lines 1–4). 
 
Spring, traditionally welcomed as the world’s return to life, is here feared because of the ‘stirring’ 
caused by the rain it brings, the penetration of shoots from the ground, breaking through from the 
buried past. Reread in the twenty-first century, Eliot’s ‘seasonal nihilism’ (Thormählen 94 n.119) 
also offers a way of contrasting the conception of seasonal order with the seasonal disruption for 
which climate change has been blamed, as Bate notes (Romantic 2; see Chapter 1, p.24 of this thesis). 
 
‘Innovations in the artisan’s workshop’: Exposing ecological process 
The poem could have ended up colder still, however. To explain why it did not I shall return to 
Latour’s first criterion: that is, ‘to study innovations in the artisan’s workshop’ as ‘one of the first 
privileged places where objects can be maintained longer as visible, distributed, accounted 
mediators’ (Reassembling 80; author’s italics). The published Facsimile of The Waste Land’s drafts 
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allows us access to the changes Eliot made in response to Vivien Eliot’s and Ezra Pound’s 
comments on the MSS and TSS. One of the processes thus traceable is that, by removing  
scene-setting passages, Pound ensures that the poem more jarringly juxtaposes its different locales, 
creating a much more compact global scope and exacerbating tensions between its ‘fragments’, 
between ‘waste’ and ‘land’. A location afforded unusual prominence by the irregularity of the 
resultant structure is the seascape of part IV, ‘Death by Water’. The brevity of this section 
compared with the others in the poem paradoxically draws more attention to each of its lines.  
This was not the case during the poem’s composition. Eliot’s MS contains an account of a sea 
voyage that ends up in the Arctic: 
 
And dead ahead we saw, where sky and sea should meet 
A line, a white line, a long white line, 
A wall, a barrier, towards which we drove. 
My God man there’s bears on it. 
Not a chance (Facsimile 61; lines 75–78). 
 
This location, both a physical and mythical end of the world, was excised by Pound in an act of 
editorial deglaciation. What remains in the poem as published are only the lines in which the body 
of ‘Phlebas the Phoenician, a fortnight dead […] rose and fell’ in the currents (lines 312–16). With 
the disappearance of the icecap, ‘Death by Water’ has no wider context and Phlebas is surrounded 
by nothing but the Mediterranean, located between the Carthage at the end of ‘The Fire Sermon’ 
and the allusively situated desert of ‘What the Thunder Said’. This jump-cut is a further instance of 
brokendown structure: it is not just the content of a drowned man that ‘troubles’ us about ‘Death 
by Water’, in Sheehan’s terms, but the manner in which the poem presents him. Pound’s removal of 
the Arctic context for The Waste Land increases the sea’s level of importance as an image. Water 
floods the rest of the poem, releasing the frozen past into its present. The water table that underlies 
the poem is also hinted at in Grover Smith’s critical diction – he observes ‘It is difficult to find lines 
simply stolen, not worked into the myth [...] because everything tends to flow together’ (113). 
Reading water as the defining image of The Waste Land does not necessarily give it a structural role: 
its very changes of state, its fluidity, mean that it permeates the poem rather than organising it. 
The poem’s breakdown of contextual boundaries can provide a way of understanding it in 
relation to climate change: because boundary breakdown is temporal as well as spatial and 
conceptual, the hybrid, material agency of climate change imposes itself on retrospective readings. 
As Lanchester points out: ‘I suspect we’re reluctant to think about it [climate change] because we’re 
worried that if we start we will have no choice but to think about nothing else’ (3). When we 
entertain climate change’s implications to their full extent, it conditions even our encounters with 
the literary canon. Texts are then reinterpreted in changing climates of reading, so long as we carry 
on reading them. Timothy Clark more broadly remarks: 
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The futural reading further decentres human agency, underlining the fragility and contingency of  
effective boundaries between public and private, objects and persons, the ‘innocent’ and ‘guilty,’ 
human history and natural history, the traumatic and the banal, and (with technology) the 
convenient and the disenfranchising (‘Scale’ 106).  
 
Such a decentring of human agency is dramatised in the course of The Waste Land. 
  
Whether forecast 
The tension between cultural and natural forces at work in The Waste Land raises the question of 
whether contemporary civilisation is in a position to successfully impose any organising principle 
on nature. I have already drawn on critical debate over whether the poem itself exhibits any such 
principle. Rainey specifically poses the question in the context of the drafts, asking ‘Did one 
passage or fragment antedate the others and preserve the trace of an original program which […] 
later dissolved?’ (‘Eliot Among the Typists’ 28). Perloff maintains that ‘“What the Thunder Said,” 
for example, is left virtually untouched by Pound,’ and that, crucially, it is ‘here Eliot discovered his 
quest theme and brought it to a swift and dramatic conclusion’ (175). This is to take Eliot at his 
word, though, in the anthropological citations of his notes: Perloff’s position thus still demands a 
mythic author figure around whom to organise the text, much as her reading of the poem’s London 
depends on the city’s reality. As I have suggested, the selves of modernism and contemporary 
climate change command no such authority, while the environments of both are without their 
cohesive, organising power. In contrast to the teleology Perloff lends the poem, Thormählen points 
out that ‘the fragments [Pound] cancelled contain fewer myth/legend relevancies than the 
published parts of The Waste Land’ (68), so even when we scour the drafts for evidence of missing 
links in the poem’s schema, they are not actually present.  
The question of whether or not there is or was ever a pattern is an important one to consider in 
the context of a contemporary, climate-informed reading of The Waste Land. If there is a structure 
to the mythical nature that underlies the poem – in, say, the turn of the seasons – then there are 
grounds for saying that the ‘damp gust / Bringing rain’ (lines 393–4) towards the end may offer the 
‘relief’ longed for at the start of the poem (line 23). That relief could take the form of a wet spring 
following a barren winter, or a mild autumn after a summer drought. But already we have seen 
Crawford liken the urban seasonal cycle to a dumb show, while Thormählen asserts that ‘the poem 
begins with the one explicit instance of regeneration it contains’ (94; author’s italics), her implication 
being that a redemptive interpretation cannot be sustained. 
In this respect, The Waste Land offers a way for a culture to articulate and examine its 
environmental concerns. It presents an analogue for scientific uncertainty over the extent to which 
we, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, are locked in to anthropogenic climate change 
by our historic greenhouse gas emissions and whether warming is taking place gradually or will 
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happen abruptly.7 The question is whether the earth’s ecosystems will now sustain a state that can 
support human life, given the impact that humanity has already had on them. Crawford draws on 
the contested pattern of The Waste Land to offer two alternative interpretations of its conclusion, 
and the point at which they fork is over the poem’s tacit framing of this environmental question: 
can it be read as offering us any chance of redemption, any hope that we will emerge from the 
wasteland’s parched landscape? The first alternative that Crawford proposes is ‘if the awaited rain 
fell at the poem’s end, it would only lead back to that beginning, “breeding / Lilacs out of the dead 
land,” with all its attendant suffering’. In this case, Crawford continues, ‘The “Shantih” at the 
poem’s end may be simply a way of stopping, [the] “formal ending”’ to which Eliot refers in his 
notes (Crawford 148–9; citing Eliot Complete 80). The second interpretation is an ‘exhausted 
collapse’ (Crawford 149), condemning us to remain among the red rocks.  
I contend that we cannot make an assessment of what The Waste Land means today without 
drawing on our understanding of the future. The question is, then, whether we can attempt the 
radical transformation of our relationship with the environment, to maintain or restore contested 
ecological patterns, for all the ‘attendant suffering’ this will entail; or whether we will pursue what 
environmentalists dub “business as usual” until the point of our own exhaustion or a systemic 
collapse in the planet’s ability to sustain us. Where Robert Pogue Harrison saw in Eliot’s vision the 
beginning of the wasteland within, the environmental neglect of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries manifests the aridity of the poetic wasteland in the world around us. Or, to rephrase 
Harrison’s remark, what Eliot identified as a cultural malaise is now an environmental one as well; 
we are in the endgame of the poet’s Game of Chess. This recognition forces us to re-examine our 
foundational fictions of nature and culture – as I will do in the next chapter through my readings of 
Wallace Stevens. 
                                                 
7
 Nigel Clark reflects in ‘Volatile Worlds, Vulnerable Bodies’ on ‘The abrupt climate change thesis’ that ‘speaks of 
thresholds which, once passed, leave climate systems tipping rapidly and irretrievably into alternative states’ (32). 
  
Chapter 3  
‘Out of nothing to have come on major weather’: Wallace Stevens’s 
fictions of our climate 
 
The poetry of Wallace Stevens is preoccupied with the meteorological and seasonal, and the term 
‘climate’ therefore carries extra weight in his writing than its more straightforward, idiomatic usage. 
Moreover, his persistent worrying away at notions of metaphor in his verse elides easy distinctions 
between literal and figurative, reference and referent. Howarth remarks that Stevens’s use of 
metaphor ‘does not […] allow you a secure vista on a scene from which you are safely excluded, 
and which then could not be believed in. Far more often, what starts out as a description turns out 
to be a series of shifting metaphors where the observer and the observed switch places’ (132). 
Stevens’s poetry expresses an awareness that we cannot separate ourselves from the world to regard 
it objectively, and recognises that perception is always entangled with conception. Having proposed 
that climate change demands a discourse that situates us within its complexity, multiplicity, 
contradiction and provisionality, I argue here that Stevens offers a poetics that can explore, manage 
and keep in tension these different states of mind and world. 
In this chapter, I will read Stevens’s work as a reminder that the experience of nature cannot be 
separated from the human imagination: pristine Nature is a myth of the mind, but a persistent one. 
Stevens’s recognition of the imagination’s intrinsic involvement in creating the world can be 
illuminated by Latour’s notion of hybridity and the quasi-object to reveal a world neither entirely 
objective in its presence nor totally subjective as experience. In poetic terms, the world is what 
Stevens understands as ‘fiction’. By failing to recognise this fictive, hybrid quality, civilisation 
supposes a separate natural realm into which it can cast its waste, in particular the intangible 
emission of greenhouse gases. As a result, we make what is, in Stevens’s opus, a metaphorical 
creation of nature into a material re-creation of it. Stevens identifies the imaginative root of our 
relation with the climate. As Gyorgyi Voros asserts in Notations of the Wild (1997), a ‘striking parallel 
exists between the current environmental movement’s political and philosophical need to 
reenvision the world and humanity’s place in it and Wallace Stevens’s artistic, visionary articulations 
of the same questions’ (18). Rather than assume that we have easy access to an independent nature, 
Stevens continually returns to the question of how we constitute the world, acknowledging both the 
necessity and the pleasure of making fictive engagements with it. Such awareness is valuable to our 
understanding of contemporary climate change, because the rate and quality of its phenomena 
require perpetual interrogation and re-interrogation. 
Stevens’s poems enact the failure of language to master or contain the world, and deal both 
implicitly and explicitly with the climate’s evasion of and resistance to our intentionality. He depicts 
the way humanity’s imaginative intervention in the world aggravates non-intentional natural agency. 
Voros points out that ‘If complete identification existed between human consciousness and 
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“objective” world,’ that is, if reference and referent were identical, ‘there would be no need for 
language’ (118). She contends that metaphor’s ‘efficiency lies in conveying a concept by way of an 
image’ while ‘its profligacy lies in that excess that spills over’ (119), and it is the tension between the 
two forces that I will be exploring in Stevens’s poetry in this chapter. 
My previous chapter began by considering the limited ecocriticism on modernist writing. I will 
make a similar endeavour here by examining a brief range of ecocritical responses to Stevens’s 
poem ‘Anecdote of the Jar’. Through my own reading of this poem, I will show that the scope of 
Stevens’s metaphors enables them to be read both as cultural mediations of the world and with 
more direct application to the ‘thing itself’, without being reducible to either. I will then proceed 
into a broader examination of Stevens’s use of seasonal and meteorological metaphor, and the 
implications of this for a poetics and criticism of climate change. Stevens’s choice of such imagery 
reads differently in the early twenty-first century because the terms in which we understand its 
vehicle – that is, climate – have changed so radically that they affect our understanding of his tenor. 
While the climate of Stevens’s poetry is fictive, this does not make it false: its creative 
manifestations of abstract phenomena offer a cultural complement to the science of climate 
modelling, as I go on to explain. In concluding the chapter, I will use the terms of Stevens’s own 
‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ (Collected Poetry & Prose 329–52) to suggest that the poems of our 
climate change ‘Must Be Abstract’, ‘Must Change’ and ‘Must Give Pleasure’. I will read both this 
long poem and selections from Stevens’s opus by considering these qualities. Having situated 
visions of Nature in their mythic tradition in previous chapters, I will use the criteria of Stevens’s 
supreme fiction to explore the material challenge that climate change presents to these necessary 
but contingent myths. 
 
Anecdotal evidence: Ecocriticism on Stevens 
Stevens’s poem ‘Anecdote of the Jar’ (1919; collected in Harmonium 1923)1 is the focus of several 
proto-ecocritical and ecocritical readings, which illustrate different approaches for the discipline. 
The poem’s three quatrains support, but do not necessarily verify, these interpretations. This 
concision of potential meaning is valuable to a climate change poetics, because it shows how a 
literary text can be adaptive and responsive, and enact or enable an array of different environmental 
engagements. Whatever their differing emphases, however, these readings all indicate the role of 
both cultural and phenomenal forces in creating and shaping the world. In the poem, Stevens 
explores the interplay between an environing wilderness and a human product: he ascribes a restless 
agency to this ‘wilderness’ that ‘rose up to’ a ‘jar’, a totem of human manufacture placed on a hill in 
Tennessee; but the jar nevertheless ‘took dominion everywhere’. This puts wild nature at odds with 
cultural artefact, not so much as opposing forces but rather as symbolising competing claims about 
the construction of the world. 
                                                 
1
 Dates given for subsequent poems discussed in this chapter will be those of their first appearance in a collection, 
unless otherwise stated. 
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The political import of the jar’s ‘dominion’ is taken up by Michael Herr in his Vietnam war 
journalism, when he writes: ‘Once it was all locked in place, Khe Sanh [Combat Base] became like 
the planted jar in Wallace Stevens’[s] poem. It took dominion everywhere’ (Dispatches 90). Herr 
draws attention to the way the base colonised not physical territory but the political imagination, 
and ‘had become a passion, the false love object in the heart of the Command’. Herr’s allusion is in 
turn considered by Frank Lentricchia in Modernist Quartet (1994), where he elaborates on its 
environmental resonances: ‘Stevens is made by Herr to speak directly against the ideology of 
imposition and obliteration coactive in Vietnam with a strategy of defoliation’ (23). Robert Kern 
then cites both readings and summarises their trajectory: ‘With its concern about defoliation and 
thus environmental imperialism, Lentricchia’s political reading begins to edge toward a more fully 
ecocritical account’ of the poem than Herr’s (‘Ecocriticism: What is it Good For?’ 268; author’s 
italics). This presents an ecocritical reading of Stevens that expands the realm of the political 
beyond its conventional boundaries as a solely human concern and into the environmental. Kern’s 
reading aligns itself with second-wave ecocritical concerns about environmental social justice. 
Robert Pogue Harrison’s philosophical approach to ‘Anecdote of the Jar’, by contrast, is in the 
more grounded terms of first-wave ecocriticism: he suggests that the ‘jar provides the surrounding 
nature with a measure of containment, of human containment’ (‘Hic Jacet’ 395; author’s italics). In 
the context of a broader argument about architecture, humanity and deracination, he asserts ‘Places 
do not occur naturally but are created by human beings through some mark or sign of human 
presence’. He argues that the poem ‘describes the minimal conditions of this sort of place-making’ 
because ‘the placement of the jar has established a horizon of reference’ for the poem’s ‘slovenly 
wilderness’ (395). This is complicated by ‘the fact that the speaker “placed a jar in Tennessee”: that 
there was already a place there in which to place the jar’ (403), because the state bears the 
Cherokee-derived name before the speaker intervenes. Tennessee is already a place, humanly 
defined, rather than a nonhuman “space”. This prompts Harrison to declare ‘We are all latecomers, 
even those of us who believe we are firstcomers’ (403). Human presence retrospectively affects our 
understanding of nature, which is for Stevens inescapably an idea rather than an objective fact. The 
political ‘dominion’ that Herr, Lentricchia and Kern identify is thus shown to be a contingent 
fiction. 
In ‘Not Ideas About the Thing but the Thing Itself’, Harrison asserts that ‘the idea of nature and 
the nature of the idea are correlated’ (661) in Stevens’s work. This means our attempts to conceive 
of ‘the inconceivable priority of nature’ are subject to ‘the ever-receding priority of the real’ (667, 
668). We are forced to acknowledge that our attempt to get past a fiction of nature is impossible. 
‘Anecdote of the Jar’ demonstrates Stevens’s recognition that Nature is a human gesture that 
confirms human identity, as I discussed in my first chapter. But the poem also figures that gesture’s 
circularity, enacting and eliding – continually and cyclically – the separation of culture and nature. 
This is evidenced in the roundness of the jar as an image, the repetition of ‘hill’ at the end of both 
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second and fourth lines in the first quatrain (rather than a conventional rhyme), and the poem’s 
spiralling return of sound in ‘surround’, ‘around’, ‘round’ and ‘ground’. In his reading of the poem, 
Roy Sellars notes the priority that the poem’s syntax gives to human conceptions, because ‘The 
adjective “slovenly”, arriving in the vanguard, gives the “wilderness” it will qualify no chance’ 
(‘Waste and Welter’ 40). The poem syntactically embodies the processes of human manufacture and 
civilisation by making us, as its readers, latecomers, as surely as we are in our environment. The 
landscape’s evasion of these imposed human terms is then seen in the final verse, which moves 
away from the enclosure of a rhymed couplet, ‘everywhere’/‘bare’ in the first two lines, to an 
unrhymed one, ‘bush’/‘Tennessee’, in the second pair. The reflexivity of our engagement with the 
‘wilderness’ is recognised by Lentricchia, who describes the imposition of jar on landscape as an act 
of ‘imaginative imperialism [...] activated and subtly evaluated’ in the poem (23). This quality of 
mutual activation and evaluation means the jar both focuses and fails to organise the ‘wilderness’ 
around it. That duality in turn makes the New World landscape, in Tony Sharpe’s words, ‘the site of 
possible despair and defeat, or victorious self-affirmation, or […] the site, simultaneously of both’ 
(Wallace Stevens: A Literary Life 10).  
By negotiating these different ecocritical readings, I am not claiming that the discipline merely 
adds its own voice to the conversation about the poem. To do so would be to dismiss the 
distinctive quality of a green reading, as George S. Lensing seems to do more sweepingly when he 
says ‘all the fashions of theory have keyed to Stevens as a tuning fork for their own reverberations’ 
(Wallace Stevens and the Seasons ix). A climate-change-inflected reading can and should entertain all the 
previous ecocritical accounts of ‘Anecdote of the Jar’, because together they demonstrate that a 
poem can signify concisely the multiple contexts and scales that climate change prompts us to 
consider. The sense of environmental belatedness that emerges in Harrison’s account also offers 
‘Anecdote of the Jar’ as the embodiment of the concerns I raised in my first chapter about the time 
lag between the persistent myth of an independent, sublime Nature and the world as a Latourian 
quasi-object, in which the hybridity of cultural and natural forcings becomes manifest.  
Discussing the recursive structures of Stevens’s poetry, J. Hillis Miller writes in The Linguistic 
Moment that they exhibit ‘some play with the figure of container and thing contained or with an 
inside/outside opposition that reverses itself. Inside becomes outside, outside inside, dissolving the 
polarity’ (403). The ‘jar’ provides a symbol for this structural effect, negotiating between a 
supposedly independent nature “outside” us and a manufactured product originating “inside” 
culture. It has a double allegiance to earth and ether, being both ‘round upon the ground / And tall 
and of a port in air’ (Collected 61). In these lines, rhyme and elongated, assonant vowels – ‘round’ 
and ‘ground’; ‘tall’ and ‘port’ – relate the jar’s attributes to the external environment, and the vowel 
sounds keeping that relationship open and suggestive as well as audible.  
Our presence in the world creates and keeps re-creating Nature, and the ‘jar’ is also then a 
verbal discontinuity that jolts us from our complacency in assuming that the world only exists as a 
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foundation for culture. It is the failure to keep natural forces buried that prompts the jarring of and 
breakdown in order in The Waste Land, but rather than repeating that poem’s effort of suppression, 
‘Anecdote of the Jar’ recounts an attempt to control or reduce nature at the same time as 
acknowledging the impossibility of doing so. Both Stevens and Eliot imagine a mythic, prehuman 
nature, as a kind of legal fiction to contextualise civilised existence. Stevens complements Eliot in 
that, where Eliot is concerned with modernity’s abortive attempts at progress out of and away from 
the natural, Stevens traces language’s provisionality in mastering or comprehending this wilderness. 
In the image of the jar, Stevens transforms the Romantic sublime of Keats’s Grecian urn into a 
mass-manufactured product, a souvenir for what is lost.2 
The Grecian urn reproduces a vision of classical nature, where in contrast Stevens’s empty vessel 
is ‘gray and bare’, devoid of representation. The transition from Romantic image to modernist 
symbol signifies a quality of abstraction that is valuable to consideration of climate change, because 
rather than seeking to imitate the scene of nature, the jar relates to what is beyond sensory 
experience. Bonnie Costello’s account of Stevens’s work maintains that his ‘abstractions are 
prompted in physical reality’ (‘US Modernism I: Moore, Stevens and the Modernist Lyric’ 164). By 
its process of abstraction, the poem stands apart from its historical moment and enables a  
climate-conscious rereading a century later. The obliqueness of Stevens’s exploration of relations 
between imagination and world means it can be read today to appreciate how, over the course of 
the twentieth century, anthropogenic environmental change re-inscribes its supposed ‘dominion’ in 
the material world and the ‘slovenly’ climate resists such control. Civilisation’s failure to share 
Stevens’s recognition of nature and culture’s mutual contingency is what underwrites human-
instigated change, because by ignoring our imaginative responsibility in the creation of Nature as an 
idea, we effect a separation that becomes increasingly specious as the climate materially changes. As 
such, it is as though we have surrounded ourselves with metaphorical jars that take Stevens’s image 
as their prototype: to recap Bill McKibben’s words ‘By changing the weather, we make every spot 
on earth man-made and artificial […] Nature’s independence is its meaning; without it there is 
nothing but us’ (54; author’s italics). We fill the open, empty jar continually with our changing 
conceptions of the world, our abstractions contained on the ground. Therefore, there is no need to 
oppose the way the way that the poem ‘has been read in terms of the endless Stevensian dialectic of 
reality and imagination’ with more ecologically committed readings, as Kern implicitly does (267). 
In mediating between the human creation of wilderness and our simultaneous failure to contain 
evasive nature, the ‘Anecdote of the Jar’ is a crucial organising fiction that helps us understand 
something of the phenomenal reality that escapes our sense experience. To quote Stevens’s own 
adage on this kind of fiction: ‘The final belief is to believe in a fiction, which you know to be a 
fiction, there being nothing else. The exquisite truth is to know that it is a fiction and that you 
                                                 
2
 Helen Vendler describes ‘Anecdote of the Jar’ as ‘a palinode’ or a poem of retraction, ‘a vow to stop imitating Keats 
and seek a native[,] American language that will not take the wild out of the wilderness’ (Wallace Stevens: Words 
Chosen Out of Desire 46). That language, however, is what bestows the quality of wild on the wilderness in my 
reading. 
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believe in it willingly’ (Collected 903). The jar, like the poem in which it appears, is both a work of 
artifice and open to the air it contains, as in Miller’s reading. The problem, both for Stevens and 
ourselves, is being aware of and resisting the tendency that Thomas C. Grey pinpoints in The 
Wallace Stevens Case, when ‘in the presence of great external events, fact’ threatens to ‘overwhelm 
[…] imagination’ (29). To regard factual modes as the only possible way of communicating a ‘great 
external event’ is to conflate the fictional with the untrue, making us inclined to dismiss it. In the 
case of climate change, though, the ‘event’ is not simply external but entangled with human 
concepts and practices, so we cannot pretend it is something to be mimetically represented in text. 
Fictionalising it therefore becomes necessary. Stevens entertains fictive or speculative relations 
between things to help come to terms with them, demonstrating that ‘circumstances apparently 
intractable to aesthetic treatment [are] in fact both in need of and amenable to it’ (Sharpe 142). 
Understanding the function of a supreme fiction of our climate in this way, I contend that Kern 
is wrong to suggest that the ‘dominion’ of the jar is ‘merely imagined’ (269; my italics), or in 
Lawrence Buell’s terms that ‘what it seems to yield is merely our own construction’ of nature 
(Writing 153). It is, rather, necessarily imagined. Sellars is alive to the value of the poem as a discourse. 
He remarks that, formally speaking, ‘Anecdotes are generous’, connoting something loose and 
casual while being to the point: therefore, ‘a reader expecting philosophical positions or citable 
results will struggle to decide if there have been any’ (40). In ‘Anecdote of the Jar’, this uncertainty 
surrounds our attempts to read culture and nature as separate, which means the jar as symbol can 
be endlessly recycled to provide dynamic readings changing as the climate changes. 
 
Some poems of our climate 
The value of Stevensian metaphor to the expression of our environmental relations lies in its hybrid 
quality. In the form of the jar, it represents a simultaneous containment and opening into the 
‘wilderness’. Stevens develops metaphors of the natural beyond ‘wilderness’, though, and terms 
such as ‘climate’, ‘weather’, ‘season’ and their associated lexicon are among the keywords of his 
poetry. To focus on these might seem unproblematically descriptive or topical, if we were to take 
them as literal. Likewise, we could be reductively symbolic if we consider them only in aesthetic 
terms, as Lensing does in his study Wallace Stevens and the Seasons (2001), which investigates ‘the 
elaborate and prolific metaphor of the seasons that would deny the egotism of the self in autumn and 
winter but reward its appetites in spring and summer’ (17; my italics). But in the context of the 
skilful equivocation between cultural and essential constitutions of nature in ‘Anecdote of the Jar’, I 
will suggest that Stevens’s metaphorical meteorology makes the climate a product of both human 
and material phenomena. 
Stevens’s metaphorical exploration of the human–climate relation anticipates climate change’s 
material emergence as a product of that relation over the twentieth century. To read the climate in 
this way fictionalises it: not in the sense that the climate is a falsehood, but in that it becomes more 
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readily comprehensible in human terms. As in fiction, we see the significance of the general as it 
resonates in imagined particulars; in Costello’s words, ‘metaphors’ for Stevens are ‘changes wrought 
on reality in order to engage with it’ (‘US Modernism’ 171). The value of a climatic fiction is that it 
suggests our understanding of the world can only ever be provisional. Tim Armstrong points out 
that for Stevens, ‘Weather is a particularly engaging metaphor for that which resists order’ (121). 
Stevens’s work can be usefully read by material ecocriticism, because both attend to the quality of 
generative openness in our environments. These play as much of a part in constituting us as we do 
in constituting them, resisting our linguistic and cultural order. Where Eliot dramatises this 
recognition through a collapse of received boundaries and collision of fragmenting discourses, 
Stevens enacts it in the reflexive examination of the imagination, in the attempt to distinguish what 
is characteristically human and what the human – as self or as civilisation – projects on to the 
world.  
‘A Postcard from the Volcano’ (1936) is one exploration of this relationship. The presence of 
‘the opulent sun’ in this poem symbolises, for Helen Vendler, ‘The persistence of nature’ (Wallace 
Stevens: Words Chosen Out of Desire 34), and is contrasted by Stevens with the voice of someone who 
perished in an eruption: ‘Children picking up our bones / Will never know that these were once / 
As quick as foxes on the hill’ (Collected 128). As the largest source of energy for the terrestrial 
biosphere, one which will not be affected by the deterioration of that system, the sun bears out the 
persistence of one paradigm of nature, the causal but indifferent physical principles of Soper’s 
second definition. But the narrator also informs us ‘that with our bones / We left much more, left 
what still is / The look of things, left what we felt // At what we saw’. That is, ways of perceiving 
the world also persist, and along with the input of solar energy they come to bear on the way we 
now view the world. But Stevens problematises our ignorance of the way these perceptions survive 
in language and their continued mediation of the solar reality: ‘Children […] / Will speak our 
speech and never know’. The danger for us lies in our failure to recognise the hegemony that 
conventional ideas of Nature still exert, even when environmental conditions have radically altered. 
The ‘dirty house in a gutted world, / A tatter of shadows peaked to white’ (129) of Stevens’s poem 
is the ruined remnant of the Romantic sublime. The ‘dirty house’ and ‘gutted world’ do not 
represent the concentration of human control of the environment that he symbolises in the 
‘Anecdote of the Jar’, but being ‘gutted’, the world is also emptied of intrinsic value, like the jar. 
When the house is ‘Smeared with the gold of the opulent sun’, the rays are not merely physical 
phenomena but invested with the aesthetic value of gold, casting an ironic sheen of natural 
permanence over the historically ephemeral dwelling.  
This entanglement of solar phenomena and perception, recognised by Stevens in conceptual 
terms, becomes material with the advent of anthropogenic climate change. The line break in ‘left 
what still is / The look of things’ invites us to linger on the possibility that we have created a 
contemporary reality, ‘what still is’, before this is resolved as the appearance of a reality alone, ‘The 
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look of things’ (128). Read in the light of McKibben’s ‘end of nature’, this elision between essence 
and appearance continues in the subsequent lines, ‘The spring clouds blow / Above the shuttered 
mansion-house’ (129). In our present climate, those clouds troublingly represent the hybridised 
agency of humanity and atmosphere: how can we be certain the water vapour of which they are 
made comes from lakes and oceans, or from aeroplane contrails? We have left things that look like 
clouds, whether or not they are the clouds they once were. More than just the visual sense is 
required to appreciate our relation with, and implication in, the climate. In ‘A Postcard from the 
Volcano’, the human enclosure of the ‘dirty house’ cannot shut out its cultural legacy, which takes 
the form of ‘A spirit storming in blank walls’. The choice of ‘storming’ as a verb achieves a status 
somewhere between metaphor and description, thanks to the meteorological context Stevens has 
created in the poem. Read in the twenty-first century, where a “tradition” of accumulated 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere increasingly disrupts weather patterns, our own cultural legacy 
becomes manifest as a form of ‘spirit storming’ that likewise elides the categories of human 
conception and material phenomena.  
 
Seasoned selves 
These transpositions between vehicle and tenor of metaphor affect humanity’s position in the 
world in Stevens’s opus. His poems, Grey writes, are ‘much more about places than about people. 
True, personae flock through them, but […] they do not emerge as living characters’ (26). They are 
ghostly human figures open to the context of the imagined reality in which they are situated. While 
this resembles my account of Prufrock’s semi-permeable selfhood (see Chapter 2, pp.60–1 of this 
thesis), Stevens’s figures are rendered by an evenness of tone that applies to all aspects of the 
world, equalising human and nonhuman, rather than by the collision of discourses in which 
Prufrock is situated and by which he is constituted. This is evinced in ‘The Snow Man’ (1923), 
denotatively a ‘body of the same substance as his environment’ (Voros 139). In the poem’s context, 
this Snow Man is far more abstract than the object of creative play from childhood.  
The poem’s opening clauses seem to be self-contained: 
 
One must have a mind of winter 
To regard the frost and the boughs 
Of the pine-trees crusted with snow; 
 
And have been cold a long time 
To behold the junipers shagged with ice, 
The spruces rough in the distant glitter 
 
Of the January sun;  
(Collected 8) 
 
That is to say, the narrator might simply be describing the conditions ‘one’ would have had to 
endure in order to witness this landscape, ‘a glittering foreground—almost an obstacle—through 
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which we are made to pass’ (Vendler 49), although there is a hint of wry reflection in the tone. 
However, these observations are then qualified by the lines ‘and not to think / Of any misery in the 
sound of the wind,’ to suggest these opening states are preconditions for a perception that does not 
project human emotion on to ‘the sound of the land / Full of the same wind / That is blowing in 
the same bare place // For the listener.’ 
Emphasising the imperative quality of the preceding ‘must’ and ‘have been’, we might read the 
poem as a sort of wilderness survival challenge, in which exposure to the winter and inhabiting ‘the 
same bare place’ is essential for the ‘listener, who listens in the snow’ to become ‘nothing himself’, 
achieving total immersion. Vendler writes: ‘The effectual abolition of that listener to a vanishing-
point […] makes the poem approach the hiding-places of unintelligibility’ (49). An interpretation 
such as this valorises the wilderness over human identity, but, in contrast, we could read the ‘must’ 
and ‘have been’ as the projection of an impossible requirement, because the abolished listener 
would paradoxically have to retain the sense necessary to experience and articulate this attainment. 
The impossibility is hinted at by the repeated ‘same’ – ‘the same wind / That is blowing in the same 
bare place’ – because the need to assert that the man and land share weather and location suggests 
that we cannot instinctively experience that identity other than through its naming. Vendler 
identifies this discrepancy as ‘nature […] projected onto another plane, the plane of language’ (4). 
Even to distinguish an imagined ‘Nothing that is not there’ from ‘the nothing that is’ is to stress by 
repetition the materiality of the word ‘nothing’. The Snow Man does then resemble Prufrock in that 
his environment comprises discourse, albeit in a radically minimal form ‘on the threshold between 
naming and abstracting’ (Voros 50). In aesthetic terms, the poem’s environment is anthropogenic, a 
named ‘nothing’ invoked at its end, to complement the ambient cold’s creation of the titular figure 
in the medium of his environment and its generation of the imagination, ‘a mind of winter’.  
Stevens does not in this poem readily subscribe to a pathetic fallacy where wintry conditions 
stand for or evoke a passionless being, because weather, seasons, and indeed all that does not admit 
of human control in his work, share the intensity of the Snow Man’s winter. In the second poem of 
‘Credences of Summer’ (1947; Collected 322–6), it is not frigidity but its opposite extreme that is 
sought to disabuse us of the illusions we bring to our interactions with the world: ‘Let’s see the very 
thing and nothing else. / Let’s see it with the hottest fire of sight. / Burn everything not part of it 
to ash’. The end-stopped, declarative lines have the spareness Stevens aspires to in our perception, 
yet the imperatives here share the ambivalent quality of those in ‘The Snow Man’: they are only 
required to urge us if ‘seeing the very thing and nothing else’ is impossible. The poem goes on to 
enjoin us to ‘Trace the gold sun about the whitened sky / Without evasion by a single metaphor’, 
yet it is only through the medium of metaphor that we begin ‘tracing’ the sun, by ‘seeing with the 
hottest fire of sight’. It is as impossible to disentangle the ‘gold’ from the ‘sun’ as it was in ‘A 
Postcard from the Volcano’. By trying to see the sun in its own terms, we have to adopt a solar 
intensity of vision, and we become the environment in the way the mind of the Snow Man is ‘of 
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winter’; at the same time, we only achieve that identity through the human device of metaphor. As 
‘Credences’, these poems show that even the supposed objectivity of seeing ‘the very thing and 
nothing else’ is a matter of belief rather than superheated perception. Angus Fletcher draws on this 
terminology to account ecocritically for our experience of natural time, talking of ‘such “states” as 
partial awareness, or, to use a word from Wallace Stevens, as the credences we enter into when 
seasons and their different weathers unfold before us’ (A New Theory for American Poetry 164; 
author’s italics). 
Stevens’s paradox progresses in ‘Credences of Summer’ as the tone seems to shift from 
insistence to something approaching desperation: ‘say this, this is the centre that I seek. / Fix it in 
an eternal foliage // And fill the foliage with arrested peace’. The alliterative ‘Fix’ and ‘fill’ mime 
the effort to render a natural truth static, while the metaphor of ‘foliage’ entangled in this 
consonance is far from being burnt ‘to ash’ in the sun’s ‘essential barrenness’. The image makes an 
analogy between the human impulse to elaborate on truth, and organic growth, so that in both 
cultural and photosynthetic terms, solar energy is a driver of change and foliation in the terrestrial 
environment. The contrasting desire to fix Nature as timeless other makes Fletcher’s ‘partial 
awareness’ not just partial in the sense of incomplete but also partisan, even wilful, because it 
favours a narrow vision of Nature that collocates ‘arrested peace’ with the open refusal to admit 
alteration: ‘Joy of such permanence, right ignorance / Of change still possible’. We are commanded 
to ‘Exile desire / For what is not’ not only because that desire exists, but also to make the present 
state, ‘is’, permanent, and therefore not to wish for a change of season. We are at the limit of life 
when we reach ‘the barrenness / Of the fertile thing that can attain no more’ and seek to restrain 
natural processes of change. Voros likens it to ‘a stagnant economy, in which all commerce 
between necessity and desire, barrenness and fecundity, summer and winter, sound and silence has 
halted [...] there is no true fulfilment without both’ (123). 
Human implication in the phenomenal world, culturally and physically, is re-affirmed in the 
third poem of ‘Credences of Summer’, where the locus of ‘the barrenness / Of the fertile thing that 
can attain no more’ is identified as ‘the natural tower of all the world / The point of survey’. This is 
not a remote spot in which to reflect, though, but ‘green’s green apogee [...] a tower more precious 
than the view beyond’. The initial phrase may echo the ‘green thought in a green shade’ of Marvell’s 
‘The Garden’ (Complete Poems 101; line 48), but where the earlier poet seeks seclusion, out of the 
sun, Stevens looks for an elevated vantage point. Indeed, in the slippage of the word ‘green’ 
between Stevens’s time and ours, the recognition of our own position as the point around which 
we organise the environment – as the wilderness surrounds the jar – represents a zenith of 
ecological awareness, rather than the remoteness of an ivory tower. While the more sedate tone of 
the three stanzas of ‘Credences of Summer’ III suggests a permanence achieved by the urgent 
effort of poem II, a permanence in which ‘the sun, / Sleepless, inhales his proper air, and rests’, 
that state is profoundly contingent on human mortality, because ‘This is the refuge that the end 
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creates’. What conveys a sense of the ‘sleepless’ or the ‘proper’ is the condition not of nature qua 
nature but of approaching death. This identification of selfhood in the external world is the 
pathetic fallacy acknowledged as such. When ‘the old man standing on the tower [...] is appeased, / 
By an understanding that fulfils his age, / By a feeling capable of nothing more’, it is only his age 
that is matched with understanding, with a suggestion that there is something that exceeds his 
feeling that cannot be expressed. In that respect, these lines parallel those that concluded the 
previous section, ‘the barrenness / Of the fertile thing that can attain no more’, to suggest that it is 
our experience rather than the condition of nature that informs our understanding of the world – 
we cannot escape the anthropocentric nature of the text.  
The co-creation of world through natural phenomena and human intervention becomes more 
explicitly aesthetic in poem VIII: 
 
The trumpet of morning blows in the clouds and through 
The sky. It is the visible announced, 
It is the more than visible, the more 
Than sharp, illustrious scene. The trumpet cries 
This is the successor of the invisible. 
 
The trumpet’s sound moves from behind the weather – it ‘blows in the clouds’ – then ‘through / 
The sky’, before taking precedence as a herald, ‘the visible announced’. It alludes to the New 
Testament’s vision of the apocalypse, when the ‘the last trump’ (1 Cor. 15.52) will signal the 
resurrection of the dead, making the hitherto invisible Kingdom of God present on Earth. But 
Stevens eschews specifically Christian imagery for a more abstract formulation, in which the 
revelation is aesthetic rather than divine. 3 Music becomes synecdochal for art in this arrangement, 
because as well as being the manifestation of weather patterns as sky or clouds, ‘the visible 
announced’ is, synaesthetically, the visual expressed as the auditory. Art, then, is both the 
precondition of meteorological phenomena, ushering them into the sky, and the condition of their 
reception or ‘announcement’ in language. But the trumpet proceeds to arrogate a special status for 
its expression, as both ‘more than visible’ and ‘the successor of the invisible’, because it 
supplements our experience of the seen world before proceeding to supplant invisible phenomena. 
Later in poem VIII, Stevens writes ‘The trumpet supposes that / A mind exists, aware of division, 
aware / Of its cry as clarion, its diction’s way / As that of a personage in a multitude’. The remarks 
would invest us with the capacity to discriminate, by ‘division’, between the music’s position as 
‘clarion’ or its manner of ‘diction’, and what it heralds, were it not for the fact that this is 
supposition. By likening its manner to ‘a personage in a multitude’, Stevens also gestures at 
individual identity as a supposition, or fiction. This is tacitly confirmed by the impersonal tone of 
poem VIII and its closing line: ‘Man’s mind grown venerable in the unreal’. That unreality, an 
                                                 
3
 Basil Bunting’s reference to Judgement Day in Briggflatts is explicitly religious, depicting the angel ‘Israfel, / trumpet in 
hand / intent on the east’. He does retain the association between the announcement and weather, however, with the 
angel’s ‘cheeks swollen to blow’ and ‘whose sigh is cirrus’ (Bunting Complete Poems 72–3). 
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unacknowledged fiction, is the solipsistic separation of ourselves, as beings and as a culture, from 
our material world.  
 
Compiling the climate 
Stevens suggests that art cannot be distinguished from our perception of the world, and this serves 
a dual purpose in my discussion: first, that our fictions of Nature still colour our perception of the 
nonhuman world, in spite of the fact that, second, our physical and cultural entanglement in climate 
has exceeded the possibility of distinguishing our art(ifice) from processes such as the greenhouse 
effect or ocean circulation. In 1942’s ‘The Poems of Our Climate’ (Collected 178–9), Stevens 
scrutinises the attempt to reduce the world to a clear image derived from nature, but in doing so 
exposes the tension between the categories of ‘cultural’ and ‘natural’. The three pieces which 
comprise ‘The Poems of Our Climate’ express a simultaneous urge to bring the climate into focus 
and the necessity for the imagination to exceed that experience. Fletcher capitalises on Stevens’s 
abstraction by making ‘The Poems of Our Climate’ more typical of how we write our engagement 
with the environment. He considers Stevens as exemplifying the problems we face when trying to 
render the scale and complexity of environments into text: ‘If we turn to the poems of our climate 
as Wallace Stevens called them, we find extreme pressure put upon the classical aim of focusing 
image and action, and we ask how any reader could be expected to identify with the whole of an 
environment’ (125). In line with Fletcher’s argument, I contend that ‘The Poems of Our Climate’ 
enact our desire to reduce climate to something tangible, while acknowledging the failure of this 
process to capture the world in imagery, and the subsequent need to keep reaching beyond it and 
explore the material phenomena which it comprises. 
Stevens writes in the second of ‘The Poems of Our Climate’: ‘Say even that this complete 
simplicity / Stripped one of all one’s torments’ – as the cold does in ‘The Snow Man’ – ‘Still one 
would want more, one would need more, / More than a world of white and snowy scents’. 
Compared with the structural failure to contain the world in ice or snow in The Waste Land, Stevens 
lyrically recognises the impossibility of uninflected blankness. It is no coincidence that the imagery 
in the first of ‘The Poems of Our Climate’ is of ‘newly-fallen snow / At the end of winter when 
afternoons return’: the snow’s distinctiveness occurs when it is out of its element, in a transitional 
phase. But the emergence of spring from winter also foregrounds the clarification and reduction of 
nature in domestic environments: ‘Clear water in a brilliant bowl, / Pink and white carnations’. 
These noun-phrases verblessly concentrate the natural into interior particularity, but then broaden 
out into the less tangible ‘light / In the room more like a snowy air, / Reflecting snow’. The 
introduction of a simile and the fussy need to recapitulate its comparison as ‘Reflecting snow’ 
disrupts the imagistic simplicity of the opening lines, suggesting the conceptual effort that is needed 
to sustain those images. In the poem’s move towards colourlessness, ‘a bowl of white, / Cold, a 
cold porcelain, low and round,’ we recall the focal image of ‘Anecdote of the Jar’, though Stevens is 
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more explicit here than in the earlier poem about its contingency as a way of containing the world. 
He sighs that ‘one desires / So much more than that’, and the line break seems to hone that desire 
into intensity before bathetically resolving into failed fulfilment as the vague ‘so much more’. The 
movement shows that however absolute the image, it remains an incomplete account of the 
climate. 
It is difficult too to reduce the flowers to their decorative function, as they are linked with 
human agency. As ‘carnations’ they are suggestively fleshy – ‘Pink and white’. But this association 
with human presence exceeds the linguistic and visual to become economic, because the flowers 
have been cultivated, picked and arranged to serve as a domesticated image of the natural. 
Moreover, these abstracted blooms are unseasonably early given the ‘newly-fallen snow’ outside, in 
which it is unlikely that flowers will be growing. Their presence therefore hints at their greenhouse 
origins or the geographical distance they have travelled, mastered by the networks of transport and 
the economy that bring plants into the suburban milieu. What seems a simple signal of high spring 
is ‘simplified’, that is, procedurally managed by human agency, to falsify or bely lingering winter.4 
Stevens was familiar enough with the practice of floristry to recognise that domestic blooms 
entangle both cultural and botanical agency. In ‘The Bouquet’ (CPP 384–7), the eponymous flower 
arrangement ‘stands in a jar, as metaphor’; Sharpe cites this poem while observing ‘that centuries of 
commercial breeding and hybridisation (which Stevens knew about) have made the rose naturally 
artificial, or artificially natural – for where does nature end and (horti)culture begin?’ (68). The 
carnations of ‘The Poems of Our Climate’ are likewise not just images, but images of imagery, the 
process by which our culture entangles itself with climate as soon as it tries to abstract (from) it.  
In the third of ‘The Poems of Our Climate’, Stevens explicates the tendency that Vendler 
describes for ‘re-examin[ing] his premises anew in every poem’ (41): ‘There would still remain the 
never-resting mind, / So that one would want to escape, come back / To what had been so long 
composed’. This procedure of ‘escaping’ and ‘coming back’ has points of comparison with the 
contemporary practice of scientific climate modelling. Simulations have to be individually run and 
tend to be mutually exclusive, dependent on a defined set of input parameters. In A Climate 
Modelling Primer, McGuffie and Henderson-Sellers suggest these simulations are instrumental in that 
they are tailored to individual purposes: ‘different model types are better suited to answer different 
types of questions’ (241). Bronislaw Szerszynski further argues, in ‘Reading and Writing the 
Weather’, that climate models prefigure certain types of technical or technological response, and are 
thus linear and instrumental: there is ‘always-already presumption of application’ (19). Rather than 
working towards a specific output or scenario, Stevens is, in ‘The Poems of Our Climate’, tending 
                                                 
4
 A similar effect is created in Louis MacNeice’s ‘Snow’ (Selected Poems 23), where, in a like scenario, interior and 
exterior are shared effects of one participle: ‘the great bay-window was / Spawning snow and pink roses against it’. 
Their commonality is then both affirmed and disavowed by the next line, where they are revealed to be ‘Soundlessly 
collateral and incompatible’. MacNeice’s subsequent lines expose the contradictory scales at play in the art of his 
floral arrangement: ‘World is suddener than we fancy it. // World is crazier and more of it than we think, / Incorrigibly 
plural’ point to the necessary prevalence of the immediate in our experience of the world, and the multiplication of that 
experience’s implication in cultural and phenomenal networks. 
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in the opposite direction, to investigate the imaginative impulse at the root of both scientific and 
poetic practice. 5 This impulse has assumed greater urgency since his time, because figuring possible 
future climates and their suitability – or otherwise – for the existence of life on earth is a practical 
necessity more than it is an aesthetic and philosophical paradox.  
To elaborate on this difference: while models are designed, as Szerszynski points out, to 
generate particular answers, Stevens reminds us that ‘The imperfect is our paradise’, that there 
never has been a stable, Edenic state, and we shouldn’t direct our efforts towards achieving one. If 
we consider this in aesthetic terms, we can read Stevens’s assertion that ‘delight, / Since the 
imperfect is so hot in us, / Lies in flawed words and stubborn sounds’ as settling for enjoyment of 
poems as ‘words’ and ‘sounds’, despite their inability to match the world, and for being ‘flawed’ and 
‘stubborn’ in those flaws. The ambiguity of ‘Lies’, though, suggests that in so doing, we 
countenance a false account of the climate. Furthermore, the line ‘Since the imperfect is so hot in 
us’ invites a reading of our mismatch with the climate in terms of thermodynamics. The 
imperfection of our linguistic and imaginative systems leads to metaphorical build-up of waste heat; 
by imagining these cultural framings as identical with the world, however, our practices build on 
that false premise to transfer entropy from metaphor into materiality, accumulating in the 
discontinuity between concept and phenomena. Our present, anthropogenically changed climate 
recontextualises Stevens’s thermodynamic metaphor by converting the vehicle into the tenor, 
because the waste heat and greenhouse gases of industrial process demonstrate the imperfection of 
artificial systems. ‘The Poems of Our Climate’ do not need to give this ‘imperfection’ a moral spin 
to pinpoint the fallacy that human imagination is sufficient to the world. 
 
Models for atmospheric apprentices 
Stevens’s poems reveal both the impossibility of enclosing the world as a way of understanding it, 
and the continual necessity for us to bring it within the scope of our imagination. The ‘climate’ of 
‘The Poems of Our Climate’ is a provisional juxtaposition of images, for which its floral 
arrangement is synecdochal. The salience of Stevens’s observation in a contemporary context is that 
scientific understanding of ‘climate’ is similarly an aggregate of variables as a working model. 
Szerszynski writes of these experimental processes: 
 
it is because the unruly, surd complexity of the weather is being tamed by being forced to pass 
through standardized forms of measurement, and through conventional practices of aggregation 
and modelling, that we are able to conceive of such abstractions as average global temperature 
or rainfall, let alone see them rising or falling (‘Reading’ 22). 
 
Szerszynski’s comments reiterate the instrumental direction of these processes: their function is to 
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 In ‘Wallace Stevens and the Scientific Imagination’, Judith McDaniel argues that ‘in all of his work, Stevens expresses 
a distinctively “scientific” imagination’ (223). By her understanding, ‘Science in the twentieth century, particularly 
physical science […] has gone far beyond the “commonsense” rational approach of the last three centuries to a highly 
speculative, imaginative approach’ (222). The theoretical ambition she identifies as common to Stevens and his 
scientific contemporaries is problematised by Szerszynski’s instrumental account of climate modelling. 
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communicate abstractions. Poetry offers a complementary mode of communication because, while 
it also seeks to render the abstract comprehensible, it never purports to be more than indicative in 
so doing. The fictive quality of a poem expresses climate more readily than climatic phenomena 
themselves because the text is oriented towards the human reader, and the evident artifice also 
cautions us from taking it to be a like-for-like representation. If we do not bring such an awareness 
to scientific discourses of climate, we risk making these themselves the focus of our attention rather 
than the physical phenomena. In Beyond Mind and Matter, Patricia Waugh describes a ‘tendency over 
time for the abstract fictions required by any system of thought to take on the appearance of 
concrete realities’ (8), and just as, in her account, modernist writers challenged this tendency in the 
early twentieth century, their work can speak to the same fallacy today. 
For Daniel B. Botkin, when we commit this fallacy, ‘huge climate models are [then] the theory 
itself, and there is little evidence, and some contradictory evidence, that this is a helpful approach’ 
(The Moon in the Nautilus Shell 339). He argues that, in contrast, what ‘computer models can tell us is 
the implications of what we know (the facts) and what we assume about a system that interests us 
[...] This is the best use’ (277). ‘The Poems of Our Climate’ attends to the implications of what we 
can know, as well as what we cannot, the elusive persistence of the ‘unruly, surd complexity’ of all 
climatic phenomena. This contrasts with the practices of ‘standardized measurement’, which on 
Szerszynski’s account seek to ‘force’ and ‘tame’ the world rather than recognise its resistance to our 
control. Botkin argues that ‘the harder we work to force environmental constancy onto our 
surroundings, the more fragile that constancy becomes and the greater the effort and energy it 
takes’ (290). For me to argue that the climate is a construction, then, is not to claim that climate is 
only a supposition rather than material phenomena; it is to see that the attempt to reduce our 
understanding of ‘climate’ to these data is effortful precisely because it cannot be defined by those 
data alone. Without the measurements that Szerszynski describes we would not be aware of the 
changes in physical climate, and their importance cannot be overstated. Stevens’s poem, on the 
other hand, recognises that we always need to reach beyond language, even if we can only do so in 
language, to appreciate what outruns our understanding and management. 
Climate modelling responds to this uncertainty by generating new models. As Tim Flannery 
points out, its recursive quality is a function of each previous iteration’s discrepancies: ‘researchers 
strive to reduce the uncertainty of predictions by producing ever more sophisticated models that 
mimic the real world’ (155).6 More sophisticated, integrated climate models do not limit themselves 
to considering meteorological, oceanic and other phenomenal criteria but ‘explicitly (albeit 
qualitatively) incorporate economic considerations, [and] estimate anthropogenic emissions 
requirements’ (McGuffie and Henderson-Sellers 243). In these descriptions, the process is directed 
towards ever-greater accuracy by the inclusion of ever-greater numbers of parameters. Botkin 
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 Similarly, Latour proposes that, because ‘nothing proves that […] externalised entities will always remain outside the 
collective’ of human and nonhuman entities, the collective must be subject to ‘progressive composition’, that is, 
constant challenging and renewal of its terms and constituents (Politics 124 & 147; author’s italics). 
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posits this as part of  
 
a kind of ecological uncertainty principle: The more you try to explain all the details, the more 
likely you are to make quantitative errors that lead you astray. The more details you seek to 
include, the greater the chance of errors that lead you astray. Yet, if you make your model (your 
theory) too simple, you are likely to miss the very qualities that determine what actually happens 
(281). 
 
Stevens’s poetics of recapitulation, on the other hand, responds to the uncertainties he finds by 
instead enacting the world’s perpetual resistance to human mastery, from which the problem 
identified by Botkin stems. Miller describes how ‘The poet tries first one way and then another way 
in an endlessly renewed, endlessly frustrated, attempt to “get it right,” to formulate once and for all 
an unequivocal definition of what poetry is and to provide an illustration of this definition’ 
(Linguistic 5). By accepting the contingency with which Stevens works, we can accept that the 
climate is changing without that acceptance having to depend on detailed depictions of our future. 
The belief in the possibility of accurate modelling is also the belief that we can fully comprehend 
physical processes and outcomes, which, even before we aggravated and intensified them, were 
already complex to describe, let alone manage.  
Where poetry’s sophistication differs from science’s is that it intrinsically explores contextual 
parameters rather than modelled specifics, framing our understanding of the world as provisional 
rather than progressive. To offer one example from Stevens’s opus, ‘Sea Surface Full of Clouds’ 
(Collected 82–5) contains five iterations of ‘the slopping of the sea’ during a cruise ‘In that 
November off Tehauntepec’, eschewing the notion of absolute mimetic truth in these alternative 
visions. Even if we read it as Lensing does, as a ‘self-indulgent example of the making power of the 
imagination’ (326), it exemplifies a bravura way of thinking and rethinking the world, never being 
satisfied with a definitive account. For instance, the ocean is in parallel syntactic structures variously 
‘the perplexed machine’, ‘the tense machine’, ‘the tranced machine’, ‘the dry machine’ and ‘the 
obese machine’. The term ‘machine’ is itself repeated mechanistically; rather like the jar, it makes 
the Romantic sublime of the ocean into something more resonant in the industrial–scientific age. 
Unlike the jar, though, the sea is the producer rather than product, driving process rather than 
remaining inert. As such, it demands fresh understanding each morning: Vendler suggests ‘The 
daily impersonal newness of the visible world was at first a disturbing thought to Stevens, as we 
know from […] Sea-Surface Full of Clouds’ (59; author’s italics). Lines that echo ‘A Postcard from the 
Volcano’ – ‘jelly yellow streaked the deck’, ‘blue heaven spread // Its crystalline pendentives on the 
sea’ – still suggest a metaphysical permanence in the solar. However, the poem also slyly rebukes 
globally northern orders of nature with its Gulf location, ‘commemorat[ing] the illicit achievement 
of summer in November’ (Sharpe 112).  
The ocean’s agency and potency shifts through the poem. It can be incipiently menacing, ‘in 
sinister flatness’ or ‘pondering dank stratagem’; it can be ‘held […] tranced’ in the manner of a 
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work of music, ‘as a prelude holds and holds’, aesthetically controlled and ordered; or it can even be 
just ‘perfected in indolence’. Stevens’s repeated re-characterisations of the ocean represent a 
response to the sea’s own creation of itself, tracing the give and take of imaginative and oceanic 
agency.7 The title of the poem is itself suspended between human perception and meteorological 
phenomena. The sea is ‘full’ of clouds from the point of view of an observer standing on deck, for 
whom their reflections appear in its surface. The sea surface also comprises water that has come 
from clouds and that will evaporate to form new clouds, so in that material respect it is also ‘full’ of 
them. Both readings transgress the linguistic separation of ‘sea’ and ‘clouds’, according to our 
understanding of ‘full’.8  
As its title resists easy determination, the poem also rejects definitive conclusion. Instead it 
draws attention to the changes in the world that, in a way paradigmatically Stevensian, requires we 
constantly re-examine our premises: 
 
    Then the sea 
And heaven rolled as one and from the two 
Came fresh transfigurings of freshest blue. 
 
The ‘freshest blue’ for Stevens signifies the renewal of imaginative energy and perception, aligning 
these with the natural cycles of waves and of night and day that have stimulated his engagement. 
Today, with the awareness that the ocean is increasingly acidifying as a result of anthropogenic 
carbon emissions and acting as a sink for vast quantities of plastic waste particulates, we cannot 
hope to share so positive an understanding.9 What ‘Sea Surface Full of Clouds’ still offers, though, 
is a sense of natural persistence at the level of physical principle, and a demonstration of how we 
remain entangled in the act of creating and recreating the world, albeit in a significantly more 
material way than Stevens envisages. 
                                                 
7
 A more explicit and accomplished examination of this co-creation is to be found in Stevens’s later ‘The Idea of Order at 
Key West’, a poem discussed in my next chapter in comparison with an ode by Basil Bunting (see pp.134–6). 
8
 A similar elision is apparent in poem XV of Stevens’s ‘Variations on a Summer Day’ (Collected 212–15): 
 
The last island and its inhabitant 
The two alike, distinguish blues, 
Until the difference between air 
And sea exists by grace alone, 
In objects, as white this, white that. 
 
The abstracted ‘white this, white that’ renders the distinction between ‘air / And sea’ increasingly slim, demonstrating 
the discrepancy between human practices of naming and phenomenal process such as the hydrological cycle. With 
the material emergence of climate change, distinctions such as these are more and more tenuous. Stevens positions 
this recognition with ‘The last island and its inhabitant’, as though the near-continuity of air and sea has submerged all 
other islands. Read in our contemporary context, the poem provides a salutary reminder of the ‘grace’ that prevents 
final inundation. 
9
 According to the International Programme on the State of the Ocean, a ‘unique consortium of scientists and other 
Ocean experts’, 
 
Damage to the Ocean is not as immediately apparent as terrestrial destruction, but it is just as serious. All of the 
stressors we have put on the Ocean — from over-fishing to pollution — have contributed to its ill-health. The 
situation is now so severe that we are altering the chemistry of the Ocean, with significant impacts on marine life 
and the functioning of marine ecosystems. 
The Ocean has already absorbed more than 80% of the heat added to the climate system and around 33% of the 
carbon dioxide emitted by humans. Ecosystems are collapsing as species are pushed to extinction and natural 
habitats are destroyed. (‘How Bad is it?’) 
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Notes towards a climatic fiction 
I argued, in my analysis of ‘Anecdote of the Jar’, that there is an environmental context in which to 
read Stevens’s work; I then proceeded to suggest that, in his meteorological metaphors, he creates a 
climate that is constitutively provisional. To foreground the fictive quality of our engagements with 
the world is for Stevens a response to the way unacknowledged preconceptions shape that world: 
‘we live in an intricacy of new and local mythologies, political, economic, poetic, which are asserted 
with an ever-enlarging incoherence’, he maintains in the essay ‘The Noble Rider and the Sound of 
Words’ (Collected 652). To think instead of ‘a fiction, which you know to be a fiction’, as Stevens 
does in the ‘Adagia’ (Collected 903), is to acknowledge our impulse for ordering the world, while 
ensuring we do not lose sight of its potential for discrepancies, or ‘incoherence’. I have outlined 
some of the myths of measurement and mastery that perplex our contemporary engagement with 
climate change, and would contend, with Voros, that Stevens’s poems ‘are the imaginative 
enactment of stepping outside [...] conceptions in order to create “a nature”’(Voros 35; citing the 
adage ‘The poem is a nature created by the poet’, Collected 905). It is with their self-recognition and 
the relentless questioning and reframing of themselves that poetic fictions as a concept are valuable 
to our understanding of contemporary climate change. 
By thinking of a ‘climatic fiction’, I do not intend to dispute the reality or the severity of the 
phenomena, or human responsibility for them. The reverse is the case: ‘climate change’ is a fiction 
inasmuch as its material phenomena exceed our use of the term, and our particular cultural 
framings of it. Incorporating this awareness in our discourse of climate change better prepares us to 
deal with the inherent uncertainties of the phenomena than does an insistence on verifying them. A 
‘climatic fiction’ therefore acknowledges that its truth is not literal but is still necessary. It is a mode 
in which we can entertain manifestations of climate change as indicative of its presence, and 
develop the imaginative faculties that enable fuller engagement with its phenomena. This 
corresponds with Costello’s ecocritical reading of Stevens in ‘“What to Make of a Diminished 
Thing”: Modern Nature and Poetic Response’, where she suggests the imagination can ‘reveal the 
entanglement of nature and culture; the interplay between our desires, our concepts, and our 
perceptions; and possibilities for renewal and vitality within that entanglement’ (574).  
Using the framework of Stevens’s long poem of 1947, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ 
(Collected 329–52), I want to assess the value of a fictive climate and the possibility of deriving a 
contemporary poetics of climate change from it. Stevens’s three criteria for his ‘Notes’ are ‘It Must 
Be Abstract’, ‘It Must Change’ and ‘It Must Give Pleasure’. By ‘abstraction’, I want to consider the 
way poetry stands apart from the reader’s immediate experience and challenges its priority in the 
formation of conceptions, as our personal experience is at odds with its cumulative environmental 
impact. By the need for ‘change’, I maintain that poetry’s invitation to be reread in a changing 
world can provide an adaptive quality for a climate change poetics. In the context of the ‘pleasure’ 
that Stevens requires of the Supreme Fiction, I will suggest, analogously, that poetry can make 
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nature, at Soper’s level of scientific principle, sensible to the reader – in the dual sense that the 
supreme fiction appeals to the senses and that it makes some sense of the phenomena. 
 
Reality check: ‘It must be abstract’ 
To consider climate change entails an engagement with the climate as an abstract, beyond 
experienced weather. This is one of the crucial reasons Why We Disagree About Climate Change, as 
Mike Hulme explains: ‘Climate cannot be experienced directly through our senses […] climate is a 
constructed idea that takes these sensory encounters and builds them into something more abstract’ 
(3–4). This construction occurs, for example, through the methods Szerszynski describes (‘Reading’ 
22). Stevens’s poetry takes place between the particular of experience and this level of abstract, 
mediating between the two. It allows the particular its symbolic weight while also giving substance 
to the abstract. His metaphorical abstractions traverse the differing scales by which we need to 
understand our own and our culture’s implication in the climate. As Timothy Clark points out, 
 
The self-evident coherence of immediate experience, far from being the possible foundation of 
secure theorising, is merely epiphenomenal and unable to see itself as such. It projects an 
illusory ground, a surface realm of human possibility, one that is delusory and even sometimes a 
form of denial (‘What on World is the Earth?’ 12).  
 
Stevens’s poems recognise this ‘illusory ground’ and offer strategies for negotiating it. 
At two different extremes on the scale of terrestrial influence, the solar and the self are shown to 
be mutually creative agents in the first section of ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’. The opening 
poem juxtaposes ‘this invention, this invented world’ with ‘The inconceivable idea of the sun’  
(I.2–3) to suggest a contrast between a fictive environment and a sun beyond human conception. 
Indeed, the subsequent stanza exhorts the apostrophised ephebe: ‘You must become an ignorant 
man again / And see the sun again with an ignorant eye / And see it clearly in the idea of it’ (I.4–6). 
But in inviting us to ‘see it clearly in the idea of it’, Stevens expresses a similarly paradoxical notion 
of solar absolutism as ‘Credences of Summer’ since it includes the anthropocentric ‘idea’ in its 
formulation. That ‘idea’ is more explicitly anthropogenic in this poem than in ‘Credences of 
Summer’, because, understood as a cleaning rather than a burning, it does not derive from the 
image of the sun itself: ‘How clean the sun when seen in its idea, / Washed in the remotest 
cleanliness of heaven / That has expelled us and our images . . .’ (I.10–12; Stevens’s ellipsis). This 
co-constitution of world from solar phenomena and human imagination is confirmed by the 
entangled insistence that ‘The sun / Must bear no name, gold flourisher, but be / In the difficulty 
of what it is to be’ (I.19–21), because ‘gold flourisher’ invokes a name at the point that naming is 
outlawed. Language, rather than the sun, is then the flourisher on ‘what it is to be’. 
This doubleness of perspective, which yearns for objectivity but has no terms other than the 
human in which to express it, recurs throughout ‘It Must Be Abstract’. At VI.16–18, Stevens 
defines the hybrid quality of abstraction as ‘It must be visible or invisible, / Invisible or visible or 
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both: / A seeing and unseeing in the eye’. In the concluding stanza of poem VI, the weather seems 
to exemplify this doubleness, as a manifestation whose terms and status shift: ‘The weather and the 
giant of the weather’ reprises unqualified conditions – ‘the weather’ as an unadorned noun – as 
distorted anthropomorphism – ‘the giant of the weather’. The continuous reformulation 
accumulates in the following line, ‘Say the weather, the mere weather, the mere air:’ before the final 
line of poem VI suggests that the weather is ‘An abstraction blooded, as a man by thought’  
(VI.19–21). But there is a slippage of metaphor, because to be blooded by thought creates the 
bodily world from the mind. Rather than regarding mind as a product of neurochemistry – that is, 
the mental as the product of the physical – Stevens’s reversed formulation shows how contingent 
our sense of the body is on our imagination. Transposing this relation into ‘weather’, the tenor of 
the metaphor in the preceding line, reminds us that our sense of an anterior Nature is 
retrospectively ‘blooded’ by our own thought of it, as in ‘Anecdote of the Jar’. In his reading of the 
poem in Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, Harold Bloom notes that ‘the weather is not just a 
trope for the supreme fiction but is itself as much of that fiction as poetry is or can be’ (186). By 
failing to recognise this, we believe our experience of the weather is independent of our projections, 
and in so doing behave as though our emissions cannot affect it, or can at least be readily 
distinguished from it. The presumption that our worldview is correct engenders contemporary 
climate change as its phenomenal complement.  
At a point between perceiving self and the sun is our concept of the planet itself. The sun is 
visible as a distinct body where the earth is not, however. The necessity for us to imagine it, and the 
meanings accreting with that imagination, demonstrate our implication in its construction, much as 
our minds construct our experience of the weather in ‘It Must Be Abstract’. Timothy Clark 
indicates that ‘the terrestiality of one’s own sensorium is implicated in the affect of the image [of 
the earth] in profound and inextricable ways’ (‘What on World’ 16). This is a particular instance of a 
paradox recognised in early twentieth-century scientific thought, which Waugh describes thus: ‘the 
empiricist sees that if the object of science is only ever an extrapolation from sensory experience, 
and if sensation remains the basis for this inference[,] then the empirical ground of knowledge rests 
on the subjective and therefore uncertain foundations of the […] mind’ (15).  
We can see an awareness of this problematic context, and a ‘desire to explore modes of knowing 
and representing which might discover a bridge between the sensory world of experience and the 
formal world of structural relations’ (Beyond 17), in the way an abstracted planetary image is framed 
in Ariel’s poems in Stevens’s ‘The Planet on the Table’ (1954). We are told that these poems 
 
should bear 
Some lineament or character,  
 
Some affluence, if only half-perceived, 
In the poverty of their words, 
Of the planet of which they were part. (Collected 450) 
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In his reading of the poem that concludes The Song of the Earth, Bate seeks to make the planet 
particular once more, transcending the mediations of the text that bring it to the table in the first 
place. He asks us to read the poem holding in mind ‘a photograph of the earth taken from space’ 
(Song 282) – already we are at one remove from the poem itself, and the poems of Ariel it contains. 
Progressively abandoning poem and picture, Bate is left with an imagined planet that he asks us to 
think of as ‘fragile, a planet of which we are a part but which we do not possess’. Bate’s suggestion 
that we ‘do not possess’ the planet is borne out in Stevens allowing that Ariel’s poems can only 
reproduce ‘Some lineament or character […] Of the planet’ – they are sketchy or incomplete. But in 
the process, they are valuable as texts, even if not as models of the world, because they present 
‘Some affluence, if only half-perceived, / In the poverty of their words’. 
However, Bate’s perverse concentration on the titular topic of the poem (planet) rather than its 
context (table) ignores the immediate environment with which it furnishes us, and cannot therefore 
fully account for the relationship between the texts and ‘the planet of which they were part’. He 
does not recognise what Waugh recognises, that ‘the impulse towards this scientific view from 
nowhere as an escape from egotism can only be an initiating move. Once achieved, that view must 
reconnect with a situatedness in the world of here and now’ (Beyond 26). If we are to do justice to 
Bate’s meditation on the poem in the light of a photograph of the earth from space, we should 
consider the full environmental context of obtaining such an image. Timothy Morton writes in The 
Ecological Thought that: ‘We become aware of the worldness of the world only in a globalizing 
environment in which [...] satellites hover above the ionosphere. […] We are becoming aware of the 
world at the precise moment we are “destroying” it—or at any rate globally reshaping it’ (132). I 
have commented on this elsewhere, that ‘Even the apparent vantage point provided by, say, a 
satellite is not external to the world […] but an implicit part in the creation of our understanding of 
it, because it is an instrument of terrestrial systems of government, science, engineering, 
communication and so on’ (‘Tensions in the Mesh’ 329). Bate’s discussion of the poem is valuable 
in that it doesn’t require the energy expenditure of an orbital shot, rather, a projection of the 
imagination. But his reading of the poem is entirely abstract, whereas the poem also imagines the 
terrestrial situation that enables abstraction. 
Stevens achieves this relation with an enframing technique in which ‘one mind apprehend[s] the 
imaginative action of another’, what George Bornstein dubs the ‘“double consciousness” [...] of 
Stevens’[s] mature verse’ (Transformations of Romanticism 198). By figuring the poet of ‘The Planet on 
the Table’ as the angelically-named Ariel, Stevens transfers the lyric impulse into a fictive archetype, 
shading the personal into the abstract. Where Bate’s reading seeks a direct apprehension of the 
planet, Stevens complicates it with an intervening consciousness, meaning that direct access to the 
physical earth is denied. In this entanglement of different scales, Stevens is able to mark again the 
interdependency of human and solar creativity: ‘his poems, although makings of his self, / Were no 
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less makings of the sun’. If we read these lines in one way, Ariel’s poems invent ‘his self’ and the 
sun – they are ‘makings’ or versions of those entities. If we read them in another, the poems are the 
product of both the (lyric) self and the enabling environment for which the sun is the dominant 
input of energy. Indeed, in Vendler’s reading: ‘our poems, are products of that solar energy that 
makes all things come into being. Our artificial distinctions between “nature” and “art” err: in this 
view, art is part of nature’ (37–8).10 The mutuality of these readings, and of human and solar 
agency, gives expression to Oppermann’s observation that ‘the natural and the cultural can no 
longer be thought as dichotomous categories. Rather, we need to theorize them together, and 
analyze their complex relationships in terms of their indivisibility and thus their mutual effect on 
one another’ (Iovino and Oppermann 462–3). The movement of the poem from self to planet to 
sun illustrates the value of Stevens’s poetics to understanding climate change: it situates and 
implicates the self in different scales simultaneously. 
Roy Sellars negotiates between the poem’s possible positions when he suggests that the ‘ripe 
shrub’ that ‘writhed’ in line 6 ‘may indicate an environmental threat or over-heated atmosphere, 
presaging the extinction of life on earth’ (45). Whether or not we accept this speculation will 
depend on the perspective from which we read the poem, and it is here that Sellars makes his 
argument more telling: ‘Ariel as non-human, aligned with the sun (line 7 [‘His self and the sun were 
one’]), may be indifferent’ to this threat, but ‘From a human perspective the stakes could hardly be 
higher’ (Sellars 45). That is to say, we have to assume Ariel’s abstract position to be conscious of 
the planet’s scale, but must then to return to earth, in the figure of the poet, to appreciate what the 
vision means for ourselves as humans. The climate-aware critic is conscious of a double 
consciousness of their own, an implication with planetary scale while also being seated at the table. 
 
Future imperfect: ‘It must change’ 
Stevens’s abstractions enable these changes of perspective, but our point of view is altered as much 
by time as by our imagined position in space. This indeterminacy is also recognised by Stevens, and 
his poetics demonstrates that the imposition of human order is a fiction as well, one that is subject 
to the passage of time. In ‘It Must Change’, the second part of the ‘Notes Toward a Supreme 
Fiction’, he offers one figuration of art as ‘The great statue of the General Du Pay’ which ‘Changed 
his true flesh to an inhuman bronze’ (III.1, 13). The contrast between ‘true flesh’ and ‘inhuman 
bronze’ elaborates on the terms of ‘The Snow Man’ in suggesting that a rigid art obscures the 
conditions of its generation by aspiring to fixity. Shifting circumstance is again figured in the 
terminology of nature in poem IV: ‘This is the origin of change. / Winter and spring, cold copulars, 
embrace / And forth the particulars of rapture come.’ (IV.4–6). While this does not seem to admit 
                                                 
10
 Miller writes: ‘The sun is that which cannot be looked at directly but is the source of all seeing, the designer of the 
figures of its happiness. The sun is the visible, invisible figure for the invisible and unnamable, for the base of the 
intelligible’ (Linguistic 418–9). 
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human input in the process of change, with art subject instead to seasonal progress, we are subtly 
present in the way Stevens anthropomorphises winter and spring as ‘copulars’. Stevens identifies a 
natural impulse for change common to humans and material phenomena. That change is 
pleasurable, too, in ‘the particulars of rapture’. 
In contrast to this is a prevailing tendency in which civilisation resists or denies the possibility 
of change by envisaging a stable or cyclical Nature. Botkin summarises this in his remark: ‘The 
more technologically and legally advanced a civilization, the greater the need and desire for 
environmental stability, for a balance of nature’ (290). This technocratic–legalistic resistance to 
change stands in contrasts to poetry’s engagement with it; but Stevens’s biography represents a 
possible reconciliation of the two tendencies, given his employment for the last four decades of his 
life by the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, where he ‘reviewed surety claims [...] 
making both legal and business judgements’ (Grey 16). In the article ‘Insurance and Social Change’ 
(1937), Stevens suggests ‘that we may well be entering an insurance era’ (Collected 793), citing ‘those 
European countries where social pressure has been most acute and social and political change most 
marked [to] indicate that, as the social mass seeks to maintain itself, it relies more and more on 
insurance’ (795). That is to say, as the pace of ‘social and political change’ accelerates, society 
demands exponentially greater reassurance from insurance. Stevens advises the insurance trade that 
‘the more they are adapted to the changing needs of changing times [...] the more certain they are to 
endure on the existing basis’ (796). Stevens’s analysis shares with his poetry an insight into 
adaptability. Sharpe even suggests ‘both poetry and insurance could be described as pragmatic 
responses to a world conceived idealistically’ (147). 
A more contemporary account of the insurance sector, concerning climate change rather than 
social change, is provided by the organisation ClimateWise, which styles itself as ‘the global 
insurance industry’s leadership group to drive action on climate change risk’. In the document 
Moving Beyond the Uncertainty of Climate Change Risk (2012), the group’s chair John Coomber asserts 
that insurance CEOs ‘should aim to do “something for the future” i.e. activities that are unlikely to 
be a money[-]earner during their tenure but are good for the long term health of the firm’. These 
terms echo Stevens’s words on business sustainability and survival (796), quoted above. Crucially in 
a textual context, Coomber remarks that ‘Inherent uncertainty means that every statement made in 
relation to climate change risk must be caveated, but that is not an excuse for inaction’. By the 
addition of more detail in the form of a caveat, the insurer’s approach resembles the climate 
modeller’s.  
Rather than seek to control or account for all possible futures, however, Stevens identifies a 
hub of imaginative understanding common to both present and the future, what Harrison describes 
as the ‘common, antecedent matrix’ of both mind and nature (‘Not Ideas’ 665). The poet’s 
recursive syntax caveats each of his propositions, but enacts rather than exhausts the principle 
expressed in the lines ‘There would still remain the never-resting mind, / So that one would want to 
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escape, come back / To what had been so long composed’ (‘The Poems of Our Climate’, Collected 
179). Rather than investigating the principles at work in our relation with climate, Coomber’s 
analysis prioritises human activity, and regards ‘the challenge [as] arising from the side effect of 
generating fossil fuel energy, the emission of greenhouse gases and their impact on the world’s 
climate systems’. If emissions are only a ‘side effect’, this centres our understanding around the 
human practice of ‘generating fossil fuel energy’. Beck cautions against such an unreflexive, 
anthropocentric approach, however: ‘unseen, screened-out “side effects” do not eliminate the self-
endangerment to which they point, but rather intensify it’ (127). While wilfully assigning greenhouse 
gas emissions to the category of ‘side effect’, as Coomber does, does not screen them out, it still 
moves them to the corner of the eye. 
To instead imagine climate change, rather than define it, requires us not to think of ‘climate’ as 
simply a zone in which human ‘effects’ occur, because climatic phenomena also have agency and 
affect our culture, which is always entangled with them. Stevens envisages such interaction of 
human intention and phenomenal nature in the fifth poem of ‘It Must Change’ in horticultural 
terms. While a fruit tree is planted, its persistence ‘Long after the planter’s death’ perplexes the 
original intentions: ‘A few limes remained, // Where his house had fallen, three scraggy trees 
weighted / With garbled green.’ (V.3–5). Humans no longer have a place in this locale as the 
collapsed house represents the ruin of a controlled, orderly environment, a motif already seen in ‘A 
Postcard from the Volcano’. Although there is a hint of human inscription on the land in the 
intentional act of planting the trees in ‘It Must Change’, this is ‘garbled’ – even the ‘limes’ are 
garbled “lines”. Change is not limited to what we as humans intend to change, but is a process to 
which the human cultivation and direction of nature are subject. The subtitle ‘It Must Change’ is 
not then an exhortation for human beings to be drivers of change, but a reminder that we need to 
accommodate such change into our understanding of the world. Botkin draws a valuable distinction 
in this regard:  
 
[T]here are kinds of changes that are natural in that they have been part of the environment for 
a long enough time for species to adapt to them, and many [species] require these changes. If we 
take actions that lead to these kinds of changes and at rates and quantities that are natural in the 
sense I have just described, then these are likely to be benign. If we invent some novel change 
that species have not had a chance to evolve and adapt to, then those are more likely to lead to 
undesirable results, and we should be very cautious in using them (xv). 
 
Stevens expresses an awareness of the first, ‘natural’ kind of change, and if we share this 
recognition rather than persist in an attempt to stabilise or control nature, we can more readily see 
where our interventions accelerate or exacerbate change. 
The planted lime trees comprise one such intervention, but one to which the landscape can 
readily adapt. Contemporary climate change is ‘novel’ in Botkin’s terms because it leads to 
‘undesirable results’. Moreover, its capacity to exacerbate prevailing, naturally driven change is 
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increased because its emergence cannot be sourced back to the motivations, whether rational or 
irrational, of human beings. At one order of magnitude, the lime trees represent organic growth 
exceeding its original function for humans – Timothy Clark draws this contrast in more general 
terms when he characterises ‘the immediacy of perception [as] our scalar blindness to the tree as a 
temporal entity, one that grows, flourishes or dies etc. over a very long period of time’ (‘What on 
World’ 11). At a greater order of magnitude, climate change is not even something we can glimpse 
at a moment in time, as we can a tree. It persists as an intangible result of chaotic and hybridised 
ecological interactions between unintentional human effects and environmental forces.  
Climate change thus outruns the insurer’s attempt to caveat it, and becomes categorically 
different to the ‘accelerating social change’ Stevens discusses. As Nigel Clark indicates, climate 
change’s intellectual difficulty entails ‘not only isolating the human contribution from the 
“background noise” of natural climatic variability, but doing so with enough confidence to be able 
to apportion human forcing among geographically and historically determinate social groupings’ 
(‘Volatile’ 42). As these processes ‘form a single complex global system – with its own internal 
dynamics and emergent properties – certain conventions of isolating specific causal agents and 
accounting for their contribution to overall change need to be fundamentally rethought’ (44). By 
continually entangling human perception with perceived phenomena, and attesting to the agency of 
both, Stevens makes poetry a fuller engagement with the world than the lawyer’s or insurer’s 
attempts to discriminate and control it. 
Recognising this need for his Supreme Fiction to ‘change’, Stevens situates himself in a tradition 
of English literary thought, in which poets have identified that their work will respond to future 
contexts. For instance, new works reorder our reading of the canon in Eliot’s ‘Tradition and the 
Individual Talent’ (Selected Prose 37–44), while Shelley characterises poets in ‘A Defence of Poetry’ as 
‘the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present’ (Shelley’s Poetry and Prose 
508). Having examined Stevens’s accommodation of prospective change in his poetics, I now 
consider how his conception of change is itself changed by responding to contemporary 
environmental understanding. In his 2010 ‘Anachronistic Reading’ of Stevens’s 1942 poem ‘The 
Man on the Dump’ (Collected 184–6), J. Hillis Miller proposes: ‘It is impossible to read [the] poem 
thoughtfully today without seeing how [the] dump with its single human presence anticipates our 
present condition’ (83). While ‘Stevens lived in that happy time before we became aware of climate 
change [and] global warming’, as we read his work now we are not so fortunate. 
Miller’s process ‘sees a text as prefiguring a future event that comes to seem what the text 
predicted, foresaw, or forecast’ (82). I would refine this by suggesting that the particular resonance 
of ‘The Man on the Dump’, its response to changing conditions, lies in the attention Stevens pays 
to the principles of waste disposal, the material implications of which have been exacerbated by 
human behaviour since the poem’s composition.11 In an aesthetic context, Stevens’s remark that 
                                                 
11
 Waste disposal extends beyond intentional acts. As Miller observes, it includes ‘all the carbon dioxide in the 
106 CHAPTER 3 
 
 
‘The dump is full / Of images’ marks a despair that our ways of viewing the world are past the 
point of meaningful use, as in ‘A Postcard from the Volcano’, ‘Children […] Will speak our speech 
and never know’ (Collected 129). Among the images on the dump are ‘the floweriest flowers’ and a 
‘green’ that ‘smacks in the eye’, and these are read by Costello as evidence ‘of weariness and 
disgust’, prompted by ‘how hackneyed these images have become’ (‘US Modernism’ 170). Yet in his 
choice of the dump itself as image, Stevens draws attention to something that is as intrinsic to our 
environment as the tired natural tropes among the other waste accumulating there. 
In its mixture of artificial and organic imagery, ‘The Man on the Dump’ exhibits the same 
reciprocity of cultural and natural agency that characterises Stevens’s poetry. At one level, the 
poem’s dump represents a specific physical environment that Stevens knew. Lensing comments 
that Stevens’s daughter ‘Holly Stevens reminds us that the description is modeled upon the actual 
dump in Hartford and the man who occupied it’ (219).12 In contrast with the trees seen by 
Lawrence Buell and David Wood (discussed in my first chapter, pp.23, 45), the dump is not a 
natural environment but an artificial one, comprising manufactured or cultivated articles left by 
intentional acts of disposal: ‘The bouquets come here in the papers’. The artificiality of the dump as 
a material construct is heightened and intensified by the process of its rendering as poetic 
metaphor. Stevens does not frame the poem as a glance from the window towards a “real” location, 
as Buell and Wood do. Instead, the concentration of the items abstracted on the dump signifies 
wider human networks in time and space: ‘the wrapper’ and ‘the corset’ hint at what they were 
designed to contain (indeed, there is still a ‘cat in the paper-bag’), while ‘the box / From Esthonia’ 
(sic) has travelled across continents. In that context, Stevens’s ‘can of pears’ has an element of 
economic symbolism that it shares with my reading of Prufrock’s peach or Sweeney’s hothouse 
grapes in Eliot’s poems. 
At the same time, the dump is not only an object created by human action, because it has its 
own agency. The accretion of these items on an ur-dump is symbolic of everything that humanity 
has to keep at bay to identify itself as humanity. Ellmann’s remarks on The Waste Land remain 
apposite in this context: ‘the subject defines the limits of his body through the violent expulsion of 
its own excess’ (94). But the dump’s ‘trash’ itself represents the persistence of matter beyond its 
cultural function. In attending to it, Stevens recognises what Jane Bennett, in her own encounter 
with litter in Vibrant Matter, describes as ‘stuff that commanded attention in its own right, as 
existents in excess of their association with human meanings, habits or projects’ (4). Although 
‘Everything is shed’ in ‘The Man on the Dump’, the poem makes an imaginative recovery of waste 
                                                                                                                                               
atmosphere from automobiles, coal-fired electricity plants, and other sources that is a chief contributor to global 
warming, […] all that methane from domestic cows and from landfills, […] all the smoke from forest-clearing’ 
(‘Anachronistic’ 85). 
12
 Lensing cites Holly Stevens’s autobiographical sketches, ‘Bits of Remembered Time’ (1971), in which she recalls ‘a 
vast stretch of barren land that people used as a dump. […] On this lot a man, seemingly coming from nowhere, built 
his home. A glorious shack, made of all the appropriate junk that could be found, with even a chimney: only when we 
noticed smoke coming out did we realize someone was living there’ (652). The Stevenses detect the presence of 
another human from the emissions he creates rather than his own person, demonstrating that scale and perspective 
are a crucial determinant of whether we focus on human beings or the environment. 
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that disabuses us of our sense that we inhabit a civilisation with no hinterland of landfill. It serves 
to remind us that ‘our trash is not “away” in landfills but generating lively streams of chemicals and 
volatile winds of methane as we speak’ (Bennett vii). Stevens’s explicit and fictive abstraction of the 
Hartford dump changes through Miller’s practice of anachronistic reading to shed light on the 
undisclosed social myth of cleanliness and progress.  
 
The greenhouse affect: ‘It must give pleasure’ 
Stevens recognises that nature always exceeds our definitions of it, and through this recognition we 
can consider the requirement for his Supreme Fiction to ‘Give Pleasure’. The process by which 
phenomena resist fixity has been figured in terms of sexual pleasure in ‘It Must Change’: ‘Winter 
and spring, cold copulars, embrace / And forth the particulars of rapture come’ (IV.5–6). Rather 
than imposing human order on these processes, poetry, by changing, participates in the same 
generative forces. For instance, Stevens has identified the imagination with natural renewal in ‘Sea 
Surface Full of Clouds’, because the poem’s cyclical quality recapitulates the waves’ own ‘fresh 
transfigurings of freshest blue’ (Collected 85). Bloom considers the criterion of ‘pleasure’ in aesthetic 
terms, for ‘what is pleasure for a strong poet, ultimately, if it is not the pleasure of priority in one’s 
invention?’ (174); but I have shown that Stevens aspires, as a poet, towards an abstract root 
common to imagination and phenomenon, and that neither natural nor cultural agency has 
‘priority’. This capacity for ‘invention’ must then be attributed to nonhuman, unintentional forces 
as much as to human will. Costello defines the common capacity as ‘the superfluity of human and 
natural creativity that stimulates change’ (‘What to Make’ 586). The creative impulse is superfluous 
to our normative sense of order, but can thus engage with transformative phenomena in a way that 
analytical impulses cannot. 
The tension between analytical and imaginative impulses can be seen in the final poem of ‘It 
Must Give Pleasure’, the third section of ‘Notes Towards a Supreme Fiction’. Stevens addresses the 
‘Fat girl, terrestrial’, the ‘fluent mundo’ that is the world (X.1, 20): ‘You remain the more than 
natural figure. […] That’s it: the more than rational distortion’ (X.11–14). In these two lines, 
Stevens contrasts the rational, which we might see as the conventional province of the human, and 
that of the natural. However, the ‘fluent mundo’ – a term that itself exceeds a more denotative 
description such as ‘changing world’ – cannot be contained by either category, ‘rational’ or ‘natural’. 
Furthermore, Stevens’s recursive phrasing shows that the act of imagining the world as person is a 
fiction, because its quality changes almost immediately from ‘fat’ to ‘terrestrial’. The world has an 
affect that ‘cannot be imagined (even ideally) as [a] person’, in Bennett’s words. In the spirit of the 
alternative readings that Stevens’s poetics encourages, ‘the more than rational distortion’ also 
suggests that phenomenal nature is not identical with the ‘rational distortion’ we have made of it. 
That rational distortion then reads as our imposition on the world, fitting its processes to our sense 
of order.  
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Stevens marks a distinction between our capacity for perception and the conception he wishes 
to rid us of in poem VII of ‘It Must Give Pleasure’: 
 
           […]But to impose is not 
To discover. To discover an order as of 
A season, to discover summer and know it, 
 
To discover winter and know it well, to find 
Not to impose, not to have reasoned at all, 
Out of nothing to have come on major weather, 
 
It is possible, possible, possible. It must 
Be possible (VII.7–14). 
 
The tension between perception and conception is expressed in the strain of the repeated ‘possible’, 
whose reach gestures at something unattainable, as the opening clauses of ‘The Snow Man’ outline 
conditions it is impossible for imagination to fulfil. The ‘order’ in ‘It Must Give Pleasure’ VII is 
derived from nature ‘as of / A season’; but because it is an analogy, the season is a conception we 
seek in the phenomenal world, something contingent on our current interglacial episode rather than 
an abiding, objective presence throughout the earth’s existence. Yet Stevens tells us we are ‘not to 
have reasoned’ at all to get here, which rules out the possibility of (pre)conceiving the seasons; we 
are instead ‘Out of nothing to have come on major weather’.  
Stevens suggests that it is in these ‘discoveries’ that we can take pleasure. However, just as I 
suggested that the oceanic optimism with which he regards renewal in ‘Sea Surface Full of Clouds’ 
is complicated by our understanding of marine pollution, so too must his pleasure in the discovery 
of ‘major weather’ be read alongside Botkin’s discrimination between naturally originating and 
artificially exacerbated change. Increased literal instances of ‘major weather’ today are the result of 
anthropogenic climate change, arising from the very unreasoned processes that shadow our 
employment of instrumental reason; Stevens’s lines in ‘It Must Give Pleasure’ now, therefore, offer 
an expression of our failure to capture the word by ‘rational distortion’. 
The importance of ‘discovery’ over ‘conception’ highlights another aspect of the pleasurable 
that becomes relevant to a poetics of climate change, that is, our sensory experience of being in the 
world. We cannot depend on our sense experience to tell us about climate change, but if climate as 
an abstract can be rendered as though it has sensory presence then we will more readily register it. 
Costello glosses Stevens’s use of the term ‘pleasure’ by highlighting such a sensual quality, but 
qualifies it with an apprehension that seems appropriate to the context of climate change: she says 
to ‘give pleasure’ means to ‘make our eyes dilate, our hair stand on end, satisfy a need’ (‘US 
Modernism’ 179). This reminds us of our bodily contingency in the world, as experienced by the 
old man in the tower of ‘Credences of Summer’.  
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In ‘What to Make of a Diminished Thing’, Costello reads Stevens’s 1954 poem ‘The Plain Sense 
of Things’ (Collected 428) in relation both to natural excess, her quality of ‘superfluity’, and to our 
imagined place in the world: 
 
After the leaves have fallen, we return 
To a plain sense of things. It is as if 
We had come to an end of the imagination, 
Inanimate in an inert savoir. 
 
What remains of the imagination is its essential quality, and Stevens strives towards this because the 
poem observes that ‘the absence of the imagination had / Itself to be imagined’. To achieve ‘The 
Plain Sense of Things’ is to attain a fictive state akin to that of ‘The Snow Man’, or the old man of 
‘Credences of Summer’ who ‘feel[s] capable of nothing more’ (Collected 323).  
For Lensing, Stevens’s winter is to be read solely in human dimensions: he claims that ‘the 
dismemberment of nature […] took on wide social and personal connotations’ for Stevens (67). Yet 
to invoke the ‘dismemberment of nature’ in 2001, as Lensing does, and not to even gesture at its 
relevance to the state of the planet fails to take account of poetry’s response to its context of 
reading, to which Miller is more sensitive in his consideration of ‘The Man on the Dump’. Lensing 
also submits the ‘rat come out to see / The great pond and its waste of lilies’ to a biographical 
interpretation, seeing it as ‘the reductive minimum, the final seer [...] the ineradicable imagination of 
a lessened poet’ (64) – as which he argues that Stevens may have imagined himself, being in his 
seventies when he composed the poem.  
In contrast, having aligned ‘human and natural creativity’ in her term ‘superfluity’, Costello is 
able to trace the entangled significance that Lensing ignores. She notes that the rat might also be 
‘the sign of renewal entering the poem of waste” (‘What to Make’ 586). Because ‘nature and culture 
slide together’ in Stevens as Costello maintains, the rat is doubly an indicator species, signalling a 
change of season, and a focal point for the poet’s imagination. As the latter, ‘Its angle of vision 
does not allow the wide prospect of the elevated Romantic beholder, but a nearly horizontal 
perspective, in which imagination and reality become so close as to be indistinguishable’ (‘What to 
Make’ 586). That doubleness means that Stevens’s rat serves as another exemplar of Bornstein’s 
notion of ‘double consciousness’: it is a mediating image, both observer of nature and observer in 
nature. Although Costello asserts that Stevens’s rodent ‘is evidently not the rat that appears in 
Eliot’s The Waste Land’, which she considers ‘a leftover from the trenches’ (586), ‘The Plain Sense 
of Things’ shares the earlier poem’s concern with the potential for renewal, while the rats in both 
are hybrids of objective entity and imaginative projection (see Chapter 2, pp.71–2 of this thesis). 
Stevens makes that doubleness into a way of escaping anthropocentricity. The already impersonal 
narrating voice – ‘we return’, ‘We had come to an end’ – hesitantly transcends humanity to 
participate imaginatively in the world it perceives, rather than remaining content with reducing that 
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world to a perceived object. In this extension, we see a quality of Bennett’s notion of vital 
materialism, that ‘a chord is struck between person and thing’ (120). 
Because the imagination takes pleasure in being ‘superfluous’ to reasoned order, it is able to 
account for what exceeds human conception. In ‘The Man on the Dump’, the dump remains the 
object of the poet’s imaginative attention even while it marks civilisation’s attempt to rid its 
consciousness of those items. In ‘The Plain Sense of Things’, this paradox of waste is embodied in 
the word ‘waste’ itself. It can stand for desolation, as in the title of Eliot’s poem, but it can also 
signal surfeit or excess, as Costello argues: ‘the “waste” of the lilies suggests the opposite of 
barrenness’, in Stevens’s poem (‘What to Make’ 586). As desolation, a ‘waste of lilies’ is in the same 
state as the ‘leaves’ that have ‘fallen’ in the first line; as surfeit, lilies cover the pond in anticipation 
of the renewal of spring from winter. The ‘waste’ is doubly squandering and profligacy, depending 
on whether one looks at the ‘great pond’ through the poet’s eyes or the rat’s. If we see it from the 
point of view of the biographical Stevens, in his seventies when the poem was published, the sense 
of desolation or emptiness is emphasised, as it is for the old man in the tower of ‘Credences of 
Summer’. But from rat’s perspective, the seasonal cycle persists and renewal is possible. The 
ambivalence is inherent to Stevens’s poetics. In ‘The Plain Sense of Things’, the imagination 
entertains the possibility of organic renewal despite the condition of waste, whereas in ‘The Man on 
the Dump’, the condition of waste is humanly created, representing a failure to imagine the trash 
possesses the vital materialism that Jane Bennett attributes to it. The lilies and the dump can be 
distinguished by Botkin’s categories of natural and unnatural change.  
Because it results from the accumulation of waste greenhouse gases, climate change signifies the 
failure of imagination that I read in ‘The Man on the Dump’, but on a global scale. It attests that we 
have only imagined as far as the energy or resources we have produced and used, and relegated the 
emissions generated to the status of ‘side effects’. Such waste is not licensed by Stevens’s 
identification of a root common to imaginative and natural renewal. Rather, the poet demonstrates 
that we have to resort to the imagination’s scope to perceive material phenomena that exceed our 
experience and interests. In ‘The Plain Sense of Things’, this human practice of waste, as compared 
to natural waste, is signified by ‘The greenhouse’ whose ‘chimney is fifty years old and slants to one 
side’.13 There is no possibility for natural renewal as the greenhouse depends on human 
intervention to restore it – it ‘never so badly needed paint’. But in terms of waste, it is still subject 
to the same physical principles as the lilies on the pond. If we consider the greenhouse’s waste in 
terms of desolation, its poor state of repair and decrepit chimney signal a failure to contain and 
harness heat: that heat dissipates into the atmosphere, and the wasteful world remains cold and icy. 
An alarming alternative, however, comes into consideration if the ‘waste’ of heat is profligate, 
because this entails an accumulation of (literal) greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
                                                 
13
 As the dump of ‘The Man on the Dump’ is an image of an artificial site, so too is the greenhouse. Also like the dump, 
the greenhouse may be inspired by a site in Stevens’s neighbourhood – Holly Stevens mentions ‘The greenhouses 
[that] were on our route’ to Elizabeth Park in Hartford (656). In both of his poems, Stevens abstracts environmental 
particulars to make them into resonant symbols. 
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In ‘Poésie Abrutie’ (Collected 268), whose title goes beyond pleasure to be ‘Besotted Poetry’,14 the 
greenhouse becomes a concentrated and intensified symbol of human interaction with the climate, 
in the same way the dump of ‘The Man on the Dump’ becomes a concentrated and intensified 
symbol of waste disposal: ‘The greenhouse on the village green / Is brighter than the sun itself. / 
Cinerarias have a speaking sheen.’ Recalling that the ‘sun itself’ in Stevens operates as a figure for 
reality in its broadest terms (Vendler 34), we can read the artificial intensification of solar energy by 
the greenhouse here as a figure for poetry, a concentration of natural energy by the imagination. 
This becomes explicit in the way that the plants in the final line are given a ‘speaking sheen’, a 
linguistic, and thus human, supplement to the reflected sun. This is a fictive intensification of the 
distant solar body’s energy into one multifaceted image, bringing it within immediate sensory 
experience. As such, it highlights both literally and figuratively the underlying natural principles that 
we would otherwise ignore or relegate to our unconscious, because we more intensely witness the 
sun’s brightness and feel its heat. We already use the phrase ‘greenhouse effect’ to imagine in 
human terms the operation of the climate, but in likening the atmosphere to an artificial structure 
we retrospectively impose order on it, as the jar does on the wilderness. The greenhouse figures the 
fictions that we need to construct to make climate amenable to human sensation.  
 
The fictions of our climate 
If the irruption of major weather into our systems of thought startles us, is there anything more 
conventionally pleasurable that a supreme fiction of the climate can offer us? However dire our 
entanglement in climate change is, sombre doomsterism is at best a smug and at worst an  
off-putting rhetorical strategy. In ‘Apocalypse Forever’, Erik Swyngedouw goes so far as to suggest 
that this approach represents a ‘negative desire for an apocalypse that few really believe will realize 
itself’ (219), with the effect of evading the political implications of climate change and pressing on 
with capitalism redressed as sustainable development. He thus advocates ‘the construction of great 
new fictions that create real possibilities for constructing different socio-environmental futures’ 
(228). More imaginative and more stimulating ways of accounting for our ecological implication are 
therefore valuable. 
Stevensian recapitulations of our predicament may thus throw up unexpected insights, supreme 
fictions for our future. His ‘Anecdote of the Jar’ is more appealing for not being, say, ‘Sermon of 
the Jar’; while ‘Sea Surface Full of Clouds’, rather than being aesthetic for its own sake, actually 
demonstrates the recursive imagination we should employ in considering our phenomenal 
environment. This quality, playful rather than programmatic, has analogies with the improvisatory 
approach that Nigel Clark advocates in response to the possibility of sudden climate change:15 ‘If 
the abrupt climate change thesis has a lesson,’ he writes, ‘it is surely as much about the way that 
                                                 
14
 This is according to the translation provided by editors Frank Kermode and Joan Richardson in their note to the poem 
(Collected 1002). 
15
 Specifically, this term describes the possibility that our cumulative environmental impacts could trigger a shift in 
conditions that is sudden or swift, by both geological and cultural timescales. 
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extreme conditions condemn us and other creatures to experimentation and improvisation as it is 
about the need for precaution and self-restraint’ (‘Volatile Worlds’ 49). 
We cannot let playfulness become synonymous with complacency; but our agency is equally 
limited if we burden ourselves with visions of definitive climate collapse. We can ‘discover’ our way 
through by ‘coming on’ it, rather than by imposing ‘rational distortion’ and imagining that to be a 
great order. The scope afforded by poetic fictions enables us to entertain and explore the 
imaginative consequences of our environmental interactions without committing ourselves to their 
material consequences. Abstract, changeable images of our climatic present and future can engage 
us by bringing those qualities into our sense experience and remind us that our survival is 
‘dependent on innumerable daily acts of endurance, compassion and making-do as it is on 
moments of high drama or breakthrough’ (‘Volatile Worlds’ 50). 
Chapter 4 
‘Who will entune a bogged orchard?’ Basil Bunting and nature’s 
discord 
 
Like the two poets I have already discussed, Basil Bunting engages with the challenge of making 
nonhuman phenomenal agency manifest. I have read Eliot as exploiting discontinuities in culture to 
indicate our implication in forces that we would conventionally repress, and argued that Stevens 
demonstrates our difficulty in projecting on to the climate an instrumental idea of order because 
language never entirely corresponds to the forces it seeks to describe. Bunting’s poetry represents 
the entanglement of human and world with a different technique, embodying natural phenomena 
not just in imagery but aurally in the materiality of his language. In ‘Radical Landscapes’, Harriet 
Tarlo writes that Bunting ‘uses musical forms and terms to explore the changing, shape-shifting 
environment. […] musical elements and natural elements correspond and coexist in such a way that 
neither can be said clearly to be a metaphor of the other, but [they] coexist as signals in a sequence’ 
(158). This weaving together of agencies in his poetry helps prepare us to deal with the implications 
of anthropogenic climate change. 
Bunting scales up from individual experience through the levels of bioregion and civilisation to 
nonhuman terrestrial and cosmic forces. The ‘patrolled bounds’ between our usual distinctions of 
scale are, in his work, zones which species that are ‘companion’ to the human ‘slither’ across, such 
as the slowworm and rat in his 1965 long poem Briggflatts (Bunting Complete Poems 59–81; 71). 
Equally unbounded is the modernist selfhood that Bunting develops in his poetry. The self cannot 
be readily identified with the body, which is shown to be situated in and constituted by the 
environment throughout his work. His is not the uncomplicated surrender of psyche to world 
articulated by Theodore Roszak in the notion of ‘ecopsychology’, which proposes that ‘the psyche 
is rooted inside a greater intelligence once known as the anima mundi, the psyche of the Earth herself’ 
(‘Where Psyche Meets Gaia’ 16; author’s italics). Rather, there is in Bunting’s work a transition 
between human and natural creations that can be illuminated by Nancy Tuana’s theory of viscous 
porosity and Beth Dempster’s of ecological boundarylessness. In responding to the question ‘who 
will entune a bogged orchard […] ?’ that Bunting asks in the second part of Briggflatts (Complete 69), I 
argue in this chapter that the music of his poetry attunes our erring ears to nonhuman phenomena, 
but without seeking to bring us into easy harmony with them. 
I will begin this chapter by examining Bunting’s poetics, which is informed by both a Romantic 
and a modernist heritage. He formulates an open style to express the entanglement of human 
cultural and wild natural agency, which I read as exemplifying Latour’s quality of hybridity. His 
patterning of this entanglement is open-ended rather than teleological, and can be seen in his 
arrangement of elemental imagery such as fire and water. Patterns are complicated and disrupted by 
human presence, which imposes a direction on material phenomena that those phenomena resist, 
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in particular in modernity, generating waste and exacerbating a tendency towards entropy. Bunting’s 
awareness of this disruption is marked by a departure from usual narratives of selfhood, and I go 
on to explain how identity is complicated by the environment of his poems. Reciprocal attempts to 
bring the world into harmony are thus fundamentally compromised, and we as humans must 
become reconciled to a state of decay.  
The chapter will centre on an analysis of Briggflatts, using the poem to display the efficacy of the 
critical tools I have so far developed. The poem represents the culmination of Bunting’s work and 
is dubbed ‘An autobiography’, although as the poet himself notes it is ‘not a record of fact’ (Complete 
226; author’s italics): it proceeds from his boyhood landscape of northern England to London, the 
Mediterranean and into the mythic history of Alexander the Great, before returning to his home 
soil. I will also consider Bunting’s earlier work by looking critically back through Briggflatts to 
demonstrate how its ecopoetics is developed in the course of his writing. His work allows us to 
envisage human beings as part of ecological co-creation, what Beth Dempster calls ‘sympoiesis’ 
(‘Boundarylessness’ 94–5). He represents our entanglement with nonhuman process without 
intentional control on either part. Such a poetics, I contend, is valuable in the articulation of human 
implication in contemporary climate change. 
 
Positioning poetics: Nature in transitional textual relation 
In light of his engagement with our experience of nature, Bunting’s work might be seen as more 
obviously amenable to environmental readings than Eliot or Stevens under the terms of first-wave 
ecocriticism. However, it is for his articulation of a particular relation with natural phenomena that 
I consider Bunting’s work here, not the incorporation of these phenomena in his work per se. The 
relation he identifies in his poetry persists into the twenty-first century, even as material nature is 
irrevocably altered by anthropogenic climate change.  
Bunting establishes this relation through a synthesis of Poundian with Wordsworthian principles. 
In the preface to the 1968 edition of his Collected Poems, Bunting declares: ‘If ever I learned the trick 
of it [i.e. poetry], it was mostly from poets long dead whose names are obvious’ (reprinted in 
Complete Poems 21). Wordsworth is the first of these, and Bunting concludes his list with his 
contemporaries Ezra Pound and Louis Zukofsky. The influence of Wordsworth and Pound in 
Briggflatts is evident to Burton Hatlen in ‘Regionalism and Internationalism in Basil Bunting’s 
Briggflatts’. Hatlen considers the provenance of the ‘concrete particular’ in Bunting’s imagery, for 
instance (60): 
 
The power of poetic language to render up such presences steadily increases as we move from 
Wordsworth to Pound. Too often Wordsworth […] give[s] us abstractions rather than images. 
But Pound’s verse is full of the things of this world, perceived with astonishing precision; and 
Briggflatts is a post-Imagist poem as well as a bardic poem, each detail finely drawn. 
 
In affirming this heritage for Bunting, I also contend that he disavows certain egotistical projections 
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of Wordsworthian Romanticism as well as the self-assertions of Poundian modernism. He enables 
an understanding of human–natural relations as mutually creative and influential.  
For Wordsworth, the infinite reach of the imagination contrasts with the irruption of reality. 
When the ‘soulless image’ of Mont Blanc ‘usurped upon a living thought / That never more could 
be’ (The Prelude 1850; VI.527–8), Wordsworth shows that his imagination outruns the world, and is 
brought down by the mismatch with it. But the power of the imagination persists, and Wordsworth 
later calls it ‘That awful Power’ that ‘rose from the mind’s abyss’ (1850 Prel. VI.594), so it  
re-ascends despite the mountain’s earlier ‘usurpation’. Bunting’s modernism in contrast attends to 
what Isobel Armstrong, in Language as Living Form in Nineteenth-Century Poetry, dubs ‘The sensory, 
immediate and self-enclosed image’, which ‘may partake in some sense of the world of phenomenal 
experience’ (209). This is the influence of Pound’s harder, imagistic phase, and of William Carlos 
Williams’s dictum, first expressed in ‘A Sort of a Song’, ‘Compose. (No ideas / but in things) 
Invent!’ (Williams Selected Poems 133). Yet a truly self-enclosed modernist poetics would preclude 
relation with the outside world, which is in this arrangement irremediably other, brought into the 
text but standing for nothing other than itself. Armstrong then asks of such an image ‘how does it 
interpret itself?’ Eliot grapples with this resistance of the objective world – Prufrock’s failures of 
self-assertion and civilisation’s effort to impose order on nonhuman processes in The Waste Land, 
respectively, reveal the vulnerability of ego and of culture to forces they would exclude or control. 
In Eliot’s work, this recognition comes only after resistance to those forces has been attempted. 
Bunting, however, already accepts this entanglement with the world, and, pragmatically, develops a 
poetics from it. The objective world remains no less present, but its effect is to efface rather than 
fracture a sense of self. 
At the opening of Briggflatts, the figure of a stonemason inscribes human language materially into 
the world, and he demonstrates the give and take that an acceptance of the world’s objective 
presence entails. The mason exists according to natural rhythm rather than that of the clock, 
‘tim[ing] his mallet / to a lark’s twitter’, and acknowledges that his mineral medium is materially 
responsive rather than purely passive, ‘listening while the marble rests’ (Complete 61). While the 
gravestone he makes is a signifier of human particularity and ‘the stone spells a name’, it stands in 
contrast to the dead man ‘In the grave’s slot’, thus in fact ‘naming none, / a man abolished’. The 
two processes, death and commemoration, are not opposed but inextricably entangled, because it is 
the dead man’s decomposition that prompts the mason’s composition in the stone. As in Stevens’s 
‘The Plain Sense of Things’, processes of organic waste engender renewal because ‘Decay thrusts 
the blade’ and ‘wheat stands in excrement / trembling’. In Briggflatts, however, this process has none 
of the aesthetic vitality of Stevens’s dialectic between imagination and reality, as even the birdsong 
becomes effortful: ‘Painful lark, labouring to rise!’ (61). The notion of birdsong, which uses the 
terms of human music to describe a nonhuman source of sound, here signifies both a human 
acceptance of natural rhythm, and that rhythm’s tendency towards death and decay. 
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Bunting’s expression of human entanglement with the world, and the world’s material resistance 
to human beings – the marble resists the mason, while the process of decay is not arrested by the 
erection of a gravestone – exemplifies the two qualities of Nancy Tuana’s notion of ‘viscous 
porosity’. She writes: ‘Attention to the porosity of interactions helps to undermine the notion that 
distinctions, as important as they might be in particular contexts, signify a natural or unchanging 
boundary, a natural kind. At the same time, “viscosity” retains an emphasis on resistance to 
changing form’ (194; author’s italics). To read this in Bunting is to see his admission of nonhuman 
material agency into the poem, as marked for example in the mason’s words ‘Rocks / happen by 
chance’. The conclusion of the first section with the lines ‘Name and date / split in soft slate / a 
few months obliterate’ (Complete 64) paradoxically ‘entunes’ in its repeated rhymes a process of 
symbolic decay, where even the solidity of the gravestone is subject to elemental erosion. The 
patterning marks an epigrammatic acceptance of what Tarlo calls ‘the ultimate “fact” of nature’ 
(158). As such it contrasts with the mountain’s troubling presence for Wordsworth, or the terror 
that Eliot communicates in the vitality of the lilacs in the opening of The Waste Land. Bunting 
accepts both material nature and the possibility of ‘chance’ into his view of the world without 
having here to bring them within the comprehension of the conscious mind. Tarlo affirms that 
‘The assumption that landscape writing always presents the land, in ways associated with traditional 
pastoral, as romantic, sublime, mystical and sentimental is belied’ by Bunting’s poetics (150).  
Our ease of access to such troubling material phenomena is complicated when human activity 
seeks to contain or suppress them, however. A transition away from grounded understanding of the 
world is doubly inscribed in Briggflatts with the movement from the first to the second part of the 
poem: first, there is a change of setting from rural to urban landscape; second, and more 
significantly, is the change of mindset this relocation prompts. In the first part of the poem we can 
‘trace / lark, mallet, / becks, flocks / and axe knocks’ (Complete 64). This list mingles processes 
natural and human: birdsong (or flight), carving, the run of a stream, agriculture and history. The 
associations ‘traced’ between the two spheres are reinforced by the common brevity of the Anglo-
Saxon diction and the material consonance in the ‘-k’ and ‘-ks’ sounds. As Tarlo points out, ‘the 
activity of nature is not so much invoked as embodied’ by Bunting’s sonic patterning in the poem 
(156). By the second movement of Briggflatts, however, the poet-figure is ‘a spy’, and what in his 
boyhood was ‘tracing’ now serves more functional ends: he ‘gauges’, ‘decodes’, ‘scans’ (Complete 65). 
His relation with the world becomes instrumental, rather than fully sensory, although by enjambing 
the objects of these verbs, Bunting suggests that natural phenomena outrun human processes of 
containment. As in the penultimate stanza of the preceding section, these images also entangle the 
natural and artificial or functional, with ‘a Flemish horse / hauling beer’ for instance. The weather is 
still present in the city in the form of ‘thunder’, and even the human channelling of water and gas, 
in ‘pipes clanking’, registers material resistance through their sound. The pipe, a connective device, 
also suggests a link between urban emplacement and natural resources. Rather than 
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straightforwardly lamenting physical separation from a rural idyll, part II of Briggflatts is marked by 
its troubled reaction to nature’s material excess, which cannot be entirely suppressed or 
instrumentalised even in the city. 
This is a concern Bunting also explores in his earlier sonata The Well of Lycopolis (1935). On one 
hand, the London of this poem is characterised by its absolute distinction from nature: ‘The nights 
are not fresh / between High Holborn and the Euston Road / nor the days bright even in summer 
/ nor the grass of the squares green’ (Complete 42). On the other hand, the invocation of natural 
time in these lines conjures the very processes the metropolis occludes. The titular ‘Well’ is itself an 
image of the inability to mark a distinction between human signification and natural phenomena, as 
it represents both civilisation’s dependence on natural resources and water’s own agency. If drunk 
by a woman, the fabled Lycopolis water would break her hymen, inscribing her body as though she 
had lost her virginity whether or not she had done so.1 The legend anticipates Alaimo’s 
observation in Bodily Natures that ‘the human body is never a rigidly enclosed, protected entity, but 
is vulnerable to the substances and flows of its environments’ (Bodily 28). Bunting’s line ‘We have 
laid on Lycopolis water’ (Complete 42) can therefore be read as reflecting both cultural and natural 
agency. It is a declaration of hospitality, when water has been provided for us; but ‘laid’ also has a 
sexual connotation, and an association with impurity. As in my reading of water in The Waste Land, 
Bunting indicates that we cannot make an instrumental distinction between kinds of water; neither 
can the city distinguish itself from the natural resources it abstracts. More broadly, in a poem 
Howarth characterises as ‘satiris[ing] Bloomsbury’s incestuous mixture of modernism and literary 
journalism’ (211), the apocalyptic mode of Eliot’s writing is itself subject to Bunting’s pastiche.2 
The parodic tone of The Well of Lycopolis suggests once more that Bunting emphasises material 
phenomena’s resistance to human control, whereas Eliot in The Waste Land sets them in tension. 
With the juxtaposition of civilised practice against its long-range environmental impacts, Bunting’s 
writing offers an emergent mode for dealing with concerns that human practice has aggravated in 
the time since he was writing.  
Notions of natural purity are tainted by the metropolis. In both Briggflatts and The Well of Lycopolis, 
Bunting is aware that urban environments require us to find a different language to engage with the 
natural, rather than simply polarising a pure nature and a polluted culture. In that awareness, 
Bunting confronts a problem also faced by his Romantic predecessor, as identified by Robert 
Pogue Harrison: ‘It is in the city that Wordsworth recollects the scene of nature, and it is only by 
recollecting his recollection that he relates to the presence of nature […] The nostalgia, in turn, is 
                                                 
1
 Bunting cryptically says in his note on the poem: ‘Gibbon mentions its effects in a footnote’ (Complete 147). Gibbon’s 
footnote itself reads: ‘Lycopolis is the modern Siut, or Osiot, a town of Said, about the size of St. Denys, which drives 
a profitable trade with the kingdom of Sennaar; and has a very convenient fountain, “cujus potû signa virginitatis 
eripiuntur”’ (The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire ed. Womersley; Vol. II., reprinting Gibbon’s 
original third and fourth volumes; 64 n.112.) The Latin translates, ‘on drinking which, the signs of virginity are torn’. 
2
 This is most notable in section III of The Well of Lycopolis: ‘Can a moment of madness make up for / an age of 
consent?’ (Bunting Complete 43) spoofs Eliot’s ‘The awful daring of a moment’s surrender / Which an age of prudence 
can never retract’ (The Waste Land 403–4). Bunting also vulgarises ‘twit twit twit’ (Waste line 203) in ‘tweet, tweet, 
twaddle, / tweet, tweet, twat’ (Bunting Complete 43). 
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what draws nature into its presence’ (Forests 163). The contrast between the first and second 
movements of Briggflatts is a contrast between the embedded language of youth and the  
self-conscious language of the metropolis. Both modes, however, are subject to a dilemma 
identified by Terry Gifford in Pastoral: ‘The problem is to find a language that can convey an 
instinctive unity that is at once both prior to language and expressed by a language that is 
distinctively human’ (8). The real shift between the first two parts of Briggflatts is not then from 
“natural” language to a more alienated vocabulary, but between a language which accepts both its 
limitations and the counter-agency of material phenomena, rather than one which attempts to 
master their dynamic force. The structure of Briggflatts is, throughout, further conditioned by the 
human view. What at first seem artless and self-important uses of language, in the first and second 
sections respectively, are actually both retrospective, seen from the reflective position arrived at in 
the poem’s final movement. Boyhood and literary apprenticeship take place in the broader 
environment of that view, which is able to entertain the material value of the world in its own right, 
‘the loveliness of things overlooked or despised’ as Bunting suggests in his A Note on Briggflatts. 
Because such material phenomena are a constant presence in Briggflatts, we should be wary of 
suggesting that those in a rural landscape are somehow more authentic than those in the city. 
Hatlen points out that Briggflatts ‘is full of references to—and invokes by their Northumbrian 
names—the flora, the fauna, the topography, and the agricultural and domestic traditions of a 
specific region of the earth’ (52). We see this, for instance, in the closely observed account of the 
mason’s work, and its relation to natural time, or the discriminating ear that picks out the ‘sweet 
tenor bull’ of the poem’s first line (Complete 61). Yet this attention to detail is not unique to the 
rustic situation of the first section, and persists in the city, where a gaze ‘gauges / lines of a Flemish 
horse / […] the angle, obtuse, / a slut’s blouse draws on her chest’ (Complete 65). We ought not, 
then, make the poem speak solely to regionalist agendas, even though Bunting himself on occasion 
favoured such readings. In the first of his own notes on the poem, for instance, he declares that 
‘The Northumbrian tongue [that] travel has not taken from me sometimes sounds strange to men 
used to the koiné or to Americans who may not know how much Northumberland differs from the 
Saxon south of England. Southrons would maul the music of many lines in Briggflatts’ (Complete 226). 
Jonathan Bate endorses Bunting’s position in more environmental terms by referring to Briggflatts as 
a ‘Northumbrian poem […] in which identity is forged in place’ (Song 234). However, Tarlo rightly 
identifies that Bunting ‘chooses (some would say disingenuously) to emphasise the rural and local 
aspects of a poem which in fact ranges the world and time’ (152).  
Tarlo’s analysis also serves to demonstrate how far a literary text can exceed authorial 
expectation and assertion. By resisting and then moving on from both rural and metropolitan 
(‘bogus’; Complete 65) accounts of the world, the poet is already conscious of the significance of 
elsewhere. He is both local and global in his outlook at the same time, hence the ‘Regionalism and 
Internationalism’ Hatlen stresses in the title of his analysis. The London of The Well of Lycopolis is 
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situated in a broader context, while Briggflatts begins with the local, the river ‘Rawthey’s madrigal’, 
and flows down to the ‘strong song’ of the ‘sea’ by the time of its coda (Complete 61, 81), admitting 
the pull of oceanic processes. Hatlen elaborates: ‘Briggflatts issues from and seeks to speak for a 
place that looks east to the North Sea as much as or more than it looks south to London’ (54). 
Bunting’s practice, drawn to the sea and further onwards as ‘the pilot turns from the wake’ (Complete 
65), thus moves in the opposite direction to Wordsworth’s nostalgic impulse. Of that, Harrison 
writes, ‘It is against the current of this river that the soul returns, from the alienating openness of 
the sublime […] to the intimate enclosure of [its] origins’ (Forests 163). Wordsworth’s return is 
against the current; Bunting allows himself to be subject to the tides, carried not home but out into 
the elements. 
 
An elemental economy 
The way Briggflatts is drawn on into the sea is indicative of the environmental boundaries that 
remain open throughout Bunting’s poetry. The poems move outwards from sites of human 
significance into elemental material processes. Briggflatts for instance resonates with images of 
elemental water and fire, and puts any instrumental use of them within a cyclical, consequential 
context. Anthony Mellors sees this openness of Bunting’s verse as part of the more general 
trajectory of Late Modernist Poetics that he analyses: 
 
Mythic consciousness attests to cosmic powers that allow ‘man’ to recover and participate in 
natural processes rather than symbolising the division between human significance and a chaotic 
universe. The shift is towards an ecological theory of artistic enactment: man is created by his 
environment, therefore he must learn to express himself through it, to permit himself to be 
expressed by it, instead of trying to beat it into shape (23). 
 
Mellors’s crucial observation is that, once environmental factors are recognised as an influence, we 
cannot then look to control our nonhuman environment in a straightforward fashion, to ‘beat it 
into shape’. Bunting expresses himself by weaving what Phillip Brown calls ‘the elemental threads’ 
of Briggflatts ‘into a rich fabric, the complexities of the soil cycle and the water cycle interlacing to 
create an intricate pattern’ (‘A Northern Lucretius’ 3). This is already evident in the way the sonata 
moves from the river to sea. In this regard, we can characterise Bunting’s work as post-pastoral, by 
the terms Terry Gifford outlines, because it ‘convey[s] an awareness of both nature as culture and 
of culture as nature’ (162). Gifford writes that contemporary ‘literature has gone beyond the closed 
circuit of pastoral and anti-pastoral’ in its visions of nature ‘to achieve a vision of an integrated 
natural world that includes the human […] a discourse that can both celebrate and take some 
responsibility for nature without false consciousness’ (148; author’s italics). In expressing such a 
recognition, Bunting’s work is valuable to a poetics of climate change, because this demands our 
attention to nature’s forces and acceptance of our role in exacerbating them.  
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The purpose of patterning nature in Bunting is to render it, as all-encompassing system and 
process, sensible at the experiential level. This represents his engagement with a Romantic dilemma 
articulated by Soper in ‘Passing Glories and Romantic Retrievals’: ‘Speech or writing mediates, 
either deliberately or as an effect, that which is immediate and preconceptual, and thus renders 
conceptual—and in the process in some sense “betrays”—that which is as it is, and is experienced 
as it is, only because it cannot be spoken’ (21). Bunting negotiates this dilemma by working in the 
opposite direction, rendering process – which has to be conceived because it takes place through 
time rather than instantaneously – in the movement of the verse. Through this movement, imagery 
such as the rocks or marble of Briggflatts become part of networks of motifs rather than remaining 
isolated, intractable objects. Bunting effects an engagement with nature not, or not solely, by 
registering a close scrutiny of the environment but by giving artist and natural forces equal status in 
the creation of the work of art.  
As a result, the processes that Bunting examines, although physical, are not reified. They are 
systemic rather than bounded, leading forever out of the poem to the phenomena of which they are 
a part.3 Beth Dempster’s notion of ‘boundarylessness’ can be productively applied here. Dempster 
suggests that ecosystems have previously been considered bounded or ‘autopoietic’, that is  
self-generating, according to some supposedly inherent or autonomous design. By way of example, 
she says of her own training as a forester ‘in the fairly common “harvesting” mentality’ that it 
‘promotes interpretation of forest systems as autopoietic’ (105). In this way, forests as systems have 
become regarded as mechanisms amenable to human control and market management. An 
alternative conception might be more helpful, she proposes. She considers the shoreline and 
snowline of a US West Coast rainforest as an example, and argues that:  
 
While these may be boundaries, they are not “self”-produced. […] the tree-line is a result of 
biological as well as climatic factors. If the latter are included as part of the system producing 
the boundary, then the boundaries must be drawn to incorporate these components, which 
would include a greater spatial extent, moving the boundaries further out (Dempster 104). 
 
Any influence coming to bear on a system, such as ‘climatic factors’, should merit consideration as 
part of that system, even if it lies beyond geographically conceived boundaries. Dempster dubs such 
an understanding of systems ‘sympoietic’ rather than autopoietic. This is akin to material 
ecocriticism’s conception of agency as not entailing intentionality, with organisms to be regarded as 
sites where fields of force come to bear rather than as bounded entities.  
                                                 
3
 This is consistent with an understanding of systemic ecology that emerges in middle of the twentieth century. Donald 
Worster outlines the conceptual value of the ecosystem in Nature’s Economy: ‘Using the ecosystem, all relations 
among organisms can be described in terms of the purely material exchange of energy and of such chemical 
substances as water, phosphorous, nitrogen, and other nutrients […] These are the real bonds that hold the natural 
world together; they create a single unit made up of many smaller units—big and little ecosystems’ (302). The 
‘ecosystem brought all nature—rocks and gases as well as biota—into a common ordering of material resources. It 
was more inclusive, paradoxically, because it was first more reductive’, Worster explains. 
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Bunting’s poetics suggests that the conventionally separate zones of human and natural 
creativity are transgressed in sympoietic fashion. It is possible thus to consider the animal world in 
Briggflatts in artistic, organisational terms. When ‘Anemones […] / design the pool / to their 
grouping’ (Complete 69), they are autonomous entities extending their influence beyond their 
individual bodies. In sympoietic terms, the power of creation and organisation is not confined to 
life, either, with agency ascribed to meteorological phenomena when ‘Mist sets lace of frost / on 
rock for the tide to mangle’ (Complete 78). Bunting’s image demonstrates Tuana’s theory of ‘emergent 
interplay, which precludes a sharp divide between the biological and cultural’ (189; author’s italics) in 
the production of phenomena: the ‘lace’ becomes a craft-like decorative overlay on the rock, but is 
a temporary inscription, as subject to phenomenal change as the gravestone was in the first part of 
the poem. Hence the system is not in aesthetic harmony, but is one where the ‘tide’ can disorder 
delicate patterning of ‘mist’ and ‘frost’, all aspects of the hydrological cycle in different states. In 
Dempster’s terms, this is not an autopoietic system that exhibits ‘Homeostatic balance’ but a 
sympoieitic one, ‘Balance[d] by dynamic tension’ (103) between different states of matter, vapour 
(‘mist’), solid (‘frost’) and liquid (‘tide’).  
The dynamic tension to which Dempster refers can be seen in the way the poet puts human and 
nonhuman agency on an equal footing in Briggflatts. The natural world and music share a creative 
impulse throughout the poem, Bunting using imagery drawn from the former synaesthetically to 
communicate the quality of the latter. The verve of ‘Asian vultures riding on a spiral / column of 
dust […] figures sudden flight of the descant / on a madrigal by Monteverdi’ (Complete 69). These 
lines embody the effect of the music in a physical image, but at the same time associate it with 
death and decay, thanks to the connotations of vultures and dust. Later in the poem, analogy shifts 
into agency. Bunting asks us to ‘consider’ the music of baroque composer ‘Domenico Scarlatti’, and 
hears ‘stars and lakes / echo him and the copse drums out his measure’ (Complete 76). In the 
transition from the verb ‘echo’ to ‘drums’, the metaphor moves from passive to active, as the 
trumpet in Stevens’s ‘Credences of Summer’ VIII first follows then precedes the weather it 
announces. Bunting’s practice in Briggflatts, ‘pragmatically admitting nature into culture’s ken and 
vice versa’, writes Sara R. Greaves, means that ‘culture and nature, the visual and the auditory, tenor 
and vehicle, weave in and out defining each other’ (‘A Poetics of Dwelling’ 69). That is to say, 
human presence in his poems is not the only source of agency.  
 
Poetics of entropy 
Mutual agency is not always harmonic in Bunting, as human design and natural process can be 
equally destructive. In the lines ‘White marble stained like a urinal / cleft in Apuan Alps, / always 
trickling, apt to the saw’, the process of gradual natural erosion makes the marble suitable for 
human intervention, that is, ‘apt to the saw’. Similarly, both ‘Ice and wedge / split it or  
well-measured cordite shots, / while paraffin pistons rap, saws rip’. Having established this 
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common destructive capacity, Bunting goes on to compare waste from both natural and industrial 
process, in the image ‘clouds echo marble middens’ (Complete 67). Water vapour cast off from land 
and sea is made to resemble the cast-offs of marble extraction in an analogy of a natural system 
with an economic one. In more general discussion of ecosystemic terminology, Donald Worster 
suggests in Nature’s Economy that use of terms such as “producer” and “consumer” to describe 
organisms in ecosystems is indicative of an economic worldview; furthermore, regarded ‘[a]s a 
modernized economic system, nature now becomes a corporate state, a chain of factories, an 
assembly line’ (313). Remember that Dempster also suggests forests are characterised as 
mechanistic so they can be economically co-opted by the ‘common “harvesting” mentality’ (105).  
Yet the economy is not the only possible model to describe natural phenomena; neither can 
economisation account for all material processes. Clouds represent one stage of a continuous 
hydrological cycle, whereas the middens are dumped waste from human industrial endeavour, that 
is, a process where continuous, cyclical use is not envisaged. This complicates the notion of an 
‘echo’ between them. Worster considers other scientific models of the environment that account 
for such discrepancies: 
 
The ecosystem of the earth, considered from the perspective of energetics, is a way-station on a 
river of no return. Energy flows through it and disappears eventually into the vast sea of space; 
there is no way to get back upstream. [...] By collecting solar energy for their own use, plants 
retard this entropic process; they can pass energy on to animals in repackaged or reconcentrated 
form—some of it at least—and the animals in turn hold it temporarily in organized availability 
(303). 
 
If we liken our economies to ecosystemic closed loops, however, we neglect what must necessarily 
be wasted. As a result, waste collects as we both produce and efface it. With this doublethink, the 
human economy is not an harmonious replication of the natural economy, but an exacerbation of 
its tendency towards entropy. This is, crucially, where Bunting’s poetics departs from Gifford’s 
notion of the post-pastoral. Bunting cannot be read as sharing the post-pastoral ‘recognition of a 
creative–destructive universe equally in balance in a continuous momentum of birth and death’ 
(Gifford 153), because his poems tend towards destruction rather than creation. Bunting’s image 
reveals the role of human activities in aggravating an innately entropic tendency. 
Taking up Bunting’s reference to ‘paraffin pistons’ – human tools run on fossil fuels – we can 
consider his analogy between midden and cloud in terms of the carbon rather than the water cycle. 
Vegetation extracts CO2 from the atmosphere and converts it into nutrition as part of its life-cycle, 
as it does solar energy in Worster’s account; in contrast, human activity simply offloads excess 
greenhouse gases – emissions from fossil fuel combustion, which derives energy from the sunlight 
stored by ancient photosynthesis4 – into atmospheric middens. In the 1933 poem ‘They Say Etna’ 
                                                 
4
  In ‘Rock, Life, Fire’, Nigel Clark describes ‘the element of excess that attends the unearthing of a previously 
inaccessible fire source, or what is effectively the making present of past solar energy’ (270). 
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(Complete 182–4), Bunting also entangles economic activity with its offcasts when he remarks that 
‘Waste accumulates at compound interest’ – a line Eric Mottram reads as evidence that ‘miners 
underground exemplify the expenditure of energy in the gears of capitalism’ (‘An Acknowledged 
Land’ 80). In the poem, waste is shown not just as the result of but as essential to the processes of 
capitalism, because ‘Capital is everything except the desert / sea, untunnelled rock, upper air’. 
Capital is defined by its environmental exclusions. It is through the aspiration to acquire these 
‘excepted’ environments that Capital broaches the territory of excess. In Bunting’s phrasing, 
‘Breathed air / is Capital, though not rented: / 70 million tons of solid matter / suspended in the 
atmosphere’ by volcanic eruption. This marks one form of accounting, where the unrented air and 
the volcanic aerosols that escape human commodification are enumerated. But by suggesting that 
‘Waste accumulates at compound interest’, Bunting also sardonically accounts for the externalised 
costs of human activity, that is, what industrial processes choose not to utilise and thus discard.  
In so accounting for ‘waste’, which is ordinarily discounted, Bunting crosses the boundary that 
creates “externality” in the first place. He thus anticipates Wood’s exegesis of externality in The Step 
Back, that ‘temporal externalisation––dumping waste in the river of time––makes sense under more 
expansive conditions. But [it] makes less and less sense as the world gets smaller’ (174). In ‘They 
Say Etna’, the world is considered in terms of resources, which are abstracted from the natural 
processes that accommodate them, thus generating waste. This contrast is evident in the two 
parodic, headline-like statements that are contrasted in the poem’s final lines. The declaration ‘MAN 
IS NOT AN END-PRODUCT, / MAGGOT ASSERTS’, reflects on the human bodily decomposition that 
Bunting will return to in Briggflatts, emphasising human materiality as a process rather than as a 
‘product’ of markets. By more economically-oriented understanding, however, ‘MAN IS AN  
END-PRODUCT AFFIRMS / BLASPHEMOUS BOLSHEVIK’ (Complete 184). 
The notion that we fail to contain or constrain the processes of nature, seen here in both 
Briggflatts and ‘They Say Etna’ in earthly, mineral form, characterises other elemental imagery 
throughout Briggflatts. Water resists commodification as, reduction to, or imposition of a defined 
state, as in The Waste Land and The Well of Lycopolis. When ‘fog on fells’ is juxtaposed with ‘spring’s 
ending’ (Complete 64), it is not just that the supposed ‘end’ of a season is smudged out by vaporous 
water, it is that the transition erases any certain seasonal boundary. This motif of unseasonal 
weather recurs throughout the poem, with the ‘bogged orchard’ and the ‘damp’ that ‘hush[es] the 
hive’ in ‘A disappointed July’ (Complete 69), or, conversely, the unexpectedly melting ice that opens 
the wintry fifth movement of the poem, ‘Drip – icicle’s gone’ (Complete 78). These images are again 
prefigured in The Well of Lycopolis, with the difficulty of registering seasons; passages such as 
‘Scamped spring, squandered summer, / grain, husk, stem and stubble / mildewed; mawkish dough 
and sour bread’ (Complete 43) show, as the earlier examples I have cited from the poem, the failure 
to synchronise human time with seasonality, meaning that the instrumental efforts of agriculture go 
past their prime, as Mother Venus also does. Meanwhile, the line ‘What reply will a / June hailstorm 
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countenance?’ (Complete 41) signals both the unmanageable quality of water as unexpected weather 
and nature as an unanswerable agent through the hydrological cycle. In these moments, seasonality 
is revealed to be contingent on the human imposition of order on the world, an order that natural 
phenomena materially resist. 
Another strand of water imagery that runs through Briggflatts not only resists but erases human 
inscription on the world. ‘Rain rinses the road’ in the poet-figure’s native countryside, and once he 
is at sea, ‘Fathoms dull the dale’ (Complete 63, 66). The latter, oceanic distances occlude the memory 
of home; but there is an overtone of swamped land as well, the ‘bogged orchard’ that is to come. 
The transience of humanity compared with water is most evident in the lines ‘Who cares to 
remember a name cut in ice / or be remembered? / Wind writes in foam on the sea’ (Complete 66). 
In the context of part II of Briggflatts – in particular the line ‘There is a lot of Italy in churchyards’ 
(67) – there is an apparent allusion to Keats’s Italian gravestone, inscribed ‘Here lies one whose 
name was writ in water’ (Motion Keats 564). One possible source behind Keats’s choice of epitaph, 
however, is Shakespeare and Fletcher’s King Henry VIII, ‘Men’s evil manners live in brass, their 
virtues / We write in water’ (4.2.45–6).5 These resonances extend the significance of Bunting’s 
‘name cut in ice’ so that it includes reputation, inscription and language; what is at stake in the 
transition between ice and sea, then, is the trace of humanity itself. Water serves a similar function 
in Briggflatts’s first movement when the boy’s young love ‘fetches’ ‘Rainwater from the butt […] to 
wash him inch by inch’ (Complete 63). The cleansing process begins an act of self-erasure by the 
poet-narrator that continues throughout the poem, alongside the ‘rinsed road’ becoming ‘dulled 
dale’. An intimate identification with the landscape is also indicated by the sly reference to the boy’s 
testicles as ‘pebbles’, making stony the organs that are seed-bearing. Whether we take the geological 
or procreative association from the innuendo, it situates the narrator in his spatial or historical 
environment, taking him out of himself into the landscape or generational time. 
There is a similar interdependence of elemental agency with the human in Briggflatts’s motifs of 
the domestication of fire. The poem demonstrates fire’s dual quality of productivity and destruction 
when it is exploited by humans. In the first part of the poem, the burning of wood ‘smoulders to 
ash’ to release the evocative ‘smell of October apples’ (Complete 63). The poet writes retrospectively 
on the way the wood holds over an autumnal memory until the spring, when it is released in the 
process of combustion. That unseasonal aspect of the process is uncontrolled, unintentional, and 
creates tension between natural time and human experience. In the second part, heat is 
                                                 
5
 See King Henry VIII (Arden Shakespeare: Third Series) 377. Motion says Keats ‘had devised an inscription which 
adapted the translation of a Greek proverb’, and interprets it as meaning his poetry ‘was [now] part of nature – part of 
the current of history’ (Keats 565). Oonagh Lahr, whose scholarship Motion cites (604 n.3), includes Shakespeare and 
Fletcher’s lines among the possible inspirations for Keats’s epitaph in ‘Greek Sources of “Writ in Water”’. However, 
her main argument is that although ‘The bitter epitaph Keats devised for his own grave is sometimes supposed to 
derive from a line in Beaumont and Fletcher’s Philaster’, the English sources are indebted to ‘a proverbial expression 
in ancient Greek’ (Lahr 17). A. J. Woodman rebuffs Lahr’s assertion, claiming that ‘Since “writing in water” occurs 
numerous times in English poets—in Shakespeare, among others—it is a priori more likely that Keats’s mind was not 
on classical literature at all’ (13). In either event, Bunting’s lines resonate in a long tradition, situating anonymous 
description in the current of natural history. 
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instrumentalised, unseen but inferred from its effect, in the lines ‘porridge bubbling, pipes clanking’ 
(Complete 65). In the third part of the poem, however, we are reminded that this process can run out 
of control; the army’s ‘torches straggle / seeking charred hearths / to define a road’ (71). The 
soldiers both create and follow a trail of destruction, the ‘charred hearths’ employing aural and 
imagistic concision to signify a connection between domestic warmth and unchecked combustion; 
Bunting’s use of the elemental image flickers between its associations with utility and danger. He 
exploits the hybrid quality that Nigel Clark identifies in his account of fire’s emergence and its 
adoption by humans: ‘almost everywhere there is natural fire’ on earth ‘there are or have been 
humans willing to augment the planet’s own pyrophytic tendencies’ – that is, its suitability for fire. 
This augmentation takes us to the point of ‘contemporary excess of anthropic combustion’ that 
Clark implicates in climate change (‘Rock’ 269, 268). Observing ‘that the interplay of biological life 
and terrestrial fire holds the earth’s atmosphere at a point which is far from equilibrium’, Clark 
concludes that now ‘might not be [a] good time to risk radically supplementing the earth’s 
combustive budget’ (272–3). Whether we read fire as having been used for heating or slaughter in 
the image of ‘charred hearths’, its waste, carbon dioxide, also accumulates at compound interest.  
 Bunting’s sonata form enables him to develop the significance of his elemental motifs as they 
recur throughout the work, expanding their resonance. By the time we reach the poem’s final 
movement, we can share Brown’s observation that, ‘As rock and water undergo transformation, so 
too does fire, and the several hearths of Briggflatts are subsumed into the flames of the cosmos’ (12). 
Bunting describes as ‘Furthest, fairest, things, stars, free of our humbug’ (Complete 80), but just as 
his experience of his natural environment is impossible to communicate without language, these 
vast, stellar processes are still entangled in human terms. To describe a star as ‘wrapt in emphatic 
fire roaring out to a black flue’ (80) is to invoke domestic processes of combustion to convey the 
stellar. Moreover, whatever the quantity of fuel remaining, it is still a finite resource by Bunting’s 
terms of comparison with coal. Bunting’s metaphor emphasises a sense of entropy on the cosmic 
scale, and as we read it today its vehicle becomes as resonant as its tenor.  
The star’s light is further figured as the ‘tremulous thread spun in the hurricane / spider floss on 
my cheek, light from the zenith’ (Complete 80); as ‘spider floss’, the image explicitly connects across 
natural, personal and cosmic scales. While drawing on scientific understanding, Roszak makes a 
similarly poetic association between selfhood and stellar matter: ‘We now know that the elemental 
stuff of which we are made was forged in the fiery core of ancient stars. In a very real sense, the 
ecologist’s web of life now spreads out to embrace the most distant galaxies’ (8). Bunting situates 
his affirmation, however, in an entropic context, conveying the common contingency of the stars’ 
lives and human existence in the lines: ‘Each spark trills on a tone beyond chronological compass, / 
yet in a sextant’s bubble present and firm / places a surveyor’s stone or steadies a tiller’ (Complete 
80). Although a star’s existence outruns anthropocentric timescales, that is, our ‘chronological 
compass’, it helps situates human presence in the world by directing our navigation and building. It 
126 CHAPTER 4 
 
is when we take that instrumental language to assume it means mastery over these fires, rather than 
a relation with them, that we fail to recognise the scalar discrepancies inherent in our conceptions, 
and we intensify their capacity to endanger us. 
 
Bunting unbound 
By tracing processes in nature and considering them in terms of human practices and identity, 
Bunting seems to honour another of Gifford’s post-pastoral criteria ‘by learning that what is 
happening in us is paralleled in external nature’ (156). Yet Gifford’s analysis necessitates the 
supposition of an ‘external nature’ at the same time as trying to elide it, because there has to be a 
medium outside the self in which what happens internally is paralleled. This is one characteristic of 
Romantic relations with nature, in this example early in The Prelude: ‘For I, methought, while the 
sweet breath of heaven / Was blowing on my body, felt within / A correspondent breeze, that 
gently moved / With quickening virtue’ (1850 Prel. I.33–6). Wordsworth’s imagination is here 
enlivened in a manner akin to electromagnetic induction rather than by a literal “inspiration” of the 
breeze through nose or mouth; the meteorological and metaphorical breezes are, unexpectedly, 
separated by the boundary of the skin. The wind does have creative agency, as Patricia Waugh 
demonstrates in her reading of these lines in Practising Postmodernism, Reading Modernism. For her, the 
passage marks a recognition of the “aesthetic” in the world: ‘In Wordsworth’s writing, […] we can 
detect that form situated in nature, a blessing in the gentle breeze which actually blows upon us to 
meet a corresponding breeze within’ (22). However, while there is a correspondence between the 
breezes, it is not a transaction across boundaries as such: the human in the environment is still 
separate from it. In Bunting’s work, a dispersal of selfhood and what it means to be human 
addresses our implication in the environment in a way Wordsworth’s internalised process cannot. 
Bunting’s questioning of the twinned stability of selfhood and environment modifies the 
Romantic discovery of the self in nature to create a sense of permeable, contingent identity, 
conditioned by and conditioning its environment. The elemental patterning of water in Briggflatts 
resists reduction to a single significance and erases human traces, and its permeation of bounded 
selfhood is a motif Bunting develops from his earliest work. For instance, while Ode 3 (1926) 
opens ‘I am agog for foam’, that ‘I’ is quickly lost in a profusion of plurals ‘our loneliness […] our 
envy’, ‘Its indifference / haunts us’ and so on (Complete 99). Individuality here is expanded into a 
collective humanity, and any character this humanity has is contingent on the elements. In this way, 
Bunting begins ‘breaking down the monolithic entities of Self and Other’, in Greaves’s words (69), 
so that nature is not other but an essential part of human identity. Bunting opens, as Dempster 
does, ‘the possibility of relinquishing boundaries’ (Dempster 97), both between individual human 
being and humanity, and between culture and nature. Compare this with the opening of The Prelude: 
Wordsworth’s ‘blessing in this gentle breeze’ (1850 Prel. I.1) is instrumental in the creation of the 
self with the sympathetic ‘corresponding mild creative breeze’ it engenders within. In Bunting, 
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while the environment provides the terms conditioning human experience, that experience is not 
individuated. Neither is nature benign in his ode; it is not even understood.  
The simultaneous influence and incomprehensibility of oceanic force is taken a stage further in 
Ode 17 (1930). In this poem, the sea is resistant not only to explanation, but also defies attempts to 
order it, physically and linguistically. The poem opens: 
 
Now that sea’s over that island 
so that barely on a calm day sun sleeks 
a patchwork hatching of combed weed 
over stubble and fallow alike 
I resent drowned blackthorn hedge, choked ditch, 
gates breaking from rusty hinges, 
the submerged copse, 
Trespassers will be prosecuted. (Complete 113; author’s italics) 
 
This expresses a failure of imposed boundaries, the ‘hedge, […] ditch, / gates’, to contain 
unexpected weather, later described as ‘this subaqueous persistence / of a particular year’. Although 
the narrator claims to ‘resent’ these drowned boundaries, the tone is more resigned than bitter, with 
the first line implying that the rising sea has been anticipated before ‘Now’. By quoting the sign 
‘Trespassers will be prosecuted’ in this context, the limits of cultural order are revealed, as though the sea 
should be subject to legal admonition but that had failed to have an effect. Even to identify and 
name a place as ‘that island’ is to intimate that it has always been an island and will remain so, 
although as Stevens points out in ‘Variations on a Summer’s Day’ these linguistic distinctions exist 
‘by grace alone’ (Collected 215). Whereas Stevens acknowledges the imaginative interdependency of 
poem and sun with the punning lines ‘his poems, although makings of his self, / Were no less 
makings of the sun’ (‘The Planet on the Table’, Collected 450), the same contingency of text on 
environment in Bunting is signalled by the physical failure of the sign to prevent flooding, using 
image rather than wordplay. The two poets present alternative answers to Timothy Morton’s 
questions about how we constitute an environment: ‘At what point do we stop, if at all, drawing the 
line between environment and non-environment: The atmosphere? Earth’s gravitational field? Earth’s 
magnetic field, without which everything would be scorched by solar winds? The sun, without 
which we wouldn’t be alive at all? The Galaxy?’ (Thought 10; author’s italics). Stevens reads the 
environment as being as far as the sun, while Bunting sets no limit, rather suggesting that it is 
human-imposed limits that are imaginary or inherently vulnerable to transgression. 
Ode 17 develops through the simile ‘a film of light in the water crumpled and spread / like a 
luminous frock on a woman walking / alone in her garden’ to the narrator’s regretful ‘Very likely I 
shall never meet her again’, suggesting that what nature symbolises in the poem is in fact simply the 
female. Hatlen similarly suggests that in Briggflatts the ‘variable’ of ‘the natural world […] is, 
however, usually an extension of the domestic/erotic world of the Woman’ (54). In The Song of the 
Earth, on the other hand, Bate reads a reverse analogy in the first part of the sonata: ‘the girl he [the 
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poet-boy] lies with is, like Wordsworth’s Lucy, an embodiment of the land’ (234). This is seen at 
least in a further association of water in Briggflatts, when boy and girl ‘kiss under the rain’ (Complete 
62), or, in a later liaison, with ‘the smooth wet riddance of Antonietta’s / bathing suit, mouth ajar 
for / submarine Amalfitan kisses’ (67). Both Hatlen and Bate read the relationship between (a) man 
and nature as an erotic one, and as such that relationship can be useful to climate change criticism 
because it renders large-scale material phenomena – landscape or water-cycle – imaginatively 
susceptible to sense. Greaves also draws the female/nature parallel in her analysis of Briggflatts, but 
her ecofeminist reading highlights the irreducibility of either to the other. She also points up 
eco/feminist agency as opposed to the agency of (a) man: ‘the most obvious Romantic Others, 
woman and nature, are not merely passive receivers and enhancers of the active masculine sublime, 
but active agents themselves’ (69). Furthermore, in Ode 17, the female and the natural are actually 
distinct, because the former fails in her attempt to control and refine the latter, to cultivate ‘her 
garden’ that she ‘had prepared […] for preservation’. Her effort is conducted ‘not vindictively, 
urged / by the economy of passions’, suggesting her acceptance of natural agency rather than an 
assertion of human design on it. The subsequent lines support such a reading: ‘Nobody said: She is 
organising / these knicknacks her dislike collects / into a pattern nature will adopt and perpetuate’. 
This disavows human attempts to impose a ‘pattern’ on the world, accepting natural agency rather 
than attempting in vain to prevent its ‘trespass’, as in the first stanza. 
Trespass, or transgression of boundaries, also has a temporal dimension, as David Wood’s 
image of ‘temporal externalisation’ as ‘dumping waste in the river of time’ suggests (174). Bunting’s 
poem is not therefore bounded by its relation to the context of composition, and its language 
cannot prevent the trespass of its own future rereading in retrospective contexts – such as that of a 
changing climate. In this case, human beings have collectively imposed ‘a pattern nature will adopt 
and perpetuate’ in the form of excessive greenhouse gas emissions, exacerbating imbalances and 
disharmonies already present in the earth’s systems. As human identity does not respond 
independently to such environmental change in Bunting’s poetry, but is rather determined by it, 
selfhood too becomes subject to the contingencies of time. To read the self in his work as a 
sympoietic system, which in Dempster’s terms is ‘maintained by dynamic interdependencies’, is to 
recognise how it is changed by the changing environment: she explains that sympoiesis ‘has neither 
temporal nor spatial boundaries’ (94). Bunting’s poems enact a recognition that selfhood and 
civilisation are contingent upon natural particularities and process, that there can be no easy, lyric, 
presupposition of the self. This is an inheritance from Wordsworthian Romanticism, in which, 
Isobel Armstrong writes: 
 
Experience is sequential and our collective analysis of it is sequential too, and the process of 
externalising and repossessing experience is not merely the analysis of a prior process ready to 
create further experience but the subject of a further one. Through the temporal process analysis 
is returned to the self as experience (38; author’s italics). 
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The self is cumulative through time, and through language, in a work like The Prelude. Wordsworth 
is not seeking to describe a self that exists discretely or completely at any stage. In Bunting, the 
smell of fire and the autumn it recalls form part of a later recognition, as I have shown, but identity 
is still more contingent than it is in Wordsworth. Where Wordsworth was ‘Fostered alike by beauty 
and by fear: / […] In that beloved Vale’ (1850 Prel. I.302–4), there is no such dialectical harmony in 
Bunting, the environment disrupting as much as shaping the sense of selfhood. 
Brian Conniff’s analysis of Briggflatts in The Lyric and Modern Poetry makes such a recognition 
central to Bunting’s poetics, especially given that the poet himself styled the work as ‘An 
autobiography, but not a record of fact’ (Complete 226; author’s italics). Conniff characterises Briggflatts 
as anti-lyric, because, conversely, ‘A timeless lyric paradise has an ultimate and coherent vision, but 
it has no convincing physical vision. It has idealized love, but it has no actual care’ (196). By 
rejecting such an unexamined projection on to the world, Bunting in Briggflatts conveys an 
understanding valuable to contemporary environmentalism, namely that we can have no ethic of 
care for our global environment if we prefer a mythic, idyllic Nature over it. The poem’s anti-lyrical 
tendency also enables us to see more easily its resistance to a consistent narrating first person 
singular. Waugh comments generally that ‘“I” is a logical fiction necessitated by grammar and 
official biography […] closing down ethical possibilities of being by fixing the self in social 
convention and oppressive tradition’ (Beyond 25). Conniff explains that in Briggflatts, by contrast, 
‘One individualized voice or another is always speaking, but not one of them seems to get very 
close to a “record of fact” about any author, real or imagined’ (182). In the opening part of the 
poem, the figure of the poet is a boy or a young man in the third person, objectified in a 
retrospective view. His identity is further disrupted as we enter the poem’s second movement 
where, Conniff contends, the ‘seasonal narrative structure no longer holds together, at least in the 
expected way, because the young poet-to-be of section one has disappeared in the shadows; he has 
turned into a dispersion of figures’ (172). Among the roles Conniff enumerates are the ‘Poet 
appointed’, ‘a spy’, ‘The pilot’ and so on (Complete 65), and these come about because the poet ‘finds 
that each culture [...] necessitates a new identity, a new disguise’ (Conniff 172).  
In the third, central section of Briggflatts, the poet’s own multiple figures are supplanted by a 
soldier in Alexander the Great’s army and the slowworm that was introduced in the first movement 
of the poem. Together with the figure of the conqueror himself, the section presents three aspects 
of selfhood, each entailing a different relation with the environment – nostalgia, conquest and 
dwelling. The mobilised soldiers lament: ‘we desired Macedonia, / the rocky meadows, horses, 
barley pancakes, / incest and familiar games, / to end in our place by our own wars’ (Complete 72). 
Even in their longing for home, however, they do not idealise it, neither as physical landscape nor 
society. In contrast, Alexander seeks to master the way ahead. His men ‘deemed the peak 
unscaleable; but he / reached to a crack in the rock / with some scorn, resolute though in doubt’ to 
make his ascent. This marks a direct bodily engagement with the mountain that perplexed 
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Wordsworth’s imagination, despite its material resistance to Alexander’s climb, ‘file sharp, skinning 
his fingers’. Overreaching himself, the figure of the conqueror is subsequently cast down and ‘he lay 
/ on glistening moss by a spring’ where he hears the other voice of the poem’s third part: ‘neither 
snake nor lizard, / I am the slowworm’ (Complete 73). Neither aspirational like the conqueror nor 
backward-looking like his army, the slowworm is content in its ecological niche: ‘Ripe wheat is my 
lodging. […] I prosper / lying low, little concerned’. Nevertheless, it still has an impact on its 
environment extending beyond its own bodily presence, as the wheat’s ‘swaying / copies my gait’. 
Mediating between the soldiers’ nostalgia and Alexander’s ambition, the slowworm still 
acknowledges that presence in the world entails a relation with it and an effect that cannot be 
confined to the body. As the section ends, being and world are brought into literal harmony ‘where 
every bough repeated the slowworm’s song’. But the movement of the poem means this is a 
momentary respite rather than a permanent state of stability.  
Bunting transfers aesthetic agency here to the animal kingdom, as he does with the ‘sweet tenor 
bull’ of the poem’s opening line. Human agency is by contrast fragmented in the poem, as is the 
poet’s own non-lyrical identity in his multiple roles. Rather than assert human individuality ‘into a 
pattern nature will adopt and perpetuate’, the unbounded selfhood seen in Briggflatts registers its 
presence in nature in other ways. Sara Greaves develops Conniff’s line of argument with an explicit 
emphasis on reading ‘A Poetics of Dwelling’ in the poem: ‘the self is refracted through a range of 
personae, human and animal, as if to deny humankind its supremacy. The landscape is fused with 
parts of the biological body, eroticised by the dispersal in the text of sexual metaphors such as the 
pebbles and the slowworm, infusing it with desire’ (69). The poem is not then autobiography but a 
natural history, the story of the environment’s unshaping of a self. While this may seem close to 
pastoral visions of a self in harmony with, or part of the harmony of, nature, Bunting’s vision of the 
nonhuman world ‘except[s] nothing that is’ (Complete 75), paying attention to the full range of its 
processes and complexities rather than making it selectively paradisal.  
One of the most striking instances of this in Briggflatts is in the sexual union of Pasiphae and the 
‘god-bull’ at the close of the second movement: 
 
nor did flesh flinch 
distended by the brute 
nor loaded spirit sink 
till it had gloried in unlike creation (Complete 70). 
 
In his exegesis of these lines, Bunting writes: ‘Those fail who try to force their destiny, like Eric 
[Bloodaxe]; but those who are resolute to submit, like my version of Pasiphae, may bring 
something new to birth, be it only a monster’ (Note). He contrasts here the failure of assertive 
personalities, among which we can also number Alexander, with a necessary endurance in our 
submission to forces outside our control. The ‘monster’ brought to birth by Pasiphae’s submission 
is the Minotaur, the result of interaction between the conventionally segregated spheres of the 
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human and the natural. The monster’s image, never explicit in the poem, is the problematic shadow 
of both the ‘tenor bull’ of the opening line and the conqueror’s assertive masculinity, among other 
human presences. Pasiphae’s acquiescence recognises the divine in its bestial, natural form as the 
superior partner in the generation of this hybrid; she conceives a monster and Bunting names it as 
such, an ‘unlike creation’. It is identifiably ‘unlike’ in that it corresponds to the category of neither 
man nor beast.  
In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour suggests it is precisely the distinction between categories 
of human and natural that engenders such hybrids, however. He argues that we as moderns 
‘innovate on a large scale in the production of hybrids’ and that this ‘is possible only because [we] 
steadfastly hold to the absolute dichotomy between the order of Nature and that of Society’ 
(WHNBM 40). The concept of hybridity is not unique to modernity, as the Minotaur myth shows; 
what is uniquely modern is the hybrids’ excessive quantity and the suppression that creates them. 
Latour goes on to ask ‘where are we to classify the ozone hole story, or global warming or 
deforestation? Where are we to put these hybrids? Are they human? Human because they are our 
work. Are they natural? Natural because they are not our doing’ (50). Bunting indicates how 
monstrous these hybrids are, even when we accept their presence in the world; Latour suggests 
further that the agency of nature remains and is exacerbated when we do not recognise or accept it. 
Hence, global warming is ‘not our doing’ in an intentional sense, even while it is the product of our 
deliberate practices or ‘work’. 
Latour describes these entangled agencies as a network, and ‘the idea of the network is the 
Ariadne’s thread of these interwoven stories’, although ‘the delicate networks traced by [her] little 
hand remain more invisible than spiderwebs’ (WHNBM 3, 5). While the Daedalean labyrinth is, like 
the Minotaur, not explicitly referred to in Briggflatts, there are a number of allusions to similar 
structures in the poem, which mingle animal and human, natural and aesthetic agency. For instance, 
there is the ‘rat […] daring / to thread / lithe and alert / Schoenberg’s maze’ (Complete 69), and the 
‘Tortoise deep in dust or / muzzled bear capering / [that] punctuate a text whose initial, / [is] lost 
in Lindisfarne plaited lines’ (Complete 68). These are woven among numerous references to natural 
networks throughout the poem, such as the ‘lace of frost’ (78), and the ‘shadows [that] themselves 
are a web’ in the sentence before Pasiphae’s ravishing by the bull (Complete 70). This entanglement 
of aesthetic and biophysical networks into the labyrinthine structure of the poem gives expression 
to the complexity that anthropogenic environmental change demands we recognise. In theoretical 
terms, it can be seen in Alaimo’s plea for ‘A trans-corporeal ethics’ which ‘calls us to somehow find 
ways of navigating through the simultaneously material, economic, and cultural systems that are so 
harmful to the living world and yet so difficult to contest or transform’ (Bodily 18). Bunting’s use of 
myth presents a way of understanding phenomena that exist outside too-readily demarcated 
categories of human intentionality. 
Pasiphae’s acquiescence to the mythical bull belies benign visions of a restorative or nurturing 
132 CHAPTER 4 
 
nature, even while it would place the human world in her passive, problematic position of 
submission and mothering a monster. While this does not give Pasiphae the ‘active agency’ that 
Greaves claims is evident in some of Bunting’s women, the poet nevertheless distinguishes 
femininity from nature, as he did in Ode 17. This contrasts with conventional ‘constructions of 
nature as female (as mother/virgin)’ that are critiqued by ecofeminist scholars such as Gretchen 
Legler (‘Ecofeminist Literary Criticism’ 228). Legler argues that such conceptions ‘are essential to 
the maintenance of this harmful environmental ethic and […] hierarchical ways of thinking’.6 
Bunting instead subverts hierarchy by revealing the hybrids it creates. The bull as brute nature 
imposes itself on Pasiphae, who is a representative not specifically of the female but of the human. 
Compare the opening of the third movement of The Well of Lycopolis, in which the re-mythologised 
nature ravishes ‘Infamous poetry, abject love’: 
 
Aeolus’ hand under her frock 
this morning. This afternoon 
Ocean licking her privities 
Every thrust of the autumn sun 
cuckolding 
in the green grin of late-flowering trees. (Complete 42) 
 
While both scenarios subjugate the female to the natural, the subjugating agent is not the human 
male. Indeed, The Well of Lycopolis’s narrator regards the elements as having taken the woman from 
him, complaining ‘I shall never have anything to myself’ (Complete 43). The implication is that we 
must endure and adapt to the exigencies of the nonhuman world, rather than attempt to master 
them – however repulsive that may be, however far we are then objectified. While this valorises a 
masculine stoicism in endurance, it does not enable masculine mastery of its others, the natural 
and/or the female. 
In the weave of Bunting’s poem, we are brought close to such alien, uncontrollable entities. In 
this respect, his practice accords with Timothy Morton’s ‘ecological thought’, which situates us in a 
‘mesh’ alongside the ‘strange stranger’; Morton explicitly uses this phrase ‘Instead of “animal”’ 
because of the latter term’s familiarity (Thought 40–1; author’s italics). ‘The ecological thought 
permits no distance’, Morton writes, and ‘This means confronting the fact that all beings are related 
to each other negatively and differentially’ (39). The slowworm and bull are both ‘strange strangers’ 
in Briggflatts, but perhaps the most tellingly proximate animal to the human is the rat that recurs 
throughout the poem. In The Waste Land, the rat exists in a quantum state between real and 
mythical, symbolising the decay that flourishes in the poem; in Stevens’ ‘The Plain Sense of Things’, 
it is both observed and observer. In Briggflatts, the rat instances the kind of ‘immediate and  
                                                 
6
 In Briggflatts, Bunting incidentally fulfils other of Legler’s criteria for ecofeminist writing, specifically: ‘1. “Re-mything” 
nature as a speaking, “bodied” subject’; ‘2. Erasing or blurring of boundaries between inner […] and outer […] 
landscapes, or the erasing or blurring of self-other […] distinctions’; ‘3. Re-eroticizing human relationships with a 
“bodied” landscape’; and also ‘7. Affirming the value of partial views and perspectives, the importance of “bioregions”, 
and the locatedness of human subjects’ (Legler 230–1). 
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self-enclosed image’ that characterises modernism, as described by Isobel Armstrong (209): it is in 
Bunting’s words, ‘rat, roommate, unreconciled’ (Complete 77). ‘Roommate’ suggests that it shares 
our habitat in very close proximity, in the way that Morton’s concept of the ‘mesh’, ‘vast yet 
intimate’, means ‘everything is brought within our awareness’ (Thought 40). Yet our being 
‘unreconciled’ with it means, in Morton’s terms, its ‘strangeness is itself strange. We can never 
absolutely figure [it] out’ (41). What being ‘reconciled’ with the rat might entail is suggested by its 
earlier appearance in Briggflatts, ‘rummaging behind the compost heap’ (Complete 69): it is associated 
with waste generated by human existence, but waste put to productive use in a cycle of decay and 
fertility, unlike the ‘marble middens’ in part II that I have discussed. If he were able to be 
‘reconciled’ with this, the poet-self would be like Pasiphae, accommodating himself to the 
exigencies he cannot instrumentally control. 
 
Mapping the order 
The cumulative influence of environmental factors in Bunting’s poetry is to disperse the sense of 
self, rather than to inspire or reveal it as it is in Wordsworth, according to Waugh’s reading. Waugh 
contrasts that Romantic discovery of the self in the world with ‘theories which view the idea of  
self-conscious fictionality as an impulse of the human rage for order’, and cites Stevens as one 
exponent of this tendency (Practising 20). In Bunting, such attempts at self-assertion are marked by 
their failure. What does this diminution of selfhood imply for the state of the world?  
The relation between the two may be characterised psychologically, by aligning intentional 
intervention in the environment with the ego; and, in contrast, associating overlooked 
environmental impact with the unconscious mind. Theodore Roszak suggests how superego and id 
can be read as becoming manifest in the world: ‘Precisely because we have acquired the power to 
work our will upon the environment, the planet has become like that blank psychiatric screen on 
which the neurotic unconscious projects its fantasies’ (5). The relegation of waste to our 
environmental unconscious thus leads to its accumulation and the formation of hybrid phenomena, 
typified by anthropogenic climate change. Bunting recognises that the wilful imposition of order 
actually generates uncontainable disorder, and this is evident in Briggflatts. Conniff suggests that the 
poem’s opening stanzas, where the liveliness of the bull and the slowworm are juxtaposed with the 
mason’s meditations,  
 
balance […] one man’s death [a]gainst its full compensation in the natural world. The pastoral 
tradition, especially in its elegiac conventions, has placed great value on one such 
compensation—and Briggflatts, at the very start, seems to fit in. Everything in the poem seems 
part of a natural order: death is balanced by sexual awakening, winter by spring. This scheme of 
things is only mildly disturbed by an impinging feeling […] that the poetic balance is a little 
overwrought: [… ] it seems that Bunting must convince himself of the conventional order (166).  
 
Conniff thus claims that ‘The poet turned to the natural, objective world for a sense of order; but 
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everything in this world […] is restlessly active, as though it were all moving in defiance of the 
aesthetic desire to arrange it all, the would-be poet’s will to mastery’ (171). Hence the poet’s 
eventual realisation that ‘he does not have to pretend that his own life ever appeared to him as a 
coherent story […] his world always controlled him more than he ever controlled it’ (Conniff 183). 
This unravelling of self-imposed order in the poem, which is styled as an autobiography, can be 
traced throughout Bunting’s writing.  
We have already seen how the narrator’s mood rises and falls with the movement of the tide in 
Bunting’s third ode (Complete 99): ‘I am agog for foam’, he announces, as the tide is ‘Tumultuous 
come / with teeming sweetness to the bitter shore’. As in The Well of Lycopolis and Briggflatts, 
phenomenal nature appears in an erotic, procreative role, siring the experience of the self. But as 
the poem draws to its close, ‘we again subside / into our catalepsy’. This is not just a simple 
synchronisation of human with marine vicissitudes but an exchange across them: the tide moves 
from ‘indifference’ to becoming ‘mad waves’ that ‘spring […] / towards us in the angriness of love 
/ […] tossing as they come / repeated invitations […] of unexplained desire’. The world beyond 
the human has an intrinsic appeal, and ‘The dear companionship of its elect / deepens our envy’. 
Yet it remains beyond us, because the sea’s desire is ‘unexplained’, and the sky’s ‘endless utterance 
of a single blue’ remains ‘unphrased’. That is to say, the world’s affect is irreducible to human sense 
while it appeals still to human sensation. The effort to express it is not an imaginative struggle so 
much as an erasure of human selfhood. The tide of Ode 3 presents the challenge that Kent C. 
Ryden outlines when, in discussing conceptions of environmental literacy, he considers ‘nature and 
natural systems in the role of the author while placing humans in the position of incompetent 
readers’ (Ryden 3; see also Chapter 1, p.30 of this thesis). This ode anticipates Briggflatts’s ‘unscarred 
ocean’ where only the ‘Wind writes in foam’ (Complete 66). 
Bunting recognises, then, that language can only pattern human experience, rather than order 
material phenomena themselves. To assess what makes his poetics distinctive, we can compare the 
ode with a modernist poem that marks a more intellectual engagement with these questions, 
Stevens’s ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’ (Collected 105–6).7 The poems both express a proximity 
to and a haunted relationship with the sea, although Bunting’s is more erotically than aesthetically 
charged than Stevens’s: the ode is immediately felt, ‘agog’ from the beginning, whereas ‘The Idea of 
Order at Key West’ is seemingly more dismissive. In the line ‘The water never formed to mind or 
voice’ (Collected 105) Stevens’s narrator indeed suggests it is not worth understanding. However, his 
                                                 
7
 The Bloodaxe Complete Poems dates Bunting’s ode as 1926, while Stevens’s ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’ first 
appeared in the quarterly Alcestis among ‘a group of eight poems [...] in October 1934’, his daughter recalls (Letters of 
Wallace Stevens 256). It is unlikely that Stevens would have read Bunting’s poem, but not impossible: Roger Guedalla 
notes in Basil Bunting: A Bibliography that Redimiculum Matellarum, the volume in which the ode first appeared, was 
‘Published March 1930, privately’ at Milan, and claimed in its opening pages to be ‘copyright in all civilised countries 
but not (yet) in the United States’ (Guedalla 13). Guedalla continues that ‘The book’s publication went totally 
unnoticed, except for a review by Louis Zukofsky’ (14). Nevertheless, Guedalla records that in Poetry 27.1 (Oct. 1930) 
‘The “News Notes” p.59 refer to the [...] publication of Redimiculum Matellarum’ (Guedalla 75). Stevens was a 
sometime contributor to Poetry, so may have seen the notice, though his most recent publication there, ‘Hibiscus on 
the Sleeping Shores’, had been nine years earlier in Poetry 19.1 (Oct. 1921). 
CHAPTER 4 135 
 
 
insistence on this point – ‘it was […] not the sea we heard’, the ‘sea / Was merely a place’, ‘The 
meaningless plungings of water and the wind’ – paradoxically create an impression of something 
that nevertheless needs to be understood. It insists on being attended to, but by being inexpressible it 
puts us in the position of Ryden’s ‘incompetent readers’. By the end of the poem, Stevens observes 
a ‘rage to order words of the sea’, even though there have been no words ‘of ourselves and of our 
origins’, only ‘ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds’ (106). In this respect, the poem acknowledges 
what goes beyond civilising experience, as The Waste Land contends with the intransigent 
nonhuman forces operating against cultural order. Compare with Stevens’s ‘ghostlier demarcations’ 
the sky’s ‘utterance of a single blue / unphrased’ in Bunting, something expressive but not explicitly 
expressed, evading understanding on human terms.  
Both Bunting and Stevens make the world’s expression of itself syntactically conditional: 
 
                If the bright sky bore 
with endless utterance of a single blue 
unphrased, its restless immobility 
infects the soul, which must decline into 
an anguished and exact sterility 
and waste away:  
   (Bunting Complete 99; my italics) 
If it was only the dark voice of the sea 
That rose, or even coloured by many waves; 
If it was only the outer voice of sky 
And cloud, of the sunken coral water-walled, 
However clear, it would have been deep air, 
The heaving speech of air, a summer sound 
Repeated in a summer without end 
And sound alone.  
   (Stevens Collected 105; my italics) 
 
Human understanding is contingent; the natural aspect is in contrast ‘endless’ in Bunting and ‘a 
summer without end’ in Stevens. This is not an expression of timeless, lyrical nature, but Kate 
Soper’s second-definition processes that ‘are indifferent to our choices, will persist the midst of 
environmental destruction, and will outlast the death of all planetary life’ (What 159–60). Soper’s 
‘indifference’ is made explicit in Bunting, although not so in Stevens. The contrast between the two 
poems also comes through in their respective attributions of agency: 
 
                        the sea 
trembling with alteration must perfect 
our loneliness by its hostility.  
     (Bunting Complete 99) 
          It was her voice that made 
The sky acutest at its vanishing.  
She measured to the hour its solitude.8 
She was the single artificer of the world 
In which she sang.  
     (Stevens Collected 106) 
  
In Bunting, the sea ‘must perfect’ one of ‘our’ qualities – that is, we are subject to oceanic processes 
beyond our control.9 In Stevens, it is the singer, another self, who perfects and delimits (‘made […] 
                                                 
8
 Contrast the way Villon in Bunting’s early sonata complains that ‘they have […] run the white moon to a schedule’. 
This effort is supplemented by a number of impositions on the natural environment: ‘They have melted the snows from 
Erebus, weighed the clouds, / hunted down the white bear, hunted the whale the seal the kangaroo’ (Complete 28). 
9
 Even if we are to read the littoral in the poem as libidinal – that is, not literally – Bunting’s analogy still needs to 
imagine an uncontrollable, nonhuman tidal energy to operate. 
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acutest’) the sky above the sea. Thus in Bunting, nature controls self, and in Stevens, the self orders, 
or attempts to order, nature, albeit aesthetically rather than instrumentally. Yet the very  
self-consciousness of that process in Stevens’s poem, and of the way, later, ‘lights in the fishing 
boats at anchor there, / […] Mastered the night and portioned out the sea’, shows that these 
absolute boundaries do not inhere in the atmosphere or hydrosphere, but are impositions from 
human perception, hence the wistful tone of the ‘ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds’ that are 
beyond us in the poem’s final line. Stevens’s Key West is not just on the Gulf of Mexico, it is on 
the gulf between language and the inexpressible. Bunting and Stevens recognise in their poems that 
the world reacts to us in ways that cannot be satisfactorily accounted for in human terms, and 
civilisation’s failure to share this recognition is one of the conditions that has engendered 
anthropogenic climate change. 
Ode 3’s impassioned submission to the sea may lack the intellectual nuance of Stevens’s poem. 
However, in his work ‘Chomei at Toyama’ (Complete 85–94), Bunting finds a voice in which to 
investigate human failure to order the world according to the imagination. As a free adaptation of a 
medieval work, the 1932 poem also takes up, as Stevens does in his opus (see for instance Chapter 
3, p.105 of this thesis), the challenge of a text’s changing position in response to its future. ‘Chomei 
at Toyama’ is written in the voice of twelfth–thirteenth-century Japanese writer Kamo no Chōmei, 
whom Bunting notes ‘belonged to the minor nobility of Japan and held various offices in the civil 
service. […] He retired from public life to a kind of mixture of hermitage and country cottage at 
Toyama on Mount Hino and there, when he was getting old, he wrote the Ho-Jo-Ki in prose, of 
which my poem is in the main a condensation’ (Complete 227). In the poem, Bunting’s Chōmei 
epigrammatically advises ‘To appreciate present conditions / collate them with those of antiquity’ 
(Complete 87), and the lines enact this principle as an adapted restatement of that principle, by 
representing it some 700 years later. That restatement suggests that historical change or progress is 
limited, because Chōmei’s sentiment still pertains in the era of modernity. Bunting thus sets two 
forms of time, cyclical and linear, in opposition in the poem. In a letter to Poetry magazine’s 
associate editor Morton Zabel in January 1933 negotiating the poem’s publication, Bunting 
commented on the pattern he sought in composing it: 
 
the balance of the calamities and consolations pivoted on the little central satire, the 
transmogrifications of the house throughout, the earth, air, fire and water, pieces, first physical 
then spiritual, make up an elaborate design which I’ve tried not to underline so that it might be 
felt rather than pedantically counted up. Also the old boy’s superficial religion breaking down at 
the end needs what goes before to give it relief, and what goes before needs the breakdown to 
anchor it to its proper place (1). 
 
As I showed in my first chapter, the ‘consolations’ of nostalgia persist today, even though we abide 
in an era of exacerbated environmental change. The same tendency, from supposed stability 
towards chaos, is one Bunting’s version of Chōmei charts. He still strives for a ‘balance of 
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calamities and consolations’ in the pastoral vein here. Later, in Briggflatts, a similar process occurs as 
the self emerges from nature as the object of nostalgia, doubly remembered in the ‘smell of 
October apples’ (Complete 63), to end in cosmic dispersal. 
 Bunting’s account of ‘Chomei at Toyama’ privileges the elemental, as Chōmei does in his 
attention to Japanese affairs. The poem’s Chōmei relates ‘I have been noting events forty years’, 
and natural disasters are prominent among those he recalls (Complete 85). The first is a fire that 
destroyed ‘In a night, / palace, ministries, university, parliament’, then a ‘cyclone’ of three years 
later after which ‘Not a house stood’ (Complete 85–6). These disasters lay waste to the institutions of 
civilisation, and as such Chōmei describes them as ‘Massacre without cause’ (Complete 86). The 
phrase highlights the difficulty we have in comprehending natural agency, because Chōmei has to 
liken it to a human atrocity, a ‘Massacre’, although a ‘cyclone’ lacks the intention that such slaughter 
would entail. It registers the agency of natural forces, but has to conceive of them in human terms. 
Nancy Tuana shows how complex this problem becomes today when she considers how to talk 
about a contemporary meteorological catastrophe, 2005’s Hurricane Katrina. She asks: 
 
Does it make sense to say that the warmer [sea surface] water or Katrina’s power were socially 
produced, rendering Katrina a non-natural phenomenon? No, but the problem is with the question. 
We cannot sift through and separate what is “natural” from what is “human-induced,” and the 
problem here is not simply epistemic. There is scientific consensus that carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases are raising the temperature of the Earth’s atmosphere. These “natural 
phenomena” are the result of human activities such as fossil fuel combustion and deforestation. 
But these activities themselves are fueled by social beliefs and structures (193; my italics) 
 
Nevertheless, Tuana continues, ‘This does not mean that we cannot attempt to determine the 
extent to which human factors increased the intensity of a hurricane or some other weather-related 
phenomena’. The weather event exposes the traces of agency.  
Bunting’s Chōmei also interrogates the significance of the cyclone as ‘Massacre without cause’ 
with the question in the subsequent line: ‘Portent?’ In the context of Hurricane Katrina, Chōmei’s 
one-word question about the weather’s significance could be answered affirmatively, albeit 
tentatively. We make Katrina a site for debate about climate change – a ‘portent’ of it – because it is 
spectacularly visible in precisely the way climate is not. ‘You can’t visualize the climate’, Morton 
reminds us (Thought 28). Within the movement of the poem, Chōmei is asking whether these 
natural disasters portend the ‘thunderbolted change of capital, / fixed here, Kyoto, for ages’ 
(Complete 86). As we saw in Ode 3, Bunting can ascribe human qualities of ‘utterance’ to natural 
process, but this transference is reversed here so the clipped ‘thunderbolted’, which at first seems to 
affirm that weather necessitated Kyoto’s relocation, is in fact a metaphor for the speed with which 
the move was carried out: human process described in natural terms. Even though ‘Nothing 
compelled the change nor was it an easy matter’, the position of ‘thunderbolted’ so soon after fire 
and cyclone complicates the semantic fields of human and natural agency. Chōmei’s cyclone 
resembles Katrina in that it serves to reveal human entanglement with meteorological processes, 
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though in the poem it is a society caught up in the effects of weather rather than its causes. Where 
Katrina complicates matters is that modernity’s too-rigid distinction between human and natural 
realms becomes more obscured by the hybrid material phenomena that result from this 
categorisation. Tuana observes that ‘Agency […] emerges out of such interactions; it is not 
antecedent to them. Our epistemic practices must thus be attuned to this manifold agency and 
emergent interplay’ (196). 
To read a commonality in a medieval Japanese cyclone and Hurricane Katrina is to attest to the 
persistent materiality of our entanglement with the environment. The relation remains the same 
across the centuries despite the notion of history as progressive. Bunting was alert to our continued 
subjection to the elements, and wrote to Zabel’s boss at Poetry, Harriet Monroe, in November 1932: 
‘The curiously detailed resemblances between mediaeval Kyoto and modern New York are not my 
invention, and I didn’t feel called on to disguise them’ (1). The poem expresses its acceptance of the 
resultant inevitabilities both in Chōmei’s tone of resignation – ‘Men are fools to invest in real estate’ 
(Complete 86) – and the continued description of human catastrophe in meteorological terms – ‘a 
thunder of houses falling’ (Complete 88). Human and natural become corresponding threats when 
Chōmei writes that his new home ‘stood on the flood plain. And that quarter / is also flooded with 
gangsters’ (Complete 89). Mottram is therefore correct in observing that both ‘Nature and men are to 
be stoically endured, a recurrent theme in Bunting’ (94–5). 
 
Nature at the end 
Those entangled agencies come to a culmination in Briggflatts, as my analysis throughout this chapter 
has indicated. As in Wordsworth or Chōmei, the poem looks for an apparent order in nonhuman 
nature through which to express a human understanding. Bunting elaborated the order of Briggflatts 
in an interview with Peter Quartermain and Warren Tallman, and explained that, having sketched a 
five-part pattern for composition, the next thing was ‘to look at it and […] say obviously what any 
poet thinking of shape would say […]: Spring, Summer, Autumn and Winter’ (‘Basil Bunting Talks 
About Briggflatts’ 15). Quite why it is ‘obvious’ that five movements would represent four seasons 
is unclear. What is most telling, however, is that it is the peak-scaling arrogance of a human 
conqueror – Alexander’s assertiveness – that disrupts the seasonal order, by rising to bisect it in the 
central, third part of the poem. Even while seeking confirmation in one natural pattern – that is, the 
movement of the seasons – the poem is re-patterned by another, the formation of a mountain. 
Alexander’s effort in ascending the ‘unscaleable’ peak brings him before the angel ‘Israfel, / 
trumpet in hand, intent on the east, / cheeks swollen to blow’ waiting for ‘the signal [to] come / to 
summon man to his clay’ (Complete 72–3). Teetering on the brink of catastrophe, the conqueror 
tumbles to earth, waking ‘on glistening moss by a spring’ where he encounters the slowworm. In 
this creature’s words, he is reminded of his place in the world: ‘I prosper / lying low, little 
concerned’ (73). Alexander thus fails in his ambition, but the poem still has scope to use this as a 
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demonstration of humility – an apocalypse in the sense of revelation rather than cataclysm. A 
comparable mountain misdirection occurs for Wordsworth in The Prelude when he is hiking on 
Mont Blanc, but this has more interior biographical significance than in Briggflatts. The narrator and 
his companion 
 
 […] clomb with eagerness, till anxious fears  
Intruded, for we failed to overtake 
Our comrades gone before. […] 
     every moment added doubt to doubt (1850 Prel. VI.575–78) 
 
This becomes a scaling of the ego as much as an ascent of the mountain, and aspires to keep 
climbing even at the very moment it recognises its failure: ‘still we had hopes that pointed to the 
clouds’ (VI.587). These ambitions are figured by Alexander in Briggflatts. He serves as a mythic 
symbol rather than a psychological dissection of arrogance, in contrast to his more cautious 
soldiers. The emphasis in his ascent, and in the slowworm’s song, is the exploration of the 
environment as much as the self. This episode prepares the way for the dispersal of ego and 
belittling of human time in the subsequent movements, and the poem works itself out in the 
discrepancy between human ego and natural agency. Conniff remarks that, as Briggflatts progresses, 
 
The seasons of the year no longer have an obvious parallel in the seasons of the poet’s life. He is 
caught, suddenly, in an anti-Romantic schism: he can no longer assume a fundamental sympathy 
between his emotions and the natural world, a sympathy that would have allowed him, in effect, 
to subordinate a world of “objects” to his own subjective experiences (175). 
 
That is to say, the phenomenal world in Briggflatts resists the imposition of an order in the form of 
traditionally conceived natural–seasonal cycles, much as anthropogenic climate change exposes 
human inability to master or engineer atmospheric processes. It is in this context that unseasonal, 
entropic motifs occur in each of the ostensibly seasonal movements of the poem. 
Without the poet’s supervening lyric ego, Conniff contends that the poem’s ‘natural forces are 
benign, even though they have been “let loose,” as far as possible, from the narrator’s controlling 
mind’ (184). How far is ‘as far as possible’? After all, Conniff treats Bunting’s resistance to 
Romantic tendencies here as a conscious poetic strategy, a controlled pose in which the poet only 
seems to relinquish control rather than actually giving it up. Nevertheless, even though Bunting 
tacitly imposes an order of increasing disorder on nonhuman nature, in doing so he counterpoints 
traditional ideas of natural harmony, because the emphasis of Briggflatts is on ‘chance events’ 
(Conniff 184). The poet resists the identification of individual life with natural, seasonal cycle, just 
as Dempster acknowledges ‘the temptation to think that organisms are autopoietic and ecosystems 
are sympoietic is tantalizing’ (105; author’s italics), before disavowing that temptation. As such, she 
recognises that that the terms represent an inviting way of conceiving the world, akin to Stevens’s 
fictions, rather than an irrefutably true and incontestable observation. In a like manner, once 
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Bunting sees its fallacy, the seasonal cycle of Briggflatts dissolves with the final movement of the 
poem, which, as we have seen, begins with unseasonal melt: ‘Drip – icicle’s gone’ (Complete 78).  
Climate change gives unanticipated material reference to Bunting’s disordered seasons. It shows 
us that what we regarded as pastoral timelessness is in fact a product of our current interglacial 
episode. With an objective relationship between the human and the environmental opened up from 
Bunting’s early odes onwards, the poet provides a salutary reminder of our earthly bearings – 
provided we are prepared to accommodate, rather than to neglect or manage, the ‘strange stranger’ 
of climate that has an inexpressible, material agency of its own. Its agency is still more clearly seen 
in the work of Bunting’s contemporary, David Jones, whose work I discuss in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
‘An Older Great Cold’: David Jones’s Anathemata and the gratuitous 
environment 
 
Climate change criticism must come to bear even where climate change is not the matter of the 
poem; climate cannot be bracketed off into the genre of the “environmental”, as it is on political 
and news media agendas, so neither can the scope of its relevance in literature.1 I have aimed to 
demonstrate this in my rereadings of poetry that pre-dates popular understanding of the 
phenomena of climate change. The work I have analysed indicates the contingency of human 
existence in the terrestrial environment, challenging defined, formal boundaries between the 
cultural and natural, and exposing the presumption of our intentional mastery of climatic forces. 
Poetry reveals the permanence of our relation with non-intentional phenomena in the face of 
anthropocentric accounts that suggest otherwise, and this relation is revealed again, materially, in 
the manifestation of contemporary climate change. Both text and climate expose the entanglement 
of human and natural agency in making the world, and this can also be demonstrated through a 
critique of modernist work that is explicitly occupied with the human–climate relation, David 
Jones’s The Anathemata (1952). The strategies employed in this work represent a practical, creative 
response to the issues I have outlined.  
Jones refers to his title as meaning ‘the blessed things that have taken on what is cursed and 
profane things that are somehow redeemed’ (Ana. 28–9). The work addresses the development of 
earth’s prehistoric environment into conditions suitable for humanity, describing the genesis of 
terrestrial landscapes and cultures after the end of the preceding glacial.2 It treats of history’s 
emergence from primeval origins, in particular in its first section, ‘Rite and Fore-Time’, and 
implicates environmental factors in the emergence of civilisation in a way that civilisation, so far as 
my analysis of The Waste Land has suggested, tries to jettison. Jones is also interested in the Waste 
Land as a cultural motif, but subordinates it to Roman Catholic tenets rather than drawing on a 
range of faiths as Eliot does in his poem. The imaginative scope of Jones’s work also responds to 
the demands that climate change makes on the imagination and on literary form. Rather than 
reading environmental change as he does, however, I will show how his poetics enables expression 
of the unintentional agency of natural phenomena in shaping and influencing human development. 
I thus shift from his focus on Christ to mine on climate.  
The Anathemata traces the emergence of humanity in both terrestrial and maritime environments, 
but situates this within a sequence of oblique narratives – in Jones’s subtitle, ‘Fragments of an 
attempted writing’ – where the motifs of Christ’s incarnation and passion resound both backwards 
                                                 
1
 As Timothy Morton comments in Ecology without Nature ‘The time should come when we ask of any text, “What does 
this say about the environment?”’ (5; see also Chapter 1, p.38 of this thesis).  
2
 I refer to The Anathemata throughout as a ‘work’ rather than ‘poem’, in acknowledgement of its mixture of verse, 
prose, inscription and annotation. 
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and forwards in time. My reading will concentrate on its first section, ‘Rite and Fore-Time’, which 
describes the end of the preceding glacial and the evolution of human culture and art. Subsequently, 
The Anathemata traces a highly allusive voyage from the Mediterranean to Britain that represents 
both the diffusion of Christianity in the West and the journey towards Christ’s incarnation in the 
work’s final sections. In sum, The Anathemata ‘is about civilization, its emergence from history, 
prehistory, and biological and geological evolution, and its meaning in the light of the Creation, the 
Incarnation, the Passion, and the Mass’ according to Henry Summerfield (An Introductory Guide to 
The Anathemata and The Sleeping Lord Sequence of David Jones 19). In ‘“It was a Dark and Stormy 
Night …”’, Oswyn Murray provides an important qualification about the distinctiveness of Jones’s 
work, though: ‘the underlying theory of history behind […] The Anathemata is explicitly conceived as 
universal for western culture, and not entailing a belief in the Catholic faith’ (15). Jones is generous 
and associative rather than dogmatic in his theology, taking a view in which non-Christian cultures, 
such as the Roman pantheon and Celtic lore, foreshadow the true faith.  
Jones finds images that resonate beyond specific historic cultures, which he accumulates into a 
fractal work where individual vignettes and episodes present scale versions of a master narrative, 
making full use of his text’s scope as ‘open in form’ but ‘formally whole’ in Thomas Dilworth’s 
words (Reading David Jones 118). The Anathemata incorporates a diversity of forms and modes: the 
opening spread (Ana. 48–9) offers inscription, prose and verse, all rife with quotation and 
parenthesis, reflecting the work’s deliberately fragmentary quality. Interpretative direction is given 
by Jones’s preface and footnotes, some of the latter proving so extensive that they require full pages 
behind plates facing the main run of text. This multiplicity and the acknowledgement that it is an 
‘attempted writing’ together represent an imaginative rather than objective engagement with 
prehistory. 
The advantage of Jones’s assemblage of techniques is the considerable scope it gives the work. 
It can, for example, encompass durations of time difficult to envisage on human scales, most 
pertinently prehistoric climatic change and the transition from Pleistocene to Holocene. In the 
words of N. K. Sandars, ‘those terrifying distances’ of time ‘are become at once local, colloquial and 
friendly’ (‘The Present Past in The Anathemata and Roman Poems’ 53). My attempted reading, as 
distinct from Jones’s attempted writing, extends the implications of his account conceptually and 
temporally into the Anthropocene, the name coined for our present epoch by those who maintain 
that human presence on earth constitutes a geological influence in its own right.3 Because Jones 
develops a poetics that transcends the scale of individual human lives and the lives of particular 
civilisations, he exhibits what Summerfield calls an ‘astonishing power to write lyrically of geological 
                                                 
3
 Will Steffen, Paul J. Crutzen and John R. McNeill define the word in their article ‘The Anthropocene’: ‘The term [...] 
suggests that the Earth has now left its natural geological epoch, the present interglacial state called the Holocene. 
Human activities have become so pervasive and profound that they rival the great forces of Nature and are pushing 
the Earth into planetary terra incognita. The Earth is rapidly moving into a less biologically diverse, less forested, 
much warmer, and probably wetter and stormier state’ (Steffen et al. 614, authors’ italics). This proposed classification 
gives greater temporal extent to Bill McKibben’s end of nature. 
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change and archaeological findings’ (19), a capability which lends itself to a poetics of climate 
change. By unbinding environmental agency from the liturgical significance Jones ascribes to it, I in 
turn give free imaginative rein to climatic agency, approaching The Anathemata as a work of aesthetic 
rather than statistical climate modelling, as I did with Wallace Stevens’s opus.  
I will first compare Jones’s handling of our human narrative with more straightforward prose 
accounts of anthropology. With its emphasis on the divine, The Anathemata does not focus on Homo 
sapiens in the way that anthropology by definition does, and the work thus does not privilege human 
presence in the environment, but considers the network of forces that comprise the world. I will 
then consider the ways Jones achieves this technically, as an exemplification of climate change 
poetics. The implications of this technique will be explored in an ecocritical consideration of 
Jones’s notion of the ‘utile’ and ‘extra-utile’ in art. This informs his understanding of ‘anathemata’, 
which names what civilisation excludes – although those exclusions can be both positive, in the 
sense of being venerated, and negative, in the sense of being overlooked or ignored. The negative 
aspect corresponds with my proposition that the repressed accumulation of greenhouse gases is a 
tradition that manifests materially in contemporary climate change. The positive side is in the vital, 
superfluous agency of the nonhuman, which we witness in The Anathemata’s exploration of our 
relation to the animal kingdom. Jones’s expression of sympathy, I argue, shows that civilisation’s 
existence is just as contingent on climatic process as that of nonhuman creatures, belying narratives 
of human exceptionalism.  
Throughout the reading, I advance my ongoing argument that tensions in human relations with 
the environment in the poetry I have analysed resonate so strongly today because, exacerbated by 
an intervening fifty or more years of human civilisation, these tendencies put even greater strain on 
our attempt to manage the nonhuman world. To read works such as The Anathemata is thus to find 
a way of articulating those tensions, and to begin to trace their exponential development towards 
contemporary environmental emergency.  
 
A telling teleology 
Central to my analysis of the other poets in this thesis has been the problematic status of humanity 
as distinct from yet situated within networks of material phenomena. This has crucial implications 
for the relative importance and influence we afford ourselves in the world. Literary response to this 
quandary is qualitatively different to scientific, or even pseudo-scientific, accounts, as can be seen in 
comparing The Anathemata to two such texts that consider the data of prehistory. Jones invites 
comparison with more linear accounts of human history in his citation, among numerous other 
sources, of Catholic historian Christopher Dawson’s The Age of the Gods (1933). Dawson purports to 
offer an anthropological overview of the emergence and development of humanity and civilisation, 
promising ‘to undertake some general synthesis of the new knowledge of man’s past that we have 
acquired’, thanks to which ‘a general vision of the whole past of our civilisation has become 
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possible’ (Dawson xii), though his endeavour has an implicitly Catholic trajectory. A more recent 
account covering the same period as The Age of the Gods is Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs and Steel 
(1998), which takes a scientist’s rather than historian’s perspective. This offers a prose treatment of 
the terrestrial environment’s influence on human development, surveying ‘the 13,000 years since 
the end of the last Ice Age,’ when ‘some parts of the world developed literate industrial societies 
with metal tools’ (13).  
Both Dawson and Diamond are concerned with producing accounts that advance their cases 
through reasoned argument rather than literary imagination. As analytic narratives, they are required 
to make cause and effect connections between data, and run the risk of reducing cultural 
development to a mechanistic, materially determined sequence. Both recognise this in moving to 
disclaim such an approach. Dawson insists ‘Not that man is merely plastic under the influence of 
his material environment. He moulds it as well as being moulded by it’ (xiii). Diamond goes further: 
 
the notion that environmental geography and biogeography influenced societal development […] 
is considered wrong or simplistic, or it is caricatured as environmental determinism and 
dismissed […] Yet geography obviously has some effect on history; the open question concerns 
how much effect, and whether geography can account for history’s broad pattern (25–6; 
author’s italics). 
 
Diamond’s formulation asks how nonhuman factors and processes (‘geography’) have influenced 
culture (‘history’). This is a succinct restatement of the question that has occupied me throughout 
this thesis, given climate change’s challenge to the notion that either nature or culture is the primary 
determinant of the world. According to Bronislaw Szerszynski, climate change ‘represents a 
collision point between humanity’s civilizational ideals and its creaturely nature: between progress 
and extinction, between the linear time of history and the cyclical time of nature, between 
transcendence and metabolism, between spirit and mere exhalation’ (‘Reading’ 10). Diamond’s 
‘open question’ therefore directs my consideration here of the extent and character of climate’s 
influence on ‘history’s broad pattern’ in Jones’s work, and how literature negotiates that give and 
take of influence in comparison to the two prose accounts.  
With Jones’s own propensity for questions, we can usefully set one of his against Diamond’s. As 
a boat approaches the British Isles at the opening of The Anathemata’s third section, ‘Angle-Land’, 
the poet asks ‘But, what was her draught, and, what was the ocean doing?’ (110). The extent to 
which a ship’s ‘draught’ displaces water in order to float is the extent to which human technology 
affects its environment, but Jones’s ‘and’, poised in its careful parenthetical commas, balances this 
displacement with the invitation to consider oceanic process. The latter part of the question is not 
‘and, what did the ocean do?’, which would imply that it was ‘doing’ only in response to the 
presence of the ship. Rather, it is ‘and, what was the ocean doing?’ a formulation that suggests the 
water is independent in its agency, a ‘doing’ already in progress and thus not solely contingent on 
human activity. Jones’s question attends to what Serenella Iovino traces in ‘the oceanic aquascape’, 
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Oppermann 457). The poet’s image of a vessel makes specific, metaphorically tangible, what 
remains abstract in the scientist and critic’s theoretical terms. 
To see quite how accommodating The Anathemata’s scope is to ‘interweaving stories’ and the 
different agencies they trace, we can make a useful comparison with the narrative modes of 
Dawson’s and Diamond’s accounts. Both authors seek to employ scientific discourse – 
anthropological and archaeological – rather than theological signification to structure their 
narratives, but in so doing both take a more teleological approach. Instead of making Christ central 
to history, as in The Anathemata, humanity is the ultimate end of millennia of progress in both 
Dawson’s and Diamond’s books. Although Dawson maintains that ‘progress is not […] a 
continuous or uniform movement, common to the whole human race’ (xvi), his subordinate clause 
does not so much qualify his understanding of the concept as make it the preserve of particular 
peoples. He goes on to reflect that ‘Progress is an abstract idea derived from a simplification of the 
multiple and heterogeneous changes through which the historic societies have passed’, suggesting it 
is a helpful if reductive organisation of events, but again limiting it to those societies privileged 
enough to be ‘historic’. This is most evident in the linear metaphor he uses in his discussion of 
Neanderthals, whom he considers ‘an over-specialised by-product, a side path or blind alley on the 
road of human development’ (10).4 By contrast, he considers that ‘It was no doubt in the 
antediluvian world of the Tertiary Age, with its mild climatic conditions and its vast development of 
mammalian life, that the earliest forms of man first came into existence’ (5). These factors prove 
the spur to human development in a subsequent passage: 
 
it was probably only after the expulsion of man from the Paradise of the Tertiary World, with its 
mild climatic conditions and its abundance of animal and vegetable life, that he made those great 
primitive discoveries of the use of clothing, of weapons, and above all of fire, which rendered 
him independent of the changes of climate and prepared the way for his subsequent conquest of 
Nature (Dawson 6). 
 
In these remarks Dawson enfolds Biblical and geological accounts of history to read the emergence 
of humanity as a gradual but predestined triumph over the environment.  
Diamond is likewise conscious that he may be read as endorsing a progressive account of 
history, and he tries to disclaim an ideological inflection to his subject matter by saying, ‘We tend to 
seek easy, single-factor explanations of success. For most important things, though, success actually 
requires avoiding many separate possible causes of failure’ (157). Yet even here, talk of ‘failure’ 
suggests the grand narrative is one based on the accomplishment of defined goals on what Dawson 
called the ‘road of human development’. Diamond makes repeated use of the terminology of failure 
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 To relegate a species to a ‘by-product’ is to make it subsidiary to a particular process. Beck’s analysis of the ‘side 
effect’ in risk society, which I have discussed (see Chapter 3, p.104 of this thesis) and take up again later in this 
chapter, makes a similar point. 
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and development in describing historical change. He begins his fifth chapter, ‘History’s Haves and 
Have-Nots’, for example, by declaring that ‘what cries out for explanation is the failure of food 
production to appear, until modern times, in some ecologically very suitable areas that are among 
the world’s richest centers of agriculture and herding today’ (Diamond 93). Likewise, his account of 
the ‘problems [that] delayed the domestication of apples, pears, plums, and cherries until around 
classical times’ (125; my italics) seems to depend on the notion that history runs accordingly to a 
schedule. But this is a retrospective imposition. Diamond takes the data of Western history and 
makes them the yardstick by which he judges other cultures, underscoring an ideological leaning 
towards European ideas of progress. Hence, he reflects on ‘some puzzling non-inventions in the 
Americas’ (370), faulting the pre-Columbian peoples for not achieving what their European 
counterparts had done. He is even more explicit in lauding contemporary neoliberalism when he 
describes the ‘factors behind Europe’s rise: its development of a merchant class, capitalism and 
patent production, its failure to develop absolute despots and crushing taxation’ (410; my italics).5 By 
flaunting to a greater or lesser extent their standards for civilisation, the prose modes of both 
Dawson and Diamond privilege a particular vector of human development, and as such they 
presume readerly expectations of narrative that proceeds in cause-and-effect fashion towards a 
contemporary pinnacle. Both books assume the gradual transition of terrestrial influence from 
natural to human agency as civilisation progresses. 
The Anathemata also seems to move, eschatologically, towards an historical apogee, although it is 
divinely rather than humanly directed. More clearly than Diamond, Jones reads environmental 
factors as preparatory for the appearance of humanity, civilisation and its saviour on the planet. 
Prehistoric changes in the terrestrial environment do literal groundwork for civilisation. 
Summerfield’s summary of pp.58–66 of the work puts it baldly: ‘The Creator scheduled the 
appearance of man’ (45). That humanity is the subject of the work is evident in the following 
passage, for instance: 
 
Before the melt-waters 
had drumlin-dammed a high hill-water for the water-maid 
to lave her maiden hair. 
 
Before they morained Tal-y-Ilyn, cirqued a high hollow for  
Idwal, brimmed a deep-dark basin for Peris the Hinge and for  
old Paternus (Ana. 66). 
 
The ‘melt-waters’ need the figurative references of ‘her’ in the first verse-paragraph and the human 
names in the second to be temporally ‘before’ and functionally ‘for’. As Dilworth indicates, the 
‘maiden’ is a river, but it can only be virginal because it is imagined in human terms: she is ‘Maiden 
because her waters are unmingled’ (126). Jones’s second stanza goes on to cite bodies of water 
created by glacial melt, and his lines elide the lakes and those they are christened for, such as ‘The 
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 The latter ‘failures’ are explicitly contrasted by Diamond with the history of China. 
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saint after whom Llanberis and Lake Peris are named’, and ‘Padarn, the sixth-century saint’ (Ana. 66 
n.2). The passage reaches back in time, but it must do so from a human perspective, where the 
‘high hill-water’ is ‘drumlin-damned’ for the purpose or utility of allowing the (anthropomorphised) 
‘water-maid’ who comes after ‘to lave her maiden-hair’. So, while Jones allows for what occurs 
‘Before’ humanity, history and indeed prehistory are always tending in humanity’s direction. We 
depend on our environment; but the development of that environment is ultimately directed 
towards fostering us. Its contingency on us is evident in our naming of it with a confirmatory 
cultural gesture. 
An anthropocentric relation is also apparent in the subsequent lines: 
 
Before the Irish sea-borne sheet lay tattered on the gestatorial  
couch of Camber the eponym 
          lifted to every extremity of the sky 
by pre-Cambrian oros-heavers 
          for him to dream 
the Combroges’ epode (Ana. 67). 
 
As Summerfield indicates, an ‘eponym’ is ‘a person from whose name the name of a nation is 
supposedly derived. Cambria = Wales (Med[ieval] Lat[in])’ (50), and this makes a further 
identification of individual with land, privileging the former. Compare this with the ‘onomastic […] 
attempts to explain place-names’ in Welsh folktale collection The Mabinogion (xi), on which Jones 
drew extensively for The Anathemata. According to that collection’s editors Gwyn Jones and 
Thomas Jones, these stories represent a source of ‘fanciful explanation’ (xviii) where narratives with 
human figures are retrospectively created to name the landscape. In The Anathemata, the landscape 
serves to elevate the figure for whom it will be named, to let him compose the ‘epode’ that will 
unify his people. The elevation is both physical and ritualistic, given the use of the word ‘gestatorial’, 
glossed by René Hague as ‘originally merely a sella gestatoria, or sedan chair, but borrowing a grander 
sense from the papal sedia gestatoria’, the throne in which popes were borne on ceremonial occasions 
(A Commentary on The Anathemata of David Jones 60; author’s italics). The movement of ground 
enables the ascent of the civilisation that develops on it. 
Despite the orientation of these passages towards human existence, we can distinguish the way 
that Jones refers to embodied experiences, such as washing hair or being borne aloft, from Dawson 
and Diamond’s more theoretical view of human evolution and cultural progress. There are other 
instances in The Anathemata where this embodiment, rather than relating the environment in terms 
of its human utility, enables nonhuman forces to be made legible, such as the beautiful image of 
‘Her loosed hair […] marking the grain of the gale’ (107). In N. K. Sandars’s words, ‘Jones takes 
this great heap of the past and tells it not as history, but as something we have experienced in our 
own flesh’ (53). Sandars significantly differentiates Jones’s practice from that of scientific discourse. 
‘This new, this larger and infinitely more complicated world’, discovered by science, ‘is intellectually 
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known, but hardly yet felt at all’; therefore, ‘just as soon as scientific knowledge has apprehended 
new territory it is proper that the poets should appropriate it’ (Sandars 51; author’s italics). Jones’s 
anthropomorphism is not scientifically objective, but as a self-acknowledged fiction, it makes the 
world accessible to human sense while emphasising our dependence on it. It accords with Patricia 
Waugh’s account of the modernist context in Beyond Mind and Matter, when ‘The new science’ of the 
early twentieth century ‘required and provided the pressure for the evolution of a new epistemology 
which could relate the abstract logic of the mathematical relations to the appearance of particulars, 
sense-data, in the world’ (8). 
Jones responds to scientific discovery by positioning it within this understanding. His general 
note to ‘Rite and Fore-Time’ explains ‘The findings of the physical sciences are necessarily mutable 
[…] But the poet, of whatever century, is concerned only with how he can use a current notion to 
express a permanent mythus’ (Ana. 82). Dawson and Diamond both synthesise ‘the findings of the 
physical sciences’ but are much less explicit about their ‘permanent mythus’ of progress with which 
they frame those findings. Jones on the other hand is open about the ‘the embodiment and 
expression of the mythus and deposits comprising the cultural complex’ (Ana. 19), which is catholic 
in both its denominational and broader senses. Although there is doctrinal reassurance in the 
organisation of this permanent mythus, because what appear to be fragments are organised around 
the presence of Christ in history, The Anathemata’s occupation with the divine means that humanity 
is never elevated to the apogee of history, as Dawson and Diamond assume is the case. In Jones’s 
reading, humans are situated within this cultural complex, an epiphenomenon of divine intention 
through environmental agency. The Anathemata is thus always awaiting the presence of the divine 
for completion of meaning. If we do not lend our faith to that presence, the text is open to other 
agencies for completion.  
As The Anathemata is not occupied with a narrative that assumes, and culminates in, the ascent of 
Western civilisation, its pattern is not limited to the trajectory of humanity out of prehistory but can 
also speculate about what may come after civilisation. The cycles of glacial and interglacial that 
Jones charts through ‘Rite and Fore-Time’ could also entail the expansion of ice at a future juncture. 
He asks whether the exemplary city of Troy could end ‘under, sheet-dark Hellespont’ (Ana. 57), 
lines glossed by Summerfield as asking ‘Will glaciers one day cover Greece and the Aegean?’ 
(Summerfield 41). Jones eschews a progressive narrative of human development of the kind 
Dawson and Diamond exemplify, and instead positions the work in the vicissitudes of climate. In 
imagining an iced-over future, he acknowledges geological, climatological and evolutionary 
contingency. Our present understanding of geology, climate and evolution are thus seen to be 
among the ‘necessarily mutable’ aspects of science, to adopt Jones’s formulation.  
Richard Kerridge directs our consideration of scientific and cultural responses to physical 
phenomena when he writes that ‘The environmental crisis is only identifiable by means of expert 
interpretation of immensely complex, constantly changing data, and by the use of computer modelling 
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and specialized techniques of statistical analysis’ (‘Ecocriticism’ 5; my italics). Kerridge strictly 
demarcates the remits of science and literary critique by declaring that ‘the scientific data and the 
interpretation of those data are fiercely contested in ways that only experts can evaluate’, so ‘part of 
the business of ecocriticism is to define how that taking-on-trust [of scientific findings] can be done 
scrupulously’. This is not to define separate areas of interest for science and criticism, but to 
describe their differing responsibilities to common interests.  
Kerridge here provides a critical solution to a creative problem that Jones identifies in his 
preface: the ‘tempo of change […] in the physical sciences makes schemes and data out-moded and 
irrelevant overnight [and] presents peculiar and phenomenal difficulties in the making of works’ 
(Ana. 15). Jones’s own response to the handling of data in The Anathemata is to provide an 
interpretative framework in which to organise and evaluate the science of his day. His juxtaposition 
of data with his Catholic ‘mythus’ shows that the two serve different functions, which we can 
characterise as discovery and revelation respectively. We cannot then simply transfer our faith in 
religion to scientific findings because the two have different qualities and purposes. When we 
elevate science itself to the status of world-view or ‘permanent mythus’, rather than a means of 
critically investigating phenomena, we make a mythology of scientific practice itself, ‘when it serves 
as revealed truth in which we need only believe without question’ as Daniel Botkin puts it (xvi). Yet 
both Dawson and Diamond adopt scientific discourse to normatise the progress with which they 
inflect their findings.  
In contrast, Jones’s poetics formally enacts the recognition that there are agencies that exceed 
our understanding, and that our interaction with the world represents a transformation of its data to 
bring them within our comprehension. This is evident from The Anathemata’s opening lines – ‘We 
already and first of all discern him making this thing other. His groping syntax, if we attend, already 
shapes’ (Ana. 49). The ‘groping’ opening lines of the work situate it at the point of relation between 
the human and the other, the attempt to make the unsayable sayable. As John Matthias explains in 
his introduction to Jones’s Selected Works, there is ‘an encounter in [Jones’s] work with sheer otherness, 
things otherwise opaque made numinous by the craft of the maker’ (15; author’s italics). Jones has 
recourse to questions throughout The Anathemata to show how he is shaping what is opaque. In one 
imagining of the first humans, for instance, he asks: 
 
By what rote, if at all, 
had they the suffrage: 
Ascribe to, ratify, approve 
in the humid paradises 
of the Third Age? (Ana. 64–5) 
 
In these lines, Jones interrogates the manner or ‘rote’ by which early humans petitioned to 
understand and order their world. His source is Dawson’s passage about ‘the expulsion of man 
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from the Paradise of the Tertiary World’ (Dawson 6; cited in Ana. 65 n.1), but the interrogative 
syntax makes the poet’s account speculative where the historian’s is affirmative. 
The acknowledgement of language’s role in shaping and ‘making other’ our experience of the 
world is most evident when Jones sets the scene for humanity. He responds imaginatively to a 
world recognised as mutable: ‘where the world’s a stage / for transformed scenes / with 
metamorphosed properties’ (Ana. 62). These lines are as aware of their own artistry as 
Shakespeare’s from As You Like It to which they allude (2.7.140).6 Jones’s performance here is 
double. First, his lines mount the scenery in which every subsequent performance of the mass will 
be rehearsed. He develops this metaphor of environment as performance space in the lines that 
follow: ‘from what floriate green-room, the Master of Harlequinade, […] called us from our  
co-laterals out, to dance the Funeral Games of the Great Mammalia, as long, long, long before, 
these danced out the Dinosaur?’ (Ana. 63). He plays off the concept of the ‘green room’ as a 
preparatory zone, anterior to performance, by opening it into natural space that is ‘floriate’, but is 
nevertheless ‘room’, functional space, for ‘us’ to dance in.  
Second, Jones’s projection into the past is a staging of one among any number of dramatic 
possibilities presented by the meanness of the fossil and archaeological record. Beginning, ‘What, 
from this one’s cranial data, is like to have been his kindred’s psyche […]?’ (Ana. 61f), a litany of 
questions precedes the invocation of a primeval theatre, and this creates a context in which we are 
prepared to entertain possible palaeo-environmental scenarios. The rhetorical, call-and-response 
quality of the questions emphasises the writer and reader’s mutual, ritual imagination of prehistory, 
marking itself as hypothetical; or fictional, in the sense of Stevens’s projections into nature. Jones’s 
metaphor of changing environmental scenery anticipates the kind of staging considered by Ulrich 
Beck, where hypothetical scenarios of environmental collapse are drawn into the present in order to 
prevent their occurrence:  
 
only by imagining and staging world risk does the future catastrophe become present – often 
with the goal of averting it by influencing present decisions. Then the diagnosis of risk would be 
‘a self-refuting prophecy’ – a prime example being the debate on climate change which is 
supposed to prevent climate change (10). 
 
Beck continues that ‘the staging of global risk sets in train a social production and construction of 
reality. With this, risk becomes the cause and medium of social transformation’ (16). Jones both 
offers a model for attempting this in literature, in a performative rather than declarative mode, and 
instructs us in the art of dramatising premises for the present, instead of supposing or requiring 
them to be objectively true.  
Botkin attests to our need for such understandings of the world in spite of the findings of 
science. ‘We need to see mythology—in the sense of a story about how the world came about and 
how it works—as still a necessary part of human existence. It is deep within us, like it or not; it is 
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 See As You Like It (Arden Shakespeare: Third Series) 227. 
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not a bad thing, it is just what we are’ (xvi). He suggests that science is a complement of and not an 
alternative to our mythologising because ‘even today, in this age when we seem to have persuaded 
ourselves that we have risen above mythology, most environmental policies, laws, and ideologies 
are consistent with (to say the least) and arguably a restatement of the beliefs about nature in th[e] 
Judeo-Christian tradition’ (Botkin xvii). We therefore do science a disservice if we regard it as 
sufficient in itself to fulfil our need for narrative. Botkin emphasises that our engagements with the 
world persist in having a sacramental quality even when devoid of an explicitly theological context, 
and The Anathemata affords scope for considering the relation between science and religion 
comprehensively as a deliberate framing of particular data. We need Jones’s breadth of vision when 
tracing the emergent networks of phenomena that climate change entails, instead of a narrow 
imposition of linear order. As Nancy Tuana remarks:  
 
material agency in its heterogeneous forms, including irreducibly diverse forms of distinctively 
human agency, interact[s] in complex ways. Agency in all these instances emerges out of such 
interactions; it is not antecedent to them. Our epistemic practices must thus be attuned to this 
manifold agency and emergent interplay (196).  
 
To give these phenomena full expression, we should respond to rather than resist the potential in 
language’s irrationalities. Szerszynski argues that ‘Writing itself (as the condition of im/possibility of 
meaning) is always aberrant, and reading the climate is thus always already subjected to the vagaries 
and aporias of writing’ (‘Reading’ 22; author’s italics). Because The Anathemata is itself ‘produced 
from a simple formula (paradox, duality, aporia)’, that results in ‘a highly complex organism which 
repeats itself through each strata of its form’ in Paul Stanbridge’s analysis (‘The Making of David 
Jones’s Anathemata’ 294), Jones’s poetics capably anticipates Szerszynski’s account of climatic 
contingencies.  
Szerszynski maintains that while ‘it may seem scandalous to divert attention away from the task 
of a causal analysis of climate change, and instead to try to understand it in terms of semiosis and 
meaning’, he wants ‘to argue, it is the dominant technological framing of climate change that 
ultimately constitutes a more radical evasion of responsibility’ (22) because rational instrumental 
analysis of climate presupposes that it will respond in predictable or manageable ways to our 
intervention. He continues, ‘standardized forms of measurement, and […] conventional practices of 
aggregation and modelling’ function by ‘bringing the weather indoors’, and this ‘tempts us to 
imagine that we can discern a “divine writing” in nature’ (22–3).7 We become peculiarly susceptible 
to the illusion of mastery over an objective reality once we have abandoned the notion of God, 
because by placing faith in scientific accounts, rather than by valuing them as experimental readings 
of the world, we make them into sacraments. We thus overload our interpretations of climate by 
investing humanity’s position with an unacknowledged divinity. It is this misreading of our relation 
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 Szerszynski refers to 'divine, natural writing, langue' (‘Reading’ 20), citing the concept of ‘divine inscription’ as opposed 
to ‘technique’ from Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology (17). 
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to the science that can lead us to a ‘confident belief in the human ability to control Nature[, which] 
is a dominant, if often subliminal, attribute of the international diplomacy that engages climate 
change’ (Hulme 351). Unlike this technocratic scientism, which supposes to shear mythology and 
ideology from its narrative, Jones’s poetic engagement with the emergence of civilisation is explicit 
about its mythical, sacramental status, expressing the impossibility of sharply distinguishing human 
activity and prejudice in the physical and cultural construction of nature. 
 
The fractal form 
Where scientific discourses attempt to streamline the data of history into cause-and-effect 
progression, The Anathemata is in contrast all too aware of the multiple and various potential 
inflections and directions that narrative can take, particularly in the form of signs. Formally central 
to the work is an opening out from narrative into resonance with an environing culture. Jones 
creates a form contingent on his understanding of the world, rather than fitting the data to a 
presupposed narrative of progress, engaging more imaginatively with the implications of 
environmental change. In The Sense of the Past, Charles Tomlinson proposes an artistic analogy for 
The Anathemata’s pattern with forms of early Celtic writing. He cites Gwyn Williams’s 
characterisation of such writing as ‘like the inter-woven inventions preserved in early Celtic 
manuscripts and on stone crosses, where what happens in a corner is as important as what happens 
at the centre, because there often is no centre’ (Welsh Poems 11).8 Jones’s use of Celtic form 
contributes a digressive quality to The Anathemata, and the pre-modern narrative on which he draws 
enacts an understanding of the world distinct from the expectations of a modern, scientifically 
literate readership. One such text that Jones cites is the collection of Welsh folktales The Mabinogion. 
Gwyn Jones’s 1974 introduction to the Everyman translation clarifies the tales’ original context: 
 
Many of the so-called structural imperfections […], such as the abrupt introductions and 
dismissals of characters, the overtaking of one theme by another, the apparent changes in a 
story’s direction, and the frequent (and frequently inaccurate) explanations of place-names, 
cannot have been regarded as faults by the author or by his audience. The tellers of the native 
tales knew no foreshadowings of nineteenth-century critical logistics; their hearer had not heard 
of the ‘well-made’ novel; and it is in the nature of wondertale to transcend factual consistency 
(xxxviii). 
 
The tenth of the eleven stories of The Mabinogion, ‘Peredur Son of Efrawg’, contains for instance a 
folding-in of narrative that seems alive to the sense of the multiple in the particular. Charged with 
reaching the Dolorous Mound to slay the Black Worm, Peredur faces a journey in three stages, in 
which he must defeat the mythical beast the Addanc, visit the Lady of Feats, and encounter the 
knights in the three-hundred pavilions that surround the mound (209–14). On the first stage, 
Peredur is offered a further choice of ‘three paths’ (211), and yet he eschews two of these to face 
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 The ‘Lindisfarne plaited lines’ that illuminate the Holy Island’s gospels likewise both inform the shaping of, and are 
imaged in, Briggflatts (Bunting Complete 68; see also Chapter 4, p.131 of this thesis). 
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the Addanc directly. The nesting of three routes within one of three stages is a simple example of 
the kind of self-similar fractal patterning Jones will create in The Anathemata. For example, part V of 
the work, ‘The Lady of the Pool’, opens with a mariner’s arrival in London, before recounting the 
song of a lavender seller whom he may have heard, nested within which is the florist’s vernacular 
inventory of local churches (Ana. 124–7; author’s italics). The different speakers resume their 
respective relations as the section continues. 
This technique of loading each episode with unexplored possibilities creates room in narrative 
for considering consequences in several vectors at once, as Jones’s notes also do with our reading 
of the text. As a way of reading the world, the technique can also enable us to account for the 
multiple relations and impacts our relations with the environment entail over different scales. This 
becomes a formal problem in the writing of climate change: we can recall, for instance, that 
Elizabeth Kolbert has consciously to limit the scope of Field Notes from a Catastrophe claiming that 
she ‘could have gone to hundreds if not thousands of other places […] to document’ the effects of 
climate change (2; see Chapter 1, p.32 of this thesis). A form of narrative that accommodates and 
even depends on such exigencies is a better expression of the risk society of climate change, in 
which causes accumulate over time and space into emergent and unexpected effects, than genres 
akin to the ‘well-made’ novel that Gwyn Jones cites, such as journalistic or popular science accounts 
with linear narratives like Kolbert’s or Diamond’s. Structurally, literary modes are capable of 
enacting the unexpected and multiple phenomena of climate change and their connections, as the 
elaborate labyrinthine structure of Briggflatts, for instance, contains its own monstrous hybrid of 
human and natural agency. Indeed, disjunctive structure is one of the earliest features that Howarth 
cites as being typical of modernist poetry: ‘Without syntax to restrict the fragments’ meaning to 
their immediate context [...] they can now connect to each other in multiple and unexpected ways’ 
(6). Poetry that encourages us to think about multiple associations fosters a sense that each of our 
engagements with the proximate, experiential world entails a relation at other scales, too – an 
awareness that by eating a peach we might disturb the universe, which is paradoxical for realistic or 
rationalist modes. 
To assess the implications of this form for the work, we can consider Paul Stanbridge’s 
‘proposed analogy for The Anathemata – the fractal’ (392). Among the ‘main characteristics of 
fractals’, Stanbridge explains, are that ‘they are self-generative from within themselves as a result of 
their iterativity’ and ‘self-similar in a hierarchized set of scalings’ (398). This quality of  
self-generating resemblance across different scales means that The Anathemata presents the 
possibility of reading various motifs or themes as dominant, recurring as they do throughout the 
work. Dilworth regards the mass as being formally central to the work, evident in the Lady of the 
Pool’s ‘lyrical celebration of the redemptive acts of Jesus, which the Eucharist sacramentally makes 
present’ (177; citing Ana. 156–7). However, the concept of fractal form also enables the work to be 
read eccentrically, and ecocentrically, with the changing environment of ‘Rite and Fore-Time’ as its 
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thematic as well as its formal starting point. Such a reading makes the work’s own contingency, and 
that of civilisation, more apparent. So although Stanbridge still asserts that there is a pattern to The 
Anathemata, he does not regard it as predetermined. His study of the drafts leads him to conclude 
that the form emerged as Jones responded to and revised what he had already composed: ‘Jones’s 
text was generated by itself. Reading over his work, a fragment suggested a free-associational chain 
of other fragments’ (136). 
The fractal itself is an emergent form in material phenomena. Scientists Giuseppe Cello and 
Bruce Malamud explain in the preface to Fractal Analysis for Natural Hazards that ‘Self-similarity and 
fractals [represent] the idea that an object’s pattern will approximately repeat itself at multiple 
scales’. They add that ‘In the Earth Sciences, the concept of self-similar scaling (scale invariance) 
and fractal geometry over a given range of scales is well recognized in many natural objects, for 
example sand dunes, rock fractures and fold, and drainage networks’, and they want too to 
‘emphasize the role of fractal analyses in natural hazard research’.9 We can infer from Stanbridge’s 
use of the term ‘fractal’ that he considers Jones’s composition process as organic or phenomenal 
rather than rationalised, a contrast we also observe between the pre-modern tales of The Mabinogion 
and popular science narrative. The Anathemata, then, offers a new kind of spatial model that 
transcends scales but finds similar patterns at those different scales. Applied fractally and 
unintentionally to the wider environment – terrestrial, maritime and atmospheric – to map 
anthropogenic environmental change, that model demonstrates the complication and entanglement 
of human and natural agency. In ‘Ecology as Text, Text as Ecology’, Timothy Morton claims that 
‘“Text” is precisely the word for th[e] fractal weaving of boundaries that open onto the unbounded’ 
(2). The Anathemata is, like Briggflatts, a site where these fractals interact at a scale visible to the reader, 
gesturing ever outwards at their repeated phenomenal formations. 
I suggested in my analysis of Stevens’s work that poetry’s ambiguity and movement towards 
abstraction is also its adaptability, because it permits us to convey natural process in a more 
sophisticated manner than mimetic reproduction of nonhuman entities (see Chapter 3, p.82 of this 
thesis). It also indicates the quality of mind with which we might better comprehend the 
complexities of processes that are not amenable to human management, particularly contemporary 
climate change. In this context, Jones’s preface and footnotes may seem like an unnecessarily 
restrictive attempt to direct the reader’s interpretations, rather than allowing for the ambiguities of 
the literary text. For instance, Jones asks in the preface to The Anathemata, ‘If the poet writes 
“wood” what are the chances that the Wood of the Cross will be evoked?’ (Ana. 23). This 
complaint framed as question is problematic for the ecocritic, who will want to attest to the 
manifold biological and ecological associations of wood, rather than its significance in a particular 
religious tradition. Jones’s annotation and exegesis suggests that he is willing to acknowledge 
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 Stanbridge notes that ‘Fractals have been applied to many phenomena in many disciplines in the past thirty years; for 
example, the structure of the universe, the structure of matter at the subatomic level, coastal and cloud formations, the 
stock market, weather systems, Brownian motion, turbulence, the growth of cities, neuroscience, and so on’ (400) – 
an impressively hybrid selection of phenomena. 
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poetry’s power of association only so far as he is required to restrain that power and direct it in 
particular interpretative vectors. As his prefatory argument continues, though, it is clear that Jones 
is not so much channelling our response to language as (re)introducing another current in it. If 
readers do not pick up on the religious connotations of ‘wood’, then 
 
that particular word could no longer be used with confidence to implement, to call up […] the 
mythus of a particular culture […]. It would remain true even if we were of the opinion that it 
was high time that the word ‘wood’ should be dissociated from the mythus and concepts 
indicated. The arts abhor any loppings off of meanings or emptyings out, any lessening of the 
totality of connotation, any loss of recession and thickness through (Ana. 23–4).  
 
That is, the project of poetry is for Jones a way of ensuring that language remains associative.  
This is taken up in The Anathemata’s second section ‘Middle Sea and Lear-Sea’, for example. 
Jones uses the terms ‘mast-tree’ and ‘steer-tree’ (Ana. 102) to describe parts of the boat undertaking 
the voyage from the Mediterranean to Britain. Summerfield explains that these terms stand, 
respectively, for ‘the pole of the mast (perh[aps] the poet’s coinage)’ and ‘the beam of the tiller 
(obs[cure])’ (67). The poet’s neologism and archaism aim to evoke the wood of the Cross, as per his 
preface, and the ship’s timbers operate through the poem as a reminder of Christ’s sacrifice, bearing 
humanity across the world’s waters through time. The elision of ‘wood’ with ‘tree’, however, points 
up the biological constitution of those timbers, alluding to Christ’s life-giving power and his vernal 
resurrection, just as the trees re-foliate in the spring. What seem to be awkward or esoteric 
synonyms deployed for mast and tiller actually redirect attention from their human instrumentality 
and remind us of their organic origins. Indeed, in The Anathemata’s seventh section, ‘Mabinog’s 
Liturgy’, Jones opens this out to question: ‘d’ sawn-off timbers blossom […] Can mortised stakes 
bud?’ (Ana. 190). This offers a further instance of the trees already regarded in this thesis (see, for 
example, Chapter 1, p.23 and p.45). Jones takes a view of the tree through time that is closer to 
Wood’s understanding of the ‘temporally extended persisting, growing tree’ (Wood 152) than 
Lawrence Buell’s ‘grove of second-growth white pines’ (Environmental 10), and his extension of the 
individual image through time into its own past and possible future fractally resembles the 
reappearance of wooden motifs across The Anathemata. Throughout the work, Jones seeks to 
revivify language through the resonance of the symbols he chooses. 
 
Futile utility 
The tensions between functional and living language are further explored by Jones in the essay ‘Art 
and Sacrament’. He comments on ‘the etymology of the word religio’, noting that ‘a commonly 
accepted view is that a binding of some sort is indicated’ and ‘it is in this sense that I here use the 
word “religious”. It refers to a binding, a securing […] it secures a freedom to function’ (Epoch & 
Artist 158; author’s italics). This attempt to rebind extra-utile significance in language can usefully 
be described by Robert Pogue Harrison’s discussion of ‘a tree whose existence cannot be accounted 
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for’ by our rational ‘efforts to reduce the world to intelligibility through mathematics or history’ 
(Forests 147). The process of rendering intelligible through instrumentalising language is read by 
Harrison as symptomatic of the post-Enlightenment world. It is also complicit in the process where 
forests are ‘stripped of the symbolic density they may once have possessed’, before ‘an even more 
reified concept’ came into play: ‘the forest as a quantifiable volume of usable (or taxable) wood. 
The usefulness of the forest becomes measured in terms of a quantifiable mass’ (Forests 121, 122). 
There is a common root to the thinning out of language and nature’s reduction to its resource value. 
We neglect the resonances and histories of language to value its denotative qualities in the same way 
the use of “natural resources” neglects both their organic existence and the unutilised output from 
their combustion, such as carbon dioxide. The latter has then to be downplayed as a side effect, 
imagined into a non-existent exteriority rather than recognised as a necessary consequence of 
power generation. As Beck explains, ‘the “side effects”, which were wilfully ignored or were 
unknowable at the moment of decision, assume the guise of environmental crises that transcend the 
limits of space and time’ (19).  
In contrast to this reduction of significance, The Anathemata deploys specific references to give 
them a wider resonance, whether cultural, national or religious, and images exceed a single function, 
as in Jones’s example of ‘wood’. The work thus exemplifies Howarth’s characterisation of 
modernist poetic form, in which ‘ordinary material [is] given artistic charge by being poetically 
framed by structures in which no item or sound is ever subordinated into mere detail’ (25). Indeed, 
Jones’s notes continually reinforce the wider associations of what he instances, and Tomlinson 
describes the work as being ‘sprawling’, ‘peppered with notes on every page and perhaps calling for 
more’ (15). Yet while much has been made critically of the status of The Waste Land’s notes, those in 
Jones’s work are by contrast little discussed – even though they are considerably more substantial 
than Eliot’s and run throughout The Anathemata as constant companion to the composition. They 
represent another strategy in Jones’s re-association of connotation. Rather than suppress irrational 
associations, he attends to the material agency of language. 
Where Maud Ellmann characterises The Waste Land’s notes as ‘a kind of supplement or 
discharge of the text that Eliot could never get “unstuck”’, representing the ‘invasion’ of the poem 
by its own ‘disjecta’ or waste matter (98),10 Jones’s practice more deliberately constitutes an 
inclusion of the excluded in the work. This is clear from his choice of title: 
 
I mean by my title as much as it can be made to mean […]: the blessed things that have taken on 
what is cursed and the profane things that are somehow redeemed […]; things, or some aspect 
of them, that partake of the extra-utile and the gratuitous; things that are the signs of something 
other (Ana. 28–9). 
 
                                                 
10
 Ellmann is citing Eliot's 1956 remarks on the poem: ‘I have sometimes thought of getting rid of these notes; but now 
they can never be unstuck’ (‘The Frontiers of Criticism’ 109–10). 
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Jones’s concept of the ‘extra-utile’ bears productive resemblances to Bonnie Costello’s 
understanding of superfluity in relation to Wallace Stevens, and the double status of waste in poems 
such as ‘The Plain Sense of Things’ or Briggflatts. Costello reads superfluity as ‘central to the 
principle of change in nature and culture’ (‘What to Make’ 569).  
Considered this way, Jones’s transubstantiation of anathematised material into venerated text is 
a celebration rather than a suppression of material agency, akin to the ‘productivity [that] puts us in 
touch with the fluency of the universe’ (‘What to Make’ 569). Rather than rationalise these forces 
into a progressive model of history, in which events are oriented largely or wholly towards 
development, the extra-utile, the superfluous, is replete with unrealised and renewable potential, as 
is the literary text itself. By opening continually out into signification, the text enacts the ‘end of 
externality’ proposed by David Wood: 
 
Now there is no outside, no space for expansion […] no slack, no ‘out,’ or ‘away’ as when we 
throw something ‘out’ or ‘away’. […] Yet so much of our making sense, let alone the 
intelligibility of our actions, still rests on being able to export, exclude, externalise what we do 
not want to consider. When that externality is no longer available, we are in trouble (172–3). 
 
In a review of The Anathemata, W. H. Auden is sensitive to the work’s acknowledgement of 
nonhuman creativity and our human response to this: ‘The “creatures” of the rite are bread and 
wine, the existence of which presuppose both a nonhuman nature which produces wheat and 
grapes, and a human culture which by thought and labor is able to convert these natural products 
into human artifacts’ (12). Auden’s observation anticipates the concern with the co-productive 
agency of the nonhuman and the human in material ecocriticism, although he sees it here directed 
into culture rather than out if it, intentionally rather than accidentally. Considered in this context, 
where the extra-utile or superfluous are a source of creativity, Jones’s own notes then represent an 
obsessive recovery and recycling of associations that civilisation has attempted to rationalise away, 
restoring an excessive quality to his references. 
In the past two decades, we have begun to pay attention to our own kind of atmospheric 
‘anathemata’ such as CFCs and CO2, accounting for their associations with human economic and 
industrial activity and their ungovernable agency. Nevertheless, the extent to which we have begun 
to quantify these and other greenhouse gas emissions as a negative natural resource is an explicit 
process of quantification, continuing rather than challenging the instrumental approach in which 
climate change originated. This instrumentality is not only implicated in attempts to manage the 
climate itself, that ‘confident belief in the human ability to control Nature’ that Hulme identifies 
(351); it also conversely enables our too-ready acceptance of climatic exigencies for economic 
exploitation in the belief that we can account for and thus handle them.  
Jones attends to this exploitative opportunism at one point in section IV, ‘Redriff’. He 
mythologically renders the transition from winter to spring on frozen northern seas as ‘when 
Proserpine unbinds the Baltic’, and his note to this line reads ‘The Rotherhithe timber-trade was 
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particularly brisk in the spring when the ice melted and freed the ships in the Baltic’ (Ana. 119). The 
possibilities for such economic opportunism have increased in the time since Jones wrote in line 
with the increased melting of the Arctic in recent years. In a New Scientist article of October 2012, 
Fred Pearce writes: ‘a major rush on resources […] will transform the Arctic as surely as the loss of 
ice’; this ‘loss of ice, brought about by burning fossil fuels, is opening up the once-remote top of 
the world to industries keen to extract oil and gas, minerals and more’ (‘Laying Claim to the Wild, 
Wild North’ 8). Pearce observes that ‘a combination of global shortages, rising prices, technical 
advances and the exposure of wide areas of the Arctic Ocean during summer melts, are triggering 
an explosion of activity’ (10). 
Our awareness of this qualifies a ‘permanent mythus’ of human opportunism in The Anathemata. 
No longer do we simply take advantage of seasonal change, but we exacerbate the differences 
between Arctic winter and summer and would, as a civilisation, rather exploit than reflect on them. 
Given that The Anathemata charts the emergence of culture as a result of conducive landscape and 
climate, human environmental opportunism is inevitably part of the process it describes. However, 
it is evident in the work that we are not to take favourable terrestrial conditions for granted. Jones’s 
suspicion about instrumental views of the natural environment is seen for example in the paragraph: 
‘the slow estuarine alchemies had coal-blacked the green dryad-ways over the fire-clayed seat-earth 
along all the utile seams’ (Ana. 72). As with the earlier passages about Tal-y-Ilyn and the 
Combroges, the prehistoric past is here described in relation to subsequent civilisation. However, 
Jones refers to the coal seams disparagingly as ‘utile’, in contrast to the ‘alchemical’ processes that 
led to their formation. Civilisation has neglected the gratuitous, excessive quality of the fossilisation, 
and hence disregarded the emission of greenhouse gases that results from their combustion,11 
underscoring Jones’s critique of their ‘utility’. These emissions are anathemata in the negative sense, 
offsetting the positive organic quality of the forests that become fossil fuel over geological time.  
This reaction to instrumental perception of the environment situates Jones in a post-Romantic 
tradition that seeks to revivify rather than rationalise our experience of the world. Donald Worster 
describes this tradition when he discusses twentieth-century environmentalism as part of a history 
that includes ‘many biocentrists, Romantics, and arcadians’ (333). All of these groups responded to 
the way that, following the Enlightenment, ‘Nature had been abruptly exiled by the scientific 
mechanists from the realms of value, ethics, and beauty’ (318). Jones, too, participates in this 
project of restoring to the world the qualities of enchantment and signification by refusing to 
reduce terms to a single function. Instead, he places language in a context where it creates resonant 
symbols. Discussing his work, Peter Howarth writes ‘Jones saw art as a kind of gathering-in of 
present and past times into symbolic shape; [... The] Anathemata begins with [an] image of art like the 
Mass, transforming daily bread into the ever-living body of Christ, fusing individual and common’ 
(196–7).  
                                                 
11
 See also Chapter 4, pp.122–3 of this thesis. 
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This intensification of experience with wider resonance can be seen in the Lady of the Pool’s 
retelling of another sailor’s voyage. In her relation, she mediates from his technical reading of the 
weather as ‘behaviours of water-spheres and atmospheres, as: incidence of tide and peculiar 
pressures of the upper air’ to her own more evocative terms, ‘Shifts of unshaping mist’, ‘muffle of 
grey fog’ and ‘Thicks of rain’ (Ana. 139–40). Sandars reads these lines as ‘marvellous physical 
description […] imperceptibly lifted and removed to a quite other height’ (66), and they continue 
the trend of bringing the weather into personal relation begun in the Lady’s earlier lines: ‘Come buy 
my sweet lavender / that bodes the fall-gale westerlies / and ice on slow old Baldpate’ (Ana. 125). 
In that vernacular ‘boding’, the plant signifies weather to come and is not commodity alone. 12 The 
Anathemata’s capacity to ‘convey’ the reader ‘imperceptibly from the shallows of our own 
experience of wind and weather onto quite different levels’ (Sandars 67) is enabled because an 
individually textured voice such as the Lady’s is also associative, becoming typical in the context of 
the work’s globality. It is not the identity of individual figures that unites, but the continuity and 
repetition of their motifs, with the Lady’s story enfolding a nautical narration. Similarly, Hague 
observes that ‘the shipwright [of part IV, Redriff], like the skipper in this and the preceding parts, is 
both individual […] and typical: thus he can serve to reflect the poet’s shifting viewpoint’ (148–9).  
Jones achieves this conjunction of character and context by multiplying the specific references 
that rehearse the liturgy, in fractally self-similar fashion, until the reader is inundated with them. 
Such globalising of individual significance is an important consideration for Morton. He suggests 
that the fractal commonality of text and ecology entails an ‘absence of background’ because the 
same principles generate both. ‘Moreover, the globally warming Earth is similarly disturbing: there 
is no longer any background (“environment”, “weather”, “Nature” and so on) against which human 
activity may differentiate itself’ (‘Ecology as Text’ 5). An ecology of text creates personae such as 
Prufrock, terrified by the uncertainty of their independent existence; but in Jones it affirms a  
trans-historical order based around Catholic rite, the subservience of the self to a greater order. 
Tomlinson identifies Jones’s practice with ‘what, in Biblical interpretation, is called typology’, 
finding ‘a whole structure of typologies’ in his work (11). He nevertheless challenges what he 
considers ‘the faults of over-reference’ in The Anathemata (12), attesting that ‘one remains 
uncomfortably aware that any given insight is likely to be crushed by imaginative over-crowding, by 
relentless typological parallels’ (15). Even the apologetic Sandars suggests that Jones was ‘always 
rather unhappy about the long, necessary, notes which he added to his writings. He would so much 
have rather that we all had his amazing knowledge, and were all able to take the allusions without 
help from him’ (62–3). If this quality does mark one of the failures of Jones’s writing, it still 
reminds us of what needs to be at stake in a poetics of climate change: the expression of inordinate, 
disordered global associations in every individual act. 
                                                 
12
 The lines, Jones explains in a note, were inspired by his ‘maternal grandmother [who] was saddened by the 
[lavender-seller’s] call, because she said it meant that summer was almost gone and that winter was again near’ (Ana. 
125 n.1). 
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The critic must be conscious of this quality of resonance in approaching a work of The 
Anathemata’s scope, because context – whether the religious tradition in Jones’s writing or 
anthropogenic environmental change in my reading – produces discomfiting disjunctions between 
immediate experience and global significance. So even when Jones is dealing with the geological 
timescale of prehistoric climate change rather than bad weather in London, he scales these 
processes to historic human time to make the transitions between them legible. This technique is 
valuable to our comprehension of the telescoping timescales of anthropogenic climate change. 
Whether this change is gradual or abrupt, it collapses two centuries of industrial civilisation’s 
combustion, forest clearance and so on into material manifestation. Each of those two hundred 
years in turn telescopes a greater order of prehistoric time into it, as Tim Flannery indicates: ‘over 
each year of our industrial age, humans have required several centuries’ worth of ancient sunlight to 
keep the economy going. The figure for 1997 – around 422 years of fossil sunlight – was typical’ 
(77). In the context of this wealth of associated emissions, it falls to the critic of climate change to 
determine whether a writer successfully communicates these disjunctions of scale – indecorous or 
irrational as they may be from a managerial perspective – or whether that writer fails to match their 
poetics to the metier. This is part of what Kerridge requires should be the ‘scrupulously’ attentive 
attitude of the ecocritic (‘Ecocriticism’ 5).  
For Jones, poetry necessarily affirms the associations of material substance. This is more 
tellingly chemical when his preface takes water rather than wood as that substance, and 
 
whether the poet can and does so juxtapose and condition within a context the formula H2O as 
to evoke […] further, deeper, and more exciting significances vis-à-vis the sacrament of water, 
and also, for us islanders, whose history is so much of water, with other significances relative to 
that (Ana. 16–17; author’s italics). 
 
What a ‘knowledge of the chemical components of this material’ can evoke (17) is an apt enough 
criterion for a poetics of climate change, even when H2O remains our object of concern. It is much 
greater if we substitute CO2 into Jones’s formulation, because then its significance extends to the 
whole planet’s future rather than British history (that of ‘us islanders’). Our responsiveness to 
language’s evocations can in turn foster a greater environmental literacy, by encouraging us as 
readers to be aware of our position within material networks and gauge the full extent of relations 
with them. 
Beyond symbolic association, another strategy for extending language’s reach in The Anathemata 
is Jones’s shifting parts of speech from noun into verb, which transforms them from object or state 
into ongoing process. For example, he exploits a typical association between the female and the 
generative when he says of the landscape ‘She must marl […] she must glen […]’ (Ana. 70). That 
‘she’ may ambiguously refer back to the previously mentioned ‘dim-eyed Clio’ or ‘naiad Sabrina’ 
(Ana. 68, 69), drawing together the emergence of human history, in the form of its muse, with its 
physical geography in the form of its associated water-sprite. On the other hand, Jones may be 
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using ‘she’ to refer to a generic, generative female quality in the same way ‘he’ is the type for the 
male craftsman or artisan, because he uses pronouns to similar effect across the work to allude to 
more than one figure, in the same way as the Lady and the sailor are both individuated and typical. 
Hague explains that Jones ‘frequently […] uses “he” or “his”, “him” etc., to indicate that, while he 
has an individual in mind, that individual is to be regarded as typical’ (11). This makes instances of 
individual agency both cultural in their resonance and collective in their effect, responding to the 
difficulty of expanding lyric’s intense individuality into cumulative, unintentional action and  
global-scale physical phenomena With the ascription of subjecthood and agency to landscape in 
‘She must marl’ and ‘she must glen’, then, Jones invokes an environment as process ‘the noun being 
used here, as so often, as a verb’ (Hague 66). By not regarding landscape as given, Jones here 
satisfies one of Lawrence Buell’s four criteria for an ‘environmental text’, exhibiting a ‘sense of the 
environment as a process rather than as a constant or a given’ (Environmental 8; author’s italics). Similarly, in 
evolutionary terms rather than geological, ‘the mammal’d Pliocene’ (Ana. 74) makes noun into 
verbal participle, transforming taxonomic construct into contingent, evolutionary process in a 
particular geological epoch. 
These techniques expand the range of reference beyond human terms, and the tension between 
the two scales is a theme Jones revisits throughout The Anathemata. With the ‘groping syntax’ of the 
opening line proper, humanity is already attempting to come to terms with terrestrial time. The 
disjunction between the two scales is evident again soon after: 
      
By intercalation of weeks 
                (since the pigeons were unfledged 
            and the lambs still young) 
            they’ve adjusted the term 
            till this appointed night (Ana. 51) 
 
Jones explains in his note that  
 
The conditions determining the exact time of the Passover were that the moon must be at the 
full, the vernal equinox past and the sun in Aries. The fixed date of the feast was the fourteenth 
day of the first month […] and if that date was due to fall before these conjunctions the 
necessary number of days were inserted into the calendar in order to postpone it (Ana. 52 n.1). 
 
That is to say, human measurement of time did not always prove sufficient to determine the 
elapsing of terrestrial cycles. A ‘term’ of weeks – a word whose lexical significance suggests the 
‘groping’ syntax of the work is both verbal and temporal – has therefore to be generated to bring 
the culture back in line with the progress of the seasons. Although Jones’s interest here is chiefly 
sacramental, it is still by indicator species such as the pigeons and lambs that discrepancies in the 
religious calendar are resolved. The need for human terms to accommodate disruption to or rethink 
the seasonal cycle persists today, but with greater urgency because the continued welfare of human 
existence depends on our ability to interpret nonhuman signs. 
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We have witnessed in Wallace Stevens’s work the need to continually re-appraise human 
imaginations in their effort to approximate the world. But where for Stevens the cycle of 
interrogation comes from a lyric impulse, for Jones it is prompted by an expression of history more 
akin to the epic mode. Jones also differs from Eliot, because while in The Waste Land the disrupted 
seasons draw attention to culture’s implication in them and their trans-historical significance, in The 
Anathemata, they become a way of negotiating from human calendars into geological time. We see 
this in the parenthetical passage (Ana. 55–8) that opens with reference to ‘Great Summer’ and 
‘Great Winter’. These are glossed by Jones as a ‘Greek guess as to the cosmic rhythm […] largely 
verified by modern physical science’ (Ana. 54), also drawing on Dawson (4). Within the first few 
pages of The Anathemata, the seasons are thus fractally scaled up into human epochs and ultimately, 
the ‘cosmic rhythm’, again suggestive of Soper’s nature as underlying physical principles. With 
regard to a seasonal arrangement of longer timeframes, Jones comments that: ‘I have no idea if at 
some remote geological time from now, there is any possibility of a similar glaciation. In the whole 
passage in square brackets I am merely employing such a possibility as a convenient allegory’ (Ana. 
58). Because the ‘possibility’ of a changing climate is now actual rather than allegorical, our locus of 
reading shifts from Jones’s central sacrament to his preliminary, climate-changing groundwork in 
‘Rite and Fore-Time’. This reading emphasises the way Jones puts civilisation in a  
climate-contingent position by speculating about a further ice age, rather than imagining, as 
Dawson does, that civilisation renders us ‘independent of the changes of climate’ (Dawson 6). The 
poet’s imagination entertains the possibility of negative change rather than progress. 
Human terms are further entangled in the geological in a subsequent verse-paragraph that 
discusses the creator of the Willendorf Venus, the prehistoric figurine of a woman: 
 
Who were his gens-men, or had he no Hausname yet 
no nomen for his fecit-mark 
          the Master of the Venus? 
whose man-hands god-handled the Willendorf stone 
          before they unbound the last glaciation 
for the Uhland Father to be-ribbon die blaue Donau 
with his Vanabride blue (Ana. 59). 
 
Tomlinson comments on these lines that ‘already in the Venus master, we have the essentials of 
man-the-maker, in this pre-Teutonic world before the Uhland Father […] – himself a pre-figuring 
of the Christian god – and the melting of the glaciers into the blue Danube’ (12). His reading 
distinguishes and juxtaposes human artifice and the melting of the glaciers. In Jones’s formulation, 
however, the agency of the two parties is elided in ‘they’, which ‘unbound the last glaciation’. The 
pronoun seems to refer anaphorically to the ‘man-hands’ that ‘god-handled’ the Willendorf Venus 
into being, entangling the emergence of human creation with environmental change. Dilworth 
reads the passage as ‘the Sky Father melted Danube ice’ (124), yet the question of exact 
responsibility for the changed climate remains open because of the third-person openness of 
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Jones’s poetics, which identifies the creative power of God with that of early humans. Man the 
maker as a ‘type’ for God in The Anathemata emphasises humanity’s power to de-create the natural 
world as well as put it to productive use. Human agency is anathematic itself, in that it can be both 
positively and negatively inflected. In the association of divine and human agency, Jones makes a 
typological resemblance; the material emergence of anthropogenic climate change subsequently 
certifies that resemblance through causal connection. Humanity changes the planet on a divine scale, 
instigating the Anthropocene,13 but lacks a theology of itself that would enable it to comprehend 
this role.  
Within the theological schema of The Anathemata, activities can be both sacramental and utile, 
which is to say, anathematic in the positive sense. When ‘Cronos […] breaks his ice like morsels, for 
the therapy and fertility of the land-masses’ (Ana. 69), he foreshadows the mass and creates aquifers; 
while human agency, in the form of ‘poor Hobs with aid-fires’ (Ana. 221), aims to ‘help the sun 
survive the winter’, Summerfield explains (134). Once these activities become regarded as solely 
utile for the purposes of agriculture, heat or power generation, however, we neglect their 
anathematic qualities, and they assume a negative value. By ignoring their consequences, we 
ironically reaffirm a cycle of positive feedback in which combustion intensifies the solar radiation 
received by the earth and the breaking of ice. Similarly, the third-person possessive in the following 
lines depends on the shared purpose of man and God: ‘And now his celestial influence gains: / 
across the atmosphere /on the water-sphere’ (Ana. 95). ‘His’ is used by Jones to suggest the spread 
of Roman civilisation and Christianity’s influence around the globe. However, emptied of its 
theological significance, ‘his’ acquires a more utile, human reading. In this context, ‘celestial’ reads 
more materially and suggests the unintended influence of human activity on and in the sky. Jones 
writes ‘the build of us / patterns dark the blueing waters’ (95) to figure the fleet’s passage across the 
sea, and this too resonates now as an image of civilisation’s projection of an environmental shadow. 
Where The Anathemata enables a wider, theological reading, it also enables future, secular readings 
where humanity occupies the sphere vacated by absent divinity. Scientism alone does not empower 
us to make this transition responsibly. 
The spread of humans across the planet is an effort of exploration, moving beyond bounds, yet 
there is a contrary human tendency to contain, reduce and limit the imagined scope of our impact 
on the world. Jones’s poetics recognises as much. His verbalisation of nouns to enact the processes 
of landscape in ‘Rite and Fore-Time’ is extended into the corresponding human field of 
cartography in ‘Angle-Land’: ‘the greyed green wastes that / they strictly grid / quadrate and 
number on the sea-green Quadratkarte’ (Ana. 115). Summerfield points out that Jones uses ‘grid’ as a 
                                                 
13
 Behringer indicates that ‘With the beginnings of agriculture’ around 12 kya, 
 
Neolithic man intervened in the natural environment. Palaeolithic hunters already probably used fire for hunting 
purposes and brought about extensive changes in the landscape […] Clearance by fire released large quantities of 
carbon dioxide – although it is impossible today to determine the ratio of ‘natural’ forest and bush fires to those 
deliberately started by humans. Neolithic encroachments in the landscape reached a new dimension as fresh areas 
were permanently cleared for settlement and for arable land or pasture (47). 
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verb, meaning to ‘cover with a grid’, and ‘quadrate’, or ‘divide into squares’, in the preparation of 
the Quadratkarte, glossed as ‘a map marked with a square grid’ (Summerfield 75). This verbalisation 
indicates the process of mapping rather than the map itself, the contingent rather than definitive 
quality of human quantification of nature. It responds to the changeable quality of what is being 
mapped, in this case the sea itself. It thus shares a premise, if not a technique, with Stevens’s 
perpetual re-examination of the world, exemplified by ‘Sea Surface Full of Clouds’. The transition 
from prose to verse through these three lines of The Anathemata, where ‘they strictly grid’ establishes 
the iambic pattern for the hexameter line that follows, audibly demonstrates the play of cartography 
from irregularity into order. Jones’s own comments on the lines, cited in Hague, in part support and 
in part give the lie to such a reading: 
 
‘probably “grid, quadrate and number” would be better running on in one line, but I know how 
it was that I broke the line at “grid”. I wanted a slight pause at that word, because I wanted 
quadrate-and number-on-the-seagreen-Quadratkarte said very much in one breath but somewhat 
sharply rapped out, but almost as one word.’ (Hague 146) 
 
The author’s intention that the words be ‘said very much in one breath […] almost as one word’, 
would be at odds with a measured, metrical reading, although ‘sharply rapped out’ suggests the 
lines’ delivery as a command, requiring clearer intonation. Jones implicates a sense of military order 
in this process of mapping.  
In ‘David Jones and the Survey’, an account of the poet’s work for the Field Survey Company in 
the First World War, Peter Chasseaud picks up on Jones’s concern with mapping. He finds it telling 
of the tension between multiple and single significations in geographical terms: 
 
Jones was interested in the opposition between the Celtic view of the living land […] and the 
Roman (i.e. modern) view of the land as an exploitable resource, to be measured, gridded, 
parcelled up, carved through with straight roads, and so on. He understands and accepts the 
utile technology […] but is also disgusted by it. His sympathy is elsewhere, with the  
extra-utile, the sacramental, the mysterious (30). 
 
It is in acknowledging the importance of science to our understanding, while refusing to accept its 
sufficiency as an account of the world, that Jones’s poetics is valuable to the writing of climate 
change. In The Anathemata he attends to the discrepancy between human impositions of order and 
recalcitrant, excessive natural phenomena. By finding a way to express their interplay with human 
agency, he anticipates the relations that are speculatively identified in material ecocriticism. 
 
Anathematised animals, contingent creatures 
We have seen a transition in terms of both narrative and form from teleology to contingency in The 
Anathemata, and an opening of linear, rational modes into associative, fractal forms through the use 
of symbol. Jones offers a way of reading prehistory and history that does not make humanity 
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central, but positions us within and makes us contingent on a network of nonhuman forces. This is 
again evident at the end of ‘Rite and Fore-Time’ when a crucial role is afforded to an animal often 
regarded as one of the lowliest: ‘the essential and labouring worm’, who ‘saps micro-workings all 
the dark day long / for his [God’s] creature of air’ (Ana. 82). God prepares the environment to 
support and nourish the existence of humans, ‘creatures of air’, through the activity of the worm, 
into whose niche Jones’s lines give us an insight. Jones cites Darwin’s The Formation of Vegetable 
Mould through the Action of Worms as the source of this passage (Ana. 82 n.2). This work takes ‘The 
share which worms have taken in the formation of the layer of vegetable mould, which covers the 
whole surface of the land in every moderately humid country, [as] the subject’ (Darwin 1). In his 
conclusion, Darwin emphasises the worm’s essential quality in preparing the earthly environment 
for humans, proposing: 
 
The plough is one of the most ancient and most valuable of man’s inventions; but long before 
he existed the land was in fact regularly ploughed, and still continues to be thus ploughed by 
earth-worms. It may be doubted whether there are many other animals which have played so 
important a part in the history of the world, as have these lowly organised creatures (139). 
 
Darwin’s work is taken up by Jane Bennett in Vibrant Matter, where she divorces it from Jones’s 
theological context. She writes: ‘Darwin does not claim […] that any divine intention is at work’ 
through the worms, and ‘the exertions of worms contribute to human history and culture[, which] 
is the unplanned result of worms acting in conjunction and competition with other (biological, 
bacterial, chemical, human) agents’ (96). Read in the light of her observations, Jones’s passage can 
still be seen to reveal the unintentional agencies that contribute to human existence.  
The fractal form of The Anathemata emphasises this quality, eschewing a linear narrative of 
progress for an extra-utile epic. Jones organically discovers his form, as Stanbridge suggests, rather 
than imposing it in advance, and as such he matches the shape of the work to the mode of 
evolution itself. There is, indeed, a lack of function common to both the practice of art and 
evolution, as Morton comments: ‘Evolution shares pointlessness with art, which at bottom is vague 
and purposeless’ (Thought 44). This makes art the expression of contingency, akin to Jones’s notion 
of the extra-utile or Costello’s of superfluity, rather than an anthropocentric co-option of 
teleological narrative forms. Morton therefore asserts that ‘Humans are not the culmination of 
anything; they aren’t even a culmination of anything’ (44; author’s italics). So although Jones sets his 
understanding of evolution in a Catholic context, he is not co-opting it to justify a presumed human 
superiority. He recognises, like Morton but unlike Dawson, that ‘The theory of evolution 
transcends attempts to turn it into a theological defense of the status quo’ (Thought 37). 
This understanding enables Jones to engage imaginatively with our relation to, and evolution 
from, the animal kingdom. At the nub of his rhetoric is a series of characteristic questions: 
 
Who was he? Who? 
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Himself at the cave-mouth 
       the last of the father-figures 
to take the diriment stroke 
      of the last gigantic leader of 
thick-felled cave-fauna? (Ana. 66) 
 
In essentially asking ‘Who was the last leader of Ice Age men to be slain at his cave-mouth by a 
beast?’ (Summerfield 45), Jones invites us to consider what constitutes human identity and how far 
back in time it obtains, but he leaves it an open question. He allows evolution a theological role, 
and does not depend on making rigid distinctions so much as finding a continuity of resemblances, 
one which enables an extension of grace into prehistory. This means he can explicitly set himself in 
opposition to essentialist accounts of what constitutes humanity, as in his note: ‘Although 
Neanderthal man of 40 to 60,000 BC appears not to be regarded by the anthropologists as a direct 
ancestor of ourselves, nevertheless, it would seem to me that he must have been “man”, for his 
burial-sites show a religious care for the dead’ (Ana. 61). Sandars takes Jones’s inclusive gesture a 
stage further by suggesting the Neanderthals ‘belong to the family story’, and on this ground she 
feels entitled to refer to them as ‘Our forefathers of 40,000 years ago’ who Jones ‘treat[s] with the 
same courtesy as “the men of Bronze” in the Aegean a mere four thousand’ years ago (Sandars 53; 
author’s italics). Compare this to Dawson’s consideration of Neanderthals as ‘a side path or blind 
alley’ (10): humanity for Jones is defined by what it does, rather than its genetic or physiological 
make-up. The impulse to read genes as defining particular characteristics is an instrumental, rather 
than imaginative, interpretation of human identity; Alaimo for instance comments that ‘Genes—
imagined as discrete, mechanistic, agential entities […] have become invested with the power of life 
itself’ (Bodily 106), whereas she reads material phenomena as emergent qualities resulting from the 
action of numerous agents. The continued and instrumental decryption of genes can therefore 
count among the ‘mutable’ scientific findings we can contrast with Jones’s more generous ‘mythus’. 
In its prehistoric reach, Jones’s extension of grace not only takes in Neanderthals, but tentatively 
includes the nonhuman. Summerfield points to the way in which ‘Fish sanctify the seas and their 
fossils the Devonian rock-beds with an ancient Christian sign’ (20), while a dinosaur even 
substitutes for a lion in the Biblical allusion ‘for Tyrannosaurus must somehow lie down with 
herbivores’ (Ana. 74) thanks to the confusion of strata through geological upheaval. Catholic rite 
gives Jones an organising schema for the work, so that animal and elemental motifs, beyond the 
scope of human civilisation, simultaneously represent and are contained by a divine pattern, 
although one that is complex and cumulative in its detail rather than reductive. Indeed, 
Summerfield maintains that ‘the animal kingdom is touchingly shown to share in the benefit of the 
Incarnation’ (26) in Jones’s work; and even though Paul Hills notes in ‘Making and Dwelling 
Among Signs’ that the poet ‘denied that animals can act gratuitously, truly play, be artists, or 
participate in the world of sign and sacrament, this was not to diminish their dignity’, and his 
‘instinct as an artist was to celebrate animals as co-presences in history’ (88). Jones is 
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sympathetically aware of the world beyond the human, even when Catholic dogma rules out full 
acknowledgement of the commonality of experience.  
Jones’s perspective of animals is indicative of the way The Anathemata’s structure more broadly 
repositions humanity by incorporating environmental agency into our view of culture. Humans and 
animals are put on equal footing in his work, and subject to the same forces. Jonathan Burt cites the 
experience of trench warfare in the poet’s earlier epic In Parenthesis (1937) to argue that ‘Soldiers and 
rats became interchangeable as humans shared with rats the underside of civilization’ (83). Hills 
elaborates on this in discussing an illustration in pencil, ink and watercolour made by Jones for In 
Parenthesis: ‘In Jones’s Frontispiece […], by adroit juxtaposition of foreground and distance, the 
scale of the rats matches, or rather exceeds, that of the infantrymen in their carrying parties’ (82). 
Jones’s rats are our companions, as they are ‘roommate’ to Bunting in Briggflatts, while also 
affording a new focal point in our vision of the world, as Stevens’s rat is in ‘The Plain Sense of 
Things’. That rats have accompanied my commentary on modernist poetry attests to their status as 
‘one of the totem animals of modernity’ (Burt 121), be that on the sullied bank of the Thames in 
The Waste Land or the confused battlefield of In Parenthesis. In a broader context, they are equally 
indicative of a world in which the boundaries of the human and the animal are ruptured: Burt 
comments that ‘Like other dangerous objects, the rat constantly pushes at the edge of the borders 
set to contain it. Just to make matters worse, it also embodies a certain ambivalence’ (12). 
Continuities between human and animal in The Anathemata become more problematic with 
Jones’s limitation of creative activity to human beings: ‘the extra-utile is the mark of man’ (Ana. 65 
n.2; author’s italics). This is problematic in terms of exegesis as much as it is ontology or aesthetics, 
because the note specifically closes down interpretative possibilities for the text, in contrast to 
Jones’s effort to rebind connotation to key terms elsewhere. His essay on ‘The Utile’ defines the 
eponymous concept as ‘the best word to cover the wholly functional works of nature, whether 
animalic or insentient (e.g. nest-building or mountain-building) and such works of man as tend to 
approximate these processes of nature’ (Epoch and Artist 180–1), which reinforces this limitation. 
His understanding of the ‘processes of nature’ resembles the level of natural principles described by 
Soper, but is difficult to align with the idea of superfluous, excessive nature discussed by Costello. 
Yet his phrase ‘wholly functional works of nature’ implies a distinction with nonfunctional works or 
processes. In a more nuanced elaboration of his definition, he writes: ‘It is important to observe 
that the works of animals and of insentient creation, though wholly and inevitably “utile” in the 
fullest and best senses of that word, are impatient of being “utilitarian”’ (Epoch 181). I read the 
differentiation of ‘utile’ from ‘utilitarian’ in this context as a distinction between animals working to 
achieve a purpose and humans working solely and efficiently to achieve a purpose. As such, the 
former exceeds the latter even when that excess is unintentional. What Costello refers to as ‘the 
purging and renewing functions of superfluity’ (‘What to Make’ 572) are in this context the qualities 
of art and animal alike. The liberation of both art and evolution from function or teleology gives us 
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further ecocritical grounding for a revisionist continuity of human and animal, rather than an 
essentialist distinction.  
The Anathemata already tends in this sympathetic direction. The final page of the work instructs: 
‘Nor bid Anubis haste, but rather stay’ at the scene of Christ’s birth (Ana. 243), and the presence of 
the canine-headed Egyptian deity, ‘a dignified reference to the old dog at the church door’ 
(Summerfield 144), includes both pagan religion and nonhuman animal at a moment key to Jones’s 
Catholic vision. The poet’s decision ‘not [to] spurn the dog’, in Summerfield’s words (144) 
demonstrates that The Anathemata is not merely an account of humanity but of creation in its fullest 
sense, a creation that we share with other forms of life but which we do not control. Animals 
nonhuman and human alike have evolved in response to, and are subject to, terrestrial 
environmental conditions. In this, rather than read creatures as humans, I read humans as creatures. 
Jones recognises humanity’s contingent existence on this planet, and as a result, civilisation’s 
dependence on the terrestrial environment. 
The ambiguity of humanity’s position is reconfirmed by the status of The Anathemata as a work 
in language, in particular literary language. It resists absolute closure or confirmation in its 
references to the divine, even if these are the author’s design. Having created a context in which the 
ascent of humanity is contingent rather than entirely provident, The Anathemata is subject to the 
same evolutionary forces. Morton makes a productive analogy in this regard between evolutionary 
processes’ lack of direction and language’s proleptic quality, asserting that ‘The reader is the future 
of the text […] beyond and above the specific addressees of the specific message’ (Thought 80). 
Given that we can no longer read inherited religious stricture in the world, as Jones does, we can 
still take from his articulation of humanity’s relations with the environment a way of reading 
anthropogenic climate change. In his terms, it can be regarded as a product of the combined 
superfluity of human artifice – our negatively inflected anathemata – and natural process. The 
sympathetic, poetic text allows space to identify human anathemata and complicity in 
environmental change, as well as culture’s contingency on that environment. Jones’s deployment of 
modernist poetics in The Anathemata is testament to the scope it affords to express the complex 
entanglement of human and natural agency in climate change. This recognition will be crucial in the 
chapter that follows, as I consider contemporary poems written in a changing climate.  
  
Chapter 6 
‘How could it be performed by the mind became the question’: Poems 
of our climate change 
 
I have argued that, by refracting our understanding of contemporary climate change through the 
lens of modernist aesthetics, we see more clearly that the categories we would conventionally 
distinguish as the “human” or “cultural” and the “natural” are actually less well-defined, more 
entangled agencies that influence the state of the planet. This condition exemplifies the concept of 
hybridity theorised by Bruno Latour, in We Have Never Been Modern and subsequent work, because it 
is the product of a political categorisation of “the environment” as a discrete entity. Latour uses the 
example of newspaper discourse, where ‘hybrid articles […] sketch out imbroglios of science, 
politics, economy, law, religion, technology, fiction’, even when ‘Headings like Economy, Politics, 
Science, Books, Culture, Religion and Local Events remain in place as if there were nothing odd 
going on’ (WHNBM 2). I have argued that, in contrast to reinforcing the rigid divisions between 
culture and nature which promulgate such hybrids, modernist works demonstrate openness to 
human and nonhuman forces. Modernist poetics much more readily corresponds to our present 
climate than does early ecocritical insistence on the primacy of the natural environment. By refusing 
to be absolute or definitive, modernist works are instead characterised by their precise articulation 
of uncertainty, lending themselves to continual re-examination and re-interpretation. They help us 
to identify that our characterisations of the world are contingent. 
By explicitly advocating a modernist ecopoetics, I have assumed that the prevailing 
understanding of climate change’s multiple phenomena in contemporary culture is, by contrast, 
largely reductive, operating from false premises about Nature. Lawrence Buell recognises the 
persistence of these premises as long as ago as The Environmental Imagination (1995), when he 
suggests that this outdated vision of ‘nature’s prominence in the literature of the United States 
might be seen as only too conspicuous: as the inertial effect of the time lag between material 
conditions and cultural adjustment’ (Environmental 14; see Chapter 2, p.56 of this thesis). From the 
perspective of an ecological scientist, Botkin elaborates: ‘our laws, policies, beliefs, and actions 
continue to be primarily based on nature as a still life. This is all the more ironic in a society 
immersed in movies, television, and computer games that are dynamic, and cell phones that can 
take moving pictures’ (8). While I concur with Botkin that Nature is too often reified,1 it is not 
ironic that we separate Nature from culture but apposite, because it enables us to project a  
longed-for stillness and harmony on to it in contrast to the pace of modern lifestyles.  
                                                          
1
 This reification extends into commodification for Timothy Morton, who writes: ‘Wilderness embodies freedom from 
determination, the bedrock of capitalist ideology. It is always “over there,” behind the shop window of distanced, 
aesthetic experience’ (EwN 113). 
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Writing that retains a vision of, or aspiration for, Nature in harmony is thus problematic. But it 
has nevertheless developed in a tradition of its own in the twentieth century. That tradition dates 
from around the same period as modernism, but represents a very different response to the 
problems with which modernism also grappled. Terry Gifford claims that 
 
retreat [into Nature] can also offer a temptation to disconnection, an escapism from complexity 
and contradiction. The contemporary sense of pastoral as a pejorative term perhaps resides in 
the Georgian poets’ lasting effect upon English culture. […] Following the horrors of the First 
World War, these poets sought refuge in rural images that did not disturb a sense of 
comfortable reassurance (71). 
 
By fostering a vision of Nature both separate – and, because separate, reassuring – more recent 
poetry written in this vein is inevitably going to have problems when it comes to dealing with the 
multiple phenomena that contribute to climate change, because it retains the vestiges of the 
outdated ideas critiqued by Botkin and Buell.  
I will proceed by considering the implications of this still-life view of nature for climate change 
discourse; this is followed by a survey of how different kinds of poetry have emerged within that 
discourse, and the range of forms and modes they adopt. I will then analyse in detail work from 
two key texts, Feeling the Pressure and Sea Change, that exemplify the different tendencies I have 
outlined, reflecting on creative achievements in the light of declarations of poetics. Throughout, I 
will emphasise the more nuanced possibilities of experimental, modernist-influenced literary writing 
over other genres. 
 
Climate change discourse: Forms and frames 
The poem I discussed in my Introduction, ‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’, typifies the sort of pejoratively 
pastoral writing that Gifford describes. Its narrator seeks comfort in the shade of ‘the spacious 
mulberry tree’, which ‘spread[s] its big hands / above [his] head’, before the abrupt transition 
marked by ‘now the sky gulps abruptly’ (1.9–12). In response to accelerated change in the natural 
world, Motion’s poem seeks to stabilise a vision of Nature against which that change can be 
measured. Botkin writes, ‘As long as we could believe that nature undisturbed was constant, we had 
a simple standard against which to judge our actions’ (324). But as Nature becomes more fixed and 
certain in such a vision, so climate change also crystallises into a particular entity, reduced to one of 
the “topics” that constitute the media category of “environment”. ‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’ borrows 
wholesale from the climate discourse of other media, such as ‘the already famously lonely polar 
bear’ (4.12). Each is an instance of the ‘persistent use of  visual icons’ of  climate change to which 
Hulme refers (13).  
Climate change attracts a plethora of ulterior concerns according to the frame we unconsciously 
or intentionally position around it. The poetic practice of writing climate change into particular 
traditions, of composing ecopoetry as ‘a subset of nature poetry’ in J. Scott Bryson’s terms (5), 
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associates it with modes such as the (pejoratively) pastoral. In this respect, poetry as a cultural 
practice represents a broader tendency for climate change to be attached to preconceived 
theoretical or ideological frameworks. These biases are, for Mike Hulme, the basis of  Why We 
Disagree About Climate Change. He remarks that ‘the idea of  climate change has been constructed in 
such a way as to ensure that it possesses th[e] quality of  plasticity. Such an attribute allows [… it] 
easily to be appropriated in support of  a wide range of  ideological projects’ (xxviii). He goes on to 
describe the concerns that appropriate climate change as four Biblical themes: ‘Lamenting Eden’, 
‘Presaging Apocalypse’, ‘Constructing Babel’ and ‘Celebrating Jubilee’ (340–55). The first represents 
a nostalgic longing for a lost Nature; the second a warning about the imminence of environmental 
collapse; the third the human attempt to master the forces of nature, with its implicit hubris; and 
the last, the opportunities climate change presents to break down hegemony and progress towards 
social justice. Motion’s poem, for example, is largely characterised by the first, elegiac mode, 
articulating a change from Natural sublime to chaos as it moves towards the second mode, 
‘Presaging Apocalypse’. It does not use its position in the tradition to advance that tradition, or to 
articulate a fresh or engaging conception of climate change.  
Contemporary poetry has had difficulty in treating climate change meaningfully because its 
understanding lags behind both scientific and popular discourse on the matter. It has not led the 
innovation in language that would take the complexities of  the changing climate into account. This 
is one of  the cultural strategies Richard Kerridge refers to in the environmental humanities, the 
‘formal experimentation that, in response to new theory, attempts to change fundamental concepts’ 
(‘Ecocriticism’ 10). T. S. Eliot remarks that innovation or development fulfils part of  what he 
entitles ‘The Social Function of  Poetry’: ‘there is always the communication of  some new 
experience, or some fresh understanding of  the familiar, or the expression of  something we have 
experienced but have no words for, which enlarges our conscience or refines our sensibility’ (18). 
‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’ instead recapitulates existing modes and risks being ‘trammelled into certain 
stock ways of expressing oneself’ as Mario Petrucci fears (see Chapter 2, p.51 of this thesis).  
Poetry has responded to and developed traditions of writing about other themes and concepts 
derived from science,2 but climate change presents particular difficulties. The peculiar timescales of 
anthropogenic climate change entangle human generational and political time with cultural and 
geological time frames, and Kerridge suggests that ‘To perceive climate change, we need to look 
back into deep history, using a variety of sources of evidence, and forward into at least the next 
hundred years, using a variety of ways of making projections’ (8). Rather than being seen as a 
daunting opportunity for re-engagement with the phenomenal world, however, climate change has 
too often been taken as a reason to retrench, and to confirm cherished, nostalgic views of natural 
stability. Latour indicates that a similar danger can befall political engagement with ecology: ‘People 
                                                          
2
 In his introduction to Science in Modern Poetry John Holmes writes ‘far from conforming to the critical consensus that 
poetry and science were antagonistic, poets throughout the twentieth century […] sought to incorporate science into 
their poetry and poetics’ (6). 
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have been much too quick to believe that it sufficed to recycle the old concepts of nature and 
politics unchanged’ (Politics 2). Literature is in a position to interrogate culturally given 
representations through formal innovation, and indeed, according to Ursula Heise, it must do so, 
because ‘climate change poses a challenge for narrative and lyrical forms’ (205). Motion is by 
contrast too ready to annex climate change to the regularity of a narrative sonnet sequence.3 Poets 
have taken a number of different responses to the phenomena and politics of climate change, 
however, and these have developed alongside scientific and societal understanding over the past 
quarter of a century. The poetics of this verse shapes its understanding of climate change, and as 
conventional strategies are increasingly shown to limit that understanding, the emergence of a 
neo-modernist aesthetics signifies the search for more comprehensive engagement with the 
phenomena.  
 
Warming to the theme: Poetry responds to climate change 
Poems begin to take up climate change as a distinctive topic in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in the 
wake of  the first ‘greenhouse summer’ in 1988 – the year, when, according to Hulme, ‘the idea of  
climate change penetrated more deeply into popular culture in the West’ as a result of  ‘a 
convergence of  events, politics, institutional innovations, and the intervention of  prominent public 
and charismatic individuals’ (63–4). Acknowledging that ‘there was no major new scientific 
discovery about climate change in 1988’ (63), Hulme suggests that the date marks instead climate 
change’s emergence on the policy agenda. Its importance was confirmed as one of the key issues 
discussed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development – the Earth 
Summit – in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.  
As a result of this topicality, early poems about climate change included politically framed satires 
such as Les Murray’s ‘The Greenhouse Vanity’ (first appearing in the London Review of  Books in May 
1989; revised for Murray’s 2003 New Collected Poems) and Simon Rae’s ‘One World Down the Drain’ 
(collected in Soft Targets: Poems from the Weekend Guardian, in 1991, and reprinted in Earth Shattering in 
2007). But global warming also occupies individual poems of  lyrical reflection, such as Steve Ellis’s 
epistolary ‘Son to a father, 21st century’ and Lavinia Greenlaw’s ‘The Recital of  Lost Cities’ (from 
West Pathway [48] and Night Photograph [15] respectively, both 1993). Fleur Adcock’s ‘The 
Greenhouse Effect’, from her 1991 book Time-Zones, mediates between lyric and topical response. 
The lyrical quality is explicitly filtered through the Romantic tradition, as she responds to ‘Aerial 
water, submarine light:’ by reflecting that ‘Wellington’s gone Wordsworthian again’. She adds: ‘He 
[Wordsworth]’d have admired it – / admired but not approved, if he’d heard / about fossil fuels, 
and aerosols’ (reprinted in Poems 1960–2000, 204–5). Those chemical references indicate that the 
experience is also mediated through a more recent text: she ‘read in last night’s [New Zealand] 
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 His most marked divergence from the form, the addition of a fifteenth line to the second poem, might correspond to 
the melting of ice ‘in deeper currents and quick, chaotic flow’ (2.15), or it might be a requirement of the sequence’s 
musical setting. But this slight variation cannot be said to present a formal or modal innovation, and indeed depends 
on the form remaining otherwise stable to achieve what minimal effect it has. 
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Evening Post / that “November ended the warmest spring / since meteorological records began”.’ 
Whether in satiric or lyrical modes, these poems are constructing a semiotics of  climate change 
from the science, in particular the imagery of  melting icebergs, rising sea levels, submerged cities 
and human conflict. These poems also mark early appearances by the arctic imagery recycled in 
‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’. Constituted from these tropes, global warming quickly becomes a given 
that allows poets to talk about much more conventional concerns, such as political ineffectiveness 
in Rae’s poem or intergenerational responsibility in Ellis’s. Without innovation of  technique, there is 
no discovery of  anything about climate change per se. 
The trend for climate change to be addressed in individual lyrics has continued over the 
subsequent twenty years. Drawing on his work as a poet of natural encounter, the late Seamus 
Heaney emphasises a less mediated engagement with the impacts of climate change in a triptych of 
poems – ‘In Iowa’, ‘Höfn’ and ‘On the Spot’ – from his 2006 collection District and Circle (52–4), 
which attest to the global scope of the phenomena by locating their narrator in a Midwestern 
cornfield, in flight over Greenland and in his garden. Simon Armitage, meanwhile, remains in the 
Romantic tradition when the narrator of ‘The Present’ (2010) meditates on an icicle found in an 
upland English landscape; the literary relationship is confirmed in the poem’s receipt of that year’s  
Keats–Shelley prize. Alongside these reflective pieces, climate change has also become more 
prominent as a theme running through entire collections over the past ten years, through various 
modes. It is manifested in the postmodern collage of Peter Reading’s collection –273.15 (2005): 
‘and didya read how them rain forests is burnin 6,000 acres an hour’; the epistolary verse of Derek 
Mahon’s Harbour Lights (2005), with its expression of surprise at ‘this new century with its 
bewildering weather’ (25); the knowing, ironic elegies of D. A. Powell’s Chronic (2009): ‘nobody said 
the undertaker would come spanking new in a blinding heat / his crucible searing arctic glaciers 
[indeed: summer surprised us]’ (43; author’s parenthesis and italics); the close rendering of scientific 
process in Michael McKimm’s Fossil Sunshine (2013): ‘We are waiting for results from Sheffield / on 
the sample taken from the horizontal / borehole’;4 or the glacial fables of Matthew Sweeney’s Black 
Moon (2007) and Hilary Menos’s Berg (2009). Among these, Reading’s collage technique and 
Powell’s allusion to The Waste Land indicate the development of alternative, more self-reflexive 
modes that begin to engage with the complexity of the phenomena. Reading is also ambivalent 
about the value of adopting Romantic nature in the face of climate change: ‘The school mag. 
Juvenilis piece, “Bonfire”, a puerile Keatsesque thing, proved microcosmic after all’. 
The intensification of interest all these poems represent corresponds with an increased attention 
to climate change beginning in the middle of the last decade, prior to the credit crunch and 
economic recession. This concern is certainly prompted by debate around the causes of Hurricane 
Katrina in August 2005, and is also likely to have been influenced by the publication of the Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change in the UK, and the Intergovernmental Panel on 
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 The citation comes from a preview of the poem ‘Poem with Horizontal Borehole’ on McKimm’s blog, Written in the 
Rocks. 
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Climate Change’s Fourth Assessment Report on Climate Change (2007–08), as well as the films The 
Day After Tomorrow (Roland Emmerich, 2004) and An Inconvenient Truth (Davis Guggenheim, 2006). 
The proliferation of cultural responses to the phenomena and politics of climate change also 
includes several poetry anthologies that take up environmental topics.  
One typical example is Earth Shattering: Ecopoems (2007), whose editor Neil Astley comments in 
his Introduction that he intends ‘to bring together a range of ecopoetry reflecting more closely 21st 
century thinking about nature, the planet, and our threatened environment’ (18). Although Astley 
interprets ‘ecopoems’ fairly broadly, this formulation suggests that the subject can only be 
addressed through the self-confirmatory genre of ‘ecopoetry’. He situates this in the tradition of 
nature writing as the opening section, ‘Rooted in Nature’, includes examples from ‘The Wilderness 
Poetry of Ancient China’ and Wordsworth, as well as excerpts from Walden. Prefacing the later 
section ‘Force of Nature’, Astley signals the clear direction he has in mind for the ‘poems showing 
the effects of global warming and climate change’: ‘The warnings given in these poems presage 
disaster in the book’s final section’ (190). This seeks to locate all such poems in Hulme’s 
apocalyptic mode.  
Another relevant anthology, The Ground Aslant (2011), is by contrast more open in its response 
to the twenty-first-century environment, exploring rather than restricting generic possibility. ‘[T]his 
is a book of radical landscape poetry, some of which may also be motivated by environmentalism. 
Although some landscape poets may be ecopoets and some ecopoets may be landscape poets, the 
two are by no means interchangeable’, explains editor Harriet Tarlo (11). She thus acknowledges 
that poetic relation to the environment is not unique to ecopoetry. Her selection also emphasises 
the value of poetic form and literary engagement rather than specifically reacting to issues: ‘poetry 
within the experimental tradition could be particularly powerful in its contribution to the necessary 
mental and emotional adjustments to environment that we need, urgently, to make’ (10). In this 
context, Tarlo can assert that references ‘to coastal erosion […] to global warming’ in the poems are 
‘uncompromising’ (10), as we are not necessarily instructed in advance to read them as “ecopoetry”. 
A further context for climate change discourse that Earth Shattering indicates is its 
institutionalisation. Robert Hass’s poem ‘State of the Planet’, for instance, is written ‘On the 
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Lamont–Doherty Earth Observatory’ (210). The 
Acknowledgements for Earth Shattering also record that ‘The sequences Indian Summer by Patience 
Agbabi and Certain Weather by John Burnside, and the poem “The Diomedes” by Matthew Hollis, 
were all commissioned by Poet in the City and Lloyd’s as part of the Trees in the City collaboration, 
designed to raise awareness of the need for action on climate change’ (246; italics in original). This 
associates the poems with particular agendas, political or corporate, just as ‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’ 
was a commission with a public function. A similar association hangs over Andrew Motion’s 
successor as poet laureate, Carol Ann Duffy. The cover of her 2011 collection The Bees is 
prominently branded with her role, and contains a number of pieces dealing with climate change 
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among other environmental issues, such as the eponymous poem, ‘The English Elms’ and 
‘Parliament’ (3, 40–1, 50). The institutional role of these poems confirms rather than challenges the 
constitution of climate change as a political issue. 
Meanwhile, Nick Drake’s 2012 book-length sequence The Farewell Glacier (2012) ‘grew out of [a] 
voyage’ with the Cape Farewell project, ‘inviting [him] to join their expedition to Svalbard’ (6). 
Charitable involvement enables the poet’s personal experience of the Arctic environment; but if 
polar experience is necessary for climate action, then we risk making the Arctic a latter-day Lake 
District, with all the environmental impact this tourist trade would generate. If on the other hand 
the poem’s role is itself to conjure Arctic presence for us without us being there, to champion the 
artist’s creative response, the poem disavows its own potency to engage us when a personified 
version of the future protests: ‘I wish I could entertain you / With some magnificent propositions 
and glorious jokes; / But the best I can do is this: / I haven’t happened yet, but I will’ (Farewell 49; 
author’s italics). This is not to fault the motives of any of these poems or sponsors, but to indicate 
how their commission reinforces a political framing of climate change, as though it is rightly the 
preserve of institutions. The poetry seems to be co-opted to a public policy agenda: topic precedes 
poetics. Opportunities for experimentation and exploration are subsidiary to coverage of the issues. 
These remarks are intended as an indicative survey of the poetry on climate change, rather than 
a thoroughgoing examination: that will require the work of a separate study. The discussion is 
designed to frame the context of climate change poetry and the need for more innovative poetics. 
To conclude this thesis, I will critique work from two volumes that are representative of the 
tendencies I have discussed. The first is an anthology of climate change writing, Feeling the Pressure, 
and the other is a collection by Jorie Graham, Sea Change. From the former book, I compare two 
pieces: the first of the pair exemplifies responses to climate change that eschew conscious 
engagement with the literary tradition, treating it as a pre-formed topic; the second articulates 
climate change with a clearer sense of literary, and in particular modernist poetic, heritage. Sea 
Change, meanwhile, is a collection that makes a fuller engagement with modernist poetics to 
articulate the multiple, hybrid phenomena of contemporary climate change. I share Kerridge’s and 
Tarlo’s understanding that there is greater potential in experimental literary forms such as  
neo-modernism for untangling our present situation, as I do Mario Petrucci’s contention that 
poetry is more successful when it works against assimilation of climate change into traditions of 
nature poetry and recognises the value of modernist artifice and uncertainty of identity. 
 
The commission of  climate concern 
The British Council’s anthology Feeling the Pressure: Poetry and Science of  Climate Change (2008) makes a 
specific project of  climate change, framing the book as a public intervention. The anthology 
presents the work of  twenty-four poets,5 organised into five sections – Trends, Extremes, Impacts, 
                                                          
5
 Motion is among these, contributing a sequence of haiku, ‘Here and Now’ (Feeling 18). 
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Actions and Complicities. Each section is prefaced by a summary of  relevant science, a poem by 
editor Paul Munden, and a cartoon. The format allows us to read different authors responding to 
climate change while foregrounding the imagery and practices common to their work. I will 
compare Munden’s own ‘Glacier’ with ‘The Kingdom of  Water is Coming’ by Michael Symmons 
Roberts, representing two of  a range of  poetic modes deployed in the book.6 Munden’s 
introduction to the volume, which outlines his own poetics of  climate change, frames the function 
of  climate change poetry in a particular and self-confessedly limited, way. Roberts’s poem, and a 
prose piece by him from a separate context, offer a way of  reframing Munden’s poetics. 
In his introduction, Munden regards climate change as a political category, rather than as a range 
of  complex, interdependent phenomena. He refers to ‘Climate change, as a topic,’ and relates that 
he ‘relished the chance to invite poets to make their particular contributions to this fairground-
attraction debate that is also the most pressing issue of our time’ (Feeling 3; my italics). This 
comprehension of climate change is lifted wholly from superficial political rhetoric rather than 
constituting a literary questioning of it. Whereas I have argued throughout this thesis that poetry 
can and will be read meaningfully outside its historic context, and that modernist poetics marks a 
particular engagement with the possibility of its own future rereading, Munden conceives of climate 
change poetry as dependent solely on its relevance to the present moment. ‘If I had thought of [the 
volume] as making some kind of forecast, I would have got it all wrong’, he writes; ‘This collection 
[…] is more of a weather report, a British snapshot of intellectual and emotional reaction to things 
as they stand at the end of 2007’ (3). It resists deeper engagement with the complexities of the 
phenomena. 
Munden’s understanding of  poetry is equally time-bound. He writes that, ‘In making [his] 
selection’, he has ‘not attempted to dwell on the tradition of ecological writing which is so strong 
both here in the UK and abroad’, openly deferring to Earth Shattering in this regard. On this basis, 
poets become a species of newspaper columnist, charged with providing ‘an intellectual and 
emotional reaction’ to climate change, rather than a considered literary engagement with it. Munden 
explains what he considers is the role of poetry in response to climate change: ‘Politicians and 
policymakers are quick to borrow writers’ tools in making their arguments, but it is perhaps writers 
themselves who can help us to explore the issues without invoking a desensitised or dismissive 
response, creating instead a movement for real change’ (3). This attempts to give political charge to 
the poems anthologised, and recognises the danger of  discourse that prompts a ‘desensitised or 
dismissive response’. But Munden’s effort is squandered by a return to clichéd political rhetoric in 
the closing phrase, ‘a movement for real change’.  
Poetry has scope instead to respond to the way our understanding changes as the climate 
changes rather than directing itself  towards particular political goals. To consider poetry as a way of  
knowing and understanding the world rather than as a versified version of  politics or science is to 
                                                          
6
 I give a fuller discussion of the volume in the seminar paper ‘Why We Don’t Write Poetry About Climate Change’ 
(available online via SoundCloud). 
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suggest that it need not be reduced to consideration in terms of  the others. Such a consideration 
also enables a fuller appreciation of  the science, because it does not imply that its complexities 
simply require literary rendering to become affective. Munden reluctantly acknowledges that poetry 
has this scope when he notes ‘It’s noticeable how many of the poets have adopted a rather oblique 
approach, almost seeming to shy away from direct statements about the predicament we face’ (3–4). 
Nevertheless, he then seeks to make capital from this obliquity by contrasting it with a political 
target, celebrating the poets’ ‘refusal to jump on the bandwagon of self-satisfaction like those 
corporations preening themselves on account of their ever so slight “green” credentials’ (4). 
Yet the anthology itself participates in a kind of market transaction as Munden preens himself 
on its green credentials. It performs a variation on the function that Timothy Morton envisages for 
ecological writing: 
 
Literature about the environment takes on various roles within consumerism. One function is to 
soothe the pains and stresses of  industrial society, as national parks assuage our weekday world. 
[…] Ecological discourse is also about collectivity: how to share this earth with other humans, 
animals, plants, and inanimate things (EwN 114). 
 
Feeling the Pressure adds a further function to Morton’s list by seeking to stimulate ‘a movement for 
real change’. The difficulty lies in the readership it seeks. If  we read Feeling the Pressure, we opt to feel 
worthy for having read poems about climate change; if  we prefer not to engage with climate 
change, prefer to deny human complicity in it or dispute its existence, we can just as easily choose 
not to read the anthology. Its function is framed and constrained by its institutional sponsorship 
and the project of  anthologising: the choice to read or not to read something branded as the 
‘Poetry and Science of  Climate Change’ confirms our existing ideologies rather than challenging 
them. If  the work does not specifically consider how climate change alters our preconceptions, 
then it fails Eliot’s criterion for poetry’s social function. 
 
Ice loss and eco-elegy 
Munden’s poem ‘Glacier’ (Feeling 11), like ‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’, exploits another ‘persistent […] 
visual icon’ of  climate change (Hulme 13), and is thus indicative of  how far the imagery of  climate 
change comes pre-formed from other discourses. Munden identifies his glacier with the 
commonplace idea of Mother Nature, and what force this conceit has comes from the suggestion 
that she is in her dotage and we have failed in our duty of care to her as we ‘witness’ the ice melt, 
‘soiling the sheets / with drool from your speechless gums’. But this characterisation demonstrates 
little novelty, since it simply reinforces the trope Hulme labels ‘Lamenting Eden’, in which ‘humans 
believe they are diminishing not just themselves, but also something beyond themselves’ (344). The 
nostalgic drift of the poem is demonstrated when the narrator decries that the glacier’s ‘natural 
eloquence / is deserting you’, because this suggests that there was an earlier time when nature’s 
message would have been clear to us. The play on ‘natural eloquence’ seeks a correspondence 
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between ‘natural’ or innate ‘eloquence’ as a human characteristic and a Nature eloquent in 
expressing itself in human terms. Yet the notion that we can readily recover a “voice” from nature 
as though it were human is fraught with difficulty, as I have argued throughout this thesis. Munden 
gestures at this incommunicability when he says we await a signal in our vigil and ‘see nothing, hear 
only / a deafening silence’. However, this silence in the poem is implied to be the result of a recent 
process rather than an abiding paradox. 
In addition to its anthropomorphised glacier, the poem attempts to engage us with the scale of  
the glacial melt with its casual, almost conversational tone. At the same time, the resignation of  the 
voice is ill-matched to the enormity of  the phenomenon, defeated before the attempt to convey it is 
even made. This presents an interpretative problem regarding Munden’s expectations for his reader. 
If  we agree with him, we share his resignation; if  we disagree, we dismiss his depiction of  the 
process. So if  Munden aims to stimulate a previously sceptical reader into action, it will be one who 
has already chosen to read the anthology in spite of  that scepticism. The poem’s weary, elegiac 
quality also stands in contrast to Hulme’s observation that ‘positive messages tend to be more 
attractive and effective in motivating behaviour change than negative ones’ (234–5). Already 
institutionally framed by the process of  anthology, however, ‘Glacier’ is further framed by the 
despairing tone in which it is written. Confirming existing responses to climate change, it is familiar 
to the point of  banality. Because the poem rehearses generalities rather than finding an incisive 
mode or tone of  its own, it renders even the personified glacier and identifiable tone of  voice 
impersonal. Although it aspires to broad appeal with the use of  third- and first-person plural 
pronouns, ‘They’, ‘We’, ‘Some of  us’, it also aspires, problematically, to a position with ‘an 
aestheticized distance toward everything’, in Morton’s words (EwN 101). As Bill McKibben 
indicates in The End of  Nature, no such point now exists: ‘By changing the weather, we make every 
spot on earth man-made and artificial’ (54). Munden thus has no strategy for articulating human 
participation in the exacerbation of climate change.  
By containing the glacial sublime in an image of human decline, the poem instead sidesteps the 
complexities of climatic phenomena. To portray us as the neglectful carers of Mother Nature 
implies that grieving for a planet is akin to grieving for a parent. As such, Munden reinforces our 
sense of resignation about climate change, asking us to come to terms with it as a private, familial 
loss rather than a collective, global one. In his essay ‘The Dark Ecology of Elegy’, Timothy Morton 
points out how difficult it is to deal with environmental crisis as a kind of grief, because ‘Ecological 
elegy asks us to mourn for something that has not completely passed, that perhaps has not even 
passed yet’ (254). His conclusion is that ‘The really difficult elegiac work would consist in bringing 
into full consciousness the reality of human and nonhuman interdependence’ (256). That is to say, 
if literature is to serve as an engagement with climate change, it cannot be written in a way that is 
bound up in the process of helping the bereaved, however painfully, move on. Climate change 
persists as multiple phenomena, and cannot be consigned to a mental graveyard once we have 
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finished reading. In attempting to make us feel guilty, Munden’s poem actually lets us off the hook: 
it attempts to elicit a particular response in us and prompt ‘a movement for real change’ (Feeling 3), 
yet its only protagonists ‘drift away’ or keep silent ‘vigil’, doing nothing to spur such action. 
 
Transubstantial water 
Michael Symmons Roberts’s ‘The Kingdom of  Water is Coming’ (Feeling 30–1) adopts a similarly 
casual tone and first-person plural inclusivity in its vision of  future deluge: ‘Sure it was there all 
along […] We should have seen it coming’. In contrast, the Christian connotations of  the title 
suggest that the poem will correspond with the second of  Hulme’s genres, ‘Presaging Apocalypse’. 
The tension between tone and mode, however, is crucial to Roberts’s articulation of  the human 
relation to climate change. In Munden’s poem the familiarity of  negative voice and imagery 
confirmed a superficial engagement with the phenomena, whereas Roberts juxtaposes a quotidian 
indifference to environmental change with the potential for catastrophe. This dramatises the 
psychological process of  ‘Splitting’, which Kerridge glosses as ‘the social and individual 
phenomenon of explicit acknowledgement accompanied by tacit disavowal of that knowledge’ 
(‘Ecocriticism’ 16). Roberts effects a reconnection between the two extremes, from the scale of  the 
human to that of  the planet, through the elemental, mutable significance of  water as an image. In 
the lines ‘it was there all along, / in the air and of  it, a freight / of  ocean in our lungs’, there is a 
transition from water’s general presence in our environment, ‘in the air’, to the physicality of  
‘freight’, then the expanse ‘of  ocean’, to the bodily sensation of  ‘our lungs’. Rather than stage a 
future catastrophe, as the apocalyptic title suggests he might, Roberts develops his scenario 
incrementally out of  the present moment, so ‘that glass of  water by the bed’ is ‘more full than 
when you left it’. This gradual increase anticipates a symbolic materialisation of  emotional states as 
‘More people cried more, / and their tears were bulbous’. By letting anxiety manifest itself  in the 
world not just as tears but as tears that expand with the increasing amount of  water, Roberts 
develops a distinctive way of  associating human activity with a change in the environment, rather 
than rehearsing a commonplace opposition of  humans and Mother Nature. 
The passage from the human to the environmental in the poem is accompanied by a shift from 
more to less closely rhymed quatrains: the first is patterned ‘along’/‘freight’/‘lungs’/‘weight’, the 
second ‘coming’/‘carnations’/‘morning’/‘saturation’ and the third ‘bed’/‘left it’/‘beat’/‘restive’. By 
the time of  the eighth, the A-rhyme is no longer sonic but semantic: ‘sea’/‘sure’/‘oceans’/‘forever’. 
Where ‘sure’ has a loose echo in ‘forever’, ‘sea’ only corresponds to ‘oceans’ in terms of  referent. 
The breakdown in the containing structures of  rhyme enacts a breakdown in previously held 
distinctions – ‘we thought land and sea /were opposites’ – while the collocation of  ‘land and sea’ 
on the same line separates them from the enjambed concept of  opposition itself. The poem shares 
with ‘The Idea of  Order at Key West’ a concern about the difficulty of  humans imposing patterns 
on the world, although Roberts’s allusion to ‘those hands that parted oceans’ gives this a more 
180 CHAPTER 6 
clearly Biblical significance than Stevens’s poem. Whose ‘hands’ these are remains ambiguous. Read 
with Stevens in mind, they may signify the conceptual force of  human imagination, as in the ‘voice 
that made / The sky acutest at its vanishing’ (Stevens Collected 106), creating the boundaries by 
which ‘land and sea’ were formerly distinguished; or, the hands may represent the power of  a 
creator who physically separates land and sea, as in Genesis 1:9–10. With this ambiguity, Roberts 
reprises the uncertainty over human or divine agency I attribute to David Jones’s lines, ‘whose man-
hands god-handled the Willendorf stone / before they unbound the last glaciation’ (Ana. 59; see 
Chapter 5, p.162 of this thesis).  
That Roberts is conscious of the modernist tradition as he develops such ambiguity is apparent 
in his essay ‘Poetry in a Post-Secular Age’ (2008). In responding to the question: ‘How can 
contemporary poets explore religious faith and experience in a secularised language and culture?’ 
(69), he tackles a problem similar to the one I have formulated here, of how poetry finds a language 
fit to describe an experience at odds with its more frequent usage. Roberts draws on Jones’s 
arguments from the preface to The Anathemata to make his case: ‘Atheist, agnostic or believer, all 
should − Jones argued − feel a sense of loss when our language looks thinner. He wasn’t suggesting 
that baptism or the cross should be the primary reference for water or wood, but that they should 
keep a place among many connotations’ (69). Jones himself  dwells in his preface on how ‘A 
knowledge of  the chemical components of  this material water’ can, ‘ideally, provide us with further, 
deeper, and more exciting significances vis-à-vis the sacrament of  water’ (Ana. 17; see Chapter 5, 
pp.160–1 of  this thesis), and Roberts draws on these significances in ‘The Kingdom of  Water is 
Coming’. He breaks down the ‘formula H2O’ mentioned by Jones (Ana. 16) to isolate its  
life-supporting oxygen:  
 
[…] lovers 
lay in bed and blew the letter 
O like smoke rings over and over 
 
O as in love, in H2O, in soul (author’s italics).  
 
He plays on the sound ‘O’ to produce a range of  associations – visual, auditory, romantic, chemical 
and spiritual – rather than limiting it to ‘fount’ and ‘drool’ as Munden does in characterising his 
‘Glacier’. In the process, the ‘O’ of  oxygen is recombined with ‘H2’ midway through the list, and 
with this chemical formation of  water from its elements, Roberts metaphorically snatches the 
breath from the poem’s recumbent lovers, rendering them ‘half-adapted but half-drowned’.  
These lines make explicit the poem’s play with different states of  water. The compression 
demanded by the lyric form makes the arrangement more apparent and less structural than the 
variations of  state I read as patterning The Waste Land or Briggflatts. The scope afforded by Roberts’s 
ten quatrains is insufficient to give the sense of  change over larger, less immediate scales that Eliot’s 
and Bunting’s forms make available. Nevertheless, the repetition of  ‘O’ by the submerged lovers is 
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reminiscent of  the dreamy, erotic context of  Prufrock’s ‘linger[ing] in the chambers of  the sea / By 
sea-girls’ (Eliot Complete 17) or Bunting’s ‘submarine Amalfitan kisses’ (Bunting Complete 67). By 
creating a context in which transitions between the lyric and mythic are possible, Roberts reduces 
the certainty of  individual experience while emphasising its sensory quality, as Jones does in The 
Anathemata. Roberts’s lines ‘when ice-caps felt as sure / as stars’ allude contrastingly to Keats’s 
‘Bright star! would I were stedfast as thou art’ (Major Works 325); as a result, they may seem to hark 
back to the Eden before anthropogenic global warming that informs both ‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’ 
and ‘Glacier’. But the key word in Roberts’s poem is ‘felt’, the way we as individuals recreate our 
experience of  the environment, even when that environment is as remote as the poles. It intimates 
the provisionality of  a process that Munden instead makes into an uncomplicated analogy with 
human experience. Roberts’s choice of  verb, to feel, is an articulation of  the way climate change 
prompts us to change our conceptions about the world. 
Roberts’s consideration of  the context of  the ‘post-secular’ also offers a possible re-framing for 
the poetry of  climate change in his exploration of  the contexts of  composition and reading. In the 
essay, he paraphrases a passage from Eliot’s ‘Religion and Literature’ (1935), where the earlier poet 
argues that a qualifying term, such as ‘religious’, is perceived as limiting the possibilities for poetry. 
Eliot posits a putative ‘lover of  poetry’, for whom, ‘when you qualify poetry as “religious” you are 
indicating very clear limitations.’ Such a reader considers that ‘“religious” poetry is a variety of  minor 
poetry: the religious poet is not a poet who is treating the whole subject matter of  poetry in a 
religious spirit, but a poet who is dealing with a confined part of  this subject matter’ (98–9; author’s 
italics). Roberts regards this as analogous with a modern suspicion about non-literary agendas that 
come to bear on writing. He observes, ‘One of the concerns about “grand narratives” of any sort is 
that the poetry may be imprisoned or used by them’, arguing that ‘this myth has left us with a terror 
of the imagination in thrall to a belief. Surely this could limit the scope of the work, may even 
reduce it to a thin preconceived outworking of doctrine or argument?’ (‘Poetry’ 71–2). The urgency 
of environmentalist discourse likewise participates in the grand narrative of climate change as 
though this itself were the phenomena, rather than representing a particular framing of them. 
Motion and Munden thus seem willingly to ‘imprison’ themselves in climate change because they 
are ‘in thrall to a belief’ of it. In contrast, Roberts argues that the ‘fear’ of a preconceived 
commitment taking precedence over literary form ‘was always unfounded. The counter examples 
are obvious, including great twentieth century innovators like Eliot, Jones, Auden, Moore, 
Berryman, Bunting’ (72). His invocation of a modern canon of innovation, including three of the 
authors I have already discussed, attests to the value of literary engagement with, rather than 
subordination to, a particular agenda. Climate change poetry then has the chance to ‘treat the whole 
subject matter of poetry’ in the light of the phenomena, rather than confining itself to the existing 
tropes and topics of a politically constituted grand narrative. 
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Poetic exploration of climate change phenomena need not then be an imitation of that political 
discourse. Roberts, however, characterises his post-secular age as having greater certainty than a 
preceding era of relativism, and he credits increasing environmental consciousness with this:  
 
[O]ur exit from the hall of mirrors is driven by ecological concerns. Relativism simply collapses 
in this context. The climate is changing or it isn’t. Species are dying out or they aren’t. Humanity 
is responsible for this or we aren’t. There’s no possibility of global warming being true for you 
but not for me (‘Poetry’ 71). 
  
In contrast, I have argued, the material emergence of  climate change cannot be disentangled from 
our framings and interpretations of  it. Anthropogenic climate change is by definition a hybrid of  
numerous human practices as individuals and societies, and a range of  physical phenomena, so it is 
not simply the case that ‘Humanity is responsible for this or we aren’t’. Nancy Tuana’s ‘Viscous 
Porosity’ offers a more nuanced reading of  this dispersal of  agency (193; see also Chapter 1, p.33 
of  this thesis). Roberts’s attempt to bring science and religion into alignment is likewise strained: 
‘Far from being opposites, science and religion are at heart both concerned with truth and 
falsehood, both are grounded in narratives, and both search for meaning and purpose in the world. 
Both are also constantly shifting and contested’ (73). While this reminds us that science has a 
narrative context as much as religion does, the types of truth, meaning and contestation with which 
both are occupied are very different, as I argued in my previous chapter, and Roberts’s attempt to 
reconcile the two does not recognise the value of that difference. As a mode of understanding, 
poetry offers a way of negotiating between competing narratives or maintaining them in tension. 
Robert Crawford identifies this quality in his distinction between science and poetry: ‘To attempt to 
collapse the differences is to weaken science and poetry; to recognise differences but also 
similarities and possibilities of mutual nourishment is to strengthen both’ (‘Poetry, Science and the 
Contemporary University’ 80). Poetry does not have to commit to a scientific or religious 
worldview, but can acknowledge the multiple frames through which we experience that world. 
What remains valuable in Roberts’s conception of ‘post-secular’ poetry, then, is its qualities, not 
its direction; for example, the associativity he derives from Jones. But as it approaches its end, ‘The 
Kingdom of Water is Coming’ thins its associations by adopting a more evidently religious tenor, as 
Roberts’s essay does. Images begin to presage a more conventional, Christian apocalypse – 
‘Cathedral candles fizzle out’. The line ‘Noah’s [flood] was a dry run’ gives Biblical precedent for 
this apocalypse while punningly suggesting that the ‘Coming’ kingdom will make the Old 
Testament deluge seem ‘dry’ by comparison. Nevertheless, by situating his poem in a scriptural 
tradition, Roberts retains its mythical quality, as an imagined engagement with climate change rather 
than a straightforward mapping of  political concerns onto conventional tropes. We may not share 
this pattern of  belief, but at least we recognise its use of  and relationship to generic expectations as 
it articulates our situation. 
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The forcing of  form 
Roberts’s loosely metrical lines, organised by ABAB rhymes of differing fullness, are part of this 
demonstration of artifice. This may carry a suggestion of our artificialisation of terrestrial, 
atmospheric or aquatic environments, but the form’s relative straightforwardness and the subtlety 
of its lost rhymes does not represent a striking departure from convention. After the pattern 
reaches its most strained, with ‘sea’/‘sure’/‘oceans’/‘forever’ in verse eight, it returns to closer 
rhymes in the final two stanzas: ‘breaks’/‘cold’/‘neck’/‘cloud’ and ‘streetlights’/‘spill’/‘out’/‘steel’, 
affirming its resolution as a more religious poem. It therefore risks being read simply as a gesture 
‘Presaging Apocalypse’, although it is not nearly as forthright in doing so as Munden’s piece 
laments Eden. 
Roberts explores the possibility of both religious and climate change tropes in his poem, and 
only at the end does he resolve the tension into a trope of apocalypse common to both. However, 
that resolution might prompt Eliot’s putative reader to dismiss the poem, for all its deftness, as 
irrational or irrelevant because of its religious context. Nevertheless, as I have demonstrated 
through my analysis of Wallace Stevens’s poetics, there is no engagement with the world that does 
not draw on the imagination: to dismiss Roberts’s poem on the basis that it foregrounds that 
imaginative work is to overlook the inevitability of such interpretative frames. Botkin identifies such 
a presumption in our expectations of  climate change science. ‘Isn’t the issue of global warming 
simply one of science and therefore rationality?’ he asks. ‘It seems to surprise us moderns when we 
discover there are debates about climate change that are charged with emotion, opinion, political 
and ideological biases’ (xi). As a result, when we look at computer models of possible 
environmental scenarios, we are wont to read them as real states, when their real value lies in 
shedding light on ‘the implications of what we know (the facts) and what we assume about a system 
that interests us, such as a forest or the biosphere. This’, Botkin argues, ‘is the best use’ (277).  
To provide a similar mechanism in literature, which acknowledges the simultaneous need for 
and provisionality of our engagement with climate, and which prevents us from accepting it as a 
neutral account of nature by emphasising its fictive quality, we can work with a kind of modernist 
difficulty that reminds us of the interpretative frames rather than ignoring them. By making us 
conscious of modernist traditions, a work can acknowledge the role played by human culture in 
creating the world, both imaginatively as cultural conception, and phenomenally through our 
impact on the physical environment. Rather than adopt a smooth and direct style that eases our 
reading of difficult material, by using elegiac or prophetic modes that are already assimilated into 
our culture, the poetry of climate change can benefit from making its engagements more explicitly 
and more strikingly. Paul Sheehan’s remarks on modernist aesthetics, that its ‘formal irregularities’ 
and ‘Brokendown narrative [are] insidiously disquieting in ways that troubling story-content cannot 
match’ (15–16; see Chapter 2, p.57 of this thesis), remain relevant, then, in a contemporary context. 
Climate change represents the ‘troubling story-content’ that is contained by media and political 
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discourse, and then re-contained in elegiac or prophetic literary modes. But, so framed, it lacks the 
‘insidiously disquieting’ quality that Sheehan identifies with ‘introducing formal irregularities’. The 
modernist work I have examined in Chapters 2 to 5 makes its own formal innovations; I now turn 
to contemporary work that draws on these influences to shape its engagement with climate change. 
 
Sea Change: Modernist poetics and climate change 
Feeling the Pressure presents a range of other poems making more striking use of both form and 
experimentation than Motion, Munden or Roberts.7 To explore more sustained formal innovation 
that engages with the modernist tradition, however, I will look at half a dozen poems from Jorie 
Graham’s 2008 collection Sea Change, focusing on the title poem. Graham adopts a distinctive style 
of versification in the book: poems throughout begin with a line ranged left, sometimes extending 
across the width of the page but on occasion finishing before halfway. This line is followed in most 
instances by between one and nine shorter lines that keep a consistent left-hand margin about forty 
per cent of the way across the page. These are followed by another long line ranged left, then more, 
shorter lines maintaining the secondary margin at roughly two-fifths of the page width. There are 
no stanza breaks, but the long lines visually organise the poems, which extend over two or three 
pages, into loose stanzaic units. Syntax is continuous and most lines are enjambed.8  
The stretching of the gaze across the page that these first lines require as we read them, or the 
sustaining of breath when we read them aloud, make the poems provocatively rather than 
evocatively sensory. If we actively “read” the regular white space before each indented line and the 
irregular space that follows it, there is a sensation of long breaths alternating with a series of shorter 
breaths.9 The effect of moving from long lines to short is not unlike some of the transitions from 
prose to verse in The Anathemata. Graham can be read productively according to Jones’s 
methodology of reading, which he outlines in The Anathemata’s preface: ‘I intend what I have 
written to be said. […] You can’t get the intended meaning unless you hear the sound and you can’t 
get the sound unless you observe the score’ (Ana. 35).10 Graham’s principle resembles Jones’s 
because it emphasises the distinctive sonic qualities of her form, and represents an engagement with 
the material rhythms of language that she develops throughout her career. Commenting on 
Graham’s earlier work, Helen Vendler writes in The Given and the Made that the poet’s realisation of 
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 Robyn Bolam’s ‘Out of Sync Haiku’ (Feeling 16), Carrie Etter’s ‘The Weather in Normal’ (19) and Patience Agbabi’s 
‘Death by Water’ (46–7) make use of the formal conventions of haiku, pantoun and sestina respectively. As with ‘The 
Kingdom of Water is Coming’, however, these forms imply to a greater or lesser degree that climate change is a 
deviation from an existing cycle or pattern. Graham Mort’s ‘Drought’ (28–9), Harriet Tarlo’s ‘summer solstice, 
manchester UK, 2007’ (48–9) and Mario Petrucci’s ‘today i could go’ (50–1) move away from individual, lyric 
experience with more experimental forms; Petrucci’s demonstrates the influence of William Carlos Williams’s and e. e. 
cummings’s poetics, for instance. I discuss these pieces in ‘Why We Don’t Write Poetry about Climate Change’. 
8
 There is a resemblance between Graham’s poems and those of Henry Vaughan such as ‘The Morning-Watch’ and 
‘The Waterfall’ (Selected Poems, pp.77 and 159–60). Although Graham’s poems lack the rhyme and metre that 
pattern Vaughan’s, they share the latter piece’s association with flowing water. 
9
 This is reflected in Graham’s own measured performance of the poems: see for example the clip ‘Jorie Graham and 
Yusef Komunyakaa at the 92nd Street Y’, in which she reads ‘The Violinist at the Window, 1918 (after Matisse)’ from 
Sea Change (available online via YouTube). 
10
 Jones’s remarks are echoed by Bunting in the preface to the 1968 edition of his Collected Poems, when he writes: ‘I 
have set down words as a musician pricks his score, not to be read in silence, but to trace in the air a pattern of 
sound’ (Complete 21). 
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‘a primacy of the material over the spiritual’ is marked by her making ‘form mirror the unstoppable 
avalanche of sensations and the equal avalanche of units of verbal consciousness responding to 
those sensations’ (106). The result is that ‘Formally speaking, “smooth,” uninterrupted, 
unproblematic narration can no longer, for Graham, represent experience, which is forever 
probing, tentative’ (112). This corresponds with Jones’s ‘groping syntax’ towards representation 
(Ana. 49). 
While Graham’s work has increasingly tended towards a ‘probing, tentative’ structure in 
Vendler’s reading, the particular form sustained throughout Sea Change is original to the collection, 
an innovation that enables various effects. In the title poem, with which the collection opens (Sea 
Change 3–5), this form signifies an uncontainable meteorological potency and agency: 
 
One day: stronger wind than anyone expected. Stronger than 
ever before in the recording 
of such. Un- 
natural says the news. Also the body says it. Which part of the body—I look 
down, can 
feel it, yes, don’t know 
where. […]  
 
Against the strength of the wind, the force of which is suggested in a blowing-back of sense at the 
first few line breaks, the poem asserts a sense of containment through human narrative. The 
opening ‘One day’ is the poem’s indication of its fictive quality, a “once upon time” whose 
abbreviation communicates urgency. Our need for framing discourses is reinforced by more explicit 
reference to ‘the recording’ of weather data and ‘the news’ that interprets it. Notably, these occur 
prior to a tacked-on sensory confirmation, ‘Also the body says it’. The priority of media over 
physical experience signals the ubiquity of discourse in our construction of the world. It represents 
a marked contrast to Wordsworth’s encounter with the wind early in The Prelude as his weather 
instigates a sympathetic internal response: ‘For I, methought, while the sweet breath of heaven / 
Was blowing on my body, felt within / A correspondent breeze’ (1850 Prel. I.33–5), which itself 
transforms the classical invocation of the muse into inspirational meteorological phenomenon. 
Graham’s versification in these lines confirms that our accounts of weather are only contingent and 
provisional: the forced enjambment of ‘Un- / natural’ signifies the effort to which we must go to 
maintain the dualism of unnatural and natural, while the break after ‘don’t know’ enacts the failure 
to locate sensation by holding ‘where’ back until the start of the next line. 
 Graham’s use of form, then, enacts a tension between uncontainable material phenomena and 
the human attempt to contain them.11 Where Motion begins ‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’ with a pastoral 
moment of stillness, the momentum of Graham’s poem prevents such calm.  
 
                                                          
11
 Vendler notes that the wind serves a similar function in Graham’s ‘Of Forced Sightes and Trusty Ferefulness’ (Dream 
of the Unified Field 95–6), where irregular stanzas show how ‘the poet attempts to join her law of song […] to the 
unstoppable destructive hurry of the cosmic wind’ (Given 114). 
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[…] And how the future 
takes shape 
too quickly. The permanent is ebbing. Is leaving 
nothing in the way of 
trails, they are blown over, grasses shoot up, life disturbing life, […] 
 
The enjambed lines create breaks where we do not syntactically expect them, at the same time 
forcing us to read through them to enact the sense of a future ‘taking shape’ too quickly for us to 
control. In several instances, there is a jarring shift in sense or tone; ‘how the future / takes shape’ 
by itself reads with a sense of contented observation, but the words ‘too quickly’ snatch that 
moment from us. Meanwhile, ‘leaving’ shifts from intransitive to transitive verb over the line break, 
only for its object to be ‘nothing’. The processes of nature cannot be contained by form or syntax. 
The attempt to do so simply prompts further change: 
[…] & it 
fussing all over us like a confinement gone 
insane, blurring the feeling of 
the state of  
being. Which did exist just yesterday, calm and 
true. Like the right to 
privacy— […] 
 
Conventional categories are exceeded by the enjambed lines. As a result, the insistence that a ‘calm 
and / true’ state ‘did exist just yesterday’ reads as another projection of human order rather than as 
an affirmation of former certainties, further undermined by its improbable precision.  
Graham’s subsequent comparison of this calmness with ‘the right to / privacy’ thus casts doubt 
on its validity too. The ‘right’ represents a public assertion of individual selfhood, but this is also 
subject to the same tension that characterises human understanding of natural processes. The 
attempt to contain or delimit selfhood engenders disorder: ‘a confinement gone / insane’. The 
poem pursues this tension between human conceptualisation and the phenomena that outrun it, 
because the phenomena’s excess incite a human will to order them. Graham even alludes to our 
process of reading in this regard later in the poem, with the ‘huge breaths passing to and fro 
between the unkind blurrings’. The bodily rhythm of breathing is at odds with the length of the 
unpunctuated line, while the ‘blurrings’ are ‘unkind’ because they complicate the distinction 
between different kinds, the categories of human and natural.  
In ‘Sustainable This, Sustainable That’, Stacy Alaimo quotes Graham’s lines beginning ‘And how 
the future / takes shape / too quickly’ to take up discussion of human failure to impose order on 
the world. Alaimo comments that these lines ‘evoke anxiety about unpredictable futures that arrive 
too soon, in need of repair. The abrupt departure of a sense of permanence may provoke the desire 
to arrest change, to shore up solidity, to make things, systems, standards of living “sustainable.”’ 
(558). In ‘shoring up’, Alaimo suggests that we make an Eliotic attempt to patch together fragments 
that sustain our view of the world and our position in it. In Graham’s poem, by contrast, this 
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process of artifice is absolute rather than fragmentary, but it has become a performance we cannot 
direct – her participles carry us forward, ‘submerging us, / making of the fields, the trees, a cast of 
characters in an / unnegotiable / drama’.12 The attempt to perpetuate human forms of 
understanding and negotiation of the world, as in this instance drama, puts us into the position of 
acknowledging what Alaimo calls ‘The human-centered discourses of sustainability’ (452). The term 
‘sustainable’ is more conventionally associated with concern for the nonhuman world and its 
phenomena, but Alaimo points up here its self-serving quality. Graham shares this understanding, 
emphasising emotional rather than environmental states in her gloss: ‘Also sustained, as in a hatred 
of / a thought, or a vanity that comes upon one out of / nowhere’ (author’s italics). 
Graham’s preoccupation with human attempts to preserve an anthropocentrically defined world 
is sustained throughout the collection. The ‘vanity’ which Graham refers to in ‘Sea Change’ is more 
explicitly the concern of ‘Belief System’ (Sea Change 45–7). This poem also opens with an indication 
of our fictive engagement with the world, and its provisional quality. ‘As a species / we dreamed. 
We used to / dream’. The qualification of tense, which until the second line break seems to be a 
continuation of sense rather than a circling of it around the same terminology, dispels the finality of 
the preceding sentence but re-affirms the loss of our capacity to dream. Part of that dream was an 
anthropocentric exceptionalism: ‘By the mind we meant / the human mind. Open and oozing with / 
inwardness’ (author’s italics). Again, the sense seems to be progressing before a line break that 
drops from ‘Open and oozing with’ to ‘inwardness’. This syntactic circularity engenders a cultural 
solipsism, where the reduction of the environment to its category in media and politics forever 
defers our implication in it:  
  
[…] —we shall put that 
off the majesty of the mind 
said, in the newspapers, walking among the blessed, 
out in the only 
lifetime anyone had—in that space—then in the space 
of what one meant by one’s 
offspring’s 
space. The future. How could it be performed by the mind became the 
question—how, this sensation called tomorrow and 
tomorrow? […] 
 
The first of the longer lines quoted here attempts to prolong an individualistic solipsism, thinking in 
terms of ‘the only / lifetime anyone had’. But the momentum of the lines and the syntactic 
continuity move from isolation, first into ‘that space’, parenthetically stalling for time, and ‘then’ on 
                                                          
12
 Graham exploits tension between form and phenomena to a greater extent than Roberts, while Motion in ‘The 
Sorcerer’s Mirror’ fits phenomena to form. In Feeling the Pressure, Carrie Etter’s pantoun ‘The Weather in Normal’ 
(19) and Patience Agbabi’s sestina ‘Death by Water’ (46) both show the formal potential for climate change poetry 
with, respectively, repeated lines or line-ending words. Such a continual reshuffling of common elements might be 
interpreted as signifying the perpetual changeability of climate, and thus avoiding the straightforward myth of a 
decline. But the pattern may also suggest a cycle invented and imposed rather than observed. A third possibility is that 
these forms signify more rigidly than Graham’s a limited textual context or environment, and the necessity of having to 
keep within bounds and recycle resources. 
188 CHAPTER 6 
into ‘the space / of what one meant by one’s / offspring’s / space. The future’. Only after we have 
attempted to formulate time as ‘space’ and a full-stop do we move into the definite ‘future’. The 
stop–start rhythm of the lines sets this hesitant attempt to manage our transition into the future 
against the forward arrow of time. But the arrival of the future prompts a further turning to human 
‘inwardness’, ‘How could it be performed by the mind became the / question’.  
The incommensurability of the future with human experience, as attested to by Tom Cohen’s 
observation that, in climate change, ‘a new network of catastrophics arrives not accessible to 
archival memory or social history alone’ (Telemorphosis xxii), is also marked in Graham’s ‘Summer 
Solstice’ (27–9): 
 
[…] how you 
cannot 
comprehend the thing you are meant 
to be looking 
for 
now, & you are weighing something you are out under the sky 
trying to feel 
the 
future, there it is now in your almost invisible 
squinting to the visible, […] 
  
In ‘Summer Solstice’ as in ‘Belief System’, Graham identifies a need for the unknown to be known 
in human terms – ‘this sensation’, ‘trying to feel’. In the questions that pattern the end of the 
passage I have quoted from ‘Belief System’, ‘How could it be performed by the mind became the / 
question—how, this sensation called tomorrow and / tomorrow?’, she addresses Ulrich Beck’s 
question about ‘the staging of global risk’ (16), doing so by using David Jones’s technique of 
repeated and reformulated interrogatives. Graham’s allusion to Macbeth (5.5.19) in ‘Belief System’, 
‘this sensation called tomorrow and / tomorrow’, suggests that our engagement with the future is 
enabled by an engagement with the ‘performance’ of the past.13 
 
Putting the past to use: Recycling modernist poetry in Sea Change 
As a poem, and throughout the book to which it gives its name, ‘Sea Change’ stages a number of 
references to the canon that help organise and inform Graham’s response to climate change. The 
title’s quotation of The Tempest, also alluded to in her poem ‘Full Fathom’ (30–1), signal her 
engagement with the future through literary tradition. In particular, she recognises the way that the 
tradition itself changes through time. In a Guardian review of the collection, M. Wynn Thomas 
remarks ‘Significantly, this volume’s title points us not to the redemptive vision of The Tempest but 
to [it] as ominously refracted through Eliot’s The Waste Land’ (3 May 2008). Graham’s adoption of 
Eliot sees a further adaptation of this tradition. 
                                                          
13
 See Macbeth (Arden Shakespeare: Second Series) 153. 
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Sea Change shares with my reading of The Waste Land a tension between the human imposition of 
order and vital, persistent material forces. When ‘the future / takes shape / too quickly’ in ‘Sea 
Change’, it is figured as ‘grasses shoot[ing] up, life disturbing life’; these echo the ‘Lilacs’ and ‘dull 
roots’ from the start of ‘The Burial of the Dead’ (Waste lines 1–3). Eliot manages to half-contain 
natural energies with the present participles that end the first three lines of his poem: ‘breeding’, 
‘mixing’ and ‘stirring’. He creates a cyclical pattern from processes that go beyond the containment 
of the line, keeping growth temporarily in check. By the twenty-first century, even this momentary 
equilibrium is impossible, and Graham’s form signifies the runaway character of natural processes. 
The force of the wind images this quality in both poems as well. In ‘A Game of Chess’, the wind 
remains beyond a door, figuring the disturbance of the narrator’s interlocutor: ‘“What is that noise 
now? What is the wind doing?” / Nothing again nothing’ (lines 119–20). As order increasingly 
disintegrates throughout The Waste Land, however, its final section is exposed to the elements, and 
we hear ‘What the Thunder Said’ rather than shutting it out. The wind in Graham’s poem 
consciously resembles Eliot’s thunder in that it cannot be shut out, and also speaks. Its voice 
refutes the claim that we are unaware of our participation in worldly phenomena: ‘consider your 
affliction says the / wind, do not plead ignorance’.  
Following Latour’s analysis in We Have Never Been Modern, our protestation of ignorance actually 
makes us complicit in change, because the imagined separation of human affairs from 
meteorological phenomena, the distinction between politics and nature, is what paradoxically 
creates hybrid, anthropogenic environments. Graham’s poem ‘Sea Change’ marks, as The Waste 
Land does, civilisation’s attempt to create a distinct “now”, a modernity that suppresses its 
contingent past. This condition is then forced to confront its own artificiality: 
 
[…] & farther and farther 
away leaks the 
past, much farther than it used to go, beating against the shutters I 
have now fastened again, the huge mis- 
understanding round me now 
so still in 
the center of this room, listening— […] 
 
In The Waste Land, the attempt to bury the past beneath ground and ice is met with the recurring 
reassertion of its presence; in Graham’s poem, the past is imagined not as the dead but as the 
weather, ‘beating against the shutters’. Nevertheless, our resistance to it is still marked by a failed 
enclosure of human domestic space apart from nature, though we respond to its ‘beating’ with 
repeated attempts to shut it out, ‘the shutters I / have now fastened again’. In the form of the ‘huge 
misunderstanding round me now’, Graham places in our contemporary climatic wasteland the ‘dirty 
house in a gutted world’ of Stevens’s ‘A Postcard from the Volcano’, with its ‘spirit storming in 
blank walls’ (Collected 129). 
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The wind in ‘Sea Change’ asks ‘consider your affliction’, and that imperative is repeated later in 
the poem: 
[…] Consider 
the body of the ocean which rises every instant into 
me, & its 
ancient e- 
vaporation, & how it delivers itself 
to me, how the world is our law, this indrifting of us 
into us, a chorusing in us of elements, […] 
 
This recalls the last line of ‘Death by Water’, which asks us to ‘Consider Phlebas’ (Waste line 321). 
Graham’s lines mark a crucial shift in emphasis from Eliot’s, however. In Eliot’s poem, ‘Consider’ 
is not attributed to a speaker, but assumes the authoritative tone of a disinterested observer. The 
instances I have cited from Graham are in contrast spoken respectively by an external ‘wind’ and by 
a seemingly autonomous ‘hissing’ thought. The tonal shift between the two poems is reflected in 
the way Graham puts a first person as object, ‘me’, at the mercy of the elements, rather than Eliot’s 
symbolic Phlebas. Graham’s key image is ‘the body of the ocean which rises every instant into / 
me’, a ‘body’ of water rather than a human corpse, marking a further breakdown in self-definition 
from the objectified Phlebas who ‘rose and fell’ in the oceanic currents. Graham brings her ‘Sea 
Change’ into personal proximity, where Eliot arranges through the use of symbol. 
The transgression of boundaries in Graham’s poetry is characterised by this trespass of the 
environmental on to the territory of the personal. There is only a versified – that is, artificial – 
boundary between ‘ocean which rises every instant into’ and ‘me’. With this attention to the 
personal, Graham enacts Alaimo’s ‘recognition not just that everything is interconnected but that 
humans are the very stuff of the material, emergent world’ (Bodily 20). Graham’s poetics before Sea 
Change already tended in a materialist direction, as Vendler indicates: ‘The self must now portray 
itself in primary matter; [...] Yet the indifference of the material universe to our fate makes us 
hesitate to appropriate the phenomena as adequate symbols of ourselves’ (Given 125; author’s 
italics). Our existence depends on water, but water’s significance exceeds this function. Graham 
creates a context where water is a signifier of multiple states, elemental and psychological, as it is in 
the poems of Eliot, Jones and Roberts. 
Sea Change’s allusions to The Tempest are further developed in Graham’s poem ‘Full Fathom’  
(30–1) to evidence a comprehensive breakdown in categories.  
 
[…] those were houses that are his eyes—those were lives that 
are his 
eyes—those are families, those are privacies, those are details—those are reparation 
agreements, summary 
judgments, those are multiplications 
on the face of the earth that are—those are the forests, the coal seams, the 
carbon sinks that are his— 
as they turn into carbon sources—his— 
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and the festering wounds that are— […] 
 
This ‘his’ could, ambiguously, refer to ‘the / upstairs neighbor you did not / protect—they took 
him / away’ mentioned earlier in ‘Full Fathom’, although a page elapses between this abduction and 
the passage quoted above. But the neighbour’s rendition from text into world – ‘he stopped reading 
and looked up / when they came in’ – is recapitulated by Graham through the fractal syntax of the 
later lines as they trace connections across scales from personal to global. She proceeds from the 
enclosing ‘houses’ to their inhabiting ‘families’, ‘privacies’ and ‘details’, to the institutional 
arrangements of ‘reparation / agreements, summary judgments’, through our ‘multiplications / on 
the face of the earth’ that lead to our impact on ‘forests’ and ‘coal seams’, and the ‘carbon sinks’ 
that we ‘turn into carbon sources’ as they exceed their capacity for storing our emissions. As in her 
poem ‘Sea Change’, Graham brings these phenomena into personal proximity with the reversal of 
Shakespeare’s formulation: ‘Those are pearls that were his eyes’ (Temp. 1.2.399)14 becomes ‘those 
were’ / ‘that are’ in ‘Full Fathom’. The listed phenomena are then rooted in an experiencing 
subject, ‘his eyes’, to become a vision of human entanglement, through society, with ‘carbon sinks’ 
and ‘carbon sources’. But Graham’s reversal is also a rhetorically effective way of directing 
environmental responsibility towards a symbolic individual: ‘they turn into carbon sources—his’. If 
these instances of ‘his’ indeed refer back to the removed neighbour, then the poem also suggests a 
domestic complicity in neglecting the chain of environmental consequence she has traced. Rather 
than ‘protect him’, the ‘you’ accused by the narrator ‘went on with your / day’ as the abduction 
took place. 
To stress the physical implication of human beings in the climate, Graham also redeploys The 
Waste Land in the poem ‘Positive Feedback Loop’. One of Eliot’s key symbols is used by Graham 
to freight contemporary personal experience with the environmental processes that are beyond our 
grasp, both physically and mentally, when she invites us to use his ‘handful of dust’ (Waste line 30) 
as a tactile model for ocean circulation. She makes the dust’s original spiritual connotations 
materially manifest. The awkwardness of the transition from one element to another, from ‘dust’ to 
‘water’, is suggested by the instruction ‘try to’: 
 
In Hell they empty your hands of sand, they tell you to refill them with dust and try 
to hold in mind the North Atlantic Deep Water 
which also contains  
contributions from the Labrador Sea and entrainment of other water masses, try to hold a 
complete collapse, in the North Atlantic Drift, in the 
thermohaline circulation, this 
will happen, […] 
 
The lines run across the page in a manner that demonstrates the difficulty of being able to follow 
the instruction ‘to hold [them] in mind’ as we have done in the hand. Terms such as ‘thermohaline 
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 Ariel’s song (1.2.396–403) can be found in The Tempest (Rev. ed., Arden Shakespeare: Third Series) 200. 
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circulation’, or ‘convective chimneys’ used earlier in the poem, make a more deliberate attempt to 
get to grips with the physical phenomena of climate, rather than depending on polar tropes. At the 
same time the conceptually difficult, ‘try / to hold in mind’, becomes what is physically impossible, 
‘try to hold a / complete collapse’, as the sequence of clauses edges further away from the initial 
imperative, eliding ‘in mind’ to reflect the elusiveness of even a few named climatic phenomena. 
The placement of the technical terms, neither glossed nor anticipated, exemplifies what Michael H. 
Whitworth, in ‘“Strange Synthetic Perfumes”’, calls ‘the aesthetics of discordance and difficulty […] 
a poetics wherein legitimate effects can be worked through the non-assimilation (or partial 
assimilation) of materials into the poem’ (99). In Graham’s poem, the introduction of the terms 
furnishes a scientific context by gesturing at the oceanic and atmospheric mechanisms that 
participate in climate. Because these terms are not assimilated into the poem, though, they create a 
necessary poetic and conceptual difficulty. 
Another sequence of imagery in Sea Change can be productively read in response to the 
modernist canon to tease out the implications of the entanglement of human sense with climate. 
‘Full Fathom’ opens in a coastal context with the lines:  
 
& sea swell, hiss of incomprehensible flat: distance: blue long-fingered ocean and its 
nothing else: nothing in the above visible except 
water: water and 
always the white self-destroying bloom of wavebreak &, upclose 
roil, & 
here, on what’s left of land, 
ticking of stays against empty flagpoles, low tide, free day […] 
 
The sea’s ‘incomprehensible’ hiss, and its aerial complement of ‘nothing […] except water’ signal 
the difficulty faced by human interpretative systems in engaging with the world. By describing the 
‘hiss’ as ‘incomprehensible’, Graham suggests we conceive of the tidal noise as something that 
should be amenable to understanding, while by failing to find anything other than water ‘visible’, we 
are forced to identify the absence as ‘nothing’, as in Stevens’s ‘The Snow Man’. The world’s 
intractability persists in the poem’s deferral of syntactic closure. The repetition of colons and 
ampersands in these lines continues throughout the poem, which is also strung through with  
em-dashes to put off a full-stop until the end of the final line. As a result, the poem accumulates as 
reformulated statements, stacking up repeated attempts to engage with the world, from which 
narratives emerge hesitantly and divergently. The intellectual grapple to express the sea’s ineffability 
revisits the theme of Bunting’s Ode 3 and more particularly, in its continued recapitulation of 
engagement, Stevens’s ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’ (see Chapter 4, pp.134–6 of this thesis).  
 In the latter poem (Collected 105–6), Stevens acknowledges that the sea has an ineffable identity, 
a ‘genius’, ‘beyond’ which the singer sings, and though she is ‘the single artificer of the world’, it is 
only the ‘world / In which she sang’, a solipsism enacted with his line break. The tension between 
‘The maker’s rage to order’ and ‘the words of the sea’ persists throughout the poem, which ends 
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with its narrator straining to hear ‘Words of the fragrant portals’ and ‘ghostlier demarcations, 
keener sounds’. In contrast, the sea’s noise in ‘Full Fathom’ is ‘incomprehensible’, while in ‘Sea 
Change’ Graham can only find ‘syllables untranscribable’. The sea is beyond human description, 
rather than involved in Stevens’s dialectic of imaginative and phenomenal experience. Where 
Stevens worries away at the human ‘rage to order’, Graham asks us to ‘Consider’ in ‘Sea Change’ 
‘how the world is our law’. Our response to this must be ironic or parodic. The ‘world is our law’ 
not because of our rage for order, but because its present state, the Anthropocene or McKibben’s 
end of nature, results from our intentional interventions in the environment and their unintended 
consequences. Science has discovered ‘laws’ by which nature works, but we have failed as a 
civilisation to realise their implications, instead assuming that knowing them amounts to mastery.  
Graham communicates our own material contingency by describing water as ‘a chorusing in us 
of elements’ in ‘Sea Change’. The metaphor is a reversal of the personification of the world as a self 
through song in ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’: ‘when she sang, the sea, / Whatever self it had, 
became the self / That was her song’. Graham is closer to Bunting in Ode 3 in making the human 
entirely contingent on the sea for its identity. The terminology of music that runs through Sea 
Change, such as this ‘choursing in us’, or ‘Who is one when one calls oneself / one? An orchestra 
dies down’ (‘Positive Feedback Loop’) and ‘The dead gods […] turn the page for / us. The score 
does not acknowledge / the turner of / pages’ (‘Belief System’), figure the self as one of many in a 
concerted musical effort. Like the orchestra, humanity can create a harmonious, if transitory and 
imaginative, world. The extension of the musical image across separate poems enacts that context 
of mutual and multiple creation. It takes the effort of a collective, however, rather than Stevens’s 
solitary singer, to create this fictive harmony.15 When we revert to the conception of ourselves as 
individuals, the orchestral effect goes unrecognised: the individualism of ‘calling oneself one’ in the 
former example means the music ‘dies down’. Having shown individualism to be implicated in 
environmental change throughout the book, Graham intimates that we aggravate that change when 
we behave as individuals, rather than engaging with it through an orchestral understanding of 
human behaviour. 
In ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’, Stevens proposes that music is our best attempt to engage 
with the world, but because the world always exceeds our songs of it, we are required to 
recapitulate these engagements. Graham uses parataxis to recapitulate her projections of the 
imagination in ‘Full Fathom’; and in ‘Sea Change’ this repetitive syntax allows her to pursue 
environmental consequences:  
 
 […] wonder is also what 
pours from us when, in the 
coiling, at the very bottom of 
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 Although singing alone, the singer in ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’ is not solitary because Stevens-as-narrator and 
‘Ramon Fernandez’ are also present. The narrator’s mediation of her song is another instance of what George 
Bornstein describes as ‘double consciousness’ (198). 
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the food 
chain, sprung 
from undercurrents, warming by 1 degree, the in- 
dispensable 
plankton is forced north now, & yet farther north, 
spawning too late for the cod larvae hatch, such 
that the hatch will not survive, nor the 
species in the end, in the right-now forever un- 
interruptible slowing of the gulf 
stream, […]  
 
The line breaks signify human imposition on the flow of environmental process, the only way in 
which we can render the ‘indispensable’ dispensable, or the ‘uninterruptible’ interruptible. The 
emphatic momentum of these lines signals the processes that drive through them, so when Graham 
invokes ‘undercurrents, warming by 1 degree,’ we cannot linger on them but proceed directly to 
their effect. As these lines see the only deployment of conventional climate change terminology in 
‘Sea Change’, occurring some fifty lines into the piece, Graham signals a context for the poem 
without topicalising it. Instead, she concentrates on following the implications of climate change in 
the use of form. Climate change is thus something that demands our consideration because is 
entangled in all of our other concerns, not something separable from them. 
As the poem ‘Sea Change’ draws to a close, it marks a movement from environmental to 
personal. Graham writes ‘so that I, speaking in this wind today, out loud in it, to no one, am 
suddenly / aware / of having written my poems, I feel it in / my useless / hands’. Such a 
concentration into natural observation and bodily experience is a strategy that marks several of the 
poems I’ve discussed; ‘Summer Solstice’, for example, closes with the image of a dove alighting in 
an acacia, ‘making its nest again this year […] as if all time / came down to this’. The conditional ‘as 
if’ here marks the fictive quality of the resolution. In ‘Sea Change’, the fiction is intentional human 
agency itself, the individual rendered powerless by ‘useless hands’. The poem instead subtly insists 
that there are other creative agencies at work, in the form of the wind and water; hence the writing 
process has been unconscious, and the narrator is ‘suddenly aware of having written [her] poems’.16 
The invocation of the act and context of composition is, as I have shown, an ecocritical trope 
rehearsed by Lawrence Buell and Timothy Morton (see Chapter 1, pp.23, 44–5). But Graham’s 
poem differs because rather than describing her surroundings, she gives them a voice: ‘quicken / 
me further says this new wind’. The verb dramatises the process of ‘quickening’ as bringing to life 
in language, but also implies human responsibility for accelerating and intensifying weather 
patterns, and their ‘uninterruptible’ course. Graham shares Kerridge’s recognition that ‘Lyric poetry 
that uses an “I” persona also has difficulty with these perspectives, having to bring them within the 
                                                          
16
 Graham’s setting is reminiscent of Ariel ‘glad he had written his poems’ in Stevens’s ‘The Planet on the Table’ 
(Collected 450). There is a comparable attempt to represent climate change as occurring in the context of writing in Jo 
Shapcott’s ‘Composition’: ‘the tea cups / wanted washing and the Gulf Stream / was slowing and O my hips / ached 
from sitting’. Shapcott’s poem seeks a more lyrical than experimental reconciliation with the phenomena, however, in 
its emplaced movement from its first lines, ‘And I sat among the dust motes, my pencil / (blue) sounding loud on the 
page,’ to its last, ‘and then there was this’ (Of Mutability 51). 
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frame of a dramatized personal consciousness’ (‘Ecocriticism’ 8). As a result she includes but does 
not centre the poem around such a persona. ‘Sea Change’ also makes a Stevensian 
acknowledgement of the limitations of lyric selfhood, because that self is characterised by its 
repeated failure to manage the world.  
The narrator of ‘Sea Change’ makes a final attempt at order, as with her earlier re-closing of the 
window shutters, but the world is beyond her control. The wind observes ‘your / best young / tree, 
which you have come outside to stake again’. Like Motion in ‘The Sorcerer’s Mirror’, Graham 
returns to her garden at the end of the poem, having situated it in a problematic global climate. 
However, her formal innovation marks a much stronger attempt to ‘Consider’ the implications of 
climate change than simply re-arranging its tropes in traditional verse structures, as Motion did. 
Motion turns away from the environment as his narrator returns to the house at the end of his 
poem, but Graham situates a pointed example of such turning away in its environmental context in 
‘Positive Feedback Loop’: ‘us in The Great Dying again, the time in which life on earth is all but 
wiped out / again—we must be patient—we must wait—it is a / lovely evening, a bit of food a bit 
of drink’. The bathetic movement from extinction to dining arrangements communicates both the 
simultaneity of everyday living and ecological collapse and the ineffectualism of the sensual lyric self 
in that context. In ‘Ecology as Text, Text as Ecology’, Morton describes ‘The gratifying illusion of 
immersion in a lifeworld provides yet another way to hold out against the truth of global warming’ 
(10). The poems of Sea Change pursue the recognition of Graham’s earlier work, where, Vendler 
writes, ‘The instabilities of matter must now be assumed by the self; and so any poem spoken in the 
voice of the material self must be an unstable poem, constantly engaged in linguistic processes of 
approximation. The material self is limited, and must enact that limitation’ (Given 128–9). 
 
‘No Long Way Round’  
The final poem of Sea Change, ‘No Long Way Round’ (54–6), marks some subtle departures from 
the form that characterises the other poems. The syntax still circles and qualifies, ‘Evening. Not 
quite. High winds again’, but the full-stops make it terser than the earlier pieces. This evokes the 
resistance and stop–start pace of there being ‘No Long Way Round’, connoting our need to live 
through what is coming rather than evading it. In this context, Graham explicitly confronts the 
paucity of prior meaning-making systems, recognising their obsolescence in the context of a 
changing climate:  
[…] We 
liked 
the feeling 
of it—truth—whatever we meant by it—I can still 
feel it in my gaze, tonight, long after it is gone, that finding of all the fine discriminations […] 
 
The ‘finding of […] discriminations’ echoes Stevens’s lines in ‘Variations on a Summer Day’ that 
‘The difference between air / and sea exists by grace alone’ (Collected 215). 
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A more striking formal divergence from the pattern of the rest of the book demonstrates what it 
means to live without these ‘fine discriminations’. In two passages of the poem, the verse clumps 
into a pair of paragraphs resembling prose. The first of these reads: 
 
[…] It is an emergency actually, this waking and doing and 
cleaning-up afterwards, & then sleep again, & then up you go, the whole 15,000 years of 
the inter- 
glacial period, & the orders and the getting done &  
the getting back in time and the turning it back on, & did you remember, did you pass, did 
you lose the address again, didn’t the machine spit it up, did you follow the machine— […] 
 
The day-to-day routines are already described as an ‘emergency’, but their rhythm carries us 
through the verse paragraph, ‘waking and doing’. The transition represents Frederick Buell’s titular 
movement From Apocalypse to Way of Life, as the discourse of ‘emergency’, or indeed, crisis, becomes 
normalised in the everyday. Graham builds up momentum in the first verse-paragraph before 
suspending it in the elongated line break. Should we mark that gap with silence, it reminds us of the 
brevity of the current interglacial;17 if we instead mark it by holding the reading breath, we realise 
the physical difficulty of even one unspoken line. In either event, the effect reminds us of our 
physical implication in the world. Graham’s resumption with a further prose-like stanza creates an 
illusion that things are close to normal, but the interruption serves to render the contingency of our 
quotidian lives. 
As with the preceding poems, ‘No Long Way Round’ draws in with a moment of lyrical 
meditation. 
 
[…] You have your imagination, says the evening. It is all you have 
left, but its neck is open, the throat is 
cut, you have not forgotten how to sing, or to want 
to sing. It is 
strange but you still 
need to tell 
your story— […] 
 
The image of the cut throat is more violent than any of Stevens’s; nevertheless, it doubly affirms, as 
his poems do, a failure to articulate an imagination that is adequate to the world, and our continual 
drive to employ it in our engagements with that world anyway, the ‘need to tell / your story’. 
Graham shows how that ‘story’ is confined to its profoundly human significance, because it 
comprises 
 
[…] how you met, the coat one wore, the shadow of which war, and how it lifted, 
how peace began again 
                                                          
17
 Graham’s 15,000-year time frame for this is at odds with the 10–12,000-year period I have suggested earlier in the 
thesis. If nothing else, this variation indicates the range of scientific theories about the duration of our window for 
civilisation, without denying that civilisation depends on it. 
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for that part of 
the planet, & the first Spring after your war, & how “life” began again, what 
normal was—thousands of times 
you want to say this—normal— […] 
 
The story begins personally, and even when it attempts to broach a more global scale it tries to 
contain it, at first with ‘the coat’, then limiting it to ‘that part of the planet’ and ‘your war’, the  
self-consciousness of what constitutes “life” – which echoes the underground stirrings of spring in 
The Waste Land, written in ‘the shadow of’ its own ‘war’ – and finally the desperation to restate 
normality. If our fictions remain local, however, then they end with us. Our definitions and 
declarations will be meaningless, as the final lines of Graham’s poem remind us: ‘there are sounds 
the planet will always make, even / if there is no one to hear them.’ 
 
Conclusion 
Climate changes it all: Ecocriticism reads modernism, modernism 
reads ecocriticism 
 
This thesis began by considering a particular climate change poem and reflecting on the traditions it 
invoked. My introduction identified a Romantic vision of nature that has characterised the poetry of 
environmental emergency, and at the same time limited that poetry’s ability to engage intellectually 
with climate change because it is at odds with the hybrid material and cultural phenomena. The 
persistence of natural harmony as a trope in contemporary writing prompted my recognition of two 
under-researched themes in environmental literary criticism: first, the discipline’s limited coverage 
of climate change; and second, the high modernist writing that ‘the ecocritical tradition has largely 
ignored’ (Holmes 6).  
I argued in my first chapter that the first oversight is the result of early ecocriticism’s selective 
misreading of Romanticism, which emphasises Romantics’ topical concern with physical, emplaced 
Nature rather than the extensive character of our entanglement in wider nonhuman phenomena. 
This tendency is exacerbated by second-wave ecocriticism’s concentration on texts with explicitly 
environmentalist themes, what Lawrence Buell calls ‘toxic discourse’ (Writing 30), however broadly 
their scope is defined. By valorising wild nature and the socio-political category of the 
“environment”, respectively, the first and second waves of the discipline have been unable to 
engage convincingly with the radically hybridised and unsituated phenomena of anthropogenic 
climate change.  
Consideration of modernist literature, then, can do more than simply make good an ecocritical 
oversight, because by rereading it we can respond to the limitations of the first and second waves, 
as I began to argue in my second chapter. In terms of first-wave preoccupation with the wild, the 
modernist poets I have studied engage more incisively with the Romantic tradition in their creative 
interrogation of it than do those critics seeking to recover Romanticism for a paradigm of our 
relation with nature. This is because modernist poets, in particular Wallace Stevens and Basil 
Bunting, are concerned with the way that relation alters over time, rather than nostalgically making 
it a locus to restore us to an idyllic wild world. Our understandings of nature are drastically 
modified by the complexities and contingencies of urban living as these intensify in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, and these processes are addressed in the poems of both Bunting and T. S. 
Eliot. They bear witness to the strain that the city, as an embodiment of civilisation and capitalism, 
places on the relation with nonhuman phenomena, and how human culture cannot resist the 
materially deleterious effects of exacerbated natural change. Yet David Jones’s imaginative scope in 
The Anathemata shows that we needn’t reject Romanticism out of hand when considering  
twentieth-century poetics; rather, that we need to situate it in a context problematised by  
nineteenth- and twentieth-century scientific findings. Because modernist writing occurs at a 
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historical moment between Romanticism and ecological emergency, the traces of literary past and 
climatic future are entangled and exposed in its work.  
There is also a second benefit in rereading modernism from an ecocritical perspective, because it 
continues the second-wave expansion of ecocriticism’s canon of consideration. By tackling texts 
not topically related to environmental crisis, we begin to understand how far our patterns of 
thought have to alter if we are to confront the full implications of climate change. As John 
Lanchester indicates: ‘I suspect we’re reluctant to think about it [climate change] because we’re 
worried that if we start we will have no choice but to think about nothing else’ (3). Reading climate 
change into the preserve of canonical modernism shows how extensively climate change can 
destabilise our patterns of thinking. This is concomitant with a recognition that contemporary 
climate change, as an exemplar of anthropogenic environmental intervention, is entangled with all 
our cultural practices: it cannot be reduced to its iterations in the topical discourses of politics or 
environmentalism, neither, entirely, to its scientific models or analyses. Not only the causes but the 
effects of climate change are entangled in human practice, and by entertaining those consequences 
in climatic fictions we can develop the imaginative resources that will inform our cultural adaptation. 
My analysis of modernist work has doubly illuminated the poetry itself, by supplying a new 
theoretical context, and ecocriticism, by taking it out of preconceived zones of relevance. Modernist 
poetics has particular further value in the consideration of climate change because it enables us to 
read the increasing complexity of unsituated environmental risk identified in the sociology of Bruno 
Latour and Ulrich Beck, as further discussed in Chapter 2. Modernism’s engagement with 
burgeoning globalism is evident in Eliot’s and Bunting’s metropolises, in Stevens’s multiply situated 
visions of ‘The Planet on the Table’ and in the temporal and geographical scope of The Anathemata. 
The more innovative and open forms employed in much of this work can be read as expressing an 
understanding of human implication in forces beyond our ordering or control, forces which are yet 
sensitive to our interference. Even the formally cautious Stevens is elliptically restive in his poems 
and refuses to endorse a stable sense of self or of the world. The modernist use of motif 
accentuates the resonance of the objective particular within the abstract general, attuning our 
imaginations to the environmental significance of our individual experiences. As such, they give 
expression to the theoretical tenets of material ecocriticism. The poetry becomes various sites of 
interaction between intentional and unintentional agencies – cultural and phenomenal, conscious 
and unconscious, authorial and futural. By not being topicalisations of “environmental crisis”, the 
work can explore the forces and principles that contribute to its emergence across the twentieth 
century, rather than its symptoms. The work’s reception in a changed climate also marks its material 
persistence, its resistance to determination by the criteria of historical context, as an aesthetic 
modelling of unintentional phenomena. 
Scope remains for a more historicist reading of the modernists’ own understandings of and 
engagements with ecology, which I have not sought to explore. Although I have referred to the 
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weather’s bearing on The Waste Land and The Anathemata’s engagement with Darwinism, as well as 
to Jonathan Bate’s discussion of Stevens and Bunting, a comprehensive ecocritical contextualisation 
of modernism has still to be written. Such an account might build on the work of Alexandra Harris 
in Romantic Moderns (2010) to explore the relevance of the landscape and engagements with nature 
for the canonical writing of the early to mid-twentieth century. What instead I have been 
developing in this thesis is a modernist ecocriticism, reading the discipline through the poetics that 
began to emerge one hundred years ago. My re-interrogation of key modernist texts in a 
contemporary context has thus brought out different qualities of the hybrid phenomena of climate 
change. The plethora of responses reflects our multiple vectors of entanglement with the 
phenomena, and the range of agendas or fictions to which we assimilate it, according to Mike 
Hulme’s mythography of climate change (340–55). I now summarise my analyses. 
In the second part of Chapter 2, I argued that, as the repressed past haunts The Waste Land, 
anthropogenic climate change has a similarly troubling presence today. It represents an 
accumulation of unresolved consequences from the emissions sidelined by civilisation, and more 
intensively in the industrial age. Climate change’s material manifestation is a challenge to human 
presumptions of rational order, and throughout The Waste Land the contingency of civilisation on 
the earth is repeatedly demonstrated. The situation of the poem on a faultline between seasonal 
renewal and cataclysm – indeed, seasonal renewal as cataclysm – prefigures our present uncertainty 
about future terrestrial conditions. Text and phenomena both break down previous certainties and 
expose the multiple agencies at work in shaping metaphorical and literal climates, as per Latour’s 
actor-network-theory. 
Once the fallacy of human intentionality is revealed, our actions are situated in a wider context, 
which Eliot figures mythologically. In Wallace Stevens’s work, which I analysed in Chapter 3, 
mythology is more unassumingly branded ‘fiction’, but that fiction is still necessary to establish the 
limit of the terms by which we understand the world. Climate resists determination by any 
individual context so it demands a way of writing that simultaneously questions the world and itself, 
as Stevens’s does. His poems are engagements with the imagination, and engagements with the 
world through the imagination. The added charge of rereading Stevens’s work today is that 
civilisation has worked from an assumption that he and Eliot challenged – that is, the sufficiency of 
human understanding to match and master material force – and we have intervened physically, if 
impalpably, in the phenomenal world. Stevens persists in telling us that we need poems of our 
climate to engage with that climate, but that these poems remain provisional fictions because 
natural forces perennially exceed human accounts of them. 
The dispersal of selfhood in Briggflatts and the doubly distinctive and typical quality of individual 
figures in The Anathemata offer ways of reading that more complex situation of intentional, 
individual activity within multiple, expanding scales and contexts, according to the criteria of 
material ecocriticism. As I discussed in my fourth chapter, Bunting’s work charts the diminution of 
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organising accounts of selfhood in response to environmental upheavals. The discrepancy that 
Stevens identifies between imagination and phenomena becomes in Bunting the zone in which 
natural forces operate, transgressing conceptual, spatial and temporal boundaries. Human action is 
seen to be just one agency among forces on numerous scales, from the grounded rat and slowworm 
to the life-cycles of stars. When humanity neglects these other scales and seeks to maintain the 
transgressed boundaries, it exacerbates a universal tendency towards entropy by failing to recognise 
the shadows of its rationalised economies. 
I argued in Chapter 5 that Jones’s Anathemata makes these shadows and implications central to 
its poetics, with each of its motifs resonating gratuitously across the work. Through the eponymous 
concept, Jones attends to that which humans set aside as having more than physical significance, 
but being doubly inflected these anathemata also entail a recognition of negative implication, with 
which we must contend. Jones is cognisant of this in his fractal organisation of seasonal time in the 
work, which enables it to entertain futures beyond civilisation as well as its preconditions. The 
poet’s decentring of humanity from the history of the earth achieves on an epic scale what Bunting 
does for Romantic selfhood, by exposing civilisation’s sensitivity to its terrestrial environment. The 
divine displaces the human as the culmination of The Anathemata; but the emergence of climate 
change gives us grounds for a further displacement of the divine by the environmental in our 
reading of the work. Jones’s aesthetic emphasis on environmental contingency means The 
Anathemata can be read fractally with ‘Rite and Fore-Time’ rather than Christ’s incarnation as 
establishing its themes, to present the possibility that progress is no more than an atheistic theology 
of history, with humans taking the place of the divine. Without the reassuring mythology of 
scientism, we cannot depend on our place in or ability to impose order on the world. 
These readings together represent three qualities of my ecocritical account of modernism: first, 
modernist work offers a fuller and more engaged reading of Romantic relations with nature as they 
are altered in the industrial era than does first-wave ecocriticism; second, a consideration of this 
work moves ecocriticism beyond its reliance on texts that are concerned with nature or 
environment as topics, providing it with greater nuance and unexpected insights; and third, it offers 
us a way of reading our environmental entanglements as they become increasingly complex with 
anthropogenic climate change. There is one further quality a reading of modernism then offers, 
which I have explored in my sixth chapter: specifically, that is, how modernism represents an 
alternative, unconsidered tradition for the writing of environmental entanglement, a modernist 
poetics of climate change. I have begun to trace the implications of my critical findings in the 
twenty-first-century poetry that responds thematically to climate change, arguing that modernist 
poetics provides a valuable way of tracing the complexities of climate change and resisting its 
reduction to a collection of tropes. I contend that neo-modernist modes enable poetry to engage 
with the extent and difficulty of climate change phenomena. However, poetry still needs to consider 
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and respond to other modes to resist Robert Crawford’s charge that incorporating scientific 
phenomena into poetry 
 
can be presented as an avant-garde strategy, but also a ghetto strategy which assumes an almost 
apartheid-like divide between our scientific age and earlier ages, between our sense of being 
human and theirs, so that our ‘post-human’ information age is held […] in absolute opposition 
to traditional lyric and so to stand apart from all but a carefully filtered version of the history of 
modernism (‘Poetry, Science’ 74). 
 
Further work remains to be done in this regard, and most helpful would be a comprehensive survey 
of climate change poetry to ascertain the full range of modes deployed; this could be modelled on 
the survey of climate change in Anglophone novels conducted by Adam Trexler and Adeline  
Johns-Putra, ‘Climate Change in Literature and Literary Criticism’ (2011). They comment that they 
are ‘deal[ing] here with climate change in fiction, as, although [they] anticipate that there will be 
more research on poetry and plays about climate change, thus far there does not seem to have been 
much work in these areas’ (186). In the course of researching this thesis, I have made an initial 
survey of such poems, presented in Chapter 6, and I would welcome the opportunity to expand on 
this with a more thoroughgoing analysis. 
At the last, we should bear in mind that climate change is not simply the transition from one 
fixed state to another but a continuous process, exacerbated in the past few centuries by human 
activity. The readings I have made in this thesis will therefore be themselves subject to change. 
Indeed, accommodating this process of change should be constitutive of ecocriticism, on Richard 
Kerridge’s analysis: 
 
Ecocritical responsibility consists in accepting that the existence of a large expert majority for a 
view constitutes a form of probability that the view is correct—the only form of probability a 
non-scientist ecocritic can scrupulously acknowledge. If the majority view changes, then the 
ecocritic has a responsibility to change accordingly, without needing to feel guilty of previous 
misjudgement, since to do so would imply a capacity to make expert judgements upon the data 
(‘Ecocriticism’ 5). 
 
Kerridge’s remarks can help us distinguish the role and responsibility of a climate change criticism 
from a climate change poetics. My readings here are necessarily contingent on the network of 
critical and scientific understandings contemporary to the researching of the thesis, and these will 
change with time, as Kerridge observes. As a work of criticism, this thesis is an act of explication 
and interpretation, communicating my particular understanding. It is therefore designed to have 
clarity and to eschew connotation for denotation, so it is contingent on the climate of criticism and 
research that produced it.  
The poetics of climate change, however, consists in both the poetry and climate change, the 
hybrid that the two terms represent. In these are entangled the forces and phenomena, and 
criticism’s respective task remains, in Hulme’s words ‘to reveal the creative, psychological, ethical 
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and spiritual work that climate change is doing for us’ (326). Climate change poems must be 
abstract enough to change with the climate, outrunning critical pronouncements on them as the 
phenomena themselves do. The poems I have studied, along with those that are being and have yet 
to be written, will then remain articulations or sites of interaction between the forces described, 
exposing the networks of agency, and making legible the entangled processes of climate change. 
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